JUDGMENT : This is an appeal filed under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging conviction and sentence imposed on the accused in S.C(NDPS).No.7 of 2005 on the file of the Special N.D.P.S Court, Thodupuzha dated 05.08.2006. Appellant is the sole accused in the above case, where State of Kerala represented by the Public Prosecutor is the respondent. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Public Prosecutor. 3. Prosecution case in nut shell is as under: In this matter, the Sub Inspector of Police received information as to possession of ganja at the residential place of the accused and accordingly he had searched the residence of the accused in the presence of the accused on 30.07.2005 at 6.20 a.m and 31.5 kg of ganja was recovered. Accordingly, the accused was nabbed and crime No.118/2005 alleging commission of offence under Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as `NDPS Act' for short) was registered. On investigation, charge laid against the accused. 4. On appearance of the accused before the special court, after completing pre-trial formalities, charge alleging commission of offence under Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act was framed and read over to the accused, to which he pleaded not guilty. As a sequel, the Special Court tried the matter. During trial, PWs 1 to 9 were examined and Exts.P1 and P21 were marked. MO1 to MO11 series were also marked. 5. The accused was questioned under Section 313(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C and the incriminating circumstances in evidence brought to his notice and his explanation was recorded. Thereafter Exts.B1 and B2 were marked on the side of the accused. 6. The learned Special Judge appraised the evidence after hearing both sides and finally found that the accused was guilty for the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act, thereby he was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years and to pay fine of Rs.1 lakh and in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one more year, while granting set off. 7. The above conviction and sentence are put under challenge in this appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant pointed out a pertinent legal question in this case regarding non compliance of Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act. 7. The above conviction and sentence are put under challenge in this appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant pointed out a pertinent legal question in this case regarding non compliance of Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act. It is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that as per Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act, any such officer of gazetted rank of the departments of central excise, narcotics, customs, revenue intelligence or any other department of the Central Government including the para-military forces or the armed forces as is empowered in this behalf by general or special order by the Central Government, or any such officer of the revenue, drugs control, excise, police or any other department of a State Government as is empowered in this behalf by general or special order of the State Government if he has reason to believe from personal knowledge or information given by any person and taken in writing that any person has committed an offence punishable under this Act or that any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance in respect of which any offence under this Act has been committed or any document or other article which may furnish evidence of the commission of such offence or any illegally acquired property or any document or other article which may furnish evidence of holding any illegally acquired property which is liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter V-A of this Act is kept or concealed in any building, conveyance or place, may authorise any officer subordinate to him but superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or a constable to arrest such a person or search a building, conveyance or place whether by day or by night or himself arrest such a person or search a building, conveyance or place. He pointed out that in this case, initially the Deputy Superintendent of Police got information and as directed by him the Circle Inspector of Police searched the residence of the accused. But the information received by the Deputy Superintendent of Police was not taken in writing as mandated under Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act and compliance of the said provisions is mandatory since harsh punishment involves in this case and non compliance of Section 41(2) by itself is a reason to acquit the accused. 8. But the information received by the Deputy Superintendent of Police was not taken in writing as mandated under Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act and compliance of the said provisions is mandatory since harsh punishment involves in this case and non compliance of Section 41(2) by itself is a reason to acquit the accused. 8. Reading of Section 41 would make it clear that any officer mentioned under Section 41(2) if he has reason to believe from personal knowledge or information given by any person and taken in writing that any person has committed an offence punishable under this Act, may authorise any officer subordinate to him but superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or a constable to arrest such a person or search a building, conveyance or place whether by day or by night or himself arrest such a person or search a building, conveyance or place. 9. In this case, this argument has been mooted by the learned counsel for the appellant giving much reliance on the evidence of PW7 and Ext.P11 -General Diary (GD) extract. PW7 examined in this case is the Sub Inspector of Police, Adimali. He had given evidence that on 30.07.2005 at about 7 a.m he got information that the accused was keeping ganja at his residence by name `Lotus House' from the Dy.S.P and accordingly he had entered the said information in the G.D and Ext.P1 is the G.D extract for the same. Thus the learned counsel for the accused is right in arguing that the search at Lotus House was carried out by PW7, the S.I of Police, as per the information given by the Dy.S.P. If so, whether the Dy.S.P, before authorising the S.I of Police to search the said place, should have recorded the information he had received in writing, before authorising the S.I of Police to search the building as mandated under Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act, is the relevant and pertinent question. 10. The learned Public Prosecutor would submit that nothing recorded in writing by the Dy.S.P in this case while giving information to the S.I of Police and the search was conducted by the S.I of Police in compliance with Section 42(1) of the NDPS Act and the said provision independently permits the S.I of Police to search and arrest the accused. 11. 11. While answering the legal question that has been posed by the learned counsel for the accused, reference to Section 42 of the NDPS Act also is absolutely necessary. Section 42 deals with Power of entry, search, seizure and arrest without warrant or authorisation. For clarity, Section 42 is extracted as under: “42. 11. While answering the legal question that has been posed by the learned counsel for the accused, reference to Section 42 of the NDPS Act also is absolutely necessary. Section 42 deals with Power of entry, search, seizure and arrest without warrant or authorisation. For clarity, Section 42 is extracted as under: “42. Power of entry, search, seizure and arrest without warrant or authorisation :--(1) Any such officer (being an officer superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or constable) of the departments of central excise, narcotics, customs, revenue intellegence or any other department of the Central Government including para-military forces or armed forces as is empowered in this behalf by general or special order by the Central Government, or any such officer (being an officer superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or constable) of the revenue, drugs control, excise, police or any other department of a State Government as is empowered in this behalf by general or special order of the State Government, if he has reason to believe from persons knowledge or information given by any person and taken down in writing that any narcotic drug, or psychotropic substance, or controlled substance in respect of which an offence punishable under this Act has been committed or any document or other article which may furnish evidence of the commission of such offence or any illegally acquired property or any document or other article which may furnish evidence of holding any illegally acquired property which is liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of this Act is kept or concealed in any building, conveyance or enclosed place, may between sunrise and sunset, -- (a) enter into and search any such building, conveyance or place; (b) in case of resistance, break open any door and remove any obstacle to such entry; (c) seize such drug or substance and all materials used in the manufacture thereof and any other article and any animal or conveyance which he has reason to believe to be liable to confiscation under this Act and any document or other article which he has reason to believe may furnish evidence of the commission of any offence punishable under this Act or furnish evidence of holding any illegally acquired property which is liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of this Act; and (d) detain and search, and, if he thinks proper, arrest any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed any offence punishable under this Act: [Provided that in respect of holder of a licence for manufacture of manufactured drugs or psychotropic substances or controlled substances, granted under this Act or any rule or order made thereunder, such power shall be exercised by an officer not below the rank of sub-inspector; Provided further that if such officer has reason to believe that a search warrant or authorisation cannot be obtained without affording opportunity for the concealment of evidence or facility for the escape of an offender, he may enter and search such building, conveyance or enclosed place at any time between sunset and sunrise after recording the grounds of his belief. (2) Where an officer takes down any information in writing under sub-section (1) or records grounds for his belief under the proviso thereto, he shall within seventy-two hours send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior.]" On reading Section 42(1), it provides that when one among the officers mentioned therein, if he has reason to believe from personal knowledge or information given by any person and taken down in writing that any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance etc., of which an offence punishable under this Act has been committed, etc. can enter into and search the building where the contraband was kept. However, Section 41(2) deals with search of a person or a place where contraband was kept by the officers mentioned therein in 2 ways. The first procedure provided is that the officer who got personal knowledge or information given by any person and taken in writing (1) may authorise any officer subordinate to him but superior in rank to a peon to arrest such a person or search a building etc. and (2) or himself arrest such a person or search a building, conveyance or place. 12. No doubt, Section 41(2) applies to an officer of a gazetted rank of the departments mentioned in Section 41(2). But the scope and ambit of Section 42 is more wide and Section 42(1) authorises any such officer being an officer superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or constable in the Department either to arrest and search a building, conveyance of having personal knowledge or information given by any person and taken in writing. In this matter, though the information was given by the Dy.S.P, who is a gazetted officer empowered to authorise a subordinate officer to search and arrest or to search and arrest the person by himself, under Section 41(2), had given information to the S.I of Police. But the Dy.S.P not recorded the information that he had received in writing. But when such an information was received by the S.I of Police, the said information was recorded in writing and the GD extract for the same as Ext.P11 has been tendered in evidence to prove compliance of the mandate of Section 42(1) of the Act. Based on Ext.P11, the S.I of Police searched Lotus House and contraband was seized and the accused was arrested. 13. Based on Ext.P11, the S.I of Police searched Lotus House and contraband was seized and the accused was arrested. 13. In the decision reported in [ (1999) 6 SCC 172 ], State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in para.9 and 10 as under: “Sub-section (1) of S.42 lays down that the empowered officer, if has a prior information given by any person, he should necessarily take it down in writing and where he has reason to believe from his personal knowledge that offences under Chap.4 have been committed or that materials which may furnish evidence of commission of such offences are concealed in any building etc., he may carry out the arrest or search, without a warrant between sunrise and sunset, and he may do so without recording his reasons of belief.” 14. In this connection, I would like to refer a decision reported in [2004 KHC 1315], State of West Bengal v. Babu Chakraborty, where the Apex Court considered Section 42(1) and (2) of the NDPS Act and held that great significance has been attached to the mandatory nature of the provisions, keeping in mind the stringent punishment prescribed in the Act. The recording of the information and ground of belief since that would be the earliest version to be available to a court of law and the accused while defending his prosecution. Therefore, failure to comply with Section 42(1), proviso to Section 42(1) and Section 42(2) would render the entire prosecution case suspect and cause prejudice to the accused. 15. In [ (2000) 2 SCC 513 ], Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri v. State of Gujarat; [ (2000) 4 SCC 465 ], Koluttumottil Razak v. State of Kerala; [ (2002) 4 SCC 229 ] Beckodan Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala and [ (2002) 9 SCC 363 ], Chhunna alias Mehtab v. State of M.P, the Apex Court has held that the non compliance of the provisions of the proviso to S.42 of the Act which is mandatory, the action was held illegal and the conviction of the accused was set aside. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also held that the onus to prove compliance lies on the prosecution and in the absence of any prosecution evidence about the compliance with the mandatory procedure, the presumption would be that the procedure was not complied with. 16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also held that the onus to prove compliance lies on the prosecution and in the absence of any prosecution evidence about the compliance with the mandatory procedure, the presumption would be that the procedure was not complied with. 16. In the case of [ (1995) 3 SCC 610 ], Saiyad Mohd. Saiyad Umar Saiyad & Ors. v. State of Gujarat, the Apex Court held that the prosecution is obliged to give evidence of the search and all that transpired in its connection. It is very relevant that the prosecution witnesses speak about the compliance about the mandatory procedure and if under the evidence to this effect is not given, the Court must assume that the person to be searched was not informed of the protection. The Court must find that the possession of illicit articles under the Act was not established. It has been held that when the officer has not deposed that he had followed the procedure mandated the Court is duty bound to conclude that the accused had not had the benefit of the protection that the Act affords; that therefore, his possession of articles under Act is not established and that the precondition for his having satisfactorily accounted for such possession had not been met; and to acquit the accused. 17. Thus it has to be concluded that the person authorised under Section 41(2) (specifically officers of gazetted rank) is authorised to search or to authorise any officer subordinate to him to search, if the gazetted officer has reason to believe from personal knowledge or information given by any person and taken in writing as provided under Section 41(2). However, Section 42 is on a much wider compass, authorising any officer superior in rank of a Peon, Sepoy or Constable to search if he has reason to believe from personal knowledge or information given by any person and taken down in writing that any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance was kept and to search the said place. 18. In the case on hand, as argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, the Dy.S.P, who had given information to PW7, would come under the category of gazetted officer, as provided under Section 41(2) and therefore, he can either search and arrest the accused or to authorise a subordinate officer to do so. 18. In the case on hand, as argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, the Dy.S.P, who had given information to PW7, would come under the category of gazetted officer, as provided under Section 41(2) and therefore, he can either search and arrest the accused or to authorise a subordinate officer to do so. At the same time, independent power is given to any officer including PW7 to search a place where contraband was suspected if he has reason to believe that from his personal knowledge or information given by `any person' and taken down in writing as provided under Section 42(1) of the Act. It is relevant to note that any person referred in Section 42(1) is to be read in a broad canvass and it has to be understood that `any person' referred in Section 42(1), shall include the Dy.S.P. To put it otherwise, `any person' referred in Section 42(1) does not exclude the Dy.S.P or any other gazetted officer dealt in Section 41(1). If so, the information received by PW7 from the Dy.S.P, if recorded as an information received by PW7, treating the same as an information received from any person by PW7, then PW7 has to comply the mandate of Section 42(1) and for the said exercise it is not necessary that the Dy.S.P given the information shall also comply the mandate of Section 41(1). As per Section 42(1) of the Act, PW7 also is an authorised officer and if he had complied with the mandate of Section 42(1), the search could not be held as erroneous for any reason. In this matter, PW7 given evidence that he got information from the Dy.S.P, Munnar and the said entry was registered in the GD and the extract of the said GD is tendered in evidence as Ext.P11. When the learned Public Prosecutor argued compliance of Section 42(1) based on Ext.P11, it is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the original GD is not produced. In this case, GD entry was recorded by PW7 himself. When the learned Public Prosecutor argued compliance of Section 42(1) based on Ext.P11, it is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the original GD is not produced. In this case, GD entry was recorded by PW7 himself. When PW7 himself given substantive evidence regarding GD entry after producing its extract in the form of Ext.P11, non production of GD as such before the court itself shall not be insisted and the same is not a reason to disbelieve compliance of Section 42(1) of the Act and to hold that the information received by PW7 taken down in writing was not proved by the production of the GD entry itself. In the decision reported in State of West Bengal v. Babu Chakraborty (supra), the Apex Court considered the mandate of Section 42(1) and (2) also relied on GD entry produced before the court to find compliance of Section 42(1). Para.17 of the judgment is relevant in this context and is extracted hereunder. “17. We have perused the evidence led in, in this regard. Neither PW4 nor PW2 deposed that they had complied with the procedure under S.42(1) and the proviso to S.42(1) and S.42(2) before they conducted the search. It is alleged by them that on search certain Polythene Bags containing Heroin were recovered. According to them, two independent witnesses of the locality Swapan Kumar Samanta and Ramkaran Prasad were taken and they witnessed the search. But unfortunately, these witnesses were not examined and no attempts were made to summon them at the trial. In fact, PW2 S.K.Dutta, on a specific question in cross examination, deposed that no search memo was prepared and, PW4 K.L.Meena said she does not remember if any search memo was prepared. Further, it is alleged that they came to Memuri Police Station at 11.30 p.mand Ext.1 G.D Entry was prepared. This G.D entry shows that the seized articles were recovered from the bedroom of the accused. The accused was also arrested on 5-5-1989. Thereafter, the case was made over to PW3 and after receiving the report from the Central Public Health and Laboratories, the accused was sent up for trial. This G.D entry shows that the seized articles were recovered from the bedroom of the accused. The accused was also arrested on 5-5-1989. Thereafter, the case was made over to PW3 and after receiving the report from the Central Public Health and Laboratories, the accused was sent up for trial. The Trial Court convicted the accused and punished the respondent for offences under S.21 of the Act and sentenced him to undergo 10 years' R.I. and pay a fine of Rs.1 lakh.” Therefore, it has to be held that non production of the GD itself is of no consequence in the case on hand. 19. In this matter, PW7 searched the house of the accused as an authorized officer under Section 42(1) of the NDPS Act and he had complied the mandate of Section 42(1) of the NDPS Act as could be gathered from the evidence of PW7 and Ext.P11. Therefore, the challenge raised by the learned counsel for the accused confining his argument as regards to non-compliance of Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act found to be not tenable. 20. Then the question is whether compliance of Section 42(2) is established in this case? Section 42(2) provides that where an officer takes down any information in writing under sub section (1) or records grounds for his belief under the proviso thereto, he shall, within 72 hours, send a copy thereto to the immediate superior official. In this case, PW7 deposed that he had prepared Ext.P12 search memo on getting information and given information report to the Circle Inspector of Police and the said information report is Ext.P13 in this matter. PW9, the immediate superior of PW7 admitted receipt of Ext.P13 and Ext.P17, a report under Section 57 of the NDPC Act on the date of occurrence itself. Therefore, in this case Section 42(2) also has been duly complied. In view of the matter, it has to be held that the challenge raised by the appellant on the allegation that mandatory compliance of Section 42(1) and (2) is not discharged by the prosecution and therefore, the accused is entitled to get acquittal, cannot be accepted. 21. The next challenge raised by the learned counsel for the accused/appellant is that the prosecution miserably failed to prove that the contraband was taken from the house of the accused. 21. The next challenge raised by the learned counsel for the accused/appellant is that the prosecution miserably failed to prove that the contraband was taken from the house of the accused. According to him, as per Exts.P9 and P10 it could not be held that the accused was a resident of the house where from the contraband was seized and, therefore, the prosecution case is not free from doubts. Controverting this submission, the learned Public Prosecutor argued that Exts.P8, P9 and P10 when read along with Ext.P20 relationship certificate proved that the accused was a resident at the place of occurrence and the contraband was seized from the said place and the accused was arrested from the spot. 22. In this case PW7 given categorical evidence as to recovery of contraband having 31.5 kg and collection of sample, etc. as per Ext.P1 search cum recovery mahazar. In this context, it is relevant to note that PW7 given categorical evidence that during search of the house, the accused was present and he was arrested from the house at 7.50 a.m and Ext.P14 is the arrest memo and Ext.P15 is the inspection memo. This is a case in which the accused was arrested from the place of occurrence. Apart from that, the prosecution produced Ext.P19 and examined PW6 to prove the ownership certificate in relation to house No.1/230 and house No.10/542 is one and the same and the same was in the name of Smt.Annakkutty Varkey, Warriampurath. Apart from that, Ext.P20 certificate issued by the Village Officer, Rajakumari Village also is proved by the prosecution through PW9. In Ext.P20, it has been stated that card No.1630003791 in relation to Warriampurathu House, Manjakkuzhi, Njeripalam Kara, Rajakumari Village, Udumbanchola Taluk is pertaining to the accused and the first name, Lottans, appears in the said rationing card is that of the accused. It has been certified further that the second person in the card is Smt.Annamma and Annamma is the mother of Lottans. Apart from Ext.P20, the prosecution proved Ext.P9 ownership certificate and Ext.P10 residential certificate issued by PW6. Ext.P9 would go to show that Smt.Annakkutty Varkey, Warriampurath was the owner of the house during recovery. It has been certified further that the second person in the card is Smt.Annamma and Annamma is the mother of Lottans. Apart from Ext.P20, the prosecution proved Ext.P9 ownership certificate and Ext.P10 residential certificate issued by PW6. Ext.P9 would go to show that Smt.Annakkutty Varkey, Warriampurath was the owner of the house during recovery. As per Ext.P10, it has been certified that in the house number mentioned in Ext.P9, Lottans along with his family have been residing permanently and the first name in Ext.P10 is that of Lottans and he was shown as the leader of the family. Apart from that names -Beena, Laly, Shinto and Annakkutty (the mother of the accused), are also shown. Thus it has to be held that the prosecution proved that the accused was a permanent resident of the place of occurrence by the said evidence despite having arrested him from the said house at the time of recovery. Therefore, this challenge also shall not sustain. 23. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that Exts.P8, P9 and P20 were not proved by narrating the same in detail by the respective witnesses. In fact, no objection seen raised at the time when the above documents were marked on the side of the prosecution. To the contrary, it appears that the above documents were marked without any objection. In the decision reported in [ AIR 1972 SC 608 ], P.C.Purushothama Reddiar v. S.Perumal, the Apex Court held in para.18 after referring the decision in [ AIR 1929 PC 110 ], Bhagat Ram v. Khetu Ram & Ors. that it is not open to a party to object to the admissibility of documents which are marked as exhibits without any objection from the other party. It was held further that once a document properly admitted, the contents of that document also admitted in evidence though those contentions may not be conclusive evidence. that it is not open to a party to object to the admissibility of documents which are marked as exhibits without any objection from the other party. It was held further that once a document properly admitted, the contents of that document also admitted in evidence though those contentions may not be conclusive evidence. In another decision reported in [ (1983) 3 SCC 118 ], State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh & Ors., another 3 Bench of the Apex Court after referring Section 35 of the Evidence Act, while dealing with a document in the form of a report written by a Sheristadar in due discharge of his official duty for ascertaining the actual possession of lands by various landlords, it was held that the Collectorate from where the document was produced before the trial court, clearly and conclusively proves that the report was made by an official Sheristadar appointed by a very governmental authority and therefore conditions under Section 35 were fully satisfied and the document to be admissible in evidence. Therefore, this challenge also cannot be considered since the documents were extract of public documents and particularly when no objection raised while admitting the same in evidence. That apart, the appellant/accused shown the same address in the appeal memorandum and he defended the case after admitting the same address. 24. Apart from the above anomalies nothing argued by the appellant to shake the prosecution case. 25. In this case, I have referred the evidence of PW7. Apart from that, PW8 examined in this case, the Head Constable attached to the police station, Rajakadu also given evidence that he had accompanied PW7 to the house of the accused on 30.07.05. 4 sacks which contained ganja had been taken from the house of the accused. He would depose in tune with the evidence of the witness PW7. He had identified the material objects as well. 26. PW9 is the then C.I of Police, Adimali. He would state that he had investigated this case. He had obtained the site plan and the ownership certificate from the respective officers. He had obtained the relationship certificate from the village officer which is marked as Ext.P20. He had recorded the statements of the witnesses. He would state that he had affixed his signature in the documents Exts.P13 and P17. He had obtained the site plan and the ownership certificate from the respective officers. He had obtained the relationship certificate from the village officer which is marked as Ext.P20. He had recorded the statements of the witnesses. He would state that he had affixed his signature in the documents Exts.P13 and P17. The chemical analysis report is marked as Ext.P21 and the same would go to show that the contraband is nothing but `Cannabis Sativa' (ganja). It was PW9, who had completed the investigation and laid charge sheet before the court. 27. Thus PW7 and PW8 had specifically stated about the detection of dried ganja from the house of the accused. PW7 deposed that the accused had kept dried ganja in 4 gunny bags. The said dried ganja weighed 31 ½ kg. in total. PW7 also deposed that he had taken 2 samples each from each gunny bags. He had sealed the same with paper slips. The accused well as 2 witnesses who were examined in this case as PW1 and PW2 had affixed their signatures in the said paper slips along with the witness PW7. The witness PW8 has supported the version of the witness PW7 in his evidence. Although PW7 and PW8 had been cross examined at length nothing has been brought out to discredit their oral testimonies. It is true that the evidence of the witnesses PW7 and PW8, who are police personnel, is not supported or corroborated by the evidence of any independent witnesses in its entirety. However, the independent witnesses, examined as witnesses PW1 and PW2, though turned hostile to the prosecution, they had admitted their signatures in the mahazar, Ext.P1 and the paper slips from Ext.P2 series and P3 series and partly corroborated the evidence of PW7 and PW8. PW7 and PW8 had categorically stated in their evidence that the mahazar as well as the paper slips were prepared at the place of occurrence, that is to say, at the house of the accused. Further, PW1 and PW2 had admitted in their evidence that police party had visited the place Njeripalam on 30.07.05 as put forth by the prosecution. PW1 and PW2 admitted further that they are the neighbours of the accused. 28. Further, PW1 and PW2 had admitted in their evidence that police party had visited the place Njeripalam on 30.07.05 as put forth by the prosecution. PW1 and PW2 admitted further that they are the neighbours of the accused. 28. The learned Special Judge considered hostility of the alleged independent witnesses and observed that hostility of independent witnesses was not something new to criminal court and such hostility by itself cannot deliver any advantage to the accused especially when the independent attestors admitted their signatures in the seizure mahazar and do not offer any convincing explanation for affixing their signatures in such mahazar. In this regard the learned Special Court relied on decisions reported in [2005(2) KLD (Cri) 631], Sudhepan @ Aniyan v. State of Kerala. This legal position is not in dispute. That is to say, hostility of independent witnesses by itself is not a reason to disbelieve the reliable evidence of official witnesses and conviction can be imposed solely based on the reliable evidence of official witnesses as well. In this case, as rightly observed by the Special Judge, on re-appreciation of the evidence of PW7 and PW8, the same is found to be wholly reliable. To put it differently, the evidence of the witnessees PW7 and PW8 read along with the other evidence discussed in detail is sufficient to bring home commission of offence alleged by the prosecution. 29. The evidence discussed in detail would go to show that the prosecution successfully proved the possession of 31.5 kg. of ganja (commercial quantity) by the accused at his residential house, in contravention to the prohibition contained in Section 20(b) (ii) of the NDPS Act and since the quantity comes to 31.5 kg., the penal provision 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act would attract in this case. Therefore, conviction imposed by the trial court does not require any interference in this case. 30. Coming to the sentence, trial court imposed R.I for a period of 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1 lakh. Section 20(b)(ii) (C) provides that when the possession is of contraband of commercial quantity, the imprisonment shall be not less than 10 years, which may extend to 20 years and may also be liable to fine which shall not be less than Rs.1 lakh and which may extend to Rs.2 lakh. Section 20(b)(ii) (C) provides that when the possession is of contraband of commercial quantity, the imprisonment shall be not less than 10 years, which may extend to 20 years and may also be liable to fine which shall not be less than Rs.1 lakh and which may extend to Rs.2 lakh. Thus the trial court imposed the minimum sentence and therefore, no interference in the matter of sentence is legally permissible. Therefore, sentence also is confirmed. 31. In the result, this appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. Consequently the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court stand confirmed. The bail bond shall stand cancelled and the appellant/accused is directed to surrender before the trial court within a period of 10 days from today and on failure to do so, the trial court is directed to execute the sentence as per law. The Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the trial court for information and for the execution of the sentence.