ORDER : P. Madhavi Devi, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking a writ of mandamus declaring the action of the respondent Nos. 3 to 6 in implementing the rule of merit-cum-seniority for its employees working from 2009 onwards as illegal, arbitrary and in violation of Rules 26(a) and 3-A of APSEB Service Regulations and in violation of judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and consequently to direct the respondent Nos. 3 to 6 to extend the benefit of rule of merit- cum-seniority to all its employees since 1986, under direct recruitment, duly revising the seniority list and promotions given to the candidates under reservation. category, who filled the backlog vacancies, having been selected under common notification for all classes and pass any other order or orders as deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. 2. When the matter is taken up for hearing the respondents have taken a preliminary objection about the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner is not an individual aggrieved by the decision of the respondents, but is an association of employees and therefore, it is in the nature of public interest litigation and it is submitted that public interest litigation is not maintainable in service matters and it is only by the person who is aggrieved by the decision that may come before this Court. It is further argued that none of the employees have challenged the decision of the respondents to implement the rule of merit-cum-seniority for its employees only from 2009 onwards. It is submitted that no representation has been received from any of the employees so far. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the decision taken by the respondents affects all the employees and the principle of merit-cum-seniority is applicable to all classes of employees, the association has taken up issue by riling the present writ petition and that it is accordingly maintainable. 4. In view of the above submissions, on 13.09.2022 this Court has observed that the preliminary objection about the maintainability of writ petition would be decided first and if the Court is of the opinion that the writ petition is maintainable, the matter will be reposted for hearing in detail on merits of the issue. 5. 4. In view of the above submissions, on 13.09.2022 this Court has observed that the preliminary objection about the maintainability of writ petition would be decided first and if the Court is of the opinion that the writ petition is maintainable, the matter will be reposted for hearing in detail on merits of the issue. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner had relied upon the following decisions in support of his contentions that the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner association is maintainable: (i) the Writ Petition No. 47125 of 2018 filed by the very same writ petitioner which had been entertained by this Court and has been disposed of vide orders dated 04.02.2019; (ii) the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V. Senthur and another v. M. Vijayakumar and another, Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 638 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No. 4954 of 2016, alongwith other petitioners dated 01.10.2021 for the proportion that even if the rights of the parties have been crystallized for more than almost two decades and upsetting those at this stage, would cause great heart-burn amongst employees in the cadre, the seniority should be based on the merit list of selection and that the list made on the basis of roster point could not be permissible in law and therefore, the respondents are bound to follow the law laid down by the Apex Court and determine the inter se seniority on the basis of selection of TNPSC and not on the basis of roster point; (iii) the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India and others, AIR 1981 SC 298 , for the proportion that Union or an Association represents a large body of persons with common grievance and therefore, narrow concept of cause of action aggrieved by an individual litigation has become obsolescent in some jurisdictions and the writ petition by an association is maintainable. 6. In order to decide the preliminary objection about the maintainability of the writ petition, whether it is an individual grievance or a group litigation, it is necessary to go into the facts of the case. 7. The cause in the writ petition is for implementing the rule of merit-cum-seniority for its employees from the year 1986 as against the decision of the respondents to implement the same only from 2009 onwards. 7. The cause in the writ petition is for implementing the rule of merit-cum-seniority for its employees from the year 1986 as against the decision of the respondents to implement the same only from 2009 onwards. The principles of rule of merit-cum-seniority cannot be an individual right, but it would be the right of the employees in the organization. As rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, this Court in WP No. 47125 of 2018 has entertained the writ petition filed by the very same writ petitioner and the respondents had not taken any objection at that stage that the writ petition filed by the association is not maintainable. 8. In the case of Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the case of an association and even therein, a preliminary objection was raised that since the petitioner was an unrecognized union, it was not a 'person aggrieved' and so its petition was unsustainable. 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that "whether the petitioners belonged to a recognized union or not, the fact remains that a large body of persons with a common grievance exists and they have approached this Court under Article 32 and that the current processual jurisprudence is not of individualistic Anglo-Indian mould, it is broad based and people oriented and envision access to justice through 'class actions', 'public interest litigation' and 'representative proceedings'. It was observed that indeed little Indians in large numbers seeking remedies in Court through collective proceedings, instead of being driven to an expensive plurality of litigations, is an affirmation of participative justice in our democracy and have no hesitation in holding that the narrow concept of 'cause of action' and 'person aggrieved' and individual litigation is becoming obsolescent in some jurisdictions. It must fairly be stated that the learned Attorney General has taken no objection to a non-recognized association maintaining the writ petitions". 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the latest judgment in the Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 638 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No. 4954 of 2016 in the case V. Senthur and another's case (supra), was considering the following contentions on behalf of the parties and has held as under: 9. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the latest judgment in the Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 638 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No. 4954 of 2016 in the case V. Senthur and another's case (supra), was considering the following contentions on behalf of the parties and has held as under: 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that "whether the petitioners belonged to a recognized union or not, the fact remains that a large body of persons with a common grievance exists and they have approached this Court under Article 32 and that the current processual jurisprudence is not of individualistic Anglo-Indian mould, it is broad based and people oriented and envision access to justice through 'class actions', 'public interest litigation' and 'representative proceedings'. It was observed that indeed little Indians in large numbers seeking remedies in Court through collective proceedings, instead of being driven to an expensive plurality of litigations, is an affirmation of participative justice in our democracy and have no hesitation in holding that the narrow concept of 'cause of action' and 'person aggrieved' and individual litigation is becoming obsolescent in some jurisdictions. It must fairly be stated that the learned Attorney General has taken no objection to a non-recognized association maintaining the writ petitions". 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the latest judgment in the Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 638 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No. 4954 of 2016 in the case of V. Senthur and another's case (supra), was considering the following contentions on behalf of the parties and has held as under: 11. In a nutshell, the contentions as raised on behalf of the said respondents are thus: (i) In the first judgment, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court had granted relief to the individual petitioners. Understanding the same, the respondent authorities had issued a fresh seniority list, thereby granting the requisite seniority to the individual petitioners. (ii) Perusal of the second judgment of the Madras High Court dated 15th November, 2019, would further fortify that the relief granted in earlier round was restricted to individual petitioners. Understanding the same, the respondent authorities had issued a fresh seniority list, thereby granting the requisite seniority to the individual petitioners. (ii) Perusal of the second judgment of the Madras High Court dated 15th November, 2019, would further fortify that the relief granted in earlier round was restricted to individual petitioners. Relying on certain observations in the said judgment, it is submitted that the Division Bench has clearly held that the delay, laches, acquiescence and accrued right would be the relevant factors and as such, the individuals who were not petitioners in the first round, are not entitled to get the seniority as per the first judgment of the Madras High Court. (iii) That the rights of the parties have been crystallized for more than almost two decades and upsetting those at this stage, would cause great heartburn amongst the employees in the cadre. (iv) That some of the employees have accepted the seniority list and now the entire exercise cannot be redone to thrust the revised seniority on such employees. (v) That in any case, the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court was capable of being interpreted as applying only to the individuals and therefore, even if the official respondents have incorrectly understood the judgment, the non-compliance of the directions cannot be considered to be willful or deliberate and as such, the action for contempt would not lie. 12. In addition, Shri Rokatgi submitted that the contempt, if any, is of the order passed by the High Court. He submitted that since by the order dated 22nd January, 2016, this Court has dismissed the SLPs albeit giving certain reasons, the same would not amount to merger, and as such, it cannot be held that the respondents have committed contempt of this Court. He further submitted that if tomorrow, merely upon dismissal of SLPs against the judgments of the High Court, the contempt petitions are entertained contending contempt of this Court, it will open a floodgate of contempt petitions. He submitted that such a practice would not be conducive to the interest of justice. 13. Shri Vaidyanathan relied on the following judgments of this Court in support of his submission that, in contempt proceedings, the Court cannot travel beyond the original judgment and order. Jhareswar Prasad Paul and another v. Tarak Nath Ganguly and others reported in (2002) 5 SCC 352 ; Midnapore Peoples Coop. 13. Shri Vaidyanathan relied on the following judgments of this Court in support of his submission that, in contempt proceedings, the Court cannot travel beyond the original judgment and order. Jhareswar Prasad Paul and another v. Tarak Nath Ganguly and others reported in (2002) 5 SCC 352 ; Midnapore Peoples Coop. Bank Limited and others v. Chunilal Nanda and others reported in (2006) 5 SCC 399 ; V.M. Manohar Prasad v. N. Ratnam Raju and another reported in (2004) 13 SCC 610 and Sudhir Vasudeva, Chairman and Managing Director, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited and others v. M. George Ravishekaran and others reported in (2014) 3 SCC 373 . 14. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that in a contempt jurisdiction, the Court will not travel beyond the original judgment and direction; neither would it be permissible for the Court to issue any supplementary or incidental directions, which are not to be found in the original judgment or order. The Court is only concerned with the willful or deliberate non-compliance of the directions issued in the original judgment and order. 15. At the outset, we may clarify that in the present proceedings, we are only concerned with the contempt of the order passed by this Court dated 22nd January, 2016. 16. Insofar as the contention of the respondents that the issue before the High Court in the first round was individualistic in nature is concerned, it will be relevant to refer to the following observations passed by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the first judgment: "37...... (ii) The cases on hand are not individualistic in nature, depending upon individual dates, facts and sequence of events. The cases on hand arise out of a most fundamental question as to the principle of law to be applied in the matter of fixation of seniority. The grievance of the writ petitioners was not individualistic, depending for their adjudication, upon distinct facts. These cases question the very foundation on which seniority was sought to be determined on principle. To such cases, the enabling provision under Rule 35(f) entitling the department to summarily reject the claim of the individuals, cannot be invoked." 17. It can thus be seen that the High Court has clearly observed that the case before the High Court was not individualistic in nature, depending upon individual dates, facts and sequence of events. To such cases, the enabling provision under Rule 35(f) entitling the department to summarily reject the claim of the individuals, cannot be invoked." 17. It can thus be seen that the High Court has clearly observed that the case before the High Court was not individualistic in nature, depending upon individual dates, facts and sequence of events. It has further observed that it arose out of the most fundamental question as to the principle of law to be applied in the matter of fixation of seniority. 18. Having observed this, in the operative part, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the first judgment held thus: "85. In view of the above, the writ appeals are allowed, the order of the learned Judge is set aside and the writ petitions filed by the appellants are allowed. There will be a direction to the official respondents to take the rank assigned by the Service Commission to the selectees, as the basis for fixation of seniority and issue appropriate orders within a period of 4 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. There will be no order as to costs." 19. It could thus clearly be seen that the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the first judgment issued a direction to the official respondents to take the rank assigned by TNPSC to the selectees as the basis for fixation of seniority and appropriate orders were directed to be issued by TNPSC within a period of 4 weeks from the receipt of the copy of the said order. 20. The basis for allowing the writ petitions by the High Court was the judgment of this Court in the case of Bimlesh Tanwar v. State of Haryana and others, (2003) 5 SCC 604 , which held that the seniority has to be determined, not on the basis of roster point but on the basis of the seniority assigned at the time of selection of the selectees. This Court, while dismissing the SLPs vide order dated 22nd January, 2016, observed thus: "The fundamental principle which has been applied by the Division Bench in the cases on hand relates to the question as to what should be the basis for drawing a seniority list. This Court, while dismissing the SLPs vide order dated 22nd January, 2016, observed thus: "The fundamental principle which has been applied by the Division Bench in the cases on hand relates to the question as to what should be the basis for drawing a seniority list. In that context, the Division Bench has noted that at the time when the Service Commission drew the list in 2000 the same was in ture with the judgment of this Court in P.S. Ghalaut v. State of Haryana and others reported in (1995) 5 SCC 625 . The Court also found that the said lis which was approved by the State Government did not achieve the finality and that ultimately when the seniority list came to be issued on 29.02.2004, by which time the judgment of this Court in Bimlesh Tanwar v. State of Haryana and others (supra), had came into effect which reversed the judgment in Ghalaut's case (supra). The Division Bench, therefore, held that there was no delay in the challenge made to the seniority list. After the emergence of the judgment in Bimlesh Tanwar's case (supra), the fundamental principle relating to drawl of seniority list was that it should be based on merit list of selection and that the list drawn based on roster point can have no application for the purpose of seniority list. As the said fundamental principle was applied by the High Court in passing the impugned judgment, we do not find any merit in these special leave petitions. The special leave petitions are dismissed. The learned Attorney General for India, appearing for the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission, raised an issue that with reference to a contra view taken by another judgment of Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court, at the instance of one of the employees an SLP is pending in the Court. Since the issue is now covered by the decision of this Court in Bimlesh Tanwar's case (supra), the pendency of the said SLP will be no consequence as the said SLP should also be covered by the said judgment of this Court, namely, Bimlesh Tanwar's case (supra)." (Emphasis supplied). 21. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of Kunhayammed and others v. State of Kerala and another reported in (2000) 6 SCC 359 : "27. 21. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of Kunhayammed and others v. State of Kerala and another reported in (2000) 6 SCC 359 : "27. A petition for leave to appeal to this Court may be dismissed by a non-speaking order or by a speaking order. Whatever be the phraseology employed in the order of dismissal, if it is a non-speaking order, i.e., it does not assign reasons for dismissing the special leave petition, it would neither attract the doctrine of merger so as to stand substituted in place of the order put in issue before it nor would it be a declaration of law by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution for there is no law which has been declared. If the order of dismissal be supported by reasons then also the doctrine of merger would not be attracted because the jurisdiction exercised was not an appellate jurisdiction but merely a discretionary jurisdiction refusing to grant leave to appeal. We have already dealt with this aspect earlier. Still the reasons stated by the Court would attract applicability of Article 141 of the Constitution if there is a law declared by the Supreme Court which obviously would be binding on all the Courts and Tribunals in India and certainly the parties thereto. The statement contained in the order other than on points of law would be binding on the parties and the Court or Tribunal, whose order was under challenge on the principle of judicial discipline, this Court being the Apex Court of the country. No Court or Tribunal or parties would have the liberty of taking or canvassing any view contrary to the one expressed by this Court. The order of the Supreme Court would mean that it has declared the law and in that light the case was considered not fit for grant of leave. The declaration of law will be governed by Article 141 but still, the case not being one where leave was granted, the doctrine of merger does not apply. The Court sometimes leaves the question of law open. Or it sometimes briefly lays down the principle, may be, contrary to the one laid down by the High Court and yet would dismiss the special leave petition. The reasons given are intended for purposes of Article 141. The Court sometimes leaves the question of law open. Or it sometimes briefly lays down the principle, may be, contrary to the one laid down by the High Court and yet would dismiss the special leave petition. The reasons given are intended for purposes of Article 141. This is so done because in the event of merely dismissing the special leave petition, it is likely that an argument could be advanced in the High Court that the Supreme Court has to be understood as not to have different in law with the High Court." 22. It is thus clear that this Court in unequivocal terms has held that if the order of dismissal of SLPs is supported by reasons, then also the doctrine of merger would not be attracted. Still the reasons stated by the Court would attract applicability of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, if there is a law declared by this Court which obviously would be binding on all the Courts and the Tribunals in India and certainly, the parties thereto. It has been held that no Court, Tribunal or party would have the liberty of taking or canvassing any view contrary to the one expressed by this Court. Such an order would mean that it has declared the law and in that light, the case was considered not fit for grant of leave. 23. This Court, while dismissing the SLPs against the first judgment, has clearly held that after the emergence of the judgment in Bimlesh Tanwar's case (supra), dated 10.03.2003, the fundamental principle governing the determination of seniority was that, it should be based on merit list of selection and that the list made on the basis of roster point, would not be permissible in law. It could thus be seen that while dismissing the SLPs, this Court has reiterated the legal position as laid down in the case of Bimlesh Tanwar's case (supra), to the effect that while determining seniority, what is relevant is the inter se merit in the selection list and not the roster point. 24. It could thus be seen that while dismissing the SLPs, this Court has reiterated the legal position as laid down in the case of Bimlesh Tanwar's case (supra), to the effect that while determining seniority, what is relevant is the inter se merit in the selection list and not the roster point. 24. It is pertinent to note that though, the then learned Attorney General had raised an issue with regard to a contrary view taken by the Madurai Bench of the same High Court, this Court clearly held that since the issue was now covered by the decision of this Court in Bimlesh Tanwar's case (supra), the pendency of the SLPs challenging the judgment of Madurai Bench, would be of no consequence inasmuch as the said SLPs would be governed by the judgment of this Court in Bimlesh Tanwar's case (supra). 25. It is thus clear that though it cannot be said that the second judgment of the Madras High Court has merged into the order of this Court dated 22nd January, 2016, still the declaration of law as made in the said order, would be binding on all the Courts and Tribunals in the country and in any case, between the parties. 26. In that view of the matter, the respondents were bound to follow the law laid down by this Court and determine the inter se seniority on the basis of selection by TNPSC and not on the basis of roster point. 28. We therefore direct the respondents to revise and publish the seniority list of the selectees, who were selected in the selection process conducted in pursuance of the notification issued by TNPSC dated 10th September, 1999, strictly on the basis of the merit determined by it in the selection process and not on the basis of the roster point. The same shall be done within a period of 12 weeks from the date of this order." 11. In view of the above judgments, this Court is also of the opinion that since the decision of the respondents to implement the policy of merit-cum-seniority would affect the employees as a class and not the individual employees, this writ petition filed by the petitioner's association is maintainable. 12. In view of the above judgments, this Court is also of the opinion that since the decision of the respondents to implement the policy of merit-cum-seniority would affect the employees as a class and not the individual employees, this writ petition filed by the petitioner's association is maintainable. 12. Thus, the preliminary objection raised by the respondents is rejected and the matter is directed to be listed before the concerned Bench for its decision on merits of the issue in the writ petition.