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2022 DIGILAW 791 (KER)

Minimol, W/o. Kunjumon v. State Of Kerala

2022-09-16

C.JAYACHANDRAN, K.VINOD CHANDRAN

body2022
ORDER : (Jayachandran, J.) 1. Ext.P1 detention order dated 28.02.2022 issued under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [for short, 'KAA(P)A'] is under challenge in this Writ Petition. As per the order impugned, petitioner's son, Mohammed Rafi, was directed to be detained for a period of one year in the Central Prison, Thiruvananthapuram. 2. Heard Sri.Jai George, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri.Anas, learned Government Pleader [attached to the Advocate General] on behalf of the respondents. Perused the records. 3. Ext.P1 order is challenged on the following grounds : (i) The detenue does not satisfy the definition of a 'known rowdy' in terms of Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P)A, in as much as, final report has not been filed in the third crime reckoned for the purpose of preventive detention, i.e. Crime No.58 of 2022 of Nooranad Police Station. (ii) Crime No.226 of 2021 of Nooranad Police Station, the second case reckoned for the purpose of detention, is one initiated on the complaint of a Police Officer. That apart, going by the prosecution allegations, it could be seen that the offence is committed by virtue of the detenue's involvement as a neighbour in an incident, which occurred due to the dispute between immediate neighbours. Therefore, the said crime is also not liable to be reckoned as per the definition of 'known rowdy', as also, by the proviso thereto. (iii) In respect of the third crime, mitigating circumstances arising from a counter case namely, Crime No.62 of 2022 of Nooranad Police Station, has not been reckoned by the detaining authority; nor was the records in the counter case forwarded to the detaining authority, so as to enable consideration, thereby vitiating Ext.P1 order. (iv) The sufficiency of proceedings under Section 107 Cr.P.C, opening a history sheet in the police station concerned and cancellation of bail pursuant to an application preferred by the Investigating Officer in the third crime were not considered while passing the impugned detention order. As regards ground no.(iv), learned counsel would elaborate that proceedings were initiated against the detenue under Section 107 Cr.P.C. on 07.02.2022. On 08.02.2022, the detenue was granted bail in the third crime [Crime No.62 of 2022]. On 09.02.2022, a rowdy history sheet was opened against the detenue in Nooranad Police Station. On 14.02.2022, the Investigating Officer applied for cancellation of bail. On 08.02.2022, the detenue was granted bail in the third crime [Crime No.62 of 2022]. On 09.02.2022, a rowdy history sheet was opened against the detenue in Nooranad Police Station. On 14.02.2022, the Investigating Officer applied for cancellation of bail. On 15.02.2022, the sponsoring authority recommended action against the detenue under section 3 of the KAA(P)A. The adequacy/sufficiency of the above referred proceedings were not considered while passing Ext.P2 detention order on 28.02.2022 is the contention. 4. Per contra, all the above contentions were refuted by the learned Government Pleader. A Full Bench decision of this Court in Stenny Aleyamma Saju v. State of Kerala [ 2017(3) KLT 676 (FB)] was propounded as the answer to the first contention that the final report in the third crime has not been filed. As regards the second contention, learned Government Pleader submitted that the complaint in the instant case is initiated by the Police Officer in his personal capacity and, not in his official capacity and that, the detenue's involvement is not in his capacity as a neighbour, pursuant to a dispute between the immediate neighbours. As regards the third contention, learned Government Pleader pointed out that, crime nos.58 of 2022 and 62 of 2022 are not case and counter. The first case, Crime no.58 of 2022, was registered at 9.30p.m. on 01.02.2022, whereas, the second case, Crime no.62 of 2022 was registered on 02.02.2022 at 11.30a.m. The first crime occurred near the Nooranad market, whereas, the second one, at the Nooranad junction. The cases are not liable to be reckoned as case and counter, as conceived in the legal parlance and hence, non supply of the records pertaining to Crime no.62 of 2022 and non consideration of the same will not vitiate Ext.P1 detention order. As regards the last contention, regarding the sufficiency of the various proceedings, including the one under Section 107 Cr.P.C., learned Government Pleader pointed out that the same has been adequately considered by the detaining authority in paragraph nos.17 and 21 of Ext.P1 order and concluded that the criminal propensity of the detenue could not be curtailed, despite initiating the said proceedings. 5. We will consider the first ground later, since it requires detailed evaluation, especially on law. The second contention is also in the context of the definition of a 'known rowdy'. 5. We will consider the first ground later, since it requires detailed evaluation, especially on law. The second contention is also in the context of the definition of a 'known rowdy'. Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P)A stipulates that the cases reckoned should be on a complaint initiated by persons other than police officers. The second proviso to section 2(p) excludes crimes, where involvement of the detenue is as a neighbour, when the incident occurred due to a dispute between the immediate neighbours. Petitioner's contention is that, the second case registered, i.e. crime No.226 of 2021 of Nooranad Police Station, is pursuant to a complaint preferred by a Police Officer, that too, in respect of an incident which occurred between the detenue and the Police Officer, who are neighbours. However, a perusal of Ext.P4 final report in the said crime would negate the petitioner's contention. Going by the final report, the incident occurred in retaliation, when the defacto complainant - a Police Officer - but not in his official capacity - questioned the accused, when his bike hit the defacto-complainant. The accused/detenue who did not relish the said conduct, along with other accused persons, unlawfully assembled, in pursuance of their common intention and attacked the defacto complainant, after trespassing into his residential compound at 8.15p.m. on 15.03.2021. Offences under Sections 326 and 447 are inter alia seen charged. It is therefore clear that the complaint has been preferred by a person in his individual capacity, and not in his official capacity as a police officer. We cannot but, find that the incident, which led to the registration of the said crime, is not one occurred pursuant to a neighbourly dispute. What is excluded is only an offence committed in the capacity of a neighbour or as a close relative of the neighbour. Relevant is the genesis of the dispute, like for example a boundary dispute; and not any and every offence committed against a neighbour. Here there is a concerted action after due pre-meditation, in retaliation of an earlier incident, which does not have any nexus with the fact that the accused and the complainant are neighbours. Therefore, the second ground is rejected. 6. The third contention pertains to non supply of records in the alleged counter case. Here there is a concerted action after due pre-meditation, in retaliation of an earlier incident, which does not have any nexus with the fact that the accused and the complainant are neighbours. Therefore, the second ground is rejected. 6. The third contention pertains to non supply of records in the alleged counter case. The incident leading to the registration of the first crime occurred at 9.30 p.m. on 01.02.2022 at the road near the Kakkanattu Kaliykkal junction. The incident leading to the registration of the second crime also took place at 9.30 p.m. on 01.02.2022 at the northern side of the Nooranad market. It is true that, going by the F.I.R., the place of occurrence is not one and the same; however the time of occurrence is the same. The fact that the second crime was registered on the next day, by itself, is not sufficient to conclude that the two crimes are not liable to be treated as case and counter. However, we are of the opinion that, the non supply of the records pertaining to the so called counter case to the third crime, or for that matter non consideration of the same, would not vitiate Ext.P1 detention order. It requires to be noticed that, what is being considered for the purpose of preventive detention is the involvement of the alleged detenue in the subject crime and not the mitigating circumstances, if any, thereof, in isolation. What is reckoned is the fact of the accused having indulged in the requisite number of serious crimes, so as to conclude whether he answers the definition of a 'known rowdy' under Section 2(p) of the KAA(P)A. A counter case, if any, in one among such crimes would not mitigate the criminal propensity of the suspect, once his involvement in the three crimes, as required under Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P)A is established, which, of course, is the objective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The remaining question as to whether his detention is necessary to curb antisocial activities and in larger public interest is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, as held in Anithakumari v. State of Kerala [ 2015 (4) KLT 632 ] and as approved by the subject Full Bench decision. We therefore repel the said contention as well. 7. The remaining question as to whether his detention is necessary to curb antisocial activities and in larger public interest is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, as held in Anithakumari v. State of Kerala [ 2015 (4) KLT 632 ] and as approved by the subject Full Bench decision. We therefore repel the said contention as well. 7. The fourth ground pertains to the sufficiency of the proceedings initiated under Section 107 Cr.P.C, as also, in opening history sheet in the Nooranad Police Station. Petitioner also points out the fact that the bail granted to him in the third crime was cancelled, which was also not considered. This, however, took pace only on 30.04.2022, much after the date of Ext.P1 detention order. 8. Paragraph No.17 of Ext.P1 detention order specifically considers the opening of rowdy history sheet against the detenue in the Nooranad Police Station. The detaining authority concluded that the said preventive step is insufficient to control the criminal propensity of the detenue. The sufficiency of the proceedings under Section 107 Cr.P.C is seen considered in paragraph 21 of Ext.P1 detention order, where also, the detaining authority found that the said proceeding is not sufficient at all to deter the detenue from indulging in anti-social activities. As already referred above, this part of the satisfaction of the detaining authority is subjective in nature. We note that the offences charged against the detenue in the three cases reckoned are relatively serious in nature. It is referred in paragraph no.25 of Ext.P1 detention order that the detenue was involved in another crime namely, Crime No.822 of 2016, which was under the provisions of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, as also, under the Kerala Prohibition of Ragging Act, 1998. However, the same was not considered for the purpose of detention, since the detenue was a juvenile at that point of time. We find that, cases have been registered against the detenue successively in the years 2020, 2021 and 2022, which were reckoned for the purpose of the instant detention. In the circumstances, we find nothing illegal or irregular in the finding of the detaining authority that the proceedings under Section 107 Cr.P.C or in opening a rowdy history sheet in the Police Station concerned is not sufficient to contain the criminal propensity of the detenue. 9. In the circumstances, we find nothing illegal or irregular in the finding of the detaining authority that the proceedings under Section 107 Cr.P.C or in opening a rowdy history sheet in the Police Station concerned is not sufficient to contain the criminal propensity of the detenue. 9. That apart, We have already held in Anita Antony v. State of Kerala [2022(4) KLT 427 (DB)] that the relative scope of preventive detention under KAA(P)A and proceedings under S.107 of the Code are different and independent and that the feasibility, if any, of a proceeding under section 107 Cr.P.C, is not an alternative for a proceeding under Section 3 of the KAA(P)A. 10. Having rejected ground nos.2, 3 and 4, we will now consider the first ground, which is the main ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The issue centers around the question whether a final report in terms of Section 173(2) Cr.P.C is a sine qua non to fulfill the requirements of Section 2(p)(iii) of KAA(P)A? 11. The question fell for consideration of a Full Bench of this Court pursuant to a reference made by a Division Bench, precisely on the point formulated above. The Full Bench in Stenny Aleyamma Saju v. State of Kerala [ 2017(3) KLT 676 ](F.B.) answered the question in the negative, holding that the final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C is not a sine qua non. The purpose and justification of preventive detention is seen dealt with in paragraph 10 of the said judgment, which is extracted here below: “10. …....... The detention in all preventive detention matters is not based on guilt of the detenue, but on the basis of strong suspicion to have indulged in objectionable activities which affect the society/nation at large. In other words, there is black and white difference between 'punitive detention' and 'preventive detention'; the former being a proceeding by way of imposition of punishment for the offence already committed by the accused; whereas in the case of the latter, it is only to prevent occurrence of any such act which is recorded as possible by virtue of the past conduct of the detenue. In the case of preventive detention, the mischief is more against the society at large, adversely affecting the 'public order', which is at a much higher pedestal than the pedestal occupied by the 'law and order' situation. In the case of preventive detention, the mischief is more against the society at large, adversely affecting the 'public order', which is at a much higher pedestal than the pedestal occupied by the 'law and order' situation. By way of 'punitive detention', the undesirable consequences which have already been resulted (by virtue of commission of offence) cannot be ruled out and the sentence is only to punish the guilty and to send a message as to consequences to the public at large. But in the case of 'preventive detention', the probable damage to be caused is of much more magnitude, as it is likely to affect the 'public order' and hence the law makers have consciously decided to take preventive measures rather than cure, thus giving rise to such Statute to abate the possible repetition/recurrence of adverse act/offence and the consequence. At the same time, the basic liberty granted to the citizen in terms of Article 21 of the Constitution of India will have to be safeguarded. This was well in the minds of the framers of the Constitution as well, who hence provided sufficient requirements by way of Article 22(5) and such other provisions as to the various procedures to be complied with in the matters of 'preventive detention' as it was an exception carved out to the personal liberty by way of Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution. As made clear by the Supreme court, there is no charge sheet in a matter of preventive detention, unlike the matters of punitive detention. Reasonable chance for repetition of the acts/offence, based on the past conduct of the detenue, if discernible from the materials produced, is sufficient for the detaining authority to record his satisfaction and to pass an order of detention. Such reasons/grounds need not conclusively prove the guilt of the accused as in the case of punitive detention – wherein the degree of proof required to find a person guilty and to impose punishment is beyond all reasonable doubts. As it stands so, the expression used “found in any investigation” by the police/investigating officer, as used in Section 2(o)(ii) or Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P)A, cannot be misunderstood or misconstrued as analogous to the level for arriving at the guilt of the accused for imposing any punishment on proving the guilt.” [underlined by us for emphasis] 12. As it stands so, the expression used “found in any investigation” by the police/investigating officer, as used in Section 2(o)(ii) or Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P)A, cannot be misunderstood or misconstrued as analogous to the level for arriving at the guilt of the accused for imposing any punishment on proving the guilt.” [underlined by us for emphasis] 12. The Full Bench expatiated in paragraph no.11 the practical requirement to proceed against suspected criminals for preventive detention, without waiting for the final conclusion of the investigation, which is required only in the case of punitive detention. The same is extracted here below: “11. …......... A stray incident as to the commission of any offence/activity is not enough to proceed against the person concerned. Number of such instances to proceed against is more, as specified, upon which it requires to be interdicted to prevent further damage to the 'public order'. In respect of such instances, once the investigation is started by the Police and sufficient materials are collected by the investigating officer, it may be quite possible to find the involvement/commission of act/instance by the detenue, which alone is sufficient for proceeding further by way of preventive detention, which is only a prudent step under the jurisprudence of suspicion. Still, the investigating officer may have to proceed further to collect more particulars and supplement the missing links, if any, to connect all the links to form a chain, especially in a case where circumstantial evidence alone is available. Even in a case where ocular evidence is available, completion of investigation and submission of charge sheet may be delayed due to various circumstances. There may be delay in getting the report of the expert; that there may be delay in getting report of postmortem examination or lab report on chemical analysis; opinion from finger print bureau, results from the narco analysis bureau or such other aspects. These materials may be necessary to corroborate the evidence already collected and to be arrayed in a sequence before the trial Court, for proceeding against the accused by way of 'punitive detention'; to prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt and get the offender convicted and sentenced, since the degree of proof required to punish the accused in a criminal case is much higher. The position may not be so when it comes to 'preventive detention', where the past conduct of the detenue is sufficient to be analyzed in the light of the materials collected, to arrive at a finding/expression of opinion that there is a chance to repeat the offence/activity, which forms the basis to have it prevented by way of passing an order of detention. So the realm occupied by the order of 'preventive detention' is much on different pedestal than the field occupied by the 'punitive detention'. This being the position, it cannot be said that unless the investigation is completed and the charge sheet is submitted by the Police/Investigating Officer, the power and procedure under Section 3 of the KAA(P)A cannot be pressed into service. This otherwise will frustrate the purpose of the legislation, which definitely is not the intention of the law makers” (underlined by us for emphasis). 13. In paragraph 14 of the judgment, the Full Bench arrived at the finding that the requirement of filing a final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. is for a different purpose altogether, namely to establish the guilt before the trial court beyond reasonable doubt, for the purpose of punishment. The Full Bench referred to a Division Bench judgment in Beji v. State of Kerala [ 2012(3) KLT 255 ], in which judgment also, it was held that the completion of investigation or filing of final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. is not a precondition to invoke the power under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P)A. The line of thought adopted by the Division Bench by referring to the definitions of “investigation”, “inquiry”, “complaint” in Cr.P.C., in juxtaposition with the definition of “known rowdy” of KAA(P)A, to arrive at the conclusion that the terms first above referred is used as in the ordinary parlance-and not in terms of the definitions in the Code-is seen endorsed by the Full Bench. The Full Bench also found little merit in the difference in the terminology by defining a 'known goonda' and 'known rowdy' by using the expression in/on. The Full Bench confirmed that, there is no tilt of balance by use of the term 'in or on' on any norms or semantics. The Full Bench also found little merit in the difference in the terminology by defining a 'known goonda' and 'known rowdy' by using the expression in/on. The Full Bench confirmed that, there is no tilt of balance by use of the term 'in or on' on any norms or semantics. In paragraph 27 of the judgment, the Full Bench distinguished between punitive detention and preventive detention and found the necessity to prevent damage to public order at the earliest opportunity, wherefore the detaining authority cannot wait for completion of investigation and submission of final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C., keeping their eyes shut until such time. The Full Bench further held that the only requirement is to record the “satisfaction” with regard to requirements of the Statute based on the information made available, whether it be final report or such other materials. 14. With due respect to the Full Bench, we are of the opinion that the issue requires reconsideration. Since the detenue is treated as a 'known rowdy' in the instant facts for the purpose of detention, let us first examine the legal requirements to find a person to be a known rowdy. Section 2(p) of KAA(P)A defines a known rowdy, which is extracted herein below:- Section 2(p): “known rowdy” means any person, who had been, by reason of acts done within the previous seven years as calculated from the date of the order imposing any restriction or detention under this Act,- (i) made guilty, by a competent court at least once for an offence of the nature under item (1) of clause (t) of Section 2 or any offence notified as such under the said clause; or (ii) made guilty, by a competent court at least twice for any offence of the nature mentioned under item (ii) of clause (t) of Section 2 or any offence notified as such under the said clause; or (iii) found on investigation or enquiry by a competent police officer or other authority, on complaints initiated by persons other than police officers, in three separate instances not forming part of the same transaction to have committed any offence mentioned in clause (t) of Section 2: Provided that any offence committed by a person,- xxxxxxx ” (underlined by us for emphasis) 15. As regards sub-clauses (i) and (ii) to Section 2(p), the requirement is a finding by a competent Court making the person guilty for at least one offence of the nature referred to in item (i) of Section 2(t) in the case of the former; and two offences of the nature referred to in item (ii) of Section 2(t) in the case of the latter - the distinction being the degree of punishment between items (i) and (ii) of Section 2(t). Apparently, there is no dispute/confusion as regards the interpretation of clauses (i) and (ii) to Section 2(p), where the requirement is a conclusive finding by a competent Court as regards the guilt of the person sought to be detained. 16. The point of difference arise only with respect to interpretation of clause (iii) of Section 2(p) of KAA(P)A. Shorn off unnecessary details, a known rowdy in the context of clause (iii) is a person who had been found on investigation or enquiry by a competent police officer or other authority to have committed an offence mentioned in Section 2(t). Thus, we take stock of three important expressions, viz. 'had been', 'found on investigation' and 'to have committed'. It is noteworthy that all the above three expressions are employed in the past tense. “Have committed”, by itself, is in the present perfect tense, but the expression, 'to have committed', when construed in the setting of the first two expressions, leaves no doubt as regards the tense, as also, the sense sought to be conveyed by the provision. What is thus being reckoned is the past conduct of the proposed detenue to find out whether he had been found on investigation by a competent police officer to have committed any offence of the categories specified, in three separate instances. 17. To ascertain the purport and scope of the expression 'found on investigation', profitable reference be made to P. Ramanatha Aiyar's 'The Law Lexicon' [3rd Edition 2012], where the expression 'find' is seen defined thus: “Find:- In its primary meaning to come to; obtain; to meet, and hence to reach, to attain to; to arrive at to discover, to determine; to declare (as to find a person guilty or innocent). In law, to ascertain by judicial inquiry to determine a controversy in favour of one of the parties, as to “find for the plaintiff”, “find true bill”. In law, to ascertain by judicial inquiry to determine a controversy in favour of one of the parties, as to “find for the plaintiff”, “find true bill”. To arrive at a conclusion; to come to a finding [S.308(5), Cr.P.C. 1973(2 of 1974)];” In the same treatise, the expression 'found' is defined thus: “Found:- Ascertained to be; obtained; or supplied; “reached”, “got at”; seen or discovered. As a verb, the term is often used as a synonym of establish or declare . In criminal law the word has a well-defined meaning regarding indictments (as) the prisoner was found guilty or innocent.” In Black's Law Dictionary [10th Edition], “find” is defined as follows: “Find:- vb.(bef.12c) To determine a fact in dispute by verdict or decision .Cf.HOLD, vb.(2)”. The expression “finding of fact” is defined in the same treatise to the following effect: “Finding of fact.(18c). A determination by a Judge, jury, or administrative agency of a fact supported by the evidence in the record, usu. Presented at the trial or hearing .- Often shortened to finding.” (underlined by us for emphasis) Thus, the expression 'find', as conceived in the legal parlance, means to determine a controversy or a fact in dispute and arrive at a conclusion, based on evidence on record. 'Found', when used as a verb, means to establish or declare the conclusion as regards the fact in dispute, which, in the context of criminal law would concern the guilt or innocence of a person. What is relevant and significant to be espoused is that the expression 'find' or 'found', connotes a 'final determination' or 'conclusion' of the fact being investigated; enquired into; or tried - and not an interim or provisional conclusion as regards the disputed fact. 18. We prefer to pinpoint the following grounds/reasons to doubt the correctness of the law laid down by the Full Bench: a). Certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are relevant. Section 168 mandates a subordinate officer to report the result of the investigation to the officer in charge of the police station. Section 169 of the code speaks about releasing the accused on bond, when evidence is found deficient upon investigation. Significantly, the expression used there is, if “it appears” to the officer in charge of the police station. Section 168 mandates a subordinate officer to report the result of the investigation to the officer in charge of the police station. Section 169 of the code speaks about releasing the accused on bond, when evidence is found deficient upon investigation. Significantly, the expression used there is, if “it appears” to the officer in charge of the police station. In cases where sufficient materials are available as regards the culpability of the accused, S.170 directs the S.H.O to forward the accused to the Magistrate for inquiry and trial, along with a report in terms of Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. One among the data which is to be included in such report as per clause (d) to Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. is “whether any offence appears to have been committed” and, if so, by whom. Therefore, the extent of satisfaction of an I.O., while forwarding an accused to the Magistrate for trial, is only that an offence appears to have been committed by the accused before him. We are persuaded to opine that this limited satisfaction of an investigating officer cannot be diluted any further, that too for the purpose of a harsh remedy, like preventive detention, where one is incarcerated without a trial. The basic minimum foundational requirement to find a person as a 'known rowdy' in terms of its definition, cannot be diluted, by espousing the laudable intention of preventive detention, as distinguished from punitive detention. The issue therefore requires reconsideration. b). In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar and Others [ AIR 1984 SC 1334 ], The Hon'ble Supreme Court, as per majority view, held thus: “ …................. It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a hard law and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his case falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant law. ….......” We are therefore of the view that unless there is a finding of the I.O, discernible from a final report as envisaged under Section 173(2), it cannot be said that one answers the requirements of the definition of a 'known rowdy', strictly in terms of Section 2(p) of the KAA(P)A, to initiate an action for preventive detention. ….......” We are therefore of the view that unless there is a finding of the I.O, discernible from a final report as envisaged under Section 173(2), it cannot be said that one answers the requirements of the definition of a 'known rowdy', strictly in terms of Section 2(p) of the KAA(P)A, to initiate an action for preventive detention. Bad and compelling facts, demonstrating extreme criminality, cannot afford any room to water down the basic requirements of the definition of a 'known rowdy' for the detaining authority to be objectively satisfied about the proposed detenue coming within that definition. Whereas, in the matter of the necessity of detention to prevent anti-social activity in terms of S.3, the same is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, as held in Anithakumari (supra) and approved by the Full Bench in Stenny Aleyamma (supra). c). The setting in which sub-clause (iii) to section 2(p) occurs in the Statute is important. Clauses (i) and (ii) to Section 2(p) stipulates the requirement of a clear finding of guilt by a competent court. Needless to say that the parameter prescribed is strict in nature. However, in clause (iii), it is enough that a person had been found on investigation or enquiry by a competent police officer or other authority to have committed any offence mentioned in section 2(t). Obviously, the standards have been diluted. It may incidentally be pointed out that the investigation component is referable to a “competent police officer” and enquiry to “other authority” - the requirements in both cases being a finding - to the extent permissible by the 'police officer' or 'authority' in law - to have committed an offence of the nature prescribed by the proposed detenue. The requirements of clause (iii), when juxtaposed with the rigour of standard prescribed in clauses (i) and (ii), appears to be a conclusive finding upon completion of investigation/ enquiry that the proposed detenue had committed an offence of the nature referred to; and not an interim satisfaction, lesser to that of a final conclusion. In practice, inferences which occurs to an Investigating Officer may vary and oscillate by and between the guilt and innocence at various stages. Certain material in the nature of evidence would tend to incriminate the accused, whereas, certain others not. In practice, inferences which occurs to an Investigating Officer may vary and oscillate by and between the guilt and innocence at various stages. Certain material in the nature of evidence would tend to incriminate the accused, whereas, certain others not. He forms an opinion as between Sections 169 and 170 of the Code only upon completion of the investigation, after considering the weight of the evidence, he had collected in the process of investigation. With all respect in our command to the judgment of the Full Bench, we are of the opinion that the proposition of law laid down in paragraph no.23 - that a final report under S.173(2) is not a pre-requisite to invoke the power under S.3 of the KAA(P)A - requires reconsideration. d). To translate into action the dictum laid down by the Full Bench, there is no provision in the Code for the Investigating Officer to express his interim inference/impression based on the investigation thus far conducted, so as to enable the detaining authority to consider its intrinsic worth. If such an impression is liable to be taken stock of as held by the Full Bench, a report will have to be generated for that purpose, requiring the Investigating Officer to express his opinion based on the evidence collected as to whether the accused has committed the crime in question, which procedure is not one sanctioned by the Code. Besides, it leads to accumulation of undue and wide powers on the Investigating Officer, thus providing ample room for arbitrary action. 19. Coming to Stenny Aleyamma, we are in perfect agreement with the distinction drawn between punitive detention and preventive detention. Nor do we have any doubt with respect to the necessity of Statutes enabling preventive detention. In the present scenario, where the crime rate is at an all time high and criminal propensities transcends all barriers of humanity, exhibiting extreme depravity, the necessity to enable preventive detention need not be over emphasized. All what we are trying to point out and emphasize is that the elementary and foundational requirements in terms of the definition - the first step indeed to initiate an action under KAA(P)A - should not be mitigated by an interpretative process, especially when the plain terms employed in the definition converges to an unmistakable idea of 'finding a person to have committed a crime on investigation'. Clauses (i) and (ii) speaks of a finding of guilt by a Court of law, whereas clause (iii) speaks of a finding on investigation. Mitigation beyond that point appears to be unwholesome and unhealthy, having regard to the paramountcy of liberty as envisaged under Article 21 of the Constitution, notwithstanding Article 22(3) enabling preventive detention. 20. Before proceeding further, we may express our opinion regarding the applicability of the Code, in the context of the decision of this Court in Beji supra, where a Division Bench found that the expressions used in KAA(P)A are not in consonance with the cognate expressions used in the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is true that the expressions 'complaint' and 'enquiry', as used in S.2(p)(iii) of KAA(P)A, cannot be assigned with the same meaning as defined in the Code vide Ss.2(d) and 2(g) respectively. However, in so far as the expression 'investigation', as used in Section 2(p) (iii) of KAA(P)A is concerned, there is no incongruence or irreconcilability with the definition under S.2(h) of the Code. There is only one method prescribed for investigating criminal offences, which is the one contemplated in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the expression 'found on investigation' as employed in KAA(P)A can only be with reference to the investigation as prescribed by the Code and cannot be in any manner otherwise. Even dehors the definition in S.2(h), investigation, as conceived in the ordinary parlance, only means collection of evidence by a police officer to find out whether a crime has been committed; and if yes, by whom. Here again, 'found on investigation' implies the formation of a conclusive opinion in respect of the said two matters afore referred; of course within the level of satisfaction permissible in law by a police officer. We are therefore of the view that in construing the scope of the expression “found on investigation” as employed in KAA(P)A, the expression 'investigation' has to be meaningfully read in consonance with its definition in the Code, as otherwise it would receive fanciful interpretations at the hands of the various authorities handling the proceedings in KAA(P)A. 21. The Full Bench has referred to various circumstance under which the investigation and submission of charge sheet will be delayed, especially the delay in obtaining the reports on chemical analysis, Finger Print Bureau, NARCO Analysis etc. The Full Bench has referred to various circumstance under which the investigation and submission of charge sheet will be delayed, especially the delay in obtaining the reports on chemical analysis, Finger Print Bureau, NARCO Analysis etc. We are of the view that, such reports are of seminal importance for an Investigating Officer to 'form an opinion” -as the Supreme Court puts it in H.N.Rishbud and another v. State of Delhi [ AIR 1955 SC 196 ] - whether the accused had committed a crime or not. Being important tools in the armoury of the Investigating Officer, such reports can tilt the balance one way or other. Therefore, a proposition that the Investigating Officer need not wait for such reports and that action under KAA(P)A can be initiated based on his transitional inference that the accused might have committed the offence seems to be too incongruent to be recognized/accepted. 22. The issue can be approached from another angle. Situations may arise, where there will be pressing necessity to file the final report without waiting for the reports on scientific evidence; say, for example, in cases where the final report has to be filed within the statutory bail period or cases where there are clear eye witnesses to the incident, who, on the estimation of the investigating officer, are credible and trustworthy. In such cases, it is open for the I.O. - and quite often, it is the practice – to file a final report based on the materials then available on record, reserving his liberty to file a supplemental final report after obtaining reports on scientific evidence, in which case, the requirements of S.2(p)(iii) are satisfied, since there is a finding that the accused had committed the offence, as expressed in the final report. At any rate, the delay in obtaining the reports on scientific evidence is not a reason to mitigate the requirements of S.2(p)(iii) is our definite opinion. We also feel that the pressing necessity to prevent damage at the hands of criminals in the earliest opportunity should not misdirect us to obviate or lessen the requirements of a 'known rowdy', as defined in Section 2(p) of the KAA(P)A. 23. We also feel that the pressing necessity to prevent damage at the hands of criminals in the earliest opportunity should not misdirect us to obviate or lessen the requirements of a 'known rowdy', as defined in Section 2(p) of the KAA(P)A. 23. In as much as we are of the opinion that Stenny Aleyamma Saju requires reconsideration, we refer this matter for consideration by a Full Bench, for which purpose, we direct the Registry to place the matter before the Honourable The Chief Justice. We note that the petitioner's preventive detention will expire on 27.2.2023. However, we also notice that the matter will not become infructuous upon the expiry of the period of detention, in as much as the petitioner will be put to prejudice, as regards the maximum period of detention of one year in case of a subsequent detention, as specifically provided for in Section 12 of KAA(P)A; in the event of a subsequent commission of crime.