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2022 DIGILAW 794 (JHR)

State of Jharkhand, through the Principal Secretary, Department of Health, Medical Education & Family Welfare, Government of Jharkhand v. Purusottam Prasad, S/o. Late Dr. Laljee Sahay

2022-07-05

RATNAKER BHENGRA, SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR

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ORDER : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. The State of Jharkhand has challenged the order dated 10th August 2016 passed in W.P.(S) No. 5675 of 2014. 2. By an order dated 1st August 2013 passed by the Director-in-Chief, Health Services, Government of Jharkhand, claim of the writ petitioner who is the respondent before us seeking parity in pay-scale for the post of Administrative Officer which post he was holding in Patliputra Medical College and Hospital, Dhanbad (in short, PMCH) was declined. 3. The said order dated 1st August 2013 came to be challenged by the respondent in W.P(S) No. 5675 of 2014 which was allowed holding that the respondent was discriminated with others in pay-scale which was in teeth of the Constitutional provisions under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 4. Mr. Satyam Parmar, the learned State counsel submits that the writ petition was barred by delay and laches on the part of the respondent in raising the claim for parity in pay-scale. However, the said plea was negated by the writ Court on the ground that no communication as regards rejection of the claim of the respondent seeking parity in pay-scale was made to him and it was for the first time that by an order dated 1st August 2013 his claim was rejected. 5. The writ Court has held as under : “12. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and upon going through the record, I find that the claim of the petitioner has finally been rejected by the respondent No. 2, Director-in-Chief, Health Services, Government of Jharkhand, by his order dated 01.08.2013 as contained in Annexure-11 to the writ application. This order has been passed pursuant to order passed by this Court in W.P.(S) No. 367 of 2011, whereby the respondent No. 2 was directed to take a final decision on the claim of the petitioner and it was also directed that if the petitioner's case was genuine the monetary benefits shall be paid to the petitioner within the period of six weeks thereafter. Prior to that there is no document to show that the petitioner was ever communicated that his claim was rejected by the State Government. In that view of the matter the submission of the learned A.A.G. for the State, that this writ application is hopelessly belated, is only fit to be rejected.” 6. Mr. Prior to that there is no document to show that the petitioner was ever communicated that his claim was rejected by the State Government. In that view of the matter the submission of the learned A.A.G. for the State, that this writ application is hopelessly belated, is only fit to be rejected.” 6. Mr. Sudarshan Srivastava, the learned counsel for the respondent reiterating the stand taken before the writ Court supports the order dated 10th August 2016 with reference to findings recorded by the writ Court in the order passed in W.P(S) No.5675 of 2014. 7. The writ Court has held as under : “13. Now coming to the facts of this case, admittedly, there is no denial to the facts that the minimum qualification for holding the post, as well as the responsibilities and duties of the post of Administrative Officers in the four Medical Colleges taken over together, including the one in which the petitioner was working, are the same. These facts stand established also from the letter dated 18.02.1989 of the State Government, recommending the case of the petitioner before the 5th Pay Revision Committee, as contained in Annexure-5 to the writ application. In spite of these established facts, if the 5th Pay Revision Committee came to the conclusion that there was nothing before it to show that the duties prescribed for all the Administrative Officers of the taken over Medical Colleges were the same, it was only due to the fact that the Department of Medical Education and Family Welfare was not represented before the Committee. In any event the Committee left it over for the Department to take final decision in the matter. One fails to understand as to how this could be taken as rejection of the claim of the petitioner by the 5th Pay Revision Committee, or that the committee did not find any pay anomaly, which has been made the sole ground by the respondent No. 2 for rejecting the claim of the petitioner, in the impugned order dated 01.08.2013 as contained in Annexure-11 to the writ application. In my considered view this order has been passed by the respondent No.2, in an absolutely mechanical manner, without applying his independent mind to the facts of the case, and is absolutely illegal and arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, and the same cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 14. Accordingly, the impugned order bearing memo No.1590 dated 01.08.2013, passed by the respondent No. 2, as contained in Annexure-11 to the writ application, is hereby, quashed. 15. This Court finds that it is an admitted position that the posts of Administrative Officers in all the four Medical Colleges taken over together carry the same duties and responsibilities and even the minimum qualification for appointment to the post of Administrative Officer are the same. Admittedly, in the other three Medical Colleges taken over together with the PMCH Dhanbad, the post of Administrative Officer initially carried the pay scale of Rs.510-1155/-, which has been denied to the petitioner for the reasons best known to the respondent authorities. Accordingly, it is directed that the pay scale of the petitioner also, be fixed at the initial stage in the same pay scale of Rs.510-1155/-, giving the successive increase in the pay scales at par as given to the Administrative Officers of the other similar Medical Colleges and to pay the arrears of the difference of pay scales to the petitioner, as also to fix and pay his pension with arrears accordingly. It is directed that all the consequential benefits shall be calculated and the monetary benefits to the petitioner shall be given within the period of two moths from the date of communication / production of a copy of this order. 16. It is directed that all the consequential benefits shall be calculated and the monetary benefits to the petitioner shall be given within the period of two moths from the date of communication / production of a copy of this order. 16. Since in the earlier order dated 09.05.2011 passed by this Court in W.P. (S) No. 367 of 2011, as contained in Annexure-8 to the writ application, it was directed that the petitioner shall be entitled to get the penal interest @ 10% per annum till final payment is made to the petitioner, and in view of the fact that this Court has come to the conclusion that the claim of the petitioner has wrongly been rejected by respondent No. 2, it is hereby, further directed that all the monetary benefits shall be paid to the petitioner along with the penal interest @ 10% per annum, till final payment is made to the petitioner.” 8. The discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is hedged with certain judicially evolve restrictions. It is well accepted that delay and laches are some of the grounds to decline exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A writ Court while exercising powers and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is under a duty to examine that (a) material facts are sufficiently disclosed in the petition (b) relief sought is not against any public policy (c) petition is not barred by any law and, (d) relief if granted would not create imbalance in the system. It is also well accepted that exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not on mere making out an arguable case and in appropriate cases the Court can decline relief. 9. The law of limitation though not applicable in a writ proceeding the principles applicable therein are adopted by the Courts to evolve the rules relating to laches and delay – limitation does not extinguish a right but it simply debars a person from enforcing his right. The respondent was appointed on the post of Sr.P.A-cum-Secretary on 22nd November 1975 which post was subsequently redesignated as Administrative Officer. He continued to serve PMCH for more than 15 years, before a claim for parity in pay-scale with Administrative Officers of other medical colleges which were taken over by the State of Bihar was raised by him. The respondent was appointed on the post of Sr.P.A-cum-Secretary on 22nd November 1975 which post was subsequently redesignated as Administrative Officer. He continued to serve PMCH for more than 15 years, before a claim for parity in pay-scale with Administrative Officers of other medical colleges which were taken over by the State of Bihar was raised by him. The respondent continued in service with the knowledge that other Administrative Officers were being paid scale of Rs.510-1155/- with increments but never attempted to come to the Court before 2011. There is no explanation by the respondent, except that no formal communication rejecting his claim for pay parity was made, why he did not agitate his claim before the authority or in the Court within a reasonable time. 10. The respondent came to this Court in W.P(S) No. 367 of 2011 seeking a direction upon the State to consider his claim for pay parity and in compliance of the direction by this Court the Director-in-Chief, Health Services, Government of Jharkhand considered his claim and passed order dated 1st August 2013. 11. But a dead cause could not have been revived by the respondent by filing a writ petition in the year 2011. In “N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy” (1998) 7 SCC 123 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. 12. In “State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari” (2013) 12 SCC 179 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under : “19. ...... it is clear as crystal that even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent authority does not arrest time.” 13. In view of the settled legal position on the subject, we can not approve the findings recorded by the writ Court that since decision of the Fitment-cum-Pay Revision Committee was not specifically brought to the knowledge of the respondent and for the first time by an order dated 1st August 2013 he was communicated the decision of the competent authority there was no delay and laches on his part. In the matters of service-linked benefits an employee cannot be permitted to raise a plea after 20 years that on admitted facts a right had accrued to him to receive pay-scale of Rs.510-1155/- which was given to the Administrative Officers of other medical colleges. For the sake of fullness, we would also indicate that parity in pay-scale is not an issue that can be agitated before the writ Court and the recommendations of the Fitment Committee cannot be challenged before a writ Court except on very limited grounds. 14. Therefore, we find serious infirmity in the order dated 10th August 2016 passed by the writ Court which is, accordingly, set aside. 15. L.P.A No.86 of 2017 is allowed and, consequently, W.P.(S) No. 5675 of 2014 is dismissed on the ground of laches and delay.