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2022 DIGILAW 799 (JHR)

Lakhan Singh v. State of Jharkhand

2022-07-06

NAVNEET KUMAR

body2022
ORDER : I.A. No. 4045 of 2020 and I.A. No. 4046 of 2020 1. Learned counsel Mr. Shailesh is present on behalf of the petitioner and learned counsel Mr. Prashant Kumar is present on behalf of the opposite party No. 2. Learned counsel for the State is also present. 2. It is jointly submitted on behalf of the petitioner and on behalf of the opposite party No. 2 that one I.A. No. 4046 of 2020 has been filed jointly on behalf of the petitioner as well as the opposite party No. 2 stating therein that both the parties have resolved their dispute amicably. 3. The learned counsel for the parties have submitted that both the parties have entered into a compromise by resolving their dispute amicably once and for all willingly and voluntarily. 4. It has been pointed out that Section 380 is not compoundable in nature but since both the parties have entered into a compromise and the genesis of the dispute is purely private in nature and it has not affected the society at large, therefore, in the interest of justice, let this Cr.M.P. be allowed in terms of the compromise of settlement by quashing C.P. Case No. 1351 of 2002 under which the summons had been issued. The learned counsels appearing on behalf of both the parties relied upon the rulings of Hon’ble Apex Court where the circumstances have been set out to compound the offences which are non-compoundable in nature as under: 1. Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Another reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 2. Yogendra Yadav & Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr. reported in (2014) 9 SCC 653 . 3. Gian Singh vs.State of Punjab & Anr. reported in (2012)10 SCC 303 4. State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan & Ors. Reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688 5. It is found that the present Cr.M.P. No. 1873 of 2011was filed in C.P. Case No. 1351 of 2002 including the order dated 25.03.2003 passed by the learned Court below wherein it has been stated that the case is made out under Section 380 of the Indian Penal Code and during the pendency of this petition both the parties have amicably settled their dispute outside the Court in the interest of lasting peace and harmony and a very cordial and healthy relation has been restored between both of them. 6. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of both the parties submitted that in view of the restoration of harmonious relationship between both the parties, let this Cr.M.P. be allowed in terms of compromise and settlement arrived at between the parties. 7. Learned A.P.P. Mr. Tapas Roy, clearly submitted that since both the parties have entered into compromise, let a suitable order be passed. 8. Further it is also found that one counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of opposite party No. 2 dated 07.07.2020 stating therein that he has entered into compromise outside the Court with the intervention of well-wishers and good feelings and harmonious relation have been restored between both of them and thus it is found that the facts of the case are squarely covered under the rulings of Hon’ble Supreme Court to all the dispute between the parties to be compounded even under section 380 of IPC which is non-compoundable in nature as under: The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh vs.State of Punjab & Anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303 laid down following principles: “58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor...............................” 59. xxx xxx xxx 60. xxx xxx xxx “61. …the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” These principles are subsequently reiterated in a number of cases. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan & Ors. (2019) 5 SCC 688 elaborating the principle the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in para 15 as under: “15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; 15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society; 15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender; 15.4. xxx xxx xxx 15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.” Further in the case of Yogendra Yadav & Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr. Vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr. reported in (2014) 9 SCC 653 recapitulating the Gian Singh's case Principle (Supra) it has been observed as under : “4. ---------- Needless to say that offences which are noncompoundable cannot be compounded by the court. Courts draw the power of compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code. The said provision has to be strictly followed (Gian Singh v. State of Punjab [ (2012) 10 SCC 303 ). However, in a given case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Code having regard to the fact that the parties have amicably settled their disputes and the victim has no objection, even though the offences are non-compoundable. In which cases the High Court can exercise its discretion to quash the proceedings will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape, murder, etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because that will have harmful effect on the society. Such offences cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or two groups. If such offences are quashed, it may send wrong signal to the society. However, when the High Court is convinced that the offences are entirely personal in nature and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquility and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases, the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time and energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of peace. In such cases, the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time and energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of peace. As a matter of fact from the aforesaid propositions of law as propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme court in Gian Singh's case (Supra), Laxmi Narayan's case (Supra), and Yogender Yadav's Case (Supra) it is now well settled that the offences which are non-compoundable cannot be compounded by a criminal Court under the section 320 of the Cr.P.C. In spite of that there is a scope of compounding the offences by invoking inherent powers of the High Court vested under section 482 of Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of the process of any court and/or to secure the ends of justice by taking into consideration the circumstances surrounding the incident, the manner and mode under which the compromise has been arrived at between the parties, and further due consideration to the nature and seriousness of the offence, in addition to the conduct of the accused, before and after the incident. But, such power is to be exercised very carefully, diligently and cautiously as observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 , as follows : “22. Thus, we find that in certain circumstances, this Court has approved the quashing of proceedings under Section 307 IPC whereas in some other cases, it is held that as the offence is of serious nature such proceedings cannot be quashed. Though in each of the aforesaid cases the view taken by this Court may be justified on its own facts, at the same time this Court owes an explanation as to why two different approaches are adopted in various cases. The law declared by this Court in the form of judgments becomes binding precedent for the High Courts and the subordinate courts, to follow under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Stare decisis is the fundamental principle of judicial decision-making which requires “certainty” too in law so that in a given set of facts the course of action which law shall take is discernible and predictable. Unless that is achieved, the very doctrine of stare decisis will lose its significance. Stare decisis is the fundamental principle of judicial decision-making which requires “certainty” too in law so that in a given set of facts the course of action which law shall take is discernible and predictable. Unless that is achieved, the very doctrine of stare decisis will lose its significance. The related objective of the doctrine of stare decisis is to put a curb on the personal preferences and priors of individual Judges. In a way, it achieves equality of treatment as well, inasmuch as two different persons faced with similar circumstances would be given identical treatment at the hands of law. It has, therefore, support from the human sense of justice as well. The force of precedent in the law is heightened, in the words of Karl Llewellyn, by “that curious, almost universal sense of justice which urges that all men are to be treated alike in like circumstances”. 23. As there is a close relation between equality and justice, it should be clearly discernible as to how the two prosecutions under Section 307 IPC are different in nature and therefore are given different treatment. With this ideal objective in mind, we are proceeding to discuss the subject at length. It is for this reason we deem it appropriate to lay down some distinct, definite and clear guidelines which can be kept in mind by the High Courts to take a view as to under what circumstances it should accept the settlement between the parties and quash the proceedings and under what circumstances it should refrain from doing so. We make it clear that though there would be a general discussion in this behalf as well, the matter is examined in the context of the offences under Section 307 IPC.” 24. xxx xxx xxx 25. xxx xxx xxx 26. Having said so, we would hasten to add that though it is a serious offence as the accused person(s) attempted to take the life of another person/victim, at the same time the court cannot be oblivious to hard realities that many times whenever there is a quarrel between the parties leading to physical commotion and sustaining of injury by either or both the parties, there is a tendency to give it a slant of an offence under Section 307 IPC as well. Therefore, only because FIR/charge-sheet incorporates the provision of Section 307 IPC would not, by itself, be a ground to reject the petition under Section 482 of the Code and refuse to accept the settlement between the parties. We are, therefore, of the opinion that while taking a call as to whether compromise in such cases should be effected or not, the High Court should go by the nature of injury sustained, the portion of the bodies where the injuries were inflicted (namely, whether injuries are caused at the vital/delicate parts of the body) and the nature of weapons used, etc. On that basis, if it is found that there is a strong possibility of proving the charge under Section 307 IPC, once the evidence to that effect is led and injuries proved, the Court should not accept settlement between the parties. On the other hand, on the basis of prima facie assessment of the aforesaid circumstances, if the High Court forms an opinion that provisions of Section 307 IPC were unnecessarily included in the charge-sheet, the Court can accept the plea of compounding of the offence based on settlement between the parties. 9. Having taken into consideration the aforesaid rulings of Hon’ble Apex Court and submissions advanced by the learned counsel for both the parties that both the parties have resolved their dispute amicably and they have settled their dispute once and for all, although Section 380 is not compoundable in nature and since the genesis of the dispute is purely private in nature and it is not going to affect the society, this Cr.M.P. is allowed by quashing the entire criminal proceeding arising out of C.P. Case No. 1351 of 2002 in terms of compromise and settlement arrived at between the parties. 10. Accordingly, this Cr.M.P. filed by this petitioner is allowed and the entire criminal proceeding arising out of C.P. Case No. 1351 of 2002 against this petitioner is hereby quashed. 11. The aforesaid Interlocutory Applications I.A. No. 4045 of 2020 and I.A. No. 4046 of 2020 also get disposed of accordingly.