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2022 DIGILAW 8 (UTT)

Anil Kumar Verma v. Kamla Bobal

2022-01-05

SHARAD KUMAR SHARMA

body2022
JUDGMENT : The petitioners before this Court, in the present writ petition, are the tenants of a shop, which is situated at the ground floor of the building, bearing Municipal No. 8, situated at Dhamawala Bazar, District Dehradun. The said market has been later on re-christened as to be ‘Saraffa Bazar’. The respondents/landlords on 2nd June 2005, had instituted the proceedings for the release of the shop in question (hereinafter to be called as to be “tenement”), on the ground, that initially, the tendency was created in favour of one late Mr. Shyam Lal as back as about 80 to 85 years ago; he had later on met with the sad demise on 6th February 1969, and he was succeeded by his two sons Mr. Panna Lal and Mr. Moti Lal. 2. The wife of the principal tenant late Mr. Shyam Lal, namely Smt. Kalawati was already predeceased. As a consequence thereto, the tenancy devolved upon Mr. Moti Lal, who too, is said to have met with the sad demise in September 2000. He was succeeded by his wife Anguri Devi, who was the Opposite Party No. 1, to the Release Application; Naresh Kumar Opposite Party No. 3; Rajesh Kumar Opposite Party No. 4. Another son Mr. Narendra Kumar, since had met with the sad demise, later on, his wife married with Mr. Anil Kumar Verma, who was impleaded as Opposite Party No. 5, in the Release Application. Mr. Anil Kumar was blessed with the son Rahul, who had been impleaded as Opposite Party No. 6, to the Release Application. Apart from the above successors of late Mr. Moti Lal, though it would not be relevant, but since the references have been made in the pleadings, the Court feels it to deal with those issues too, they are that late Mr. Moti Lal was also succeeded by the daughter Neelam, Meena, Beena and Anju, who, according to the pleadings of the petitioners before the Court below, as well as, that of the respondents/landlords were already married daughters, who were at the relevant point of time were living with their respective in-laws. 3. The opposite parties to the proceedings and as per the pleadings, raised in the release application, it is not in dispute, that Opposite Party No. 3 Mr. Naresh Kumar, was one of the successors of the principal tenant late Mr. 3. The opposite parties to the proceedings and as per the pleadings, raised in the release application, it is not in dispute, that Opposite Party No. 3 Mr. Naresh Kumar, was one of the successors of the principal tenant late Mr. Moti Lal, he was already engaged in an independent business. Similarly, Opposite Party No. 4, Rajesh Kumar, admittedly, was having a separate business in Haridwar. So far as the Opposite Party No. 2, is concerned, i.e. Mr. Panna Lal, who was impleaded as a party respondent in the release application, who was the son of late Mr. Shyam Lal and uncle of late Mr. Moti Lal, he too had an independent business and had a separate watch repairing shop in Dehradun. 4. The release application, thus preferred by the landlords respondents, they had come up with the case, that as per the release application, the principal owner of the property late Mr. Kishanlal, had let out the shop in question to late Mr. Shyam Lal, the principal tenant; the chauhaddi of the said property i.e. the tenement in question, was described at the foot of the release application, its details since not being disputed it is not reiterated herein by way of its repetition. 5. Consequent to the death of Mr. Kishan Lal, the respondents to the present writ petition were substituted in the release application, which had been initiated by late Mr. Kishan Lal, seeking release of the tenement in question; on the ground that the same was required for the purposes of settling his son Mr. Amit Kumar, who at that point of time, was aged about 28 years married; but was unemployed. 6. The need, as expressed in the release application, it was contended by the landlord/respondent that since Amit Kumar was unmarried, major and since the tenement in question was situated at Dhamwala, District Dehradun, which is now called as ‘Saraffa Bazar’, the same was required by him to meet his family need and for the purposes of settling Mr. Amit Kumar in an independent business and according to the pleadings, which had been raised in the release application, the respondents/landlords had submitted; that looking to the location of the shop in question, it was more suitable to meet his emergent need for the proposed business, in which Mr. Amit Kumar was intended to be engaged. 7. Amit Kumar in an independent business and according to the pleadings, which had been raised in the release application, the respondents/landlords had submitted; that looking to the location of the shop in question, it was more suitable to meet his emergent need for the proposed business, in which Mr. Amit Kumar was intended to be engaged. 7. The opposite parties had put in appearance before the learned Prescribed Authority/Civil Judge (Senior Division), in the proceedings of the release application, which was registered as Rent Control No. 37 of 2005, Kishan Lal Vs. Anguri Devi and others and on 16th July 2007, they had filed their written statements on behalf of opposite party Nos. 1, 4, 5 and 6 and primarily, in the written statement, thus filed by them, which was numbered as Paper Number 56 (ka), and apart from it, the other written statement, which was filed by the opposite party No. 2 i.e. Mr Panna Lal i.e. Paper Number 19 (ka), and the written statement filed by opposite party No. 7, i.e. Paper Number 69 (ka). In fact, there had been a consistent admission on behalf of opposite parties to the proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of Act No. 13 of 1972, from the following perspectives :- (i) That there existed a relationship of landlords and tenants. (ii) There was no quarrel amongst the parties to the proceedings before the learned Prescribed Authority that the release was maintainable, as it was admitted by them that the provisions of Act No. 13 of 1972, was applicable over the tenement in question. Hence this Court will not be addressing upon the above two issues, which normally happens to be the bone of contention in the proceedings which are conducted under the provisions of Act No. 13 of 1972. 8. The opposite parties, in the written statements, particularly in Paper Number 56 (ka), had come up with the case, that late Mr. Shyam Lal, who was initially inducted as a tenant and was said to have met with the sad demise on 6th February 1969, had been occupying the tenement in question for last more than 85 years, paying the rent initially @ 60/- per month, which was later on enhanced to Rs. 700/- per month from time to time. 9. Though not relevant, but it was contended by the opposite parties in the written statement that late Mr. 700/- per month from time to time. 9. Though not relevant, but it was contended by the opposite parties in the written statement that late Mr. Shyam Lal had solemnized the second marriage with Mrs. Kailashwati (which was his second marriage) and from the earlier marriage of Mrs. Kailashwati, she with her first husband Mr. Sipahi Lal she had three children and since the sons of Kailashwati, out of the wedlock with Sipahi Lal, had no relationship with the business of the principal landlord Shyam Lal of the tenement in question. 10. In the written statement, it was contended that one Mr. Moti Lal, who allegedly claimed to have succeeded the tenancy upon his death in September 2000, the tenancy had devolved upon the opposite parties and they have submitted, that in fact on account of an admitted relationship of the landlord and tenant, and that the rent of the tenement in question was consistently remitted to the landlords and there had been no default committed by them in any manner, whatsoever. 11. It has also further an admitted fact in the written statement i.e. Paper Number 56 (ka), that on the death of Moti Lal, the rent was paid by Mr. Anil Kumar i.e. opposite party No. 5 to release application to the landlord applicants to the release, which was accepted by them. 12. It is contended by the respondents in the written statement, that in fact, the need, which has been expressed by the landlord in the release application to settle his son Mr. Amit Kumar, in an independent business, in fact, its a false story on the ground, that Mr. Amit Kumar was already engaged in a business along with his father Mr. Kishan Lal in a proprietorship firm, which was registered with the Commercial Tax Department under the name and style of ‘Amba Jewellers’, and in the configuration of the said Firm, Kishan Lal and Amit Kumar, since were shown as to be the proprietor, it was on this premise and on the basis of the certificate, which was issued by the Commercial Tax Department, the defence was taken by the tenants that the need of engaging Mr. Amit Kumar, in an independent business is an artificial need, particularly, when the registration certificate, which was placed on record, it had reflected that Mr. Amit Kumar, in an independent business is an artificial need, particularly, when the registration certificate, which was placed on record, it had reflected that Mr. Amit Kumar was already engaged in a business i.e. in the name and style of ‘Amba Jewellers’, along with Mr. Kishan Lal, his father. 13. Another defence, which was taken by the tenants in the written statement was that there was no bonafide need of the landlords to get the shop released; for the reason being that the landlord since he was working in ONGC, and having retired from the services; since he was the recipient of the post retiral benefits, hence, in fact, there was no financial crunch, which the landlord’s family was alleged to be facing as shown in the release which could lead to an inference that their need was a hard pressing need. Court is of the opinion that the receipt of retiral benefits by Kishan Lal, cannot be read to mitigate the need of son to be engaged in an independent business, merely because of payment of retiral dues to Kishan Lal. 14. Besides this, the tenants, in defence, have also contended that since the family of the landlords is a small family, having various other sources of income and other properties, which were detailed in their statements which were recorded by way of Paper Number 59 (ka), it was contended that the landlord had various other properties, which could be easily utilised by them for the purposes of alleged need of engaging Mr. Amit Kumar in an independent business. 15. Apart from that, the defence taken by the tenant/petitioners, were without any evidence on record was also, that the Release Application is ill motivated, as he has got an adjoining shop, from where too the Amba Jewellers is being operated, hence the application happens to be a malafide application, which has been instituted as a consequence of the business rivalry and to achieve the objective to reduce the business competition by getting the release of the tenement, by ousting the petitioner from the shop. 16. 16. Though, for the purposes of the proceedings under the Act No. 13 of 1972, those facts would not be relevant, at all, which the tenants in the written statement had come up with the case, that the release application ought not to have been entertained for the reason being that there had been a chain of litigation interse between the landlord and his successors in relation to the property ever since 1969 and the first Suit, being Suit No. 13 of 1969, Smt. Ramsarani Vs. Moti Lal and others, was instituted before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, on the ground of need and for which the permission under Section 3 of the U.P. Rent Control and Eviction Act 1947, was sought. 17. It was contended by the tenant that as a consequence of the grant of permission under Section 3 of the Act of 1947, it was at the behest of the predecessor of the present petitioner Moti Lal the permission thus granted was carried to a contest before the Allahabad High Court by filing the writ petition, being Writ Petition No. 236 of 1972, which, according to the tenant, was allowed by the judgement dated 13th February 1975, whereby the permission granted under Section 3 of the Act of 1947, was set aside. These proceedings under the old Act, will not legally effect the proceedings of Section 21(1)(a) of Act No. 13 of 1972, as the old Act was overridden by Section 43 of Act No. 13 of 1972, and proceedings under Section 3 before District Magistrate of the old Act of 1947 was saved by the Act of 1972. Particularly, reference be had the provisions of Section 43(2)(a) of Act No. 13 of 1972, which is extracted herein below, apart from the fact that these were the proceedings confined to be under Section 3 of the Act, seeking prior leave to litigate under 1947 Act, from District Magistrate. “43(2)(a) - Any application or proceeding pending immediately before the commencement of this Act before the District Magistrate under section 3 of the old Act shall stand transferred to the prescribed authority having jurisdiction and shall be deemed to be an application or proceeding under section 21 of this Act and shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” 18. This Court is of the view that the principal proceeding, which was held under the Act of 1947, which is alleged to have been culminated by the judgement of the Allahabad High Court rendered on 3rd February 1975, would be of no relevance and bearing for the reason being, that denial of permission under Section 3 of the Act of 1947, cannot be logically interpreted in a manner, as if it was creating a restriction against the landlord for at all times to come in future to initiate any proceedings for the release of the tenement in question, despite the emergent need of the landlord or his family members, particularly as per the intention of legislature provided under Section 43(2)(a) already extracted above. Because I am of the view that the case has to be analysed under the prevalent law enforced at the time of filing of the release. 19. Apart from it, the tenant has also taken a defence that there had been an initial suit for partition, being Suit No. 40 of 1979, between the Opposite Party No. 2, and the late husband of Opposite Party No. 1. As a consequence thereto, on the rendering of the decree of partition of the property, it was contended that a Second Appeal being Second Appeal No.111 of 2003, Panna Lal Vs. Rajesh Kumar and others, was pending consideration before the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital. The said Second Appeal was dismissed by the coordinate Bench of this Court on 01.09.2014, the relevant part is extracted hereunder:- “Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the parties have entered into compromise out of the Court but the same still has to be verified. The compromise deed is to be filed in the Trial Court after due verification, so learned counsel for the appellant is not pressing the present appeal. The appeal is dismissed as not pressed.” 20. This Court is of the view, that even if there happens to be any concluded proceedings of partition interse between the co-owners of the property of which the tenement is a part of it, the pendency of an interse determination of partition rights in respect to the claim of respective share will have no effect. This Court is of the view, that even if there happens to be any concluded proceedings of partition interse between the co-owners of the property of which the tenement is a part of it, the pendency of an interse determination of partition rights in respect to the claim of respective share will have no effect. So far as the proceedings of release under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act No. 13 of 1972, is concerned, which has to be independently decided and particularly under the circumstances of the present case where it is not in dispute raised ever by the tenants/petitioners, that they didn’t existed a relationship of landlord and tenant, in the proceedings of release, which had been initiated by way of Case No. 37 of 2005. Hence, all the above objections taken as a consequence of the other collateral proceedings between alleged co-sharers, is of no avail and particularly the petitioner tenant cannot take the benefit of pending proceedings between co-sharers, where relationship of landlord and tenant is not denied at the stage of inception of defence. 21. The other written statements, which had been filed by the other opposite parties to the proceedings, would not be of much relevance for discussion for the reason being, that if all the written statements are read compositely i.e. Paper Number 69 (ka), 56 (ka), in fact, it is almost a reiteration of a same set of facts, claim and circumstances, which needs no repetition at this point of time. 22. Not even this, and more importantly, when prior to the initiation of the proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act No. 13 of 1972, when the notices were issued by the landlord to the tenant to vacate the premises the same was replied by the tenant by filing a reply being paper number 19 (ka), on records of the Court, wherein the above two vital aspects of the establishment of relationship of landlord and tenant and that of applicability of the Act No. 13 of 1972, right from the day of the initiation of the proceedings by issuance of notice was not disputed and not denied by the petitioner at any stage of the proceedings. 23. The parties to the proceedings led their respective evidences. On account of the fact that despite of service of notice, the Opposite Party No. 3, i.e. Mr. 23. The parties to the proceedings led their respective evidences. On account of the fact that despite of service of notice, the Opposite Party No. 3, i.e. Mr. Naresh Kumar, had not put in appearance; the matter proceeded ex parte against him by an order dated 6th October 2009. This order to proceed ex parte had attained finality qua opposite party No. 3. 24. The landlord in support of his contentions had filed his affidavit by way of paper No. 91 (ka) and the son of Mr. Moti Lal, i.e. Mr Amit Kumar, for whom the need was expressed for being settled in an independent business, he too has filed his affidavit paper number 92 (ka). Apart from it, other independent witnesses who were proceeded by way of Faizan Mohammed he had filed an affidavit paper No. 93 (ka); Ashok Kumar Phakri, filed an affidavit paper No. 94 (ka) and the certificate issued by the Assistant Commissioner Commercial Tax Paper Number 95 (ka), and the Annual Municipal Assessment Paper No. 96 (ka) to 99 (ka), supports the stand taken by the landlord respondents. 25. As far as the petitioners are concerned, they too had led their evidences by way of filing the affidavits of the respective witnesses on which, they wanted to place reliance along with the documents with regard to the nature of business; the notices issued; and the judgements which were relied in the proceedings. 26. At this stage, there are two other vital issues, which this Court feels it to be are required to be mentioned; that it had never been the defence of the tenant /petitioner at any stage of the proceedings right from the date when they have submitted the reply to the Notice i.e. paper No. 19 (ka), or their respective written statements that- (i) There as a consequence of the release of the tenement in question, it will have any bearing on the proceedings under Rule 16 of the Rules framed under the Act. (ii) There had been no plea which was ever raised at the behest of the tenants/petitioners, that at any stage right from the time when the initial notices were issued by the landlord, requesting the tenants to vacate the premises, they had ever made any recognised efforts under law to look for an alternative accommodation and this has not been a defence which has been taken by the petitioner even in the writ petition. 27. Based on the aforesaid pleadings, the release application was considered by the learned Prescribed Authority and the same was allowed by one of the impugned judgement dated 28th June 2010, impugned in the writ petition. 28. The learned Prescribed Authority, while assigning its logic while considering the rival contentions in the proceedings; had determined the impact with regard to the relationship of landlord and tenant and applicability of Act No. 13 of 1972. Apart from it, he had also widely discussed the oral and documentary evidences which had been led by the parties in the proceedings including the part of certificate, which was issued by the Commercial Tax Department, pertaining to the nature of business, which was being operated, under the name and style of “Amba Jewellers”, which is shown to have been registered in the name of Kishan Lal and Amit Kumar. 29. In fact, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submitted that this document has been misinterpreted and misreading by the learned Prescribed Authority, for the reason being that once it has been certified by the Commercial Tax Department, that Amba Jewellers has been registered as to be a proprietorship Firm, and the name of Mr Amit Kumar was also reflected in the certificate, which was thus issued along with the principal owner landlord Kishan Lal, the need of Mr Amit Kumar, based on which, the release was filed, was artificial and not bonafide at all to fall within the parameters of Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. This argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners may not be accepted by this Court. 30. The registration of a Firm i.e. ‘Amba Jewellers’, with the Commercial Tax Department, in which Mr. Kishan Lal and Mr. This argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners may not be accepted by this Court. 30. The registration of a Firm i.e. ‘Amba Jewellers’, with the Commercial Tax Department, in which Mr. Kishan Lal and Mr. Amit Kumar were jointly appearing, that itself does not mean that Kishan Lal i.e. the principal owner would be deprived for all times to come to get release of the tenement in question for the purposes of independently engaging Mr. Amit Kumar, who was shown to be as one of the proprietor of the Firm; because I am of the view that the registration of a Firm is exclusively for the taxation purposes and it does not still mitigate the rights of the landlord to independently engaged his son Amit Kumar, though his name might have been reflected in the certificate and that too particularly when it has been a consistent case of the landlord that Mr Amit Kumar used to momentarily assist Mr. Kishan Lal i.e. the principal landlord, in operating the business in question which is a quite normal situation prevalent in the Indian society, but that itself would not deprive Mr. Amit Kumar, to be independently engaged in the proposed need expressed in the release application. 31. This stand pertaining to the configuration of business of Amba Jewellers, stood further clarified by the affidavit on record i.e. Paper No. 94 (ka), submitted by Faiz Mohd., the independent witness, who had specifically stated, that in fact Amit Kumar never used to independently conduct the business of Amba Jewellers, in fact, it was independently conducted by Mr Kishan Lal. Rather, he has also made a statement pertaining to the certificate, which was issued by the Assistant Commissioner Commercial Tax i.e. Paper No. 95 (ka), that the Firm was registered under an exclusive proprietorship of Mr Kishan Lal, who was solely conducting the business. 32. The learned Prescribed Authority has specifically recorded the findings, that a right of a civil citizen to be independently engaged as it has been constitutionally mandated under Article 91(g) of the Constitution of India cannot be clouded by the pleading raised by the petitioner tenant, about the nature of engagement, particularly the need of petitioner was not found to be bonafide at all. 33. 33. It had been further observed in the findings which has been recorded by the learned Prescribed Authority, and particularly, while recording findings on the comparative hardship, that the need of the landlord was more hard-pressing, for the reason being, that during the pendency of the Release Application or ever since, since the issuance of the notices, the landlord has not made any efforts to look for an alternative accommodation and hence in the light of the ratios of various judgements referred to in the judgement of learned Prescribed Authority, particularly, having reference to the judgement as reported in AIR 2008 SCW 6201 , Shamshad Ahmed and others Vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj; judgment reported in 2008 (2) ARC 456 Jagdish Chandra Vs. District Judge, Kanpur and others; judgement reported in 2010 (28) LCD 662, Ramraj Vs. Additional District Judge and others and even the judgement rendered by this Court in the matters of 2008 UAD 105 , Vijay Kumar Gupta Vs. Tara Singh, where almost there had been a consistent view was taken though while making comparative analysis of the need expressed by the two rival parties in the proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act No. 13 of 1972, that if the tenant has not led any evidence to show that he had ever made any legally reckoned efforts to look for an alternative accommodation, the balance of comparative hardship, will always tilt towards the landlord and it would be deemed, that the need expressed by the landlord to engage his son in an independent business, happens to be more bonafide and hard pressing as compared to the tenant, because in an event of allowing of a release, the tenant would not suffer. 34. Though, its not a case of the tenant before the Court below in the perspectives of the effect of Rule 16(2)(c), but, it was observed and is being observed again, that the implications of Rule 16(2)(c), would be diluted while the analysis is made on the subject of comparative hardship, when the tenant has failed to establish, that he had made an effort to look for an alternative accommodation after filing of the release. Hence, I am of the view, that it is always the prerogative of the landlord to get an accommodation vacated under his ownership for the purposes of engagement of his son in an independent business. 35. Hence, I am of the view, that it is always the prerogative of the landlord to get an accommodation vacated under his ownership for the purposes of engagement of his son in an independent business. 35. Reverting back to the earlier proceedings, which culminated interse between the co-owners of the property by way of a partition suit or even in that way the proceedings under the Act of 1947, Rule 18(2) of the Rules framed under the Act No. 13 of 1972 becomes relevant. For the purposes of conscience Rule 18(2) is extracted hereunder:- “(2) Where an application of a landlord against a tenant under Section 21 for the release of any building or any specified part thereof or any surplus land appurtenant to such building is rejected on merits and a fresh application on the same ground is made within a period of one year from that decision, the Prescribed Authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive.” 36. It has observed that even after the decision rendered in the previous proceedings of the case for the claim of release, still the right of the landlord is reserved under the Act itself to initiate a proceedings after the expiry of one year period of a prior decision and hence too, the reasons which has been assigned by the learned Prescribed Authority is absolutely just and proper and it does not suffer from any apparent vices, calling for an interference in a writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as if the address which was sought to be made by the counsel to deal with the merits of the matter, particularly, when the appreciation of evidence made by the learned Prescribed Authority, in fact, he has quite elaborately dealt with both oral and documentary evidence while deciding the release application. 37. The petitioners, being aggrieved against the judgement of learned Prescribed Authority dated 28th June 2010, had preferred a Rent Control Appeal, being Rent Control Appeal No. 103 of 2010, before the Court of 1st Additional District Judge, Dehradun and the same had been dismissed by the judgement dated 26th May 2018. 38. 37. The petitioners, being aggrieved against the judgement of learned Prescribed Authority dated 28th June 2010, had preferred a Rent Control Appeal, being Rent Control Appeal No. 103 of 2010, before the Court of 1st Additional District Judge, Dehradun and the same had been dismissed by the judgement dated 26th May 2018. 38. In fact, prior to the judgement dated 26th May 2018, in fact, the tenants/petitioners’ counsel had also filed an application Paper Number 67C, wherein the petitioners had sought to cross examine the witnesses which were adduced by the landlords i.e. Smt. Kamla Bobal and Amit Kumar in the light of their respective affidavits paper Nos. 38C and 39C, dated 06.08.2012, but the said application was rejected by the learned Appellate Court by an order dated 9th May 2018, which is also made a subject matter of challenge in the present writ petition. 39. It needs no reference that the proceedings under the Act No. 13 of 1972, are summary in nature, where the detailed procedure of cross-examination of the witnesses is not required to be made by way of mandatory provisions because the Act or the Rules framed there under, do not anywhere strictly mandate a complete cross examination of the witnesses for the purpose of deciding the proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act No. 13 of 1972. Hence, the order dated 9th May 2018, rejecting the Application Paper No. 67C2 too cannot be faulted of particularly, for the reasons, which have been assigned by the learned Appellate Court in paragraph 12 and 13 of its judgement and order dated 9th May 2018. 40. Hence, the order dated 9th May 2018, rejecting the Application Paper No. 67C2 too cannot be faulted of particularly, for the reasons, which have been assigned by the learned Appellate Court in paragraph 12 and 13 of its judgement and order dated 9th May 2018. 40. On the basis of change circumstances, the Court has held that the changed circumstances, which had occurred during the pendency of the proceedings may not necessitate to enable the tenant to cross examine the witnesses, because it is settled proposition, that if the circumstances has changed during the pendency of the proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act No. 13 of 1972, it will have no barring because the need of the landlord would always be exclusively determined on the basis, as it existed on the date of the institution of the release application, which in the instant case, happens to be of 2nd June 2005 and hence the Court has rightly opined that based on the evidence produced by the parties by way of an affidavit of their respective witnesses, they were sufficient enough to decide the release application and cross examination of the witnesses was not necessary. 41. If the judgement of the learned appellate Court too is taken into consideration, which has been attempted by the tenant to contend that it was based on a perverse interpretation of the evidence adduced by the parties, in fact, this was the only exclusive ground which has been pressed by the learned Senior Counsel, that the judgements would be vitiated because it suffers vices being perverse, in fact, the concept of perversity of a judgement was required to be substantiated by the learned counsel for the petitioners as to in what manner and what bearing will it have if the findings of the both the Courts below have recorded concurrently, on appreciation of the evidence adduced by the parties to the proceedings, are read in consonance to the evidences adduced by the parties, in fact, on a detailed elaboration of the arguments extended by the parties and having heard them at length, this Court is of the opinion that the judgements do not suffer from any apparent perversity, as such, as all the aspects even the aspects which was not even pleaded by the tenant had been considered by both the Courts below concurrently. 42. 42. Hence I do not find any perversity or illegality in the impugned judgements in question, hence the writ petition lacks merits and fails. The same is, accordingly, dismissed.