JUDGMENT : This Criminal Appeal is filed by the appellants-A1 to A6 aggrieved by the judgment dated 07.01.2015 in S.C. No.607 of 2010 by the learned V Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge (Mahila Court) at Hyderabad. 2. The case of the prosecution, as per the charge sheet filed by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Banjara Hills Division, Hyderabad against the appellants-accused, was that the deceased Aparna was married with the appellant No.1 Praveen Kumar (A1) on 15.05.2003. It was an arranged marriage. At the time of marriage, the father of the deceased gave Rs.3.00 lakhs cash, 15 tulas of gold as dowry besides furniture worth Rs.1,00,000/-. After marriage, Aparna joined her husband (A1) and led conjugal life happily for some period. She gave birth to a boy on 22.04.2005, who was named as Sujith Kumar. The boy was aged about 5 years and was studying UKG in Vignana Jyothi Public School, Madhuranagar, Hyderabad by the date of death of the wife Aparna. The case of the prosecution was that A1, at the instigation of A2 to A6, started harassing the deceased Aparna physically and mentally for additional dowry. All the family members i.e. A1 to A6 used to consume liquor and demand the deceased to get money from her parents. A1, at the instance of his other family members, used to beat the deceased Aparna. A2 to A6 provoked A1 to send the deceased to her parents’ house to get Rs.2.00 lakhs for purchasing a car for them. Due to the continuous harassment by A1 to A6, the deceased went into depression and on 27.07.2009 in the afternoon committed suicide by hanging to the ceiling fan with her chunni. She left a suicide note stating that no one was responsible for her death. The accused persons informed about the death of Aparna to her father. The father of the deceased lodged a report before the police on 27.07.2009 at 6.30 PM stating that all the accused persons i.e. his son-in-law (A1), the mother of A1 (A2), the sister of A1 (A3), the husband of A3 (A5) and the brothers of A1 (A4 and A6) were responsible for the death of his daughter. 3. Basing on the said report, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Jubilee Hills Police Station, registered a case vide Crime No.350 of 2009 for the offences under Sections 306 and 498-A IPC. 3. Basing on the said report, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Jubilee Hills Police Station, registered a case vide Crime No.350 of 2009 for the offences under Sections 306 and 498-A IPC. He visited the scene of offence i.e. house of A1 at Sri Krishna Nagar, Hyderabad and drafted a rough sketch of the scene and also got photographed the scene through a photographer. He conducted the scene of observation panchanama in the presence of witnesses and seized two chunni pieces used by the deceased for committing suicide, the suicidal note and the CD marker which was placed on the suicidal note and a diary of the deceased. He recorded the statements of the neighbours of the deceased and shifted the body to the Osmania General Hospital Mortuary. He gave requisition to the MRO to conduct inquest. The MRO, Nampally visited the OGH Mortuary and conducted the inquest over the body of the deceased. She examined the father and brother of the deceased during inquest and sent the dead body for Post Mortem Examination. The Assistant Professor of Forensic Medicine, Osmania Medical College, Hyderabad conducted autopsy. As per his opinion, the deceased died due to hanging. Basing on the statements of the father and brother of the deceased recorded during the inquest, the SI of Police, Banjara Hills Police Station added Section 304-B IPC to the existing offences under Sections 306 and 498-A IPC. He also recorded the statements of the blood relatives of the deceased. He effected the arrest of A1 to A5 on 30.07.2009. A6 surrendered before the court on 05.08.2009. The Sub-Inspector sent the suicide note along with the diary of the deceased to the Forensic Science Laboratory. The Scientific Officer of FSL gave opinion that the suicide note was written by the person, who wrote the diary and the said writings were matching. After completing the investigation, the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Banjara Hills filed charge sheet against A1 to A6. 4. The case was taken cognizance by the XVII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, registered the same as PRC No.27 of 2010 and committed it to the court of Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad. On registering the said case as SC No.350 of 2009, the same was made over to the V Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge (Mahila Court), Hyderabad. 5. 4. The case was taken cognizance by the XVII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, registered the same as PRC No.27 of 2010 and committed it to the court of Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad. On registering the said case as SC No.350 of 2009, the same was made over to the V Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge (Mahila Court), Hyderabad. 5. Learned V Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, on hearing the Additional Public Prosecutor and the defence counsel, framed charges against A1 to A6 for the offences under Sections 468-A, 304-B and 306 IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (for short ‘DP Act’). On their pleading not guilty, the trial was conducted. 6. The prosecution examined PWs.1 to 18 and marked Exs.P1 to P9 and MOs. 1 to 5. The diary and suicide letter were marked as MOs.1 and 3 instead of as exhibits. No defence witnesses were adduced by the accused, but however, Exs.D1 to D3 were marked on their behalf. 7. The trial court, on considering the oral and documentary evidence on record and the material objects exhibited before it, found A1 to A6 guilty for the offences under Sections 468-A, 304-B and 306 IPC and under Section 4 of the DP Act and acquitted A2 to A6 for the offence under Section 3 of DP Act, and found A1 guilty for the offence under Section 3 of DP Act and sentenced A1 to A6 to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay fine of Rs.500/- each in default to undergo simple imprisonment for six months for the offence under Section 498-A IPC; sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years each for the offence under Section 304-B IPC and further sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 4 years and to pay fine of Rs.500/- each and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for six months for the offence under Section 306 IPC. A1 to A6 were further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- each in default to undergo simple imprisonment for three months for the offence under Section 4 of the DP Act. A1 was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs.15,000/- in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one year for the offence under Section 3 of the DP Act. A1 was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs.15,000/- in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one year for the offence under Section 3 of the DP Act. All the sentences are directed to run concurrently. 8. Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence recorded against them, the appellants-A1 to A6 preferred this appeal contending that the trial court did not test the instant case properly in the light of the settled principles under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 306 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act. The learned Sessions Judge simply relied on the interested testimonies of PWs.1 to 8, who were none other than the relatives of the deceased and convicted the appellants even though there was no proper evidence or material against them. Several material omissions were extracted in the evidence of the witnesses. Not considering them by the learned Sessions Judge was fatal to the case of the appellants-accused. The trial court failed to consider the suicidal note written by the deceased and failed to consider that the police seized the same at the scene of offence and the hand-writing expert also gave opinion that the person who wrote the diary had also written the suicidal note. The learned Sessions Judge ignoring the same on the ground that the suicidal note did not bear the signature of the deceased, was contrary to law and prayed to set aside the judgment dated 07.01.2015 passed in SC No.607 of 2010 by the V Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge (Mahila Court) at Hyderabad. 9. Heard learned counsel for the appellants-accused and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the learned Sessions Judge believed the evidence of PWs.1 to 3 in convicting the appellants for the offences under Sections 304-B and 306 IPC, but failed to consider that their evidence was an improvement which was not stated in their earlier statements recorded by the police. The trial court failed to give any reasons for disbelieving the evidence of the expert examined as PW.15. MOs.1 and 2, suicide note and the diary, were seized immediately by the Investigating Officer from the scene of offence hence, they could not be suspected as created subsequently. The trial court failed to give any reasons for disbelieving the evidence of the expert examined as PW.15. MOs.1 and 2, suicide note and the diary, were seized immediately by the Investigating Officer from the scene of offence hence, they could not be suspected as created subsequently. There was no evidence with regard to abetting the deceased to commit suicide for the offence under Section 306 IPC or attracting the offences under Section 304-B IPC or 498-A IPC and relied upon several judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in support of his contentions with regard to the applicability of Section 304-B, 306 and 498-A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act to the facts and circumstances of the case. He also contended that the conduct of PW.1 in filing several cases against the accused would need to be looked into. But, the trial court failed to consider the same. 11. The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, contended that the learned Sessions Judge rightly convicted the accused as the deceased committed suicide in depression only due to the harassment meted out to her in the hands of A1 to A6. The suicide note was planted by the appellants as the deceased would not have stated that she told lies to her parents. The observations of the trial court in convicting the accused would not require any interference by this court and prayed to dismiss the appeal. 12. Now the point for consideration is : Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the appellants-accused for the offences under Sections 304-B, 306, 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against A1 to A6 and for the offence under Section 3 of DP Act against A1 beyond reasonable doubt and whether the conviction and sentence recorded by the Sessions Court against all the appellants-accused needs any interference by this Court? 13. On a perusal of the evidence of witnesses, PW1 was the father of the deceased, PW.2 was the brother of the deceased, PW.3 was the mother of the deceased, PW.4 was the son of the deceased. PW.6 was the sister of PW.1, PW.7 was the niece of PW.1 and PW.5 was a distant relative of PW.1. A friend of PW.1 was examined as PW.8. One of the neighbours of the deceased was examined as PW.9. PW.6 was the sister of PW.1, PW.7 was the niece of PW.1 and PW.5 was a distant relative of PW.1. A friend of PW.1 was examined as PW.8. One of the neighbours of the deceased was examined as PW.9. A panch witness for the seizure of the suicide note, diary and the two pieces of chunni, was examined as PW.10. A panch witness for the inquest panchanama was examined as PW.11 and the MRO, who conducted the inquest, was examined as PW.12. The photographer, who had taken the photos at the scene of offence, was examined as PW.13. The doctor, who conducted the autopsy, was examined as PW.14. The Assistant Director of FSL, who compared the writings of the deceased on the suicide note with the writings in her diary, was examined as PW.15. The Constable, who apprehended A1 to A5 at their house, was examined as PW.16. The SI of Police of PS Jubilee Hills, who conducted the investigation, was examined as PW.17 and the Assistant Commissioner of Police of PS Jubilee Hills Division of Hyderabad, who filed charge sheet, was examined as PW.18. 14. The close relatives of the deceased PWs.1 to 3 were the material witnesses in this case to know the reason behind the death of the deceased. The father of the deceased examined as PW.1, stated that he performed the marriage of his daughter (deceased) with A1 on 15.05.2003 and he gave dowry of Rs.3.00 lakhs, 15 tulas of gold and furniture worth of Rs.1,00,000/-. After marriage, the deceased and A1 lived at Yousufguda, Hyderabad and they were blessed with a son. They lived happily for three years. A1-Praveen Kumar and his mother Suseela (A2) and the sister of A1 Sujatha (A3) and brother of A1 Prashanth Kumar (A6) demanded additional dowry and asked the deceased to get the demanded amount from them. His wife was constantly paying the demanded amount to his daughter. One year prior to the incident, the sister of A1 also started living in one of the portions of the house owned by the accused. Thereafter, all the accused started consuming alcohol jointly and demanded the deceased for additional dowry. Once they beat his deceased daughter and his daughter informed him about the demand and harassment made by the accused. One year prior to the incident, the sister of A1 also started living in one of the portions of the house owned by the accused. Thereafter, all the accused started consuming alcohol jointly and demanded the deceased for additional dowry. Once they beat his deceased daughter and his daughter informed him about the demand and harassment made by the accused. Then he called A1 and discussed about their harassment to the deceased and admonished them not to harass the deceased and if they continued to do so, threatened to lodge a complaint against them. He further stated that one year prior to the incident, all the accused sent the deceased to his house asking to bring Rs.1.5 lakhs for regularization of their house. He refused to meet the said demand as the said house was a joint family property. Six moths later, A1 again sent the deceased to his house asking to bring Rs.2.00 lakhs for purchase of car. 15. He further stated that once in a week his daughter and grandson used to visit their house and A1 also accompanied them some times. He stated that he and his wife went to the house of the deceased a day prior to the incident around 9.30 PM and asked the deceased when she would come to their house. The deceased stated that she would come on next Friday. When they were leaving the house, the deceased asked his wife about Rs.2.00 lakhs which was demanded by her husband. His wife promised to comply the demand by intimating to him. On the next day i.e. on 27.07.2009 at about 3.30 PM A1 telephoned to him and informed about the suicide of the deceased by hanging. 16. Thus, as per the evidence of this witness, the marriage of the deceased was performed with A1 on 15.05.2003 and she committed suicide on 27.07.2009 i.e. after six years of her marriage with A1. As per this witness, the deceased and A1 lived happily for three years and the demand of Rs.1.50 lakhs was made one year prior to the death of the deceased and the demand of Rs.2.00 lakhs for purchase of car was made by A1 six months before her death. Thus, these demands were made five years after the marriage of the deceased with A1, but not earlier to it. Thus, these demands were made five years after the marriage of the deceased with A1, but not earlier to it. The witness also had not given any specific details as to when the demand was made by the accused with the month and year. As per his evidence the demand to purchase the car was informed by the deceased to his wife, but not to him and his wife promised the deceased to comply the demand by intimating to him and on the night prior to her death also, the deceased enquired with his wife about the demand made by A1 for purchase of car and his wife promised to comply the said demand by intimating with him. His evidence as to the deceased asking him for Rs.1.50 lakhs for regularisation of their house and the deceased informing his wife about the demand made by A1 for Rs.2.00 lakhs for purchase of car six months prior to her death was extracted as omissions which were not stated by him either in his compliant marked as Ex.P.1 or in his 161 Cr.P.C. statement recorded by the police. 17. The brother of the deceased was examined as PW.2 and he stated that at the time of marriage, the accused demanded for dowry of Rs.4.00 lakhs, but they had given cash of Rs.3.00 lakhs. The said statement of demand of Rs.4.00 lakhs and giving only Rs.3.00 lakhs was not stated by PW.1, the father of the deceased. PW.2 also stated that the accused demanded additional dowry of Rs.2.00 lakhs for purchase of car and sent his sister to their house and they promised to give the same later. He had not stated about the demand of Rs.1.50 lakhs made for regularization of the house by the accused thorough the deceased as stated by PW.1. He only stated about the additional dowry demand of Rs.2.00 lakhs for purchase of car. He had not given the details as to when the said demand was made. In his cross examination, he admitted that he had not stated to the police when the accused demanded the deceased for additional dowry as well as about the harassment of the deceased by the accused. He had not given the details as to when the said demand was made. In his cross examination, he admitted that he had not stated to the police when the accused demanded the deceased for additional dowry as well as about the harassment of the deceased by the accused. Thus, the said statement of PW.2 for demand of additional dowry of Rs.2.00 lakhs was elicited as a material omission and he also failed to give the specific details as to the month and year when such demand was made. 18. The mother of the deceased was examined as PW.3. She stated that at the time of marriage, the accused demanded dowry of Rs.4.00 lakhs, but they had given Rs.3.00 lakhs only. As per her evidence all the accused started harassing the deceased demanding additional dowry after the birth of the male child and the accused demanded for an amount of 2.00 lakhs for purchase of car and they promised to pay Rs.1.00 lakh only. She also had not stated about the demand of Rs.1.50 lakhs for regularization of the house informed by the deceased to them as stated by PW.1. She stated only about the demand of Rs.2.00 lakhs for purchase of car and that they promised to pay only Rs.1.00 lakh, which was not stated by PW.1 or PW.2 that they agreed to pay only Rs.1.00 lakh. She also failed to give the details as to when such demand was made by the accused and informed to them by the deceased. Her evidence also would reveal that one day prior to the alleged incident, they went to the house of the accused to see the deceased and stayed there for some time and later returned to their house. At that time, the accused No.1 was sleeping in the house and he did not come out of the room or met them. Next day afternoon they received information from A1 that their daughter Aparna committed suicide. She had not stated about the deceased enquiring about Rs.2.00 lakhs, the demand of A1, for purchase of car, at that time. She would not have ignored such material piece of evidence as stated by PW.1, if the same was the reason for her daughter committing suicide. She had not stated about the deceased enquiring about Rs.2.00 lakhs, the demand of A1, for purchase of car, at that time. She would not have ignored such material piece of evidence as stated by PW.1, if the same was the reason for her daughter committing suicide. She had not stated any abnormality in the behaviour of the deceased observed by her or and any complaint made by the deceased to her, when they met her on the previous night of the death of the deceased. 19. Thus, the evidence of PWs.1 to 3 is not consistent with regard to the alleged demands made by the accused through the deceased. Their evidence in the said regard was elicited as material omissions, which were not stated in their 161 Cr.P.C. statements recorded by the police. It was also elicited in the cross examination of PWs.1 to 3 that the deceased was studying 1st year degree at the time of marriage and she discontinued her studies but later she was admitted in another college and completed B.Sc. Computer Science and A1 used to drop her at the college and bring her. The birthday celebrations of their grandson were performed by A1 and the entire expenditure was met by A1 and they were also invited to the said celebrations. PW.2 admitted that A1 was a government employee working in Secretariat and Ex.B1 were the photographs (4 in number) showing the celebrations of the birthday function of the deceased in the presence of her husband, in-laws and other family members. PW.2 also admitted that during the lifetime of the deceased, on every Saturday, she used to come to their house along with her husband. A1 also used to stay for some time at their house and on the same night, they used to go to their house. The photographs of the birthday celebrations of the son of the deceased at the house of A1 were marked as Ex.D2 through this witness. PW.3 also stated that the deceased continued her further studies after the marriage. Thus, the evidence of these witnesses would disclose that the deceased used to visit the house of her parents regularly on every weekend and A1 also used to accompany her many a time and they used to return on the same day and the relations between them were cordial. Thus, the evidence of these witnesses would disclose that the deceased used to visit the house of her parents regularly on every weekend and A1 also used to accompany her many a time and they used to return on the same day and the relations between them were cordial. It would also reveal that the deceased also continued her studies and completed her graduation after her marriage and A1 used to drop and pick her up at the college and he also used to celebrate the birthdays of his wife and son in the presence of his family members and also PWs.1 to 3 which would show that the relations between all of them were cordial. 20. PW.1 also admitted in his cross examination that subsequent to the death of his daughter, he filed a suit for recovery of an amount of Rs.6.00 lakhs including worth of the articles alleged to have given by him at the time of marriage (including dowry of Rs.3.00 lakhs) and the said suit was numbered as OS No.2637 of 2010 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. He also admitted that he filed OS No.2188 of 2011, as representative of the son of A1, for partition and separate share from the properties of A1. He also admitted that A1 filed OP No.1310 of 2009 on the file of the Additional Family Court for custody of the child. He admitted that he filed a maintenance case against A1 on the file of the Additional Family Court, Hyderabad for maintenance of his grandson, who was a minor. Thus, his evidence would disclose that after the death of his daughter, he brought his grandson and kept him under his custody against the will and wish of A1, due to which A1 was forced to file OP No.1310 of 2009 for the custody of his child. Keeping the minor grandson in his custody, he filed OP for the maintenance of his grandson from A1 and also filed a partition suit demanding separate share from the properties of A1 and a suit for recovery of an amount of Rs.6.00 lakhs (including the dowry of Rs.3.00 lakhs) given by him. He feigned his ignorance about the dismissal of OS No.2637 of 2010 on 06.09.2013. The admission of PW.1 with regard to the suits filed by him would show his conduct and his litigant nature. He feigned his ignorance about the dismissal of OS No.2637 of 2010 on 06.09.2013. The admission of PW.1 with regard to the suits filed by him would show his conduct and his litigant nature. His evidence also would not disclose any amounts paid by him to any of the accused, after the marriage of the deceased with A1. Though he stated that his wife constantly paid the demanded amount to his daughter, he failed to give any details of the dates or the amounts paid by his wife or her earning capacity to pay the said amount. PW.3 had not stated about paying any amount to the deceased or A1. Thus, it would only show the conduct of PW.1 in making false allegations against the accused and giving false evidence. 21. The son of the deceased, aged about 9 years, was examined as PW.4. He was aged about 4 years by the date of death of his mother. He stated that he attended the School on the date of the incident and his school timings were from 8.30 AM to 3.30 PM. He stated that his father killed his mother, but took him to school by saying that she was suffering with fever. He also stated that he had taken lunch box to the school on that day. Thus, this minor boy deposing about his father killing his mother would show the poison created in his mind by the persons in whose custody he was living after the death of his mother. 22. PW.5 was a distant relative of PW.1 and she stated that at the time of marriage, the parents of the deceased gave cash of Rs.3.00 lakhs, 15 tulas of gold, furniture worth Rs.1.00 lakh and also a bike to A1. Giving bike to A1 was not stated by PWs.1 to 3. It was an improvement in her evidence. She stated that the deceased informed her about the harassment made by her husband and in-laws demanding to get additional dowry and claimed that she was not happy with the accused. She had not given any specific details as to when the deceased informed her about the harassment of her husband and in-laws and the amounts demanded by them towards additional dowry. She stated that since she was in medical profession (as Staff Nurse in ESI Hospital), the deceased used to telephone her and take her advice. She had not given any specific details as to when the deceased informed her about the harassment of her husband and in-laws and the amounts demanded by them towards additional dowry. She stated that since she was in medical profession (as Staff Nurse in ESI Hospital), the deceased used to telephone her and take her advice. Her evidence also would disclose that on 27.07.2009 at 4.00 PM, she received a phone call from the maternal uncle of the deceased from Visakhapatnam who informed about the death of the deceased by way of hanging and asked her to go to the house of the accused to see the situation. She stated that at that time, she was on duty and after completing her duty, she went to the house of the accused and by that time, the accused shifted the deceased to the hospital. Thus, she was not informed by the parents of the deceased about the death of the deceased and she received information from some other distant relatives from Visakhapatnam and she visited the house of the accused only on completion of her duty but not even imm0ediately on receipt of the said information. It shows her closeness with the deceased and what importance could be given to her evidence. She stated that A4 stated at the time of funeral that they killed the deceased and also threatened to kill them. This part of the evidence cannot be considered as any extra judicial confession made by A4 or any credence can be given for such evidence. 23. PW.6 was the maternal aunt of the deceased (sister of PW.1), who was living in Rayakurthi village of Bhimavaram, West Godavari District. Her evidence with regard to demand of Rs.1.50 lakhs by the accused for construction of an up-stair building, for which her brother did not agree and the accused demanding Rs.2.00 lakhs for purchase of car for which also PW.1 did not accept, cannot be given much credence as she is not an immediate family member of the deceased. She had also not stated as to how she came to know about such demands made by the accused. Her evidence as to her brother PW.1 not accepting to meet the demand of Rs.2.00 lakhs for purchase of car was not even stated by PW.1. PW.1 had not stated about such demand made by the deceased to him. She had also not stated as to how she came to know about such demands made by the accused. Her evidence as to her brother PW.1 not accepting to meet the demand of Rs.2.00 lakhs for purchase of car was not even stated by PW.1. PW.1 had not stated about such demand made by the deceased to him. His evidence is only to the extent that such demand was made by the deceased to his wife. He had not stated about his wife informing him about such demand and he refusing to meet such demand. 24. PW.7 was the daughter of PW.6 and she stated that Pw.1 was her maternal uncle. She also stated about a bike given to A1 at the time of marriage and Rs.20,000/- given to the sister of A1 towards Adapaduchu katnam, which were not stated by PWs.1 to 3. She stated that she was a resident of Miyapur, Hyderabad and now and then she used to come to the house of the deceased and that the deceased informed about the accused harassing her by demanding additional dowry. She also failed to give specific details as to when she visited the house of the deceased and when such demand of additional dowry was made by the accused and was informed to her by the deceased. Without specific details, such vague evidence of the distant relatives of the deceased cannot be a basis to sustain a conviction against the appellants-accused. 25. PW.8 was a friend of PW.1. He was a resident of Parbhani of Maharashtra State. His evidence as to A1 and his family members demanding dowry of Rs.4.00 lakhs but the parents of the deceased giving cash of Rs.3.00 lakhs, household articles and a bike, cannot be believed as he admitted in his cross-examination that he had no personal knowledge about the family affairs of A1 and the deceased and he came to know all the said facts through PW.1 and basing on the information furnished by PW.1 only, he gave his evidence in chief and came to know that the family of A1 was not good. Thus his evidence is hearsay and no importance can be attached to it. 26. Thus his evidence is hearsay and no importance can be attached to it. 26. A neighbour of the deceased was examined as PW.9 and she stated that the deceased used to visit her house now and then but never stated anything to her with regard to her family affairs or disputes with the family members. 27. PW.10 was the panch witness for the scene of offence panchanama and he stated about the police conducting the scene of offence panchanama on 27.07.2009 between 3.00 PM and 4.30 PM and seized a diary, suicide note and two pieces of chunni in his presence. The same were marked as MOs.1 to 3 respectively. 28. Thus, his evidence would disclose that police visited the scene of offence immediately and conducted the scene of offence panchanama and seized the suicide note and the diary of the deceased. In the suicide note, marked as MO2, it was mentioned that “no one was responsible to her death. She asked her husband to look after their son Sujith well and to admit him in a good school. By referring to her parents, she stated that she told all lies to them and she could not face them and asked her father not to create any nuisance on her death and not to blame anyone and not to file any cases and to take care of her mother. She also stated that due to her own depression, she was dying and asked her gold to be used for the studies of her son.” As the suicide note was not signed by the deceased, the trial court refused to consider the same. The trial court also observed that the police failed to mention the seizure of the same in Form-66 before the court while filing the charge sheet wherein the seizure of the property would be shown. Hence, observed that it would raise a suspicion in the mind of the court with regard to the seizure of suicidal note by the police at the time of visiting the scene of offence. But when the evidence of PW.10 is clear as to the seizure of the suicidal note by the police along with the diary of the deceased from the scene of offence, the trial court disbelieving the same does not appear to be proper. 29. But when the evidence of PW.10 is clear as to the seizure of the suicidal note by the police along with the diary of the deceased from the scene of offence, the trial court disbelieving the same does not appear to be proper. 29. The trial court observed that the police failed to place any evidence to show that the hand writing covered under MO1diary belonged to the deceased, as except the name of the deceased on the first page of MO1, there was no signature of the deceased found on MO1. The trial court failed to consider that people would not make signatures while writing diaries and there was no denial by PWs.1 to 3 that writings on MOs.1 and 2 did not belong to the deceased. 30. The police sent the seized suicide note and the diary from the scene of offence to the hand-writing expert of the Foren sic Science Laboratory and the hand writing expert examined as PW.15 stated that the writings on the suicide note were written by the person, who wrote the writings in the diary. No reasoning was given by the court below for refusing to consider the said evidence of PW.15 and coming to the conclusion that prosecution failed to establish that the hand-writing covered under MOs.1 and 2 belonged to the deceased. 31. The trial court ignored the evidence of the prosecution witnesses PWs.10 and 15 examined in the said regard and observed that as the accused failed to state in their 313 Cr.P.C. examination about the suicidal note written by the deceased and that the same was found at the scene of offence, when the deceased committed suicide and as the mother-in-law of the deceased had seen the dead body for the first time and A1 and A2 had not stated the said fact before the court about the suicidal note said to have written by the deceased and about their handing over the same to the police, suspected the genuineness of MOs.1 and 2. Thus, the Sessions Court placed the burden on the accused and not believed the prosecution version as to the seizure of the suicide note from the scene of offence and gave a reasoning that as A1 and A2 failed to state about handwriting over the suicidal note to the police, disbelieved the same. Thus, the Sessions Court placed the burden on the accused and not believed the prosecution version as to the seizure of the suicide note from the scene of offence and gave a reasoning that as A1 and A2 failed to state about handwriting over the suicidal note to the police, disbelieved the same. The reasoning given by the Sessions Court is not in accordance with the law as the burden would not lie on the accused to show that they handed over the suicide note to the police to believe the same as true. 32. Learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Vipin Jaiswal (A-1) v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2013) 3 SCC 684 wherein it was held that : “11. In any case, to hold an accused guilty of both the offences under Sections 304-B and 498A IPC, the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused. From the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, and in particular PW1 and PW4, we find that they have made general allegations of harassment by the appellant towards the deceased and have not brought in evidence of any specific acts of cruelty or harassment by the appellant on the deceased.” 33. In the said case also a suicide note was written by the deceased and it was produced by the accused by examining him as DW1. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that : “14…. It appears from Ext. D19 that the deceased has written the chit according to her free will saying that nobody was responsible for her death and that her parents and family members have harassed her husband and she was taking the step as she was fed up with her life and because of her quarrels were taking place. 15. When the appellant, who is the husband of the deceased, has said in his evidence as DW1 that the aforesaid chit (Ext. 15. When the appellant, who is the husband of the deceased, has said in his evidence as DW1 that the aforesaid chit (Ext. D19) has been written by the deceased herself and has been signed by her and it also appears from his evidence quoted above that he was acquainted with her handwriting and signature, the Trial Court and the High Court could have recorded a finding one way or the other by comparing her handwriting and signature with some of her other handwritings and signatures under Section 73 of the Evidence Act. In the alternative, the Trial Court and the High Court could have sought for an expert's opinion under Section 45 of the Evidence Act on whether the handwriting and signature were that of the deceased. But unfortunately, neither the Trial Court nor the High Court have resorted to these provisions of the Evidence Act and instead by their own imaginary reasoning disbelieved the defence of the appellant that Ext.D19 could not have been written by the deceased. 16. In our considered opinion, the evidence of DW1 (the appellant) and Ext.D19 cast a reasonable doubt on the prosecution story that the deceased was subjected to harassment or cruelty in connection with demand of dowry. In our view, onus was on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the ingredient of Section 498A, IPC and the essential ingredient of offence under Section 498A is that the accused, as the husband of the deceased, has subjected her to cruelty as defined in the Explanation to Section 498A, IPC. Similarly, for the Court to draw the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act that the appellant had caused dowry death as defined in Section 304B, IPC, the prosecution has to prove besides the demand of dowry, harassment or cruelty caused by the accused to the deceased soon before her death. Since the prosecution has not been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt this ingredient of harassment or cruelty, neither of the offences under Sections 498A and 304B, IPC has been made out by the prosecution.” 34. In the present case also, except making vague allegations of harassment by the appellants – accused towards the deceased, nothing was brought in the evidence of PWs.1 to 3 with regard to specific acts of cruelty or harassment of each of the appellants on the deceased. In the present case also, except making vague allegations of harassment by the appellants – accused towards the deceased, nothing was brought in the evidence of PWs.1 to 3 with regard to specific acts of cruelty or harassment of each of the appellants on the deceased. In the present case the suicide note and the diary of the deceased were seized by the prosecution i.e. police itself immediately after the death of the deceased from the scene of offence, but, not subsequently produced by the accused as in the said case and marked through his evidence. In such circumstances also, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the trial court and the High Court ought to have compared the signatures and hand writing of the deceased under Section 73 of the Evidence Act or to have referred it to an expert’s opinion under Section 45 of the Evidence Act. In the present case, the prosecution had referred the suicide note and the diary of the deceased to expert for opinion and the expert also gave opinion that both the handwritings were written by one and the same person. The expert also gave evidence before the court as PW.15. But, the same was not considered by the trial court and instead by its own imaginary reasoning disbelieved the said evidence that it could not have been written by the deceased. When the expert stated that the writings were one and the same, the learned Sessions Judge disbelieved the suicide note observing that it was not signed by the deceased and the writings in the diary were also not signed by the deceased, which is improper. The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor argued that the suicide note was planted, as it was mentioned therein that the deceased admitting about stating lies to her parents, which was not believable. But the said argument of the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor is against the evidence collected by the prosecution itself and lead by the prosecution and stated by the witnesses. No reasoning was given by the Sessions Court for not believing the evidence of PWs.10 and 15. 35. But the said argument of the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor is against the evidence collected by the prosecution itself and lead by the prosecution and stated by the witnesses. No reasoning was given by the Sessions Court for not believing the evidence of PWs.10 and 15. 35. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that the prosecution failed to prove the necessary ingredients of harassment or cruelty, the essential requirements of the offence under Section 498-A IPC and that soon before her death, she was subjected to harassment or cruelty caused by the appellants essential to prove the offence under Section 304-B IPC, to draw the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act that the appellant had caused dowry death as defined under Section 304-B IPC. 36. Learned counsel for the appellants-accused relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhola Ram v. State of Punjab, (2013) 16 SCC 421 , wherein it was held that : “19. In a case of a dowry death, every member of the family may not be fully and equally guilty. The degree of involvement may differ – as an associate, as a silent witness, as a conniving witness and so on. 25. Merely making a demand for dowry is not enough to bring about a conviction under Section 304-B of the IPC. As held in Kans Raj a dowry death victim should also have been treated with cruelty or harassed for dowry either by her husband or a relative. In this case, even assuming the silent or conniving participation of Bhola Ram in the demands for dowry, there is absolutely no evidence on record to suggest that he actively or passively treated Janki Devi with cruelty or harassed her in connection with, or for, dowry. The High Court has, unfortunately, not adverted to this ingredient of an offence punishable under Section 304B of the IPC or even considered it. 26. The High Court has relied on the presumption available under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 to conclude that Janki Devi’s death was a dowry death. However, this presumption cannot be stretched to implicate all and sundry in Darshan Ram’s family in demanding additional dowry from Janki Devi’s family and harassing her and treating her with such cruelty that she had to resort to taking her life. However, this presumption cannot be stretched to implicate all and sundry in Darshan Ram’s family in demanding additional dowry from Janki Devi’s family and harassing her and treating her with such cruelty that she had to resort to taking her life. As mentioned above, there is a possibility of members of the family having varying roles, active and passive. Depending on the nature and extent of involvement, a person may be punished for an offence under Section 498-A or Section 304-B or Section 306 of the IPC or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. A dowry death will not ipso facto suck the husband with all his relatives into the net of Section 304-B of the IPC.” 37. In the present case also there is no evidence with regard to any of the appellants treating the deceased with cruelty or harassing or demanding dowry or additional dowry. No role played by the brothers, sister and mother of A1 and the husband of the sister of A1 was stated by any of the witnesses. Except a vague statement made by PW.1 that all the accused started consuming alcohol jointly demanding the deceased to bring dowry, no specific details were given as to who demanded the deceased to bring dowry or what was the amount demanded or the dates when such demand was made or what was the cruelty or harassment caused to the deceased by any of the appellants. Implicating the appellants as accused and adding Section 304-B IPC by the police in the charge sheet and the trial court convicting the appellants – accused without any specific evidence against any of them is without considering the ingredients of Section 304-B IPC that the deceased shall be subjected to cruelty or harassment and such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with the demand of dowry and the deceased should have been subjected to such cruelty or harassment soon before her death. 38. Learned counsel for the appellants also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Thakkan Jha and others v. State of Bihar, (2004) 13 SCC 348 , wherein it was held that : “7. 38. Learned counsel for the appellants also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Thakkan Jha and others v. State of Bihar, (2004) 13 SCC 348 , wherein it was held that : “7. No presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act would be drawn against the accused if it is shown that after the alleged demand, cruelty or harassment the dispute stood resolved and there was no evidence of cruelty or harassment thereafter. Mere lapse of some time by itself would not provide to an accused a defence, if the course of conduct relating to cruelty or harassment in connection with the dowry demand is shown to have existed earlier in time not too late and not too stale before the date of death of the victim. This is so because the expression used in the relevant provision is 'soon before'. The expression is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. The expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. It cannot be said that the term 'soon before' is synonymous with the term 'immediately before'. This is because of what is stated in Section 114 illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. The determination of the period which can come within the term 'soon before' is left to be determined by the Courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression 'soon before' would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link [see Hira Lal v. State (Government of NCT), Delhi.” 39. In the present case also the prosecution failed to show that there was any proximate and live link between the demand alleged to have been made by the appellants one year or six months prior to the death of the deceased and the death of the deceased. 40. The learned counsel for the appellants also relied upon the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad in Smt. Beila Devi and another v. State of U.P., 2016 SCC OnLine All 103, wherein it was held that : “19. 40. The learned counsel for the appellants also relied upon the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad in Smt. Beila Devi and another v. State of U.P., 2016 SCC OnLine All 103, wherein it was held that : “19. The expression "soon before death" in Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act was considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Hira Lal vs. State (Govt. of NCT) Delhi; 2003 (8) SCC 80 and the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph (9) observed as under:- "9. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of "death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances". The expression "soon before" is very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into service. The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by the prosecution. "Soon before" is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The expression "soon before her death" used in the substantive Section 304B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence [pic]Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression "soon before" is not defined. A reference to the expression "soon before" used in Section 114 Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods "soon after the theft, is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for their possession". It lays down that a court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods "soon after the theft, is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for their possession". The determination of the period which can come within the term "soon before" is left to be determined by the courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression "soon before" would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence." 20. In Kamesh Panjiyar alias Kamlesh Panjiyar vs. State of Bihar, (2005) 2 SCC 388 , the Hon'ble Apex Court considered the expression "soon before death" and held as under:- "......The expression ''soon before' is very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into service. Prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by prosecution. ''Soon before' is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The expression ''soon before her death' used in the substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test......" The same view was expressed in Thakkan Jha & Ors. vs. State of Bihar, (2004) 13 SCC 348 and Baldev Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 13 SCC 233 . 21. The expression ''soon before her death' used in the substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test......" The same view was expressed in Thakkan Jha & Ors. vs. State of Bihar, (2004) 13 SCC 348 and Baldev Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 13 SCC 233 . 21. The above decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court laid down the proximity test i.e. there must be material to show that "soon before her death" the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment "for or in connection with dowry". The facts must show the existence of a proximate live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death of the victim. "Soon before death" is a relative term and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down fixing any time-limit. The determination of the period which can come within the term "soon before death" is left to be determined by the Courts depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 26. An isolated instance of demand of dowry about many years prior to the death cannot be said to construe proximate live link to the death to sustain the conviction of the appellant under Section 304B I.P.C.” 41. Learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the judgment of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Gokul Chandra Chatterjee v. The State, 1950 SCC OnLine Cal 27 for not considering the suicide note written by the deceased, wherein it was held that : “18. There can be no doubt that these letters were written statement made by a person who was dead at the time of the trial. The statement could only be admissible if they were statements made by the deceased as to the cause of her death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her death.” 42. In the present case, the suicide note marked under MO.2 was written by the deceased stating that no one was responsible for her death. The same was admissible under Section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act, but the same was not considered by the trial court. In the present case, the suicide note marked under MO.2 was written by the deceased stating that no one was responsible for her death. The same was admissible under Section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act, but the same was not considered by the trial court. She stated in clear terms that due to her own depression she was dying and asked her father not to blame anybody and not to file any case and not to create any nuisance on her death. Thus, this Court is of the opinion that the trial court committed error in convicting all the appellants for the offence under Section 304-B IPC and also under Section 498-A IPC without there being any evidence of specific instance of cruelty or harassment caused by the appellants to the deceased, particularly, soon before her death. 43. With regard to convicting the appellants for the offence under Section 306 IPC by the trial court, the learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ude Singh and others v. State of Haryana, (2019) 17 SCC 301 wherein it was held that : “16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be a proof of direct or indirect act/s of incitement to the commission of suicide. It could hardly be disputed that the question of cause of a suicide, particularly in the context of an offence of abetment of suicide, remains a vexed one, involving multifaceted and complex attributes of human behaviour and responses/reactions. In the case of accusation for abetment of suicide, the Court would be looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act/s of incitement to the commission of suicide. In the case of suicide, mere allegation of harassment of the deceased by another person would not suffice unless there be such action on the part of the accused which compels the person to commit suicide; and such an offending action ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. Whether a person has abetted in the commission of suicide by another or not, could only be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each case. 16.1 For the purpose of finding out if a person has abetted commission of suicide by another, the consideration would be if the accused is guilty of the act of instigation of the act of suicide. 16.1 For the purpose of finding out if a person has abetted commission of suicide by another, the consideration would be if the accused is guilty of the act of instigation of the act of suicide. As explained and reiterated by this Court in the decisions above-referred, instigation means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. If the persons who committed suicide had been hypersensitive and the action of accused is otherwise not ordinarily expected to induce a similarly circumstanced person to commit suicide, it may not be safe to hold the accused guilty of abetment of suicide. But, on the other hand, if the accused by his acts and by his continuous course of conduct creates a situation which leads the deceased perceiving no other option except to commit suicide, the case may fall within the four-corners of Section 306 IPC. If the accused plays an active role in tarnishing the self-esteem and self-respect of the victim, which eventually draws the victim to commit suicide, the accused may be held guilty of abetment of suicide. The question of mens rea on the part of the accused in such cases would be examined with reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused and if the acts and deeds are only of such nature where the accused intended nothing more than harassment or snap show of anger, a particular case may fall short of the offence of abetment of suicide. However, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted or was provoked, a particular case may be that of abetment of suicide. Such being the matter of delicate analysis of human behaviour, each case is required to be examined on its own facts, while taking note of all the surrounding factors having bearing on the actions and psyche of the accused and the deceased.” 44. There is no evidence in the present case to show that the appellants had instigated the deceased to commit suicide or any positive act was committed by the appellants in provoking, inciting or encouraging the deceased to commit suicide. There is no evidence in the present case to show that the appellants had instigated the deceased to commit suicide or any positive act was committed by the appellants in provoking, inciting or encouraging the deceased to commit suicide. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that mere allegation of harassment of the deceased by another would not suffice unless there be such action on the part of the accused which would compel the person to commit suicide and such offending action also ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence of the suicide by the deceased. 45. The learned counsel for the appellants also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Amalendu Pal Alias Jhantu v. State of West Bengal, (2010) 1 SCC 707 on the aspect that : “12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the Court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without their being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable. 13. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 of IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC.” 46. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC.” 46. Learned counsel for the appellants also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat in Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat and another, (2010) 8 SCC 628 wherein it was held that : “We are convinced that there is absolutely nothing in this suicide note or the FIR which would even distantly be viewed as an offence much less under Section 306, IPC. We could not find anything in the FIR or in the so-called suicide note which could be suggested as abetment to commit suicide. In such matters there must be an allegation that the accused had instigated the deceased to commit suicide or secondly, had engaged with some other person in a conspiracy and lastly, that the accused had in any way aided any act or illegal omission to bring about the suicide.” 47. In the present case also, there is no evidence on record to show that the appellants had instigated the deceased to commit suicide or engaged in any conspiracy or aided by doing any act or by omitting to do any act, to bring about the suicide of the deceased. Thus, this Court is of the view that the Sessions Court erred in convicting the appellants for the offence under Section 306 IPC without there being any evidence in the said regard. 48. Even for convicting the appellants for the offence under Section 4 of the DP Act, the learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Vipin Jaiswal’s case (1 supra), wherein it was held that : “9. We have perused the evidence of PW 1 and PW 4, the father and mother of the deceased respectively. We find that PW 1 has stated that at the time of marriage, gold, silver articles, ornaments, T.V., fridge and several other household articles worth more than Rs.2,50,000/- were given to the appellant and after the marriage, the deceased joined the appellant in his house at Kagaziguda. We find that PW 1 has stated that at the time of marriage, gold, silver articles, ornaments, T.V., fridge and several other household articles worth more than Rs.2,50,000/- were given to the appellant and after the marriage, the deceased joined the appellant in his house at Kagaziguda. He has, thereafter, stated that the appellant used to work in a xerox cum type institute in Nampally and in the sixth month after marriage, the deceased came to their house and told them that the appellant asked her to bring Rs.50,000/- from them as he was intending to purchase a computer and set up his own business. Similarly, PW4 has stated in her evidence that five months after the marriage, the appellant sent her away to their house and when she questioned her, she told that the appellant was demanding Rs.50,000/- and that the demand for money is to purchase a computer to start his own business. Thus, the evidence of PW1 and PW4 is that the demand of Rs.50,000/- by the appellant was made six months after the marriage and that too for purchasing a computer to start his own business. It is only with regard to this demand of Rs.50,000/- that the Trial Court has recorded a finding of guilt against the appellant for the offence under Section 304B, IPC and it is only in relation to this demand of Rs.50,000/- for purchase of a computer to start a business made by the appellant six months after the marriage that the High Court has also confirmed the findings of the Trial Court with regard to guilt of the appellant under Section 304B, IPC. In our view, both the Trial Court and the High Court failed to appreciate that the demand, if at all made by the appellant on the deceased for purchasing a computer to start a business six months after the marriage, was not in connection with the marriage and was not really a 'dowry demand' within the meaning of Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 10. This Court has held in Appasaheb & Anr. Vs. 10. This Court has held in Appasaheb & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra (2007) 9 SCC 721 : “In view of the aforesaid definition of the word "dowry," any property or valuable security should be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly at or before or any time after the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the said parties. Therefore, the giving or taking of property or valuable security must have some connection with the marriage of the parties and a correlation between the giving or taking of property or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential.” 49. In the present case also, the allegation against the appellants was with regard to A1 making a demand of Rs.2.00 lakhs for purchase of a car. The said alleged demand was made five years after the marriage of the deceased with A1. The same was also extracted as an omission. Hence, it cannot be really considered that it was a dowry demand made in connection with the marriage within the meaning of Section 2 of the DP Act. Hence, the conviction and sentence of the appellants for the offence under Section 4 of DP Act is also considered as not maintainable. 50. No documentary evidence was produced by PWs.1 to 3 to show that the appellants made any demand for dowry at the time of marriage and that they paid the same. Except the oral evidence of the witnesses, there is no documentary evidence or photographs filed in the said regard. The complaint made by PW.1 with regard to the demand of dowry at the time of marriage was six years after the alleged demand made by the accused and that too after the death of the deceased. As such, the conviction of the appellant No.1 (A1) for the offence under Section 3 of the DP Act is also considered as illegal. 51. Hence, the conviction of the appellants recorded by the Sessions Court for the offences under Sections 304-B, 306 and 498-A IPC and Sections 4 and 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is considered as not in accordance with the requirements of law and therefore, is liable to be set aside. 52. 51. Hence, the conviction of the appellants recorded by the Sessions Court for the offences under Sections 304-B, 306 and 498-A IPC and Sections 4 and 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is considered as not in accordance with the requirements of law and therefore, is liable to be set aside. 52. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is allowed setting aside the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 07.01.2015 passed in SC No.607 of 2010 by the V Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, (Mahila Court) at Hyderabad recorded against the appellants-accused. The appellants-accused are acquitted for the offences under Sections 304-B, 306 and 498-A IPC and Sections 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and the appellant No.1-A1 also for the offence under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, with which they were charged. The bail bonds of the appellants-accused shall stand cancelled and the fine amount, if any, paid by the appellants-accused shall be refunded to them. Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending shall stand closed.