JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. By way of present petition filed under Art.227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner society has laid challenge to order dated 13.6.2022 passed by respondent No.1, whereby appeal preferred by the respondent No. 3 has been allowed and Resolution No. 1(2), dated 1.4.2022 passed by the petitioner society, thereby accepting the resignation dated 31.3.2022 tendered by respondent No.3, from the post of Salesman in society has been set aside 2. For having bird’s eye view of the matter, relevant facts may be summed up thus. Respondent No.3 Kamal Nain, who was working as a Salesman in petitioner Society since 8.3.2010, tendered a resignation on 31.3.2022 to the President of the society, thereby resigning from the post of Salesman (Annexure P-2). In the end, the respondent No.3 specifically stated that “Mujhe mansik taur se pareshan kiya jar aha hai, jis karan, mein apni naukdi chhod raha hoon.” Accordingly, vide resolution No. 1(2) dated 1.4.2022 passed by the Managing Committee of the petitioner society, the resignation was accepted. Later on, respondent No.3 files an appeal under Clause 21 of the Compendium of Instructions and Working Guidelines issued by Registrar Cooperative Societies, Himachal Pradesh, against the Resolution dated 1.4.2022, on the ground that the resignation tendered by him was not ‘voluntary’ but under duress and as such, same amounts to ‘termination of service’. 3. Petitioner society contested the appeal filed by the respondent No.3 before Registrar Cooperative Societies vide its reply (Annexure P- 5), mainly on the ground that the appeal is not maintainable in view of the fact that the said remedy is only available, if services of a Cooperative Society are terminated or he is dismissed and in the case at hand, respondent No.3 tendered his resignation from the post of Salesman. Besides this, it is averred that the respondent No.3 is habitual of creating problems in the society and has filed various false complaints and also instigated his family to file complaints against the society. Respondent No.1 i.e. Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies Dehra also filed its reply to the appeal and prayed for dismissal of appeal. 4. Besides this, it is averred that the respondent No.3 is habitual of creating problems in the society and has filed various false complaints and also instigated his family to file complaints against the society. Respondent No.1 i.e. Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies Dehra also filed its reply to the appeal and prayed for dismissal of appeal. 4. The appeal filed by respondent No.3 before Registrar Cooperative Societies was further entrusted to respondent No.1, who vide impugned order dated 13.6.2022 allowed the appeal and set aside resolution dated 1.4.2022, against which the petitioner has approached this Court, mainly on the ground that remedy of appeal under Rule 21 of the Primary Agriculture Co-operative Society Rules before Registrar Cooperative Societies is available to an aggrieved person, only in case of termination or dismissal from service. Reference has been made by the petitioner to a decision rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in M/s New Victoria Mills and others v. Shrikant Arya, Civil Appeal No. 5685 of 2021, decided on 27.9.2021 to enure its argument that the resignation once accepted, cannot be withdrawn. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent No.3, Mr. Atharv Sharma, argued that the petitioner society has initiated selection process for the post of Assistant Secretary, against which the respondent No.3 filed an appeal before Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies, who allowed the appeal, which was further challenged by the petitioner society before Additional Registrar Cooperative Societies, Dharamshala, which was allowed. resultantly, the respondent No.3 has filed CWP No. 218 of 2022, which is pending adjudication before this court. He also referred to complaint filed by the respondent No.3 against petitioner society against alleged harassment, in which enquiry is stated to have been initiated and report has been submitted by Enquiry Officer i.e. Inspector Co-operative Societies. Mr. Sharma argued that the petitioner society has left no stone unturned to harass the respondent No.3 and now the petitioner society has engaged a close relative of Secretary. Main stress of Mr. Sharma, however, is on two aspects i.e. whether the resignation tendered by the respondent No.3 is voluntary and another, that whether the appeal under Rule 21 before Registrar Cooperative Societies is maintainable or not. Mr. Sharma referred to the remark made by respondent No.3 in resignation dated 31.3.2022 regarding mental harassment to stress that the resignation is not voluntary rather under duress. Qua another point, Mr. Mr. Sharma referred to the remark made by respondent No.3 in resignation dated 31.3.2022 regarding mental harassment to stress that the resignation is not voluntary rather under duress. Qua another point, Mr. Sharma argued that in the case at hand, resignation is in fact termination of service, which is not with the approval of Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies, connoting it to be termination. 6. In the backdrop of aforesaid, what falls for determination before this court, without going into nitty-gritty’s of the matter is that, whether the resignation is in fact “termination” and if it is so, whether remedy of appeal is available to the respondent No.3 before Registrar Cooperative Societies, as per Rule-21 of the Primary Agriculture Cooperative Society Rules. 7. Having heard Learned Counsel appearing for the parties and perused the material available on record, this court finds that facts, as have been noticed hereinabove, are not in dispute rather the same stand admitted. Careful perusal of the resignation letter tendered by the respondent No.3 (Annexure P-2) clearly reveals that, while tendering resignation, respondent No.3 specifically made note that since he has been mentally tortured and harassed, he is resigning. Apart from above, documents available on record reveal that resignation was tendered vide communication dated 31.3.2022 but the letter seeking permission to withdraw the resignation was submitted on 1.4.2022 but, by that time, petitioner society had accepted the resignation. Petitioner Society, while accepting the resignation dated 31.3.3022 tendered by the respondent No.3 from the post of Salesman, directed him to hand over charge of the balance stock to the Managing Committee on or before 7.4.2022. Though, having carefully perused Rule-4 of the Primary Agriculture Co-operative Society Rules, this court finds merit in the submission of learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the appeal against termination or dismissal from service lies but definitely not against acceptance of resignation, however, this court cannot lose sight of the fact that since the resignation is nowhere defined under the aforesaid Rules, party being aggrieved of acceptance of resignation cannot be left remediless. 8. Though, Mr. Saklani, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner is right in contending that the resignation once accepted cannot be withdrawn but, record clearly reveals that resignation tendered on account of mental harassment was sought to be withdrawn by respondent No.3 on 1.4.2022, on which, date, allegedly the petitioner society accepted the resignation. 8. Though, Mr. Saklani, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner is right in contending that the resignation once accepted cannot be withdrawn but, record clearly reveals that resignation tendered on account of mental harassment was sought to be withdrawn by respondent No.3 on 1.4.2022, on which, date, allegedly the petitioner society accepted the resignation. Though, respondent No.3 before acceptance of resignation had made request for its withdrawal, but said request was not considered and the petitioner society after having accepted the resignation, directed respondent no.3 to hand over charge to the society. Needless to say, it has been repeatedly held by Hon'ble Apex Court and other Constitutional Courts that in order to constitute a complete and operative resignation, there must be an intention to relinquish or give up the office. Forced resignation cannot be termed as voluntary resignation. Resignation tendered under duress or obtained by the employer in any other manner would amount to termination of services by the employer. 9. Though, Mr. Saklani vehemently argued that the resignation was tendered by respondent No.3 of his own volition and without there being any coercion and duress, but having perused the reply filed by Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies to the appeal filed by respondent No.3 before Joint Registrar (Credit) Cooperative Societies, Himachal Pradesh, this court is persuaded to agree with Mr. Atharv Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent No.3, that respondent No.3 was being harassed and humiliated constantly by the petitioner society. Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies, Dehra in para-3 of the reply to the appeal has admitted that respondent No.2 i.e. petitioner society had been harassing and humiliating the appellant (respondent No.3) without there being any reason or rhyme. Besides above, aforesaid authority has further stated in its reply that the matter was enquired and a detailed report was prepared qua the same. Enquiry Officer visited the spot on 13.4.2022 and 25.4.2022 respectively. Though efforts were made to resolve the dispute inter se respondent No.3 and the petitioner society, but the matter could not be resolved. It appears that respondent No.3 had also applied for the post of Assistant Secretary but he despite being eligible, was not offered appointment, as a result of which, he was compelled to approach this Court. Probably, being unhappy with the aforesaid act of respondent No.3, petitioner society had been harassing respondent No.3 mentally, who thereafter was compelled to tender his resignation, Annexure P-2. 10. Probably, being unhappy with the aforesaid act of respondent No.3, petitioner society had been harassing respondent No.3 mentally, who thereafter was compelled to tender his resignation, Annexure P-2. 10. It is none of the case of the petitioner society that note given in the resignation letter with regard to mental harassment was added later on by respondent No.3. Though, Mr. Saklani, while referring to the resignation letter, attempted to argue that the aforesaid note was added on 1.4.2022 and signatures below the same are of respondent No.3, but having perused the aforesaid note given in the resignation letter, this court finds no merit in the aforesaid plea of Mr. Saklani, rather, perusal of the aforesaid note clearly reveals that the same was put on the same date when resignation was tendered and signatures below the note are not of respondent No.3, rather of some other person. Since the resignation was not ‘voluntary’ but on account of harassment, as is evident from the note given in the resignation, Joint Registrar Cooperative Societies rightly held the case of the petitioner to be of constructive dismissal. Since resignation is not absolutely voluntary, unequivocal and intentional, rather the same is the result of mental harassment as stands duly established on record from the reply filed by Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the authority, while passing the impugned order. Relevant para of reply filed by Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies in the appeal, is reproduced herein below: “Para 3: That the contents of para no. 3 of the appeal are admitted to the extent that respondent no.2 had been harassing and humiliating the appellant without there being any rhyme or reason as alleged. It is admitted to the extent that appellant filed and application before replying respondent and matter was inquired by the respondent no.1 and a detailed report was prepared qua the same. Ti is submitted here that inquiry officer visited the spot on 13/04/2022 and 25/04/2022. Notice was issued to both the parties and they appeared before the inquiry office. It is submitted here that despite various effort the dispute between the appellant and respondent no.2 could not solved. It is further submitted here that respondent no.2 was directed to reconsider the resignation letter of appellant.” 11. Notice was issued to both the parties and they appeared before the inquiry office. It is submitted here that despite various effort the dispute between the appellant and respondent no.2 could not solved. It is further submitted here that respondent no.2 was directed to reconsider the resignation letter of appellant.” 11. Direction of petitioner society to the respondent No.3 to hand over charge on or before 7.4.2022 amounts to termination. If it is so, respondent No.3 rightly filed an appeal under Rule 21 of the Rules. 12. Reliance is placed upon a judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Dharamvir Singh Tyagi, 1986 (Supp) SCC 665, whereby Hon'ble Apex Court having taken note of the fact that the petitioner in that case was made to resign during the period of emergency on the ground that he would be taken into custody, observed that resignation being not voluntary, amounts to termination. Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: “1. The respondent was a lecturer in one of the intermediate colleges in Uttar Pradesh. He faced certain proceedings and was put under suspension but later he was reinstated on April 3, 1976. It was alleged by him that on the following day he was sent for by the management and taking advantage of the fact that it was the period of emergency, he was threatened to resign otherwise he was told that he would be taken into custody. Respondent 1 took the stand that under the threat he resigned. Immediately after emergency was over he made representation to the District Inspector of Schools disclosing his stand that the resignation was not a valid one as it had been taken under threat. The District Inspector accepted the stand of the respondent and directed reinstatement on April 10, 1978. On the same date Respondent 1 reported to duty. Against this order the management preferred an appeal to the Regional Deputy Director of Education. It is alleged that on the following date, i.e April 11, 1978 the District Inspector had recalled his order of reinstatement against which the petitioner filed a writ petition and that was allowed. The High Court has held that the order of the District Inspector recalling the order of restoration to service was bad. It is alleged that on the following date, i.e April 11, 1978 the District Inspector had recalled his order of reinstatement against which the petitioner filed a writ petition and that was allowed. The High Court has held that the order of the District Inspector recalling the order of restoration to service was bad. While disposing of the writ petition the High Court found that the management had preferred an appeal which was still pending with the Deputy Director and the same should be disposed of. The Deputy Director in due course allowed the appeal and vacated the order of the District Inspector. Thereupon Respondent 1 preferred a fresh writ petition to the High Court which has succeeded. That has brought about this appeal by special leave. 2. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at some length we think it unnecessary to get into the exercise of finding out whether the District Inspector's order was amenable to an appeal under the Service Rules. The High Court has taken the view that the impugned order of the District Inspector was not open to appeal to the Regional Deputy Director. We leave that question to be agitated in an appropriate case, if necessary. In the facts of the case we are inclined to agree with the counsel for the respondent that the order of the High Court should be allowed to work out and Respondent 1 who is already in service should be continued. There is also the question as to whether he should be paid salary for the period for which he was not actually working. In view of the finding of the District Inspector of Schools which has been approved by the High Court that it was not a case of voluntary resignation but under threat Respondent 1 had been made to resign, we are inclined to agree with the counsel for the respondent that the full salary should be admissible. Steps shall now be taken to ensure payment of full salary. Respondent 1 will be entitled to continuity of service. Appeal is disposed of accordingly. Parties shall bear their own costs.” 13. Reliance is also placed upon a judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Moti Ram v. Pararm Dev, (1993) 2 SCC 725, wherein it has been held that the resignation means spontaneous relinquishment or giving up an office. Respondent 1 will be entitled to continuity of service. Appeal is disposed of accordingly. Parties shall bear their own costs.” 13. Reliance is also placed upon a judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Moti Ram v. Pararm Dev, (1993) 2 SCC 725, wherein it has been held that the resignation means spontaneous relinquishment or giving up an office. It has been categorically held in the aforesaid judgment that in order to constitute a complete and operative resignation, there must be intention to give up or relinquish the office and the concomitant act of its relinquishment. Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: “16. As pointed out by this court, 'resignation' means the spontaneous relinquishment of one's own right and in relation to an office, it connotes the act of giving up or relinquishing the office. It has been held that in the general juristic sense, in order to constitute a complete and operative resignation there must be the intention to give up or relinquish the office and the concomitant act of its relinquishment. It has also been observed that the act of relinquishment may take different forms or assume a unilateral or bilateral character, depending on the nature of the office and the conditions governing it. (See : Union of India v. Shri Gopal Chandra Misra & Ors., [1978] 3 SCR 12 at p. 21). If the act of relinquishment is of unilateral character, it comes into effect when such act indicating the intention to relinquish the office is communicated to the competent authority. The authority to whom the act of relinquishment is communicated is not required to take any action and the relinquishment takes effect from the date of such communication where the resignation is intended to operate in prasenti. A resignation may also be prospective to be operative from a future date and in that event it would take effect from the date indicated therein and not from the date of communication. In cases where the act of relinquishment is of a bilateral character, the communication of the intention to relinquish, by itself, would not be sufficient to result in relinquishment of the office and some action is required to be taken on such communication of the intention to relinquish, e.g., acceptance of the said request to relinquish the office, and in such a case the relinquishment does not become effective or operative till such action is taken. As to whether the act of relinquishment of an office is unilateral or' bilateral in character would depend upon the nature of the office and conditions governing it. Under the Constitution of India there are various offices which can be relinquished by unilateral act of the holder of the office and acceptance of resignation is not required, e.g., President [Article 56(a)]. Vice-President [Article 67(a)], Deputy Chairman of Rajya Sabha [Article 90(b)], Speaker and Deputy Speaker of Lok Sabha [Article 94(b)], Judge of the Supreme Court [Article 124(2)(a)], Judge of a High Court [Article 217 (1)(a)]. As regards member of either House of Parliament or a member of a House of Legislature of a State, originally, the position was that he could resign his office by unilateral act and the acceptance of resignation was not required.” 14. High Court of Bombay in Shriram Swami Shikshan Sanstha v. Education Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur, 1983 0 Supreme (Bom) 63, in similar facts, held that forced case of resignation amounts to ‘termination’. It has been further held in the aforesaid judgment that the resignation not voluntarily given by the employee but is brought about by force, duress or in any other manner by the employer is by the act of the employer, amounts to termination. High Court of Bombay held as under: “5. We have, therefore, to consider the question whether the employee can move the Tribunal under S. 9 of the Act in the case of an alleged forced resignation. The language used in S. 9 of the Act covers not only dismissal and removal but all forms of termination of service. On behalf of the petitioner, a decision of the Karnataka High Court in M/s. Southern Roadways Ltd., Bangalore v. Padmanabhan, (1979 Lab I.C. 234) arising under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is relied upon to show that the phraseology "or otherwise terminates the services" covers the case of forced resignation and, therefore, a reference under S. 2-A read with S. 10 of the Act is maintainable in the case of a forced resignation. We fell that it is a well settled proposition of law that a forced resignation, which means a resignation not voluntarily given by the employee but is brought about by force, duress or in any other manner by the employer is by the act of the employer. We fell that it is a well settled proposition of law that a forced resignation, which means a resignation not voluntarily given by the employee but is brought about by force, duress or in any other manner by the employer is by the act of the employer. In substance the contract of service comes to an end in such case by the action on the part of the employer. It, therefore, amounts to termination of service by the employer. In the decision of the Karnataka High Court (cited supra), the Court was considering the phraseology "otherwise terminates the services" used in S. 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. A similar phraseology is used in S. 9(1) of the Act. We are in agreement with the view taken by the Karnataka High Court in the decision cited supra. We are supported in this view also by an old decision by the Additional Judicial Commissioner in Abraham Reuben v. Karachi Municipality (A.I.R. 1929 Sin. 69), which has relied upon an English decision in Stephenson v. London Joint Stock Bank Ltd. (1903) 52 W.R. 183). We therefore, hold that the phraseology "whose services are otherwise terminated" used in S. 9(1) of the Act covers cases of forced resignation and, therefore, in such matters, an employee can move the Tribunal under S. 9(1) of the Act. In the circumstances, we allow this petition and set aside the impugned order of the Additional Education Officer dated 3rd December, 1982 and the memo dated 30th December, 1982 issued by him pursuant to his aforesaid impugned order dated 3rd December, 1982. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a). No order as to costs.” 15. Consequently, in view of above, I find no merit in the present petition and the same is dismissed. Order dated 13.6.2022 passed by Joint Registrar (Credit) Cooperative Societies, Himachal Pradesh, Shimla is upheld. The petition stands accordingly disposed of alongwith all pending applications.