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2022 DIGILAW 805 (HP)

Prem Chand v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board

2022-12-09

SATYEN VAIDYA

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JUDGMENT : Satyen Vaidya, J. By way of instant petition, petitioners have prayed for following substantive reliefs:- i) That the respondent-Board may be directed to issue the final seniority list of Assistant Engineers (Electrical), forthwith. ii) That the respondent-Board may be directed to give the seniority to the applicants as Assistant Engineers (Electrical) since 27.04.1992/May 1992, vide A-3 which was followed without break, continuously and uninterruptedly till regularization on 31.12.1997, vide A-4 for all intends and purposes, forthwith. iii) That the action of the respondent-Board in not holding the DPC for regular promotions since April, 1992 till December, 1997, only to deny the regular promotion and seniority w.e.f. date of initial appointment/promotion on 27.04.1992 vide A-3/May 1992, may be declared illegal and unconstitutional forthwith. iv) That in the alternative, the respondent-Board may be directed to hold review DPC or to give promotion as Assistant Engineers (Electrical) as per the R&P Rules being a ‘selection post’ by applying the criteria as in the OM, dated ¾.11.1981 vide A-8 and by giving due weightage to the factum of performing arduous and higher nature of duties on higher posts vis-à-vis the persons working on the lower posts, forthwith. v) That the ‘Provisional Seniority List’ of Assistant Engineers (Electrical) issued on 1.1.2005 vide A-6 in determining the Seniority from 31.12.1997, i.e. the date of regular promotion as per A-4, may be declared illegal and may be quashed and set aside. 2. The initial appointment of petitioners in respondent No.1-Board was as Junior Engineers (Electrical) [for short, ‘JE(E)’]. During service, they acquired higher qualification of ‘AMIE’. The next promotional post available to the petitioners was that of Assistant Engineer (Electrical) [for short, ‘AE(E)’] 3. As per Recruitment and Promotion Rules for the post of AE(E), 54% by direct recruitment and 46% by promotion was the prescribed method of recruitment. In case of recruitment by promotion, 6% quota was available to the Junior Engineers (Degree Holder) with two years service in the cadre. Similarly, 6% quota was available for those JEs(E) who passed Section ‘A’ and ‘B’ AMIE during service period. Remaining 34% quota was available to other categories and further reference to them may not be relevant for the decision of instant case. 4. Similarly, 6% quota was available for those JEs(E) who passed Section ‘A’ and ‘B’ AMIE during service period. Remaining 34% quota was available to other categories and further reference to them may not be relevant for the decision of instant case. 4. Respondent No. 1, vide Office Order No. 59, dated 27.04.1992, ordered the JE(E) AMIE including petitioners to look after the works of Sub Divisions/Units mentioned against their names till those posts were filled up on regular basis. It was clearly mentioned that the arrangement was purely stop gap and incumbents listed in the order would not be entitled to claim seniority etc. of the post of AE (E). Petitioners and all others mentioned in the aforesaid order were held entitled to 20% activity allowance of their basic pay or the pay to which they would have been entitled had they been appointed in the normal course to the post of AE(E) whichever was less. 4. Petitioners were promoted as AEs (E) on regular basis, vide office order dated 31.12.1997. Their promotion was to take effect from 20.12.1997 or from the date of taking over of charge by them, which ever was later. Petitioners accepted the promotion orders and joined in pursuance thereto. 5. Petitioners approached the erstwhile Himachal Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal by way of Original Application in November, 2006 by raising following contentions: (i) Provisional seniority list issued by respondent No.1-Board of AE(E) on 01.01.2005 showing the seniority of the petitioners as AEs (E) from the date of their regularization was wrong and illegal as they were entitled to be conferred seniority w.e.f 27.04.1992, when they were deputed to look after the works of Sub Divisions. (ii) Since, the post of AE (E) was a selection post, the process of promotion was to be undertaken necessarily by following the principle of merit-cum-seniority. (iii) Respondent No.1-Board had failed to convene the meetings of DPC for regular promotions to the posts of AE(E) since April, 1992 till December 1997, only to deny the petitioners regular promotion and seniority w.e.f. 27.04.1992. 6. Respondent No. 1 has contested the claim of the petitioners on the following grounds:- (i) Petitioners and others were ordered to look after the affairs of Sub Divisions, vide office order dated 27.04.1992 only as stop gap arrangement purely on temporary basis and no procedural requirements as prescribed /laid down under relevant R&P Rules/selection principle were followed. 6. Respondent No. 1 has contested the claim of the petitioners on the following grounds:- (i) Petitioners and others were ordered to look after the affairs of Sub Divisions, vide office order dated 27.04.1992 only as stop gap arrangement purely on temporary basis and no procedural requirements as prescribed /laid down under relevant R&P Rules/selection principle were followed. Petitioners and others were entitled to get 20% activity allowance of their basic pay or the pay to which they would have been entitled, had they been appointed in the normal course to the post of AE (E) which ever was less. Petitioners had not acquired any right to claim seniority and condition to that effect was explicitly mentioned in the office order dated 27.04.1992. The necessity for such stop gap arrangement was to meet the emergent situation as the works in the field, Sub Divisions were suffering badly for non-availability of the AE(E) as there was no direct recruitment since long. (ii) The direct recruitment for the post of AE(E) was last made in the year 1988-89 and thereafter no such recruitment was made till 1998 due to imposition of complete ban. Consequently, about 130 vacancies of A E (E) fell to the share of Graduate Engineers to be appointed by method of direct recruitment. In the meeting of “Full Board” held on 03.12.1997, it was decided to fill 106 vacancies available from the quota of direct recruitment by promotion by granting one-time relaxation in R & P Rules. (iii) Accordingly, Class-I DPC met on 20.12.1997 and ordered the promotion of 106 JE(E) to the post of AE (E) on regular basis. DPC specifically noted that since the promotions were being ordered in bulk, the general instructions for filing up selection post were not being applied in order to avoid supersessions. (iv) Petitioners did not fall in the zone of consideration as per batch-wise seniority for the vacancies available upto 31.12.1992, hence, they continued working as AEs(E) on acting basis. As per instructions dated 18.08.1995, the seniority of Junior Engineers AMIE was to be drawn as per length of service in the grade and not on the basis of date of acquisition of AMIE. (v) The instructions dated 18.08.1995 were made effective retrospectively w.e.f 01.01.1993. As per instructions dated 18.08.1995, the seniority of Junior Engineers AMIE was to be drawn as per length of service in the grade and not on the basis of date of acquisition of AMIE. (v) The instructions dated 18.08.1995 were made effective retrospectively w.e.f 01.01.1993. Prior to these instructions, the seniority of JE(E), who had acquired AMIE degree during service was considered from the date of acquisition of AMIE degree, however, as per instructions dated 18.08.1995, the seniority was to be based on the date of induction in the cadre of Junior Engineers (Electrical). (vi) The other counter parts of the petitioners, who had qualified AMIE, Section ‘A’ and ‘B’ examination prior to them and were senior to the petitioners as per seniority list dated 17.07.1995 were also promoted purely on acting/ad-hoc basis. Their officiation on acting/ad-hoc basis from 1986 onwards continued till such time vacancies for them were available/regular DPC was held and were accordingly promoted on regular basis only in the years 1994 and 1995. 7. During the pendency of the petition and by way of rejoinder petitioners raised another contention that the private respondents (subsequently impleaded) were not entitled to be placed seniors to the petitioners as they were granted promotion by ignoring the principle of merit-cum-seniority. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the case carefully. 9. Petitioners themselves have placed reliance on the office order No. 59, dated 27.04.1992 by way of which they were ordered to look after the works of Sub Divisions. Evidently, while deputing petitioners on abovesaid ad-hoc assignments due procedure for consideration of incumbents for promotion to the post of AE (E) was not adopted. In such fact situation, the question that arises for determination is whether such ad-hoc appointments of petitioners would be sufficient for them to fetch the benefit of seniority as AE(E)? 10. A Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers’ Association Vs. State of Maharashtra and others (1990) 2 SCC 175 has held as under:- “13. When the cases were taken up for hearing before us, it was faintly suggested that the principle laid down in Patwardhan's case was unsound and fit to be over-ruled, but no attempt was made to substantiate the plea. State of Maharashtra and others (1990) 2 SCC 175 has held as under:- “13. When the cases were taken up for hearing before us, it was faintly suggested that the principle laid down in Patwardhan's case was unsound and fit to be over-ruled, but no attempt was made to substantiate the plea. We were taken through the judgment by the learned counsel for the parties more than once and we are in complete agreement with the ratio decidendi, that the period of continuous officiation by a government servant, after his appointment by following the rules applicable for substantive appointments, has to be taken into account for determining his seniority; and seniority cannot be determined on the sole test of confirmation, for, as was pointed out, confirmation is one of the inglorious uncertainties of government service depending neither on efficiency of the incumbent nor on the availability of substantive vacancies. The principle for deciding inter se seniority has to conform to the principles of equality spelt out by articles 14 and 16. If an appointment is made by way of stop-gap arrangement, without considering the claims of all the eligible available persons and without following the rules of appointment, the experience on such appointment cannot be equated with the experience of a regular appointee, because of the qualitative difference in the appointment. To equate the two would be to treat two un-equals as equal which would violate the equality clause. But if the appointment is made after considering the claims of all eligible candidates and the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularization of his service in accordance with the rules made for regular substantive appointments, there is no reason to exclude the officiating service for purpose of seniority. Same will be the position if the initial appointment itself is made in accordance with the rules applicable to substantive appointments as in the present case. To hold otherwise will be discriminatory and arbitrary. This principle has been followed in innumerable cases and has been further elaborated by this Court in several judgments including those in Baleshwar Dass v. State of U.P. and others, [1981] 1 SCR 449 and Delhi Water Supply and Sewage Disposal Committee and others v. R.K. Kashyap and others, [1989] Supp. 1 SCC 194, with which we are in agreement. This principle has been followed in innumerable cases and has been further elaborated by this Court in several judgments including those in Baleshwar Dass v. State of U.P. and others, [1981] 1 SCR 449 and Delhi Water Supply and Sewage Disposal Committee and others v. R.K. Kashyap and others, [1989] Supp. 1 SCC 194, with which we are in agreement. In Narender Chadha and others v. Union of India and others, [ 1986] 1 SCR 211, the officers were promoted all though without following the procedure prescribed under the rules, but they continuously worked for long periods of nearly 15-20 years on the posts without being reverted. The period of their continuous officiation was directed to be counted for seniority as it was held that any other view would be arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16. There is considerable force in this view also. We, therefore, confirm the principle of counting towards seniority the period of continuous officiation following an appointment made in accordance with the rules prescribed for regular substantive appointments in the service. 47. To sum up, we hold that: (A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation. The corollary of the above rule is that where the initial appointment is only ad-hoc and not according to rules and made as a stop-gap arrangement, the officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority. (B) If the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules but the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularization of his service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service will be counted. (C) When appointments are made from more than one source, it is permissible to fix the ratio for recruitment from the different sources, and if rules are framed in this regard they must ordinarily be followed strictly. (D) If it becomes impossible to adhere to the existing quota rule, it should be substituted by an appropriate rule to meet the needs of the situation. In case, however, the quota rule is not followed continuously for a number of years because it was impossible to do so the inference is irresistible that the quota rule had broken down. (D) If it becomes impossible to adhere to the existing quota rule, it should be substituted by an appropriate rule to meet the needs of the situation. In case, however, the quota rule is not followed continuously for a number of years because it was impossible to do so the inference is irresistible that the quota rule had broken down. (E) Where the quota rule has broken down and the appointments are made from one source in excess of the quota, but are made after following the procedure prescribed by the rules for the appointment, the appointees should not be pushed down below the appointees from the other source inducted in the service at a later date. (F) Where the rules permit the authorities to relax the provisions relating to the quota, ordinarily a presumption should be raised that there was such relaxation when there is a deviation from the quota rule. (G) The quota for recruitment from the different sources may be prescribed by executive instructions, if the rules are silent on the subject. (H) If the quota rule is prescribed by an executive instruction, and is not followed continuously for a number of years, the inference is that the executive instruction has ceased to remain operative. (I) The posts held by the permanent Deputy Engineers as well as the officiating Deputy Engineers under the State of Maharashtra belonged to the single cadre of Deputy Engineers. (J) The decision dealing with important questions concerning a particular service given after careful consideration should be respected rather than scrutinized for finding out any possible error. It is not in the interest of Service to unsettle a settled position. With respect to Writ Petition No. 1327 of 1982, we further hold: (K) That a dispute raised by an application under article 32 of the Constitution must be held to be barred by principles of res judicata including the rule of constructive res judicata if the same has been earlier decided by a competent court by a judgment which became final. 11. Thus, it is clear that if an appointment is made by way of stop gap arrangement without considering the claims of all the eligible available persons and without following the rules of appointment, the experience on such appointment cannot be equated with the experience of a regular appointee, because of the qualitative difference in the appointment. 12. 11. Thus, it is clear that if an appointment is made by way of stop gap arrangement without considering the claims of all the eligible available persons and without following the rules of appointment, the experience on such appointment cannot be equated with the experience of a regular appointee, because of the qualitative difference in the appointment. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioners, on the other hand, has placed reliance on following extract from judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and Another Vs. Harish Chander Bhatia and Others reported in (1995) 2 SCC 48 :- “7. Shri Tulsi, however, contends that Rule 25 visualizes officiating appointment and not permanent; and that appointment is required to be made when a member of the Service is not available. Though this is so, but the facts of the present case would show that though the appointments were stated to be officiating these continued for a very long period, which in the case of Respondent 1 was of about 12 years as he came to be appointed under Rule 25 on 6-11-1972 and was fixed permanently in the slot meant for promotees on 28-7-1984. An officiating appointment for over a decade cannot be treated as fleeting appointment with no service benefits to be given. Any other view would very seriously prejudice such a service-holder who, even after having rendered service equal to those of permanent appointees for a long period, and that too for proper functioning of the Service, would be denied the benefit of the same for no cogent reasons. Any other view is bound to have a demoralising effect in the Service as a whole. As the appointments under Rule 25 are also to duty posts, which may form part of the strength of Service because what has been stated in Rule 4(3), we are of the view that justice of the case and the need to preserve the efficient functioning of the Service would require to treat the appointments of the respondents as permanent, despite their having been first appointment on officiating basis.” 13. After going through the aforesaid judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners, I have no hesitation to say that the same will not be helpful to further the cause of the petitioners for the reason that it also applied the same principles of law as enunciated by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers’ Association case (supra). In the facts of Harish Chander Bhatia (supra), the initial appointments of respondents therein were held to have been made in accordance with the rules i.e. Delhi and Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Police Service Rules, 1971. It was in such background that the above quoted para-7 came into being. 14. The method of recruitment to the post of AE (E) in respondent No. 1/Board as per R&P Rules provided 54% by direct recruitment and 46% by way of promotion. Out of posts to be filled by promotion further allocation of category wise quota was prescribed and only 6% quota in promotional posts was available to those JE (E), who had acquired AMIE during service. Similarly, other feeding categories were also apportioned their separate quota. In view of above situation, the promotion against each quota was to be made as per availability of vacancies in each respective quota. There is nothing on record to prove that the petitioners were asked to look after the works of Sub Divisions by promoting them on ad-hoc basis against their respective quota. 15. In light of above exposition as also the available fact situation, petitioners herein are not entitled to seek seniority as AE(E) from the dates when they were promoted on ad-hoc and acting basis merely as stop gap arrangement. 16. The contention of the petitioners that since they had indulged in arduous and continuous job as AE(E) since 27.04.1992 till 31.12.1997, they were entitled for grant of seniority as AE (E) w.e.f 27.04.1992, also deserves to be rejected for the same aforesaid reason that their ad-hoc promotion was only a stop gap arrangement and since such officiation was without adherence to the rules of promotion, mere continuation on such stop gap arrangement would not make petitioners entitled for seniority. 17. It has next been contended on behalf of the petitioners that respondent No. 1/Board is liable to be directed to hold review DPC by applying the principle of merit-cum-seniority. Such contention also deserves rejection. 17. It has next been contended on behalf of the petitioners that respondent No. 1/Board is liable to be directed to hold review DPC by applying the principle of merit-cum-seniority. Such contention also deserves rejection. It is the admitted case of parties that the promotions of petitioners to the post of AE (E) on regular basis w.e.f. 31.12.1997 were not against 6% quota meant for them, but was against the vacant posts from the quota of direct recruits and the same was also the result of one-time relaxation granted by respondent No. 1/Board in R&P Rules. Having reaped benefits of promotion against the quota meant for direct recruits, the petitioners cannot raise the issue with respect to non-adherence to the principle of merit-cum-seniority, especially, when the DPC convened for such purpose had specifically noted that the principle applicable for selection posts would not be adhered to as the promotions were being made in bulk keeping in view the specific exigency. 18. Petitioners have also submitted that the private respondents were also granted promotions without observance to the principle of merit-cum-seniority. It is contended by petitioners that they should also have been considered while making promotion during the year 1994 and 1995 as they were falling in the zone of consideration. Petitioners had not laid any factual foundation in the petition so as to succeed even on such count. No such prayer is made by the petitioners in the petition, rather they have alleged to the contrary that DPC was not convened between 1992 to 1997 in order to deny the petitioners their due right of consideration. Even otherwise, the petitioners cannot raise such a belated claim having once accepted their promotion in pursuance to order dated 31.12.1997. 19. Respondent No. 1/Board has also prayed to defeat the claim of the petitioners on the ground of delay and latches. The objection of respondent No. 1 is not without substance. Petitioners were promoted vide order dated 31.12.1997 and in pursuance thereto, they joined as AE(E) on regular basis. They were fully aware at the time of acceptance of such promotion that they were not granted any benefit retrospectively w.e.f. 17.04.1992 as there was no such stipulation in their promotion order. The objection of respondent No. 1 is not without substance. Petitioners were promoted vide order dated 31.12.1997 and in pursuance thereto, they joined as AE(E) on regular basis. They were fully aware at the time of acceptance of such promotion that they were not granted any benefit retrospectively w.e.f. 17.04.1992 as there was no such stipulation in their promotion order. In absence of such stipulation, it cannot be said that the petitioners still anticipated to be granted seniority as AE(E) w.e.f. 17.04.1992 especially when they were promoted against the quota meant for direct recruitment. The circulation of provisional seniority list dated 01.01.2005, thus would not have given any fresh cause of action to the petitioners. The claim of the petitioners is thus, also held to be suffering from vice of delay and latches. 20. In view of above discussion, there is no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s) if any, also stands disposed of.