JUDGMENT Subba Reddy Satti, J. Plaintiff in O.S. No. 42 of 2006 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Puttur filed the above second appeal. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties to this judgment are referred to as they were arrayed in the plaint. 3. Plaintiff filed suit O.S. No. 42 of 2006 seeking partition of plaint schedule properties. Plaintiff and 2nd defendant are daughters of late Anandaiah and 1st defendant. 3rd defendant is sister of said Anandaiah and 4th defendant is her husband. Defendants 5 and 6 are followers of defendants 3 and 4. 4. In the plaint, it was contended inter alia that Anandaiah died on 23.07.2005 leaving behind plaintiff, defendants 1 and 2 as his legal heirs; that plaint schedule properties are the ancestral properties of plaintiff, defendants 1 and 2 and they have been in possession and enjoyment of the same along with late Anandaiah; that defendants 3 and 4, sister and brother-in-law of late Anandaiah, taking advantage of his vices, causing lot of troubles and creating several nominal documents; that the plaintiff is not aware of the nominal documents; that Anandaiah had no exclusive right to execute any document; that the plaintiff got married in the year 1998 and started residing at Chennai with her husband; that late Anandaiah, is under the control of defendants 3 and 4, never cared to look after the welfare of plaintiff, defendants 1 and 2 and that defendants 1 and 2 joined hands with defendants 3 and 4 to deprive the rights of the plaintiff. Hence, plaintiff filed the suit for partition of plaint schedule properties into three equal shares and to allot one such share to the plaintiff by metes and bounds and also to grant permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering or dispossessing plaintiff's joint possession of the plaint schedule properties. 5. Two items are shown in plaint schedule. Item No. 1 consists of different extents of land in different survey numbers, in total Ac. 4.76 cents of land along with RCC roofed shed, coconut trees, three bore wells, three 7.5 HP motors with electricity service connections. Item No. 2 is RCC building bearing Door No. 8-141. 6. 2nd Defendant filed written statement and supported the case of the plaintiff. 7. 3rd Defendant filed written statement and the same was adopted by defendants 4 to 6. Item No. 2 is RCC building bearing Door No. 8-141. 6. 2nd Defendant filed written statement and supported the case of the plaintiff. 7. 3rd Defendant filed written statement and the same was adopted by defendants 4 to 6. In the written statement, it was contended inter alia that an extent of Ac. 0.18 cents in S. No. 243/3 and well, pipes and service connection and shed with 3 HP motor; Ac. 0.65 cents in S. No. 243/2; Ac. 0.80 cents in S. No. 243/8, Ac. 0.65 cents in S. No. 243/9, Ac. 0.10 cents in S. No. 243/4, Ac. 0.21 cents in S. No. 243/6, Ac. 0.17 cents in S. No. 243/7, Ac. 0.11 cents in S. No. 243/12, Ac. 0.10 cents in S. No. 243/13, Ac. 0.43 cents in S. No. 243/14 and Ac. 0.34 cents in S. No. 243/15 shown in item No. 1 of plaint schedule are the self-acquired properties of late Anandaiah; that on 06.07.1988 and 05.10.1990 the said Anandaiah sold the properties in favour of 3rd defendant for necessities and family expenses under a registered sale deed; that 3rd defendant has been in possession and enjoyment of the same; that Ac. 0.72 cents in S. No. 241/2, Ac. 0.31 cents in S. No. 242/7 in item No. 1 of plaint schedule belonged to N. Rajappa Naidu, N. Jayachandran, N. Gopal, N. Devarajulu and N. Kesavulu, who in turn sold the said properties to 3rd defendant under a registered sale deed dated 13.12.1993 along with Ac. 0.38 cents in S. No. 242/8; that the revenue authorities issued pattadar pass book and title deed after due enquiry; that item No. 2 of plaint schedule belonged to A.R. Adam Sahib; that after his death, his sons A.R. Jailabuddin, A.R. Samsudeen, A.R. Shalaludeen sold away the said property in favour of 3rd defendant under a registered sale deed dated 22.12.1993; that the plaintiff in collusion with defendants 1 and 2 filed the above suit; that the suit is barred by limitation and eventually, prayed to dismiss the suit. 8. Basing on the pleadings of respective parties, the trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree directing the division of the plaint schedule properties into three equal shares and allot one such share by metes and bounds to the plaintiff by considering good and bad qualities of plaint schedule properties? 8. Basing on the pleadings of respective parties, the trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree directing the division of the plaint schedule properties into three equal shares and allot one such share by metes and bounds to the plaintiff by considering good and bad qualities of plaint schedule properties? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for grant of permanent injunction as prayed for? (3) Whether the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts as pleaded by defendants 2 to 6? (4) Whether there is no cause of action to file the suit as pleaded by defendants 3 to 6? (5) Whether the suit is barred by limitation as pleaded by defendants 3 to 6? (6) To what relief? 9. During the trial, plaintiff examined herself as P.W. 1 and got marked Exs. A-1 to A-6. On behalf of defendants, 3rd defendant examined herself as D.W. 1 and got examined D.Ws. 2 and 3. Exs. B-1 to B-6 were marked. 10. Trial Court on consideration or oral and documentary evidence, dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 24.02.2011. Trial Court came to the conclusion that father of plaintiff Anandaiah got properties under Ex. A-1 registered settlement deed executed by A. Nadamuni Naidu and hence, those properties settled by virtue of Ex. A-1 are the separate properties of Anandaiah and they do not constitute ancestral properties. Trial Court also came to conclusion that the plaintiff failed to prove that the sale deeds are nominal documents and the plaintiff omitted to include one more house property in her village in the plaint schedule. Trial Court also came to conclusion that properties purchased by 3rd defendant alone are shown in plaint as schedule properties. By recording the said findings, the trial Court dismissed the suit. 11. Against the said judgment and decree, plaintiff filed appeal A.S. No. 75 of 2011 on the file of X Additional District Judge, Tirupathi. Lower appellate Court, being the final fact finding Court on consideration of entire evidence, both oral and documentary and also legal aspects, dismissed the appeal vide judgment and decree dated 16.07.2018. Lower appellate Court also recorded finding that the grandfather of plaintiff gifted the landed properties in favour of father of plaintiff under Ex. A-1 and hence, those properties cannot be treated as ancestral properties. Lower appellate Court also recorded finding that the grandfather of plaintiff gifted the landed properties in favour of father of plaintiff under Ex. A-1 and hence, those properties cannot be treated as ancestral properties. Lower appellate Court also recorded finding that the plaintiff did not mention in the plaint that the properties gifted to her father are treated as ancestral properties and eventually, dismissed the appeal. Assailing the same, the above second appeal is filed. 12. Heard Sri. T.C. Krishnan, learned counsel for appellant and Sri. V. Eswaraiah Chowdary, learned counsel appearing on behalf of contesting respondents. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the Courts below failed to consider the material evidence and came to wrong conclusion. He would submit that the documents stands in the name of 3rd defendant are not supported by any consideration and they are nominal and sham documents. He would also submit that the properties devolved upon Anandaiah and 1st defendant by virtue of settlement deed are ancestral properties and they cannot be treated as separate properties of Anandaiah. He also would contend that neither the plaintiff nor defendants 1 and 2 are parties to the documents, wherein Anandaiah sold the properties and hence, they do not bind the parties and he thus, prayed this Court to allow the second appeal. 14. Learned counsel for contesting respondents supported the judgments of the Courts below. 15. Scope of Sec 100 of Code of Civil Procedure was considered by Hon'ble Apex Court in number of decision. In Hero Vinoth Vs. Seshammal AIR 2009 SC 1481 , it was held thus: '19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court will not be interfered by the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court will not be interfered by the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court will, however, interfere where it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at by ignoring material evidence. It was furthermore held: 23. To be 'substantial' a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law 'involving in the case' there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. (See Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari. 24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC, relevant for this case, may be summarized thus:- (i)... (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. (See Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari. 24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC, relevant for this case, may be summarized thus:- (i)... (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law.' 16. In the light of the expressions of Hon'ble Apex Court on the scope of interference by the High Court in second appeal, this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of CPC must confine to the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the concurrent findings of the Court below where the Courts below have exercised the discretion judicially. Further the existence of substantial question of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction. This Court cannot substitute its own opinion unless the findings of the Court are manifestly perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. 17. Going by the pleadings, admitted facts are that A. Nadamuni Naidu, father of Anandaiah settled the properties under Ex. A-1 in favour of Anandaiah in the year 1968. Whatever properties purchased by D3 from Anandiah were shown in item No. 1 of plaint schedule. 3rd Defendant purchased Ac. 0.72 cents in S. No. 241/2 and Ac. 0.31 cents in S. No. 242/7 from N. Rajappa Naidu and others under a registered sale deed dated 13.12.1993 and those properties were also shown in item No. 1 of plaint schedule. Whatever properties purchased by D3 from Anandiah were shown in item No. 1 of plaint schedule. 3rd Defendant purchased Ac. 0.72 cents in S. No. 241/2 and Ac. 0.31 cents in S. No. 242/7 from N. Rajappa Naidu and others under a registered sale deed dated 13.12.1993 and those properties were also shown in item No. 1 of plaint schedule. 3rd Defendant also purchased item No. 2 from A.R. Jailabuddin and others under a registered sale deed dated 22.12.1993 and the same was shown as item No. 2 of plaint schedule. The ancestral house wherein defendants 1 and 2 have been residing was not shown as one of the items in the plaint schedule. 18. Whether the property settled in favour of Anandaiah by A. Nadamuni Naidu would be treated as ancestral properties or as separate properties of Anandaiah? 19. Property inherited by a person from his father, or father's father or father's great grandfather or property allotted at a partition, is his ancestral property. In that property, his own son, son's son or son's son's son acquires by birth Coparcenary rights. It is, therefore, Co-parcenery property. Subsequent to the passing of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act 2005, the daughters of a Coparcener are having equal rights along with other coparceners. Accretions to coparcenary property, such as purchases made with the income of the coparcener property are also co-parcenery property. 20. When the self-acquired property of a father devolves on his son, it becomes under Shastric Hindu law, Joint family property in the hands of his son, so that his son/s entitled to a right by birth. This law is changed as a result of Section 8 of Hindu Succession Act 1956. Property which a son inherits from his father's father becomes only his self acquired property. He inherits along with his brothers, sisters and mother also. 21. As discussed supra, under Ex. A-1 A. Nadamuni Naidu gifted the properties to Anandaiah and whatever properties Anandaiah got under Ex. A-1 become his self acquired properties. It is not the case of the plaintiffs that the properties gifted to Anandaiah were treated as joint family properties. No pleading or evidence regarding blending of properties acquired by Anandaiah under Ex A-1 with other properties. 22. Plaintiff as P.W. 1 in her evidence deposed that plaint schedule properties are self acquired properties of her grandfather, who settled some properties under Ex. No pleading or evidence regarding blending of properties acquired by Anandaiah under Ex A-1 with other properties. 22. Plaintiff as P.W. 1 in her evidence deposed that plaint schedule properties are self acquired properties of her grandfather, who settled some properties under Ex. A-1 in favour of his three sons. She also deposed that she does not know as to which of the schedule properties covered under Ex. A-1 had fallen to the share of her father. She also admitted that her father purchased residential house in the village and defendants 1 and 2 are residing in the said house. She also deposed that no document was filed to establish that her father purchased other items of plaint schedule properties out of income derived from B schedule properties. Therefore, the plaintiff failed to establish that item Nos. 1 and 2 of plaint schedule properties are ancestral properties and she is entitled for a share in the said properties. 23. Plaintiff having pleaded that plaint schedule properties are ancestral properties failed to discharge burden lies on her. Plaintiff also pleaded that registered documents in the name of D3 are sham and nominal. Having been pleaded that Exs B-1 to B-4 are sham and nominal plaintiff failed to prove that registered sale deeds Exs B-1 to B-4 are nominal or sham. Under Sec 101 of Indian Evidence Act, the burden of proof lies on plaintiff to prove that plaint schedule properties are ancestral properties and Ex B-1 to B-4 are sham and nominal. However, plaintiff failed to prove the same by leading evidence. Thus, the findings of fact recorded by both the courts below are based on appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence as also the legal aspects. 24. It is pertinent to mention here that the house which was purchased by Anandaiah was not shown as one of the item in the plaint schedule. Admittedly, defendants 1 and 2 are residing in the said house. 25. The findings of the fact recorded by the Courts below are based on oral and documentary evidence on record. No questions of law much less substantial questions of law involved in the second appeal warranting interference under Sec 100 CPC. Hence, the appeal is liable to be dismissed, however, without costs. 26. Accordingly, the second appeal is dismissed at admission stage. No order as to costs. No questions of law much less substantial questions of law involved in the second appeal warranting interference under Sec 100 CPC. Hence, the appeal is liable to be dismissed, however, without costs. 26. Accordingly, the second appeal is dismissed at admission stage. No order as to costs. As a sequel, all the pending miscellaneous applications shall stand closed.