ORDER : The present interlocutory application is filed by the Petitioner herein (Respondent No. 5 in E.P. No. 1 of 2022) who was the Returning Officer for the Member of Legislative Council Elections, Adilabad Constituency to strike off his name from the array of parties in E.P. No. 1 of 2022. 2. Heard Mr. Avinash Desai learned counsel for the Petitioner herein, Mr. Ghanshyamdas Mandhani learned counsel representing Mr. Bankatlal Mandhani for Respondent No. 1 herein and Mr. B. Nalin Kumar learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 herein. 3. Facts of the case: i) Election petition bearing E.P. No. 1 of 2022 was filed by Respondent No. 1 herein challenging the election of Mr. Vithal Dande (Respondent No. 2 herein) as Member of Legislative Council, Adilabad Constituency as void. ii) In the said election petition, Respondent No. 1 herein contends that he had filed his nomination on 23.11.2021 and after scrutiny of the same it was found to be in order. The name of Respondent No. 1 was reflected in the list of validly nominated candidates dated 23.11.2021. However, on 26.11.2021, Respondent No. 1 found out that his name was missing in the final list of candidates. On enquiry, Respondent No. 1 found out that one Mr. Kishan Singari (Respondent No. 6 herein), who was one of his proposers in the nomination, withdrew his nomination by forging his signature and falsely claiming that he was authorized to withdraw the nomination. iii) According to Respondent No. 1, he immediately raised a complaint with the Petitioner herein who was the returning officer on the same day i.e., 26.11.2021 by sending a WhatsApp message and by submitting a representation. Further, Respondent No. 1 claims that he had submitted another representation dated 27.11.2021 to the Petitioner herein seeking certified copies of his nomination form and the alleged forged withdrawal forms submitted by the said Kishan Singari i.e., respondent No.6 herein, but the same were not furnished. iv) Subsequently, the election was conducted for the post of Member of Legislative Council, Adilabad and vide Gazette Notification No. 65 dated 15.12.2021, Respondent No. 2 herein was declared as the returned candidate. v) Respondent No. 1 contends that due to the actions of the Petitioner herein he was deprived from contesting the said election, despite his nomination being in order. Therefore, he has filed E.P. No. 1 of 2022. v) Respondent No. 1 contends that due to the actions of the Petitioner herein he was deprived from contesting the said election, despite his nomination being in order. Therefore, he has filed E.P. No. 1 of 2022. In the said E.P. No. 1 of 2022, Respondent No. 1 herein had arrayed all the candidates to the election as parties along with the Petitioner herein. The Petitioner herein was arrayed as Respondent No. 5 in the election petition. Therefore, the Petitioner herein, in the present interlocutory application, challenges his arrayment as one of the Respondent in the election petition on the ground that he is not a necessary party. 4. Contentions of the Petitioner (Returning Officer): i) As per Section 82 and Section 86(4) of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act, 1951’) only candidates who have contested elections can be arrayed as party to an election petition. A Returning Officer cannot be made a party to an election petition even if allegations of corrupt practices are levelled against him/her. Reliance was placed on Michael B. Fernandes v. C.K. Jajjar Sharief, (2002) 3 SCC 521 , B. Sundara Rami Reddy v. Election Commission of India 1991 Supp (2) SCC 624 , Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghoshal, (1982) 1 SCC 691 and Baadi Reddy Appanna Dora v. AtchamambaKorpu, AIR 2003 AP 368 . ii) The allegations of corrupt practices against a Returning Officer shall be dealt in accordance with Section 99 of the Act, 1951 at the conclusion of the trial. Reliance was placed on Election Officer v. Parbhatbhai v. Savabhai Patel, MANU/GJ/1304/2020and Jyoti Basu (supra). iii) Therefore, the name of the Petitioner herein shall be struck off from the array of Respondents in the election petition. 5. Contentions of Respondent No. 1 (Election Petitioner): i) Respondent No. 1 in paragraph Nos.7 to 16 of E.P. No. 1 of 2022, has specifically pleaded that the Petitioner herein has failed to perform his duty under Section 37 of the Act, 1951 which obligated him to verify the genuineness and veracity of the withdrawal of nomination forms allegedly submitted by Respondent No. 6. The action of the Petitioner amounts to abdication of duty in collusion with Respondent No. 6 and Respondent No. 2 and the same constitutes a ‘corrupt practice’. The action of the Petitioner amounts to abdication of duty in collusion with Respondent No. 6 and Respondent No. 2 and the same constitutes a ‘corrupt practice’. ii) As per Section 83 of the Act, 1951, the allegations and names of the people involved in corrupt practices were specifically pleaded. Therefore, the Petitioner herein was arrayed as a respondent. Reliance was placed on Ajay Maken v. Adesh Kumar Gupta, (2013) 3 SCC 489 . iii) Relying on Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh, 1954 SCR 892 , it was contended that the array of parties as mentioned in Section 82 of the Act, 1951 is not final and conclusive. iv) The decisions relied upon by the Petitioner herein are not applicable to the facts of the present case as the said decisions did not consider Section 83 of the Act, 1951. 6. Findings of the court: i) From the facts and contentions of the parties herein, the question before this Court is whether a returning officer can be arrayed as a necessary party to an election petition if the alleged corrupt practice involves illegal withdrawal of nomination form. Before deciding the said issue, it is apposite to discuss the relevant statutory provisions of the Act, 1951 pertaining to joinder of parties along with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the same. The relevant provisions are extracted below: “79 (b). “candidate” means a person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate at any election; 82. Parties of the petition.—A petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition— (a) where the petitioner, in addition to claiming declaration that the election of all or any of the returned candidates is void, claims a further declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected, all the contesting candidates other than the petitioner, and where no such further declaration is claimed, all the returned candidates; and (b) any other candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made in the petition. 83. 83. Contents of petition.—(1) An election petition— (a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies; (b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice; and (c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for the verification of pleadings: Provided that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. (2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition. 86. Trial of election petitions.—(1) The High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117. Explanation.—An order of the High Court dismissing an election petition under this sub-section shall be deemed to be an order made under clause (a) of Section 98. (2) As soon as may be after an election petition has been presented to the High Court, it shall be referred to the Judge or one of the Judges who has or have been assigned by the Chief Justice for the trial of election petitions under sub-section (2) of Section 80-A. (3) Where more election petitions than one are presented to the High Court in respect of the same election, all of them shall be referred for trial to the same Judge who may, in his discretion, try them separately or in one or more groups. (4) Any candidate not already a respondent shall, upon application made by him to the High Court within fourteen days from the date of commencement of the trial and subject to any order as to security for costs which may be made by the High Court, be entitled to be joined as a respondent. (4) Any candidate not already a respondent shall, upon application made by him to the High Court within fourteen days from the date of commencement of the trial and subject to any order as to security for costs which may be made by the High Court, be entitled to be joined as a respondent. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section and of Section 97, the trial of a petition shall be deemed to commence on the date fixed for the respondents to appear before the High Court and answer the claim or claims made in the petition. (5) The High Court may, upon such terms as to costs and otherwise as it may deem fit, allow the particulars of any corrupt practice alleged in the petition to be amended or amplified in such manner as may in its opinion be necessary for ensuring a fair and effective trial of the petition, but shall not allow any amendment of the petition which will have the effect of introducing particulars of a corrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition. (6) The trial of an election petition shall, so far as is practicable consistently with the interests of justice in respect of the trial, be continued from day to day until its conclusion, unless the High Court finds the adjournment of the trial beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded. (7) Every election petition shall be tried as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to conclude the trial within six months from the date on which the election petition is presented to the High Court for trial. 87. Procedure before the High Court.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the High Court, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) to the trial of suits: Provided that the High Court shall have the discretion to refuse, for reasons to be recorded in writing, to examine any witness or witnesses if it is of the opinion that the evidence of such witness or witnesses is not material for the decision of the petition or that the party tendering such witness or witnesses is doing so on frivolous grounds or with a view to delay the proceedings. (2) The provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be deemed to apply in all respects to the trial of an election petition. 98. Decision of the High Court.—At the conclusion of the trial of an election petition the High Court shall make an order— (a) dismissing the election petition; or (b) declaring the election of all or any of the returned candidate to be void; or (c) declaring the election of all or any of the returned candidates to be void and the petitioner or any other candidate to have been duly elected; 99. Other orders to be made by the High Court.—(1) At the time of making an order under Section 98 the High Court shall also make an order— (a) where any charge is made in the petition of any corrupt practice having been committed at the election, recording— (i) a finding whether any corrupt practice has or has not been proved to have been committed at the election, and the nature of that corrupt practice; and (ii) the names of all persons, if any, who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of any corrupt practice and the nature of that practice; and (b) fixing the total amount of costs payable and specifying the persons by and to whom costs shall be paid: Provided that a person who is not a party to the petition shall not be named] in the order under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) unless— (a) he has been given notice to appear before the High Court and to show cause why he should not be so named; and (b) if he appears in pursuance of the notice, he has been given an opportunity of cross-examining any witness who has already been examined by the High Court and has given evidence against him, of calling evidence in his defence and of being heard. (2) In this section and in Section 100, the expression “agent” has the same meaning as in Section 123.” ii) It is clear from the above provisions that Section 82 of the Act, 1951 provides who shall be arrayed as parties to an election petition. It states that all the contesting candidates and the candidates against whom allegations of corrupt practices exist shall be made parties to the election petition. It states that all the contesting candidates and the candidates against whom allegations of corrupt practices exist shall be made parties to the election petition. Further, Section 86(4) of the Act, 1951 provides that any other candidate who has not been made a respondent can implead himself/herself as a party. It is relevant to note that Section 82 and Section 86(4) of the Act, 1951 only permits candidates to be made parties. The term ‘candidate’ is defined under Section 79(b) of the Act, 1951 and it says any person who is duly nominated or a person who claims to have been duly nominated. A joint reading of Sections 82 and 86(4) of the Act, 1951 indicates that only candidates who have been nominated or claim to have been nominated and who have contested an election can be arrayed as parties. iii) The same view was taken by the Supreme Court in Jyoti Basu (supra). In the said decision, along with the candidates, the Chief Minister and two Ministers of the State Government were arrayed as respondents to the election petition alleging that they were involved in corrupt practices. The election petitioner therein contended that since allegations of corrupt practices existed against the Chief Minister and the Ministers, they were necessary and proper parties. The Supreme Court rejected the contention of the election petitioner therein and held that only candidates as mentioned under Section 82 and Section 86(4) of the Act, 1951 can be necessary parties to the election petition and no others. iv) The Apex Court noted that the concept of proper parties as provided under the Code of Civil Procedure is alien to an election petition. The reasoning behind restricting the array of parties only to candidates mentioned in Section 82 and Section 86(4) of the Act, 1951 was that all the people (who may run into hundreds) involved in corrupt practices cannot be tried in the six-month time period prescribed to decide the election petition. Further, the Court therein noted that high public functionaries like Chief Minister cannot be made parties to an election petition merely on allegations of corrupt practices. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below: “8. A right to elect, fundamental though it is to democracy, is, anomalously enough, neither a fundamental right nor a common law right. It is pure and simple, a statutory right. So is the right to be elected. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below: “8. A right to elect, fundamental though it is to democracy, is, anomalously enough, neither a fundamental right nor a common law right. It is pure and simple, a statutory right. So is the right to be elected. So is the right to dispute an election. Outside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right to be elected and no right to dispute an election. Statutory creations they are, and therefore, subject to statutory limitation. An election petition is not an action at common law, nor in equity. It is a statutory proceeding to which neither the common law nor the principles of equity apply but only those rules which the statute makes and applies. It is a special jurisdiction, and a special jurisdiction has always to be exercised in accordance with the statute creating it. Concepts familiar to common law and equity must remain strangers to election law unless statutorily embodied. A court has no right to resort to them on considerations of alleged policy because policy in such matters as those, relating to the trial of election disputes, is what the statute lays down. In the trial of election disputes, court is put in a strait-jacket. Thus the entire election process commencing from the issuance of the notification calling upon a constituency to elect a member or members right up to the final resolution of the dispute, if any, concerning the election is regulated by the Representation of the People Act, 1951, different stages of the process being dealt with by different provisions of the Act. There can be no election to Parliament or the State Legislature except as provided by the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and again, no such election may be questioned except in the manner provided by the Representation of the People Act. So the Representation of the People Act has been held to be a complete and self-contained code within which must be found any rights claimed in relation to an election or an election dispute. We are concerned with an election dispute. The question is who are parties to an election dispute and who may be impleaded as parties to an election petition. We have already referred to the scheme of the Act. We have noticed the necessity to rid ourselves of notions based on common law or equity. We are concerned with an election dispute. The question is who are parties to an election dispute and who may be impleaded as parties to an election petition. We have already referred to the scheme of the Act. We have noticed the necessity to rid ourselves of notions based on common law or equity. We see that we must seek an answer to the question within the four corners of the statute. What does the Act say? 9. Section 81 prescribes who may present an election petition. It may be any candidate at such election; it may be any elector of the constituency; it may be none else. Section 82 is headed “Parties to the petition” and clause (a) provides that the petitioner shall join as respondents to the petition the returned candidates if the relief claimed is confined to a declaration that the election of all or any of the returned candidates is void and all the contesting candidates if a further declaration is sought that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected. Clause (b) of Section 82 requires the petitioner to join as respondent any other candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made in the petition. Section 86(4) enables any candidate not already a respondent to be joined as a respondent. There is no other provision dealing with the question as to who may be joined as respondents. It is significant that while clause (b) of Section 82 obliges the petitioner to join as a respondent any candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made in the petition, it does not oblige the petitioner to join as a respondent any other person against whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made. It is equally significant that while any candidate not already a respondent may seek and, if he so seeks, is entitled to be joined as a respondent under Section 86(4), any other person cannot, under that provision seek to be joined as a respondent, even if allegations of any corrupt practice are made against him. It is clear that the contest of the election petition is designed to be confined to the candidates at the election. All others are excluded. The ring is closed to all except the petitioner and the candidates at the election. It is clear that the contest of the election petition is designed to be confined to the candidates at the election. All others are excluded. The ring is closed to all except the petitioner and the candidates at the election. If such is the design of the statute, how can the notion of “proper parties” enter the picture at all? We think that the concept of “proper parties” is and must remain alien to an election dispute under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Only those may be joined as respondents to an election petition who are mentioned in Section 82 and Section 86(4) and no others. However desirable and expedient it may appear to be, none else shall be joined as respondents.” 10. It is said, the Civil Procedure Code applies to the trial of election petitions and so proper parties whose presence may be necessary in order to enable the court “effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved” may be joined as respondents to the petitions. The question is not whether the Civil Procedure Code applies because it undoubtedly does, but only “as far as may be” and subject to the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the Rules made thereunder. Section 87(1) expressly says so. The question is whether the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code can be invoked to permit that which the Representation of the People Act does not. Quite obviously the provisions of the Code cannot be so invoked. In Mohan Raj v. Suendra Kumar Taparia [ AIR 1969 SC 677 : (1969) 1 SCR 630 : (1969) 2 SCJ 198 ] this Court held that the undoubted power of the Court (i.e. the Election Court) to permit an amendment of the petition cannot be used to strike out allegations against a candidate not joined as a respondent so as to save the election petition from dismissal for nonjoinder of necessary parties. It was said: “The court can order an amendment and even strike out a party who is not necessary. But where the Act makes a person a necessary party and provides that the petition shall be dismissed if such a party is not joined, the power of amendment or to strike out parties cannot be used at all. It was said: “The court can order an amendment and even strike out a party who is not necessary. But where the Act makes a person a necessary party and provides that the petition shall be dismissed if such a party is not joined, the power of amendment or to strike out parties cannot be used at all. The Civil Procedure Code applies subject to the provisions of the Representation of the People Act and any rules made thereunder (see Section 87). When the Act enjoins the penalty of dismissal of the petition for non-joinder of a party the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be used as a curative means to save the petition.” Again, in K. Venkateswara Rao v. Bekkam Narasimha Reddi [ AIR 1969 SC 872 : (1969) 1 SCR 679 : (1969) 2 SCJ 505 ] it was observed: “With regard to the addition of parties which is possible in the case of a suit under the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 subject to the added party's right to contend that the suit as against him was barred by limitation when he was impleaded, no addition of parties is possible in the case of an election petition except under the provisions of subsection (4) of Section 86.” 11. The matter may be looked at from another angle. Parliament has expressly provided that an opportunity should be given to a person who is not a candidate to show cause against being “named” as one guilty of a corrupt practice. Parliament however, has not thought fit to expressly provide for his being joined as a party to the election petition either by the election petitioner or at the instance of the very person against whom the allegations of a corrupt practice are made. The right given to the latter is limited to show cause against being “named” and that right opens up for exercise when, at the end of the trial of the election petition notice is given to him to show cause why he should not be “named”. The right does not extend to participation at all stages and in all matters, a right which he would have if he is joined as a party at the commencement. The right does not extend to participation at all stages and in all matters, a right which he would have if he is joined as a party at the commencement. Conversely the election petitioner cannot by joining as a respondent a person who is not a candidate at the election subject him to a prolonged trial of an election petition with all its intricacies and ramifications. One may well imagine how mischievous minded persons may harass public personages like the Prime Minister of the country, the Chief Minister of a State or a political leader of a national dimension by impleading him as a party to election petitions, all the country over. All that would be necessary is a seemingly plausible allegation, casually or spitefully made, with but a facade of truth. Everyone is familiar with such allegations. To permit such a public personage to be impleaded as a party to an election petition on the basis of a mere allegation, without even prima facie proof, an allegation which may ultimately be found to be unfounded, can cause needless vexation to such personage and prevent him from the effective discharge of his public duties. It would be against the public interest to do so. The ultimate award of costs would be no panacea in such cases, since the public mischief cannot be repaired. That is why Public Policy and legislative wisdom both seem to point to an interpretation of the provisions of the Representation of the People Act which does not permit the joining, as parties, of persons other than those mentioned in Sections 82 and 86(4). It is not as if a person guilty of a corrupt practice can get away with it. Where at the concluding stage of the trial of an election petition, after evidence has been given, the court finds that there is sufficient material to hold a person guilty of a corrupt practice, the court may then issue a notice to him to show cause under Section 99 and proceed with further action. Where at the concluding stage of the trial of an election petition, after evidence has been given, the court finds that there is sufficient material to hold a person guilty of a corrupt practice, the court may then issue a notice to him to show cause under Section 99 and proceed with further action. In our view the legislative provision contained in Section 99 which enables the court, towards the end of the trial of an election petition, to issue a notice to a person not a party to the proceeding to show cause why he should not be “named” is sufficient clarification of the legislative intent that such person may not be permitted to be joined as a party to the election petition. 13. In view of the foregoing discussion we are of the opinion that no one may be joined as a party to an election petition otherwise than as provided by Sections 82 and 86(4) of the Act. It follows that a person who is not a candidate may not be joined as a respondent to the election petition. The appeal is therefore, allowed with costs and the names of the appellants and the 7th respondent in the appeal are directed to be struck out from the array of parties in the election petition. We may mention that in arriving at our conclusion we have also considered the following decisions cited before us: S.B. Adityan v. S. Kandaswami [ AIR 1958 Mad 171 : ILR 1958 Mad 279 : (1958) 1 Mad LJ 61] ; Dwijendra Lal Sen Gupta v. HarekrishnaKonar [ AIR 1963 Cal 218 : 66 Cal WN 917] , H.R. Gokhale v. BharuchaNoshir C. [ AIR 1969 Bom 177 : 70 Bom LR 466] ; and S. Iqbal Singh v. S. Gurdas Singh Badal [AIR 1973 P & H 163 : ILR (1972) 1 Punj 554]. v) Further, the view expressed in Jyoti Basu (supra) was followed in B. Sundara Rami Reddy (supra) and was subsequently affirmed by a Full Bench of the Supreme Court in Michael B. Fernandes (supra). In Michael B. Fernandes (supra), the Returning Officer was arrayed as one of the respondents for not following the relevant provisions of the Act, 1951. The Appellant therein contended that though the Returning Officer was not a necessary party, he was a proper party under the Code of Civil Procedure. In Michael B. Fernandes (supra), the Returning Officer was arrayed as one of the respondents for not following the relevant provisions of the Act, 1951. The Appellant therein contended that though the Returning Officer was not a necessary party, he was a proper party under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court rejected the said contention and held as follows: “……………..Part VI starting with Section 79 deals with disputes regarding elections. Under Section 80 of the Act, no election shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this part. Presentation of petition is dealt with in Section 81 and such petition could be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-section (1) of Section 100 and Section 101. Section 82 stipulates as to who shall join as respondents to an election petition. Section 82 may be quoted hereinbelow in extenso: “82. Parties of the petition.—A petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition— (a) where the petitioner, in addition to claiming declaration that the election of all or any of the returned candidates is void, claims a further declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected, all the contesting candidates other than the petitioner, and where no such further declaration is claimed, all the returned candidates; and (b) any other candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made in the petition.” Section 83 provides as to what should be contained in an election petition and Section 86 in Chapter III deals with trial of election petitions. Section 87 is the procedure for such trial and it provides that every election petition shall be tried as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to the trial of suits. As stated earlier, Section 100 indicates the grounds on which an election can be declared to be void and Section 101 indicates the grounds on which a candidate other than the returned candidate may be declared to have been elected. We are not concerned with the other provisions of the Act in the case in hand. As stated earlier, Section 100 indicates the grounds on which an election can be declared to be void and Section 101 indicates the grounds on which a candidate other than the returned candidate may be declared to have been elected. We are not concerned with the other provisions of the Act in the case in hand. An appeal to the Supreme Court has been provided under Section 116-A. On a plain reading of Section 82, which indicates as to the person who can be joined as a respondent to an election petition, the conclusion is irresistible that the returned candidate, the candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practice have been made is to be joined as party-respondent when declaration is sought for holding the election of the returned candidate to be void and when a prayer is made as to any other candidate to be declared to be duly elected, then all the contesting candidates are required to be made party-respondents. On a literal interpretation of the aforesaid provisions of Section 82, therefore, it can be said that an election petition which does not make the persons enumerated in Section 82 of the Act, as party-respondents, is liable to be dismissed. The two decisions of this Court directly on the question are the cases of Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal [ (1982) 1 SCC 691 ] and B. Sundara Rami Reddy v. Election Commission of India [1991 Supp (2) SCC 624]. In the former case, Chinnappa Reddy, J., speaking for the Court, held that right to elect or to be elected or dispute regarding election are neither fundamental rights nor common law rights but are confined to the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder and consequently, rights and remedies are all limited to those provided by the statutory provisions. On the question of joinder of parties, referring to Sections 82 and 86(4) of the Representation of the People Act, it was held that the contest of the election petition is designed to be confined to the candidates at the election and all others are excluded and, therefore, only those may be joined as respondents to an election petition, who are mentioned in Sections 82 and 86(4) and no others. An argument had been advanced in that case that even if somebody may not be a necessary party under Section 82 of the Act, but yet he could be added as a proper party as provided in Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the Court rejected that contention on a finding that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code apply to election disputes only as far as may be and subject to the provisions of the Act and any rules made thereunder and the provisions of the Code cannot be invoked to permit that which is not permissible under the Act. It was in that context the Court further observed that the concept of “proper parties” is and remains alien to an election dispute under the Act. This decision was followed in B. Sundara Rami Reddy case [1991 Supp (2) SCC 624] referred to supra and it was reiterated that the concept of “proper party” is and must remain alien to an election dispute under the Act and only those may be joined as respondents to an election petition, who are mentioned in Sections 82 and 86(4) of the Act and no others. The Court in this case added that however desirable and expedient it may appear to be, none else shall be joined as the respondents. Mr Venkataramani, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that the law enunciated in the two decisions and the observations made are too wide and while Section 82 casts an obligation on an election petitioner to join those mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) as party-respondent, it does not put an embargo for addition of any other person in an appropriate case, depending upon the nature of allegation made and consequently, the expression “any other” in the two decisions referred to above, must be held not to have been correctly used. Mr Venkataramani relied upon the observations made by this Court in M.S. Gill case [Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr., (1978) 1 SCC 405 : (1978) 2 SCR 272 ] wherein the Court had observed that the Constitution contemplates a free and fair election and vests comprehensive responsibilities of superintendence, direction and control of the conduct of elections in the Election Commission. This responsibility may cover powers, duties and functions of many sorts, administrative or other, depending on the circumstances and submitted that the basis of electoral democracy being a free and fair election and fairness imports an obligation to see that no wrongdoer candidate benefits from his own wrong. In case where allegations are made against the Returning Officer or the Chief Electoral Officer with regard to the conduct of the election, there should be no bar to array them as parties and according to Mr Venkataramani in Gill case [Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr., (1978) 1 SCC 405 : (1978) 2 SCR 272 ] the Chief Election Commissioner was a party and, therefore, this Court in Jyoti Basu [ (1982) 1 SCC 691 ] as well as the subsequent case, having not noticed the aforesaid judgment of the larger Bench, the latter decision will be of no assistance. We are not in a position to accept the submission of Mr Venkataramani inasmuch as in Gill case [Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr., (1978) 1 SCC 405 : (1978) 2 SCR 272 ] an order of the Election Commissioner was under challenge by filing a writ petition and it was not an election petition under the provisions of the Representation of the People Act. There is no dispute with the proposition that a free and fair electoral process is the foundation of our democracy, but the question for consideration is, whether by indicating in the Act as to who shall be arrayed as party, the court would be justified in allowing some others as parties to an election petition. For the aforesaid proposition, Gill case [Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr., (1978) 1 SCC 405 : (1978) 2 SCR 272 ] is no authority. Mr Venkataramani then relied upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Dwijendra Lal Sen Gupta v. HarekrishnaKonar [ AIR 1963 Cal 218 : 66 CWN 917] where the question came up for consideration directly and the Calcutta High Court did observe that the Returning Officer may nevertheless in an appropriate case be a “proper party” who may be added as party to the election petition and undoubtedly, the aforesaid observation supports the contention of Mr Venkataramani. Following the aforesaid decision, a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of H.R. Gokhale v. Bharucha Noshir C. [ AIR 1969 Bom 177 : 70 Bom LR 466] had also observed that the observations of Shah, J. in Ram Sewak Yadav case [Ram Sewak Yadav v. Hussain Kamil Kidwai, AIR 1964 SC 1249 ] in paragraph 6 are not intended to lay down that the Returning Officer can in no event be a proper party to an election petition. But both these aforesaid decisions of Calcutta High Court [ AIR 1963 Cal 218 : 66 CWN 917] and Bombay High Court [ AIR 1969 Bom 177 : 70 Bom LR 466] had been considered by this Court in Jyoti Basu case [ (1982) 1 SCC 691 ] and the Court took the view that the public policy and legislative wisdom both seem to point to an interpretation of the provisions of the Representation of the People Act which does not permit the joining, as parties, of persons other than those mentioned in Sections 82 and 86(4). The Court also in paragraph 12 considered the consequences if persons other than those mentioned in Section 82 are permitted to be added as parties and held that the necessary consequences would be an unending, disorderly election dispute with no hope of achieving the goal contemplated by Section 86(6) of the Act. In the aforesaid premises, we reiterate the views taken by this Court in Jyoti Basu case [ (1982) 1 SCC 691 ] and reaffirmed in the later case in B. Sundara Rami Reddy [1991 Supp (2) SCC 624] and we see no infirmity with the impugned judgment, requiring our interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. This appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.” vi) It is relevant to note that Section 83(1)(b) of the Act, 1951 indicates that the election petition shall contain all the details including the names of the parties and the nature of corrupt practice committed by them. Section 83(1)(b) of the Act, 1951 uses the term ‘parties’ instead of the term ‘candidates’ which appears in Section 82 and Section 86(4) of the Act, 1951. The said distinction between the terms ‘parties’ and ‘candidates’ was noted and explained by the Supreme Court in Ajay Maken (supra) as follows: “31. Section 83(1)(b) of the Act, 1951 uses the term ‘parties’ instead of the term ‘candidates’ which appears in Section 82 and Section 86(4) of the Act, 1951. The said distinction between the terms ‘parties’ and ‘candidates’ was noted and explained by the Supreme Court in Ajay Maken (supra) as follows: “31. Section 83(1)(b) requires that an election petition shall set forth “as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice”. In my opinion the employment of the expression “parties” in the abovementioned clause is to compendiously cover the returned candidate, his election agent or any other person committing a corrupt practice with the consent of either the returned candidate or his election agent or any other agent committing a corrupt practice falling within the scope of Section 100(1)(d)(ii). 33. The question of proof of the commission of a corrupt practice arises only if there is an appropriate pleading in that regard in the election petition. I have already noticed that Section 83 stipulates that an election petition, which contains allegations of corrupt practice, must contain full particulars of the “names of the parties” alleged to have committed a corrupt practice. I am of the opinion that the legislature chose to use the expression “parties” for the reason that there are various categories of persons, who are capable of committing a corrupt practice in connection with the election of a returned candidate: (i) the returned candidate; or (ii) his election agent, or (iii) any other person with the consent of either the returned candidate or his election agent; or (iv) any other agent, as explained earlier. The difference in the language of Sections 82 and 83(1)(b), in my opinion, is significant. While Section 82 speaks of candidates, Section 83(1)(b) speaks of parties.” vii) It follows from a combined reading of Sections 82, 83(1)(b), 86(4) of the Act, 1951 that only candidates who have participated in the election can be made parties to an election petition. A party who is named and against whom allegations of corrupt practices exist cannot be made a party to the election petition. viii) At this stage, it is appropriate to discuss Section 98 and Section 99 of the Act, 1951 in the context of issuing notice to persons against whom allegations of corrupt practices have been made. A party who is named and against whom allegations of corrupt practices exist cannot be made a party to the election petition. viii) At this stage, it is appropriate to discuss Section 98 and Section 99 of the Act, 1951 in the context of issuing notice to persons against whom allegations of corrupt practices have been made. A party against whom allegations of corrupt practices only come into the picture after the conclusion of trial. Section 98 of the Act, 1951 states that the High Court after conclusion of the trial shall pass an order either dismissing the election petition or declaring the election of the returned candidate(s) as void or declare any other candidate to have been duly elected. Along with the order under Section 98 of the Act, 1951, the Court shall also pass an order under Section 99 of the Act, 1951. ix) Under Section 99 of the Act, 1951, the Court shall decide and record findings regarding commission of any corrupt practices and name such people in the order who have been found guilty of such corrupt practices. However, before naming such persons who have been guilty of corrupt practices, the Court shall issue a show cause notice to such persons asking why he/she shall not be named as guilty of corrupt practices. Further, such persons shall also be given an opportunity to cross examine any witnesses examined during the trial who have given evidence against them. x) The scope and rationale behind Section 99 of the Act, 1951 was explained by the Supreme Court in Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, (1955) 2 SCR 457 . The Court therein held that before recording names of people who have been found guilty of corrupt practice, they should be given a show cause notice and an opportunity of hearing. The relevant paragraph is extracted below: “6. The object of giving notice to a person under the proviso is obviously to give him an opportunity to be heard before a finding is given under Section 99(1)(a)(i) that he has committed a corrupt or illegal practice. This clearly appears from clause (b) of the proviso, which enacts that the person to whom notice is to be given should have an opportunity of cross-examining witnesses who had been examined before and given evidence against him, of calling his own evidence and of being heard. This clearly appears from clause (b) of the proviso, which enacts that the person to whom notice is to be given should have an opportunity of cross-examining witnesses who had been examined before and given evidence against him, of calling his own evidence and of being heard. This is in accordance with the rule of natural justice which requires that no one should be condemned without being given an opportunity to be heard. The reason of the rule, therefore, requires that notice should be given to persons who had had no previous opportunity in respect of the matters mentioned in subclause (b) to the proviso. Such, for example, would be witnesses and possibly agents of the parties, as observed in Nyalchand Virachand v. Election Tribunal [8 Election Law Reports 417, 421] though it is not necessary to decide that point, but it cannot refer to parties to the petition who have had every opportunity of taking part in the trial and presenting their case. Where an election petition is founded on a charge of corrupt practice on the part of the candidate, that becomes the subject-matter of enquiry in the petition itself. If at the trial the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the charge had been proved, then it has to hold under Section 100(2)(b) that the election is void, and pass an order to that effect under Section 98(d). Section 99(1) enacts that the finding of corrupt practice under Section 99(1)(a)(i) or naming a person under Section 99(1)(a)(ii) should be at the time of making an order under Section 98. If the contention of the appellant is to be accepted, then the result will be that even though there was a full trial of the charges set out in the petition, if the Tribunal is disposed to hold them proved it has first to give notice of the finding which it proposes to give, to the parties, and hold a fresh trial of the very matters that had been already tried. That is an extraordinary result, for which it is difficult to discover any reason or justification. That is an extraordinary result, for which it is difficult to discover any reason or justification. It was argued by the learned Attorney General that the giving to a party to a proceeding a second opportunity to be heard was not unknown to law, and he cited the instance of an accused in a warrant case being given a further opportunity to recall and cross-examine prosecution witnesses after charge is framed, and of a civil servant being given an opportunity under Article 311 to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. In a warrant case, the accused is not bound to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses before charge is framed, and in the case of civil servants, the decision that they are entitled to a second opportunity was based on the peculiar language of Sections 240(2) and (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and Article 311 of the Constitution. They are exceptional cases, and do not furnish any safe or useful guidance in the interpretation of Section 99.” xi) In Mercykutty Amma v. KadavoorSivadasan, (2004) 2 SCC 217 , the Supreme Court explained the object of Section 99 of the Act, 1951 as follows: “30. Section 99 of the Act empowers the High Court to record the names of all persons, who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of any corrupt practice and the nature of that practice. The proviso appended to clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 99 mandates that before a person is so named, he has to be given notice to appear before the High Court and to show cause why he should not be so named and upon his appearance, if any, pursuant to such notice he must be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who have already been examined by the High Court and gave evidence against him and further giving him an opportunity of calling in evidence in his defence and of being heard. 31. The requirement to apply the provisions of Section 99 is in respect of a person who is not a party to the proceeding. The statute mandates that before a person is named as having indulged in corrupt practices he must be given the same opportunity which is given to a party to the petition. 31. The requirement to apply the provisions of Section 99 is in respect of a person who is not a party to the proceeding. The statute mandates that before a person is named as having indulged in corrupt practices he must be given the same opportunity which is given to a party to the petition. By reason of such a notice and giving an opportunity to the noticee to cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the parties to the said petition and examining witnesses on behalf of his defence, he is placed in the same position as that of a party in the petition. [See: Ramesh YeshwantPrabhoo (Dr) v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte [ (1996) 1 SCC 130 ].] 32. Naming of a person as having indulged in corrupt practices has serious consequences. A person indulged in corrupt practices whether party to the petition in terms of Section 82 or subsequently receives a notice in terms of Section 99 would stand on the same footing having regard to the provisions contained in Section 8-A of the Act. Such a person may not be a necessary party within the meaning of Section 82 of the Act but it is beyond any cavil that no finding could be recorded by naming such a person unless the mandatory provisions of Section 99 are complied with. (See: Patangrao Kadam v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Yadav Deshmukh[ (2001) 3 SCC 594 ] .)” xii) Further, the procedure under Sections 98 and 99 of the Act, 1951 was explained by the Supreme Court in Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil, (1996) 1 SCC 169 . The Court therein held that an order under Section 99 of the Act, 1951 naming persons guilty of corrupt practices shall be made along with the order under Section 98 of the Act, 1951. The show cause notice, opportunity of hearing and cross-examination as contemplated under Section 99 comes into picture at the time of conclusion of trial and not after the conclusion of the trial. In other words, a final order under Section 98 of the Act, 1951 shall also include findings regarding commission of corrupt practices along with names of persons found guilty of corrupt practices as provided under Section 99 of the Act, 1951. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below: “54. In other words, a final order under Section 98 of the Act, 1951 shall also include findings regarding commission of corrupt practices along with names of persons found guilty of corrupt practices as provided under Section 99 of the Act, 1951. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below: “54. The opening words in Section 98 are “At the conclusion of the trial of an election petition the High Court shall make an order.” There can be no doubt that Section 98 contemplates the making of an order thereunder in the decision of the High Court rendered “at the conclusion of the trial of an election petition”. Declaration of the election of any returned candidate to be void in accordance with clause (b) is clearly to be made in the decision of the High Court rendered at the conclusion of the trial of an election petition and not at an intermediate stage. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) in Section 98 contemplate the different kinds of orders which can be made by the High Court in its decision at the conclusion of the trial which has the effect of disposing of the election petition in the High Court. There is nothing in Section 98 to permit the High Court to decide the election petition piecemeal and to declare the election of any returned candidate to be void at an intermediate stage of the trial when any part of the trial remains to be concluded. 55. Sub-section (1) of Section 99 begins with the words “At the time of making an order under Section 98 the High Court shall also make an order” of the kind mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) therein. It is amply clear that the order which can be made under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 99 is required to be made “at the time of making an order under Section 98”. As earlier indicated, an order under Section 98 can be made only at the conclusion of the trial. There can be no doubt that the order which can be made under subsection (1) of Section 99 has, therefore, to be made only at the conclusion of the trial of an election petition in the decision of the High Court made by an order disposing of the election petition in one of the modes prescribed in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 98. This alone is sufficient to indicate that the requirement of Section 99 is to be completed during the trial of the election petition and the final order under Section 99 has to be made in the decision of the High Court rendered under Section 98 at the conclusion of the trial of the election petition. 56. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 99 provides for the situation “where any charge is made in the petition of any corrupt practice having been committed at the election”. In that case, it requires that at the time of making an order under Section 98, the High Court shall also make an order recording a finding whether any corrupt practice has or has not been proved to have been committed at the election and the nature of that corrupt practice; and the names of all persons, if any, who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of any corrupt practice and the nature of that corrupt practice. Clause (b) further requires the fixing of the total amount of costs payable and specifying the person by and to whom costs shall be paid. The net result is that where any charge is made in the petition of any corrupt practice having been committed at the election, the High Court shall “at the time of making an order under Section 98” also make an order recording a finding whether any corrupt practice has or has not been proved to have been committed at the election and the nature of that corrupt practice; and where the charge of corrupt practice has been found proved, it must also record the names of all persons, if any, who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of any corrupt practice and the nature of that practice. Thus the trial is only one at the end of which the order made by the High Court must record the names of all persons, if any, who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of the corrupt practice and the nature of that practice. 58. The rationale is obvious. Thus the trial is only one at the end of which the order made by the High Court must record the names of all persons, if any, who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of the corrupt practice and the nature of that practice. 58. The rationale is obvious. Where the returned candidate is alleged to be guilty of a corrupt practice in the commission of which any other person has participated with him or the candidate is to be held vicariously liable for a corrupt practice committed by any other person with his consent, a final verdict on that question can be rendered only at the end of the trial, at one time, after the inquiry contemplated under Section 99 against the other person, after notice to him, has also been concluded. Particularly, in a case where liability is fastened on the candidate vicariously for the act of another person, unless that act is found proved against the doer of that act, the question of recording a finding on that basis against the returned candidate cannot arise. Viewed differently, if the final verdict has already been rendered against the returned candidate in such a case, the opportunity contemplated by Section 99 by an inquiry after notice to the other person is futile since the verdict has already been given. On the other hand, if the question is treated as open, a conflicting verdict after inquiry under Section 99 in favour of the noticee would lead to an absurdity which could not be attributed to the legislature. 59. The plain language of Sections 98 and 99 of the R.P. Act indicates the construction thereof made by us and this is also supported by the likely outcome of a different construction which is an absurd result and must, therefore, be rejected. The High Court has overlooked the obvious position in law in taking a different view. No notice under Section 99 was given by the High Court before making the final order under Section 98 of the R.P. Act declaring the election to be void. This is a fatal defect. 60. The High Court has overlooked the obvious position in law in taking a different view. No notice under Section 99 was given by the High Court before making the final order under Section 98 of the R.P. Act declaring the election to be void. This is a fatal defect. 60. This alone is sufficient to indicate that apart from the reasons given earlier, the election of the appellant in the present case could not be declared void by making an order under Section 98 on the ground contained in Section 100(1)(b) of the R.P. Act without prior compliance of Section 99. Absence of notice under Section 99 of the R.P. Act vitiates the final order made under Section 98 by the High Court declaring the election to be void.” xiii) From a perusal of Section 99 of the Act, 1951 and the decisions discussed above, the procedure under Section 99 of the Act, 1951 can be summed up as follows: i) The allegations of corrupt practices under Section 83(1)(b) against any person shall have to be proved by the election petitioner during the trial. ii) If the court reaches a conclusion that corrupt practices were committed, the nature and mode of commission of such corrupt practices shall be recorded. iii) The court will then have to issue a notice to such persons who have been found guilty during the trial to show why they should not be named as guilty of corrupt practices. iv) After receiving such notice, such persons will be given an opportunity of hearing and cross-examination. Such persons, after receiving the notice, will be at par with the candidates who are arrayed as parties to an election petition. xiv) Therefore, only candidates under Section 82 and Section 86(4) of the Act, 1951 can be made parties to an election petition. Any other person against whom allegations of corrupt practices are made shall be dealt with in accordance with Section 99 of the Act, 1951. xv) Now coming to the facts of the case, the Petitioner herein contends that he is not a necessary party and cannot be arrayed as a respondent in light of Section 82 and the decisions of the Supreme Court in Jyoti Basu (supra), B. Sundara Rami Reddy (supra) and Michael B. Fernandes (supra). xv) Now coming to the facts of the case, the Petitioner herein contends that he is not a necessary party and cannot be arrayed as a respondent in light of Section 82 and the decisions of the Supreme Court in Jyoti Basu (supra), B. Sundara Rami Reddy (supra) and Michael B. Fernandes (supra). The Petitioner also contended that Respondent No.1 has a remedy under Section 99 of the Act, 1951 to prove the alleged corrupt practices during trial. xvi) Given the peculiar factual situation, the contentions of the Petitioner herein cannot be accepted. It is relevant to note that the main contention of Respondent No. 1 herein in E.P. No. 1 of 2022 is that his nomination was withdrawn illegally and the said withdrawal of nomination was accepted by the Petitioner herein in breach of Section 37 of the Act, 1951. The corrupt practice in the present case only involves Respondent No. 6 herein (who allegedly submitted the withdrawal form without the authorization of Respondent No. 1) and the Petitioner herein who accepted the alleged withdrawal form without verifying its genuineness and authenticity. xvii) In light of the facts of the case and in view of the said specific allegations leveled against the petitioner herein by respondent No.1 -Election Petitioner, if this Court holds that the Petitioner herein is not a necessary party to the election petition, then it may not be possible for Respondent No.1 -Election Petitioner to establish the commission of a corrupt practice by the Petitioner herein relying on the procedure prescribed under Section 99 of the Act, 1951. xviii) As stated above, Section 99 of the Act, 1951 involves a two-step procedure. Firstly, the Court shall reach a finding that a corrupt practice as alleged was committed and it was committed by people who have been named in the election petition. Secondly, after reaching the finding regarding commission of corrupt practice, the Court shall issue a show-cause notice to all such people who have been found to be involved in such corrupt practice to show why they should not be named in the order. xix) It is important to note that issuance of show-cause notice under Section 99(1)(a) of the Act, 1951 shall be preceded by a finding or conclusion that a corrupt practice was committed by the persons named in the election petition. xix) It is important to note that issuance of show-cause notice under Section 99(1)(a) of the Act, 1951 shall be preceded by a finding or conclusion that a corrupt practice was committed by the persons named in the election petition. In other words, a show-cause notice can only be issued if the election petitioner is able to establish commission of a corrupt practice as alleged in the election petition. xx) In the present case, the procedure under Section 99 of the Act, 1951 will not assist Respondent No. 1 as no show cause notice can be issued, unless commission of corrupt practice is established. Respondent No. 1 cannot establish the alleged corrupt practice of withdrawal of his nomination form, unless the Petitioner herein or Respondent No. 6 are examined. If the Petitioner herein is not a party to the election petition, he cannot be examined. xxi) A recourse in the form of summoning the Petitioner as a witness to be examined is available to Respondent No.1 to establish the said corrupt practice. However, the Petitioner herein cannot be summoned as a witness in light of Section 95 of the Act, 1951. The said provision is extracted below: “95. Answering of criminating questions and certificate of indemnity.—(1) No witness shall be excused from answering any question as to any matter relevant to a matter in issue in the trial of an election petition upon the ground that the answer to such question may criminate or may tend to criminate him, or that it may expose or may tend to expose him to any penalty or forfeiture: Provided that— (a) a witness, who answers truly all questions which he is required to answer shall be entitled to receive a certificate of indemnity from 2[the High Court]; and (b) an answer given by a witness to a question put by or before 1[the High Court] shall not, except in the case of any criminal proceeding for perjury in respect of the evidence, be admissible in evidence against him in any civil or criminal proceeding. (2) When a certificate of indemnity has been granted to any witness, it may be pleaded by him in any court and shall be a full and complete defence to or upon any charge under Chapter IXA of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), or Part VII of this Act arising out of the matter to which such certificate relates, but it shall not be deemed to relieve him from any disqualification in connection with an election imposed by this Act or any other law.” xxii) A bare reading of Section 95 of the Act, 1951 makes it clear that a witness is bound to answer all the questions posed to him/her and cannot take the defence that such statements will incriminate him. However, the witness is protected by the certificate of indemnity issued by the High Court which will be a complete defence in any court of law in the country in relation to his statements made as a witness during the trial. xxiii) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in S. Raghbir Singh Gill v. S. Gurcharan Singh Tohra, 1980 Supp SCC 53 held that Section 95 of the Act, 1951 is akin to Section 132 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Both the provisions protect the witnesses for prosecution for their statements during the trial. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below : “12. Does Section 94 prevent anyone from seeking information about how a person has cast his vote from the mouth of the person or is it the privilege of the voter not to be compelled to disclose for whom he has voted? The provision is cast in negative language. The important words are “shall be required”. The word “required” has an in-built element of compulsion. When it is said that no witness shall be required to state for whom he has voted at an election, on a pure grammatical construction uninhibited by any other consideration it would mean that the witness cannot be compelled against his will to disclose how he has voted or for whom he has voted. When it is said that no witness shall be required to state for whom he has voted at an election, on a pure grammatical construction uninhibited by any other consideration it would mean that the witness cannot be compelled against his will to disclose how he has voted or for whom he has voted. When a witness is put in the witness box and he is questioned under oath as to any matter relevant to the issue in any suit or in any civil or criminal proceeding, in which he is called to give evidence, the witness is not excused from answering any question relevant to the matter under enquiry upon any ground including the ground that the answer to such question will criminate or may tend directly or indirectly to criminate such witness or that it will expose or tend directly or indirectly to expose such witness to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind as provided in Section 132 of the Evidence Act. There is a proviso to the section which extends protection in respect of such compelled testimony to the extent indicated in the proviso. Section 87(2) of the Act was enacted to avoid any contention that an election petition is neither a civil nor criminal proceeding and hence Section 132 of the Evidence Act is not attracted. But as the proviso to Section 132 of the Evidence Act extends only a qualified privilege, Section 95 of the Act which is in parimateria with Section 132 of the Evidence Act had to be incorporated in the chapter with its own proviso for a slightly larger protection. In view of the imperative language of Section 132 of the Evidence Act a witness cannot refuse to answer a question which is relevant to the matter under enquiry in which he is called as a witness even on the pain of self-incrimination. In the past in the countries governed by Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence the witness was privileged both from answering questions and producing documents the tendency of which was to expose the witness to any criminal charge, penalty or forfeiture (see Spokes v. Grosvenor Hotel Co. [(1897) 2 QB 124 : 66 LJQB 572]). This privilege was founded upon the maxim nemo teneturseipsumprodere, meaning, no one is bound to criminate himself and to place himself in peril. [(1897) 2 QB 124 : 66 LJQB 572]). This privilege was founded upon the maxim nemo teneturseipsumprodere, meaning, no one is bound to criminate himself and to place himself in peril. Over a period, as Wigmore puts it, the privilege indirectly and ultimately works for good — for the good of the innocent and of the community at large, but directly and concretely it works for ill — for the protection of the guilty and the consequent derangement of civic order and therefore, there ought to be an end of judicial cant towards crime. The result is that the privilege is withdrawn as clearly transpires from the language of Section 132 of the Evidence Act and the proviso only affords a qualified privilege inasmuch as any such answer which a witness shall be compelled to give under the main part of Section 132 shall not subject him to any arrest or prosecution, or be proved against him in any criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such answer. One may recall here constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination as enacted in Article 20(3) which provides that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. It would, therefore, appear that a witness when questioned in the witness box relevant to the matter in issue in a proceeding in which he is called as a witness has to answer the question put to him and cannot escape obligation to answer the question even if the answer was likely to incriminate him except to the extent the qualified privilege is extended to him under the proviso. Section 87(2) of the Act provides that the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, shall, subject to the provisions of the Act, be deemed to apply in all respects to the trial of an election petition. Section 95(1) of the Act reenacts the main part of Section 132 of the Evidence Act. The combined effect of Section 87(2) read with Section 95 of the Act, and omitting Section 94 for the time being, would be that if a witness in an election petition is questioned as to for whom he voted he would be under an obligation to answer that question. The combined effect of Section 87(2) read with Section 95 of the Act, and omitting Section 94 for the time being, would be that if a witness in an election petition is questioned as to for whom he voted he would be under an obligation to answer that question. The principle of secrecy of ballot necessitated a specific provision excusing the witness from answering such a question which he would be under an obligation to answer under Section 132 of the Evidence Act or Section 95(1) of the Act. Section 94 precedes Section 95 which obliges a witness to answer all questions relevant to the enquiry in an election petition even on the pain of self-incrimination. But for Section 94, the witness could not have avoided answering the question put to him as to for whom he voted. 13. Secrecy of ballot undoubtedly is an indispensable adjunct of free and fair elections. A voter had to be statutorily assured that he would not be compelled to disclose by any authority as to for whom he voted so that a voter may vote without fear or favour and is free from any apprehension of its disclosure against his will from his own lips. To that extent Section 94 of the Act carves out an exception to Section 132 of the Evidence Act and Section 95 of the Act (see Dr ChhotabhaiJivabhai Patel v. VadilalLallubhai Mehta [(1971) 12 GLR 850, 860] ). As Section 94 carves out an exception to Section 132 of the Evidence Act as also to Section 95 of the Act it was necessary to provide for protection of the witness if he is compelled to answer a question which may tend to incriminate him. Section 95 provides for grant of a certificate of indemnity in the circumstances therein set out. A conspectus of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and Sections 93, 94 and 95 of the Act would affirmatively show that they provide for a procedure, including the procedure for examination of witnesses, their rights and obligations in the trial of an election petition. The expression “witness” used in the section is a pointer and further expression “other person” extends the protection to a forum outside courts. The expression “witness” used in the section is a pointer and further expression “other person” extends the protection to a forum outside courts. Section 94, therefore, cannot be singled out as was contended on behalf of the appellant as a substantive provision and being unrelated to the procedure prescribed for trial of election petition. This conclusion is reinforced by the title of Chapter III “Trial of Election Petitions” because it is legitimate and indeed proper to have recourse to heading and sub-heading given to a group of sections in an Act of Parliament to find guidance for the construction of the words in a statute (see R. v. Board of Trader [(1965) 1 QB 603, 607 : (1964) 2 All ER 561] ) coupled with this one can advantageously refer to a known canon of construction that every section of a statute is to be construed with reference to the context and other sections of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.” xxiv) If the Petitioner herein is summoned and examined as a witness, he cannot be subject to any prosecution, if it is proved that he was involved in the commission of the corrupt practices. Therefore, he cannot be summoned as witness, in as much as he cannot be protected for his wrong doing and failure to comply with the procedure. xxv) At this stage, it is relevant to note that a charge of corrupt practices is akin to a criminal charge and the same has to be proved by leading cogent evidence. The courts cannot find a person guilty of corrupt practices on mere preponderance of probabilities. In the said context, the Supreme Court in Ananga Uday Singh Deo v. Ranga Nath Mishra, (2002) 1 SCC 499 held as follows: “28. It has been held in a number of cases by this Court that the petition lacking in “material facts” and “material particulars” as provided under Section 83 is required to be dismissed. Allegation of corrupt practice is a serious allegation which entails serious consequence of disqualifying the candidate from contesting the election for a period which may extend up to six years.The charge of corrupt practice is to be proved like a criminal charge requiring the standard of proof to be beyond reasonable doubt. 31. Allegation of corrupt practice is a serious allegation which entails serious consequence of disqualifying the candidate from contesting the election for a period which may extend up to six years.The charge of corrupt practice is to be proved like a criminal charge requiring the standard of proof to be beyond reasonable doubt. 31. After referring to the case-law it was held by this Court : (SCC pp. 651-52, paras 3-4) “3. The sum and substance of these decisions is that a charge of corrupt practice has to be proved by convincing evidence and not merely be preponderance of probabilities. As the charge of a corrupt practice is in the nature of a criminal charge, it is for the party who sets up the plea of ‘undue influence’ to prove it to the hilt beyond reasonable doubt and the manner of proof should be the same as for an offence in a criminal case. This is more so because once it is proved to the satisfaction of a court that a candidate has been guilty of ‘undue influence’ then he is likely to be disqualified for a period of six years or such other period as the authority concerned under Section 8-A of the Act may think fit. Therefore, as the charge, if proved, entails a very heavy penalty in the form of disqualification, this Court has held that a very cautious approach must be made in order to prove the charge of undue influence levelled by the defeated candidate. 4. Another well-settled principle is that before the allegation of ‘undue influence’ can be proved, it must be shown that ‘undue influence’ proceeds either from the candidate himself or through his agent or by any other person either with his consent or with the consent of his election agent so as to prevent or cloud the very exercise of any electoral right.” xxvi) Therefore, a party alleging a corrupt practice has to establish the same beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that effective opportunity shall be given to such a party to prove such charges. In the present case, if the Petitioner herein is not examined, Respondent No. 1 will not be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt, the charge of illegal withdrawal of his nomination form by the Petitioner herein. It follows that effective opportunity shall be given to such a party to prove such charges. In the present case, if the Petitioner herein is not examined, Respondent No. 1 will not be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt, the charge of illegal withdrawal of his nomination form by the Petitioner herein. xxvii) To sum up, if the petitioner herein is not impleaded as a necessary party he will be is placed in a Catch-22 situation where the he will be left with no effective remedy. The Catch-22 situation arises on two counts: i. Firstly, no recourse can be taken under Section 99(1)(b) of the Act, 1951 to issue a show-cause notice to the Petitioner herein unless a corrupt practice is established. However, to establish a corrupt practice, the Petitioner herein along with Respondent No. 6 have to be examined. The Petitioner herein and Respondent No. 6 cannot be examined unless they are made parties which is impermissible under Sections 82 and 86(4) of the Act, 1951 and the law laid down by the Supreme Court. ii. Secondly, it could have been argued that the corrupt practice can be proved by summoning the Petitioner herein as a witness and without impleading him as a party. However, as stated above, the Petitioner herein cannot be summoned as a witness as he will be protected for his statements under Section 95 of the Act, 1951. Under Section 95 of the Act, 1951, the intention of legislature could not have been to protect a person against whom allegations of corrupt practice are specifically pleaded. Therefore, recourse to Section 95 of the Act, 1951 is also not permissible. xxviii) According to this Court, the courts have to interpret law in a way that avoids absurdity and which does not leave the parties without an effective remedy. The Supreme Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 held as follows: “23. In view of the language used in Section 340 CrPC the court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the section is conditioned by the words “court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice”. This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(1)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice. It is possible that such forged document or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence in court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the court may not consider it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint. The broad view of clause (b)(ii), as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants, would render the victim of such forgery or forged document remediless. Any interpretation which leads to a situation where a victim of a crime is rendered remediless, has to be discarded.” xxix) A person having a right shall have a remedy. This is recognized in the Latin maxim ubi jus ib iremedium. Similarly, the maxim lex semper dabit remedium means that the law always provides a remedy. The remedy provided to enforce a right shall be effective and one which provides opportunity to a person to prove his right and its breach thereof. xxx) In the present case, if the Petitioner herein is not impleaded as a necessary party, Respondent No. 1 will be left without an effective remedy whereby he cannot establish the alleged corrupt practice of illegal withdrawal of nomination form. At the cost of repetition, Section 99 of the Act, 1951 does not assist Respondent No. 1 for the reasons stated above. At the cost of repetition, Section 99 of the Act, 1951 does not assist Respondent No. 1 for the reasons stated above. xxxi) Further, for this Court to reach a conclusion that a corrupt practice as alleged was committed, the Petitioner herein becomes a necessary party. It is relevant to note that the Supreme Court in Moreshar Yadaorao Mahajan v. Vyankatesh Sitaram Bhedi (D), 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1307 explained the concept of necessary parties as one against whom a right to seek relief exists and one in whose absence no effective decree can be passed. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below: “18. It could thus be seen that a “necessary party” is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the court. It has been held that if a “necessary party” is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. 19. As already discussed hereinabove, the plaintiff himself has admitted in the plaint that the suit property is jointly owned by the defendant, his wife and three sons. A specific objection was also taken by the defendant in his written statement with regard to non-joinder of necessary parties. Since the suit property was jointly owned by the defendant along with his wife and three sons, an effective decree could not have been passed affecting the rights of the defendant's wife and three sons without impleading them. Even in spite of the defendant taking an objection in that regard, the plaintiff has chosen not to implead the defendant's wife and three sons as party defendants. Insofar as the reliance placed by Shri Chitnis on the judgment of this Court in the case of Kasturi (supra) is concerned, the question therein was as to whether a person who claims independent title and possession adversely to the title of a vendor could be a necessary party or not. In this context, this Court held thus: “7. …….From the above, it is now clear that two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question who is a necessary party. Tests are” (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party.” 20. …….From the above, it is now clear that two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question who is a necessary party. Tests are” (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party.” 20. It can thus be seen that what has been held by this Court is that for being a necessary party, the twin test has to be satisfied. The first one is that there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings. The second one is that no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such a party.” xxxii) Therefore, in the present case, the Petitioner herein becomes a necessary party to the election petition as Respondent No. 1, has a right to establish commission of a corrupt practice and without his arrayment no effective order can be passed regarding commission of such corrupt practice. xxxiii) While it is true that, the Supreme Court in Jyoti Basu (supra), B. Sundara Rami Reddy (supra) and Michael B. Fernandes (supra)has held that only candidates under Sections 82 and 86(4) of the Act, 1951 are necessary parties, however, the said decisions are not applicable to the peculiar facts of the present case. Precedents like any other law cannot contemplate all the factual situations that might arise. They have to be applied in a manner which furthers the intention of the legislature, avoids absurdity and does not render a party remediless. xxxiv) The Apex Court in Megh Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 8 SCC 666 held that additional or different facts make a difference in the application of precedents. Each case depends on its own facts. The relevant paragraph is extracted below: “18. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases or between two accused in the same case. Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. It is more pronounced in criminal cases where the backbone of adjudication is fact-based.” xxxv) Further, in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. It is more pronounced in criminal cases where the backbone of adjudication is fact-based.” xxxv) Further, in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani, (2004) 8 SCC 579 discussing the application and interpretation of precedents, the Supreme Court held that the Courts shall rely on precedents by giving reasons as to the similarity of the case with that of the precedent relied upon. Precedents are not theorem’s and the same cannot be applied without discussing its relevance with the present facts. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below: “9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton [ 1951 AC 737 : (1951) 2 All ER 1 (HL)] (AC at p. 761) Lord MacDermott observed : (All ER p. 14 C-D) “The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J., as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge,…” 10. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. [(1970) 2 All ER 294 : 1970 AC 1004 : (1970) 2 WLR 1140 (HL)] (All ER p. 297g-h) Lord Reid said, “Lord Atkin's speech … is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances”. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. [(1970) 2 All ER 294 : 1970 AC 1004 : (1970) 2 WLR 1140 (HL)] (All ER p. 297g-h) Lord Reid said, “Lord Atkin's speech … is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances”. Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No. 2) [(1971) 1 WLR 1062 : (1971) 2 All ER 1267] observed:“One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament.” And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board [ (1972) 2 WLR 537 : (1972) 1 All ER 749 (HL)] Lord Morris said : (All ER p. 761c) “There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.” 11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 12. The following words of Hidayatullah, J. in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus : (Abdul Kayoom v. CIT [ AIR 1962 SC 680 ] , AIR p. 688, para 19) “19. … Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.” *** “Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.” (xxxvi) A perusal of the above decisions indicates that judicial precedents are applicable in the context of relevant facts. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.” (xxxvi) A perusal of the above decisions indicates that judicial precedents are applicable in the context of relevant facts. The principle of stare decisis which states that the courts are bound by judicial precedents is not rigid in its application. If the facts are different or where there are additional facts, the Court can distinguish the said facts with that of the precedent sought to be relied upon by a party. Judicial principles and practice grant circumstantial flexibility to a judge to decide a case in the context of its own facts. (xxxvii) In the present case, according to this Court, the decisions of Jyoti Basu (supra), B. Sundara Rami Reddy (supra) and Michael B. Fernandes (supra) are inapplicable. If the ratio of the said decisions is applied and it is held that the Petitioner herein is not a necessary party, then the Respondent No. 1 will not be able to establish the corrupt practice of illegal withdrawal of his nomination. (xxxviii) As stated above, the said alleged corrupt practice involves the role of only the Petitioner herein who alleged to have acted in contravention of Section 37 of the Act, 1951 and Respondent No. 6 who submitted the alleged forged withdrawal form. It becomes imperative that both of them are examined to establish the commission of the corrupt practice. It is all the more important to treat them as necessary parties as Section 99 of the Act, 1951 cannot assist Respondent No. 1 for the reasons stated above. Sections 82, 86(4), 98 and 99 of the Act, 1951 when read together do not contemplate factual situation that has arisen in the present case. Therefore, the interpretation of the said provisions in the aforesaid decisions are not applicable to the present case. 7. Conclusion: (i) Therefore, in light of the aforesaid discussion, this Court holds that the Petitioner herein is a necessary party. (ii) The present interlocutory application is accordingly dismissed.