ORDER : 1. The above Criminal Miscellaneous Case was filed with the following prayer: “......to quash Annexure B Final Report in Crime No. 658/2019 of Chengannur Police Station and all further proceedings in C.P. No. 1/2020 pending on the files of Judicial First Class Magistrates Court-I, Chengannur.” 2. Heard Sri. Nikhil Sankar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/sole accused, Sri. B. Jayasurya, learned counsel appearing for R1, State of Kerala and Sri. S. Mohammed Al Rafi, learned counsel appearing for the contesting 2nd respondent (lady de facto complainant). 3. The petitioner herein initially was arrayed as the sole accused in Crime No. 90 of 2019 Varatharappilly Police Station, Thrissur district for offences punishable under Section 376 of IPC on the basis of First Information Statement furnished by the 2nd respondent (lady de facto complainant) on 07.03.2019 at 12.00 noon in respect of the alleged incident happened on 27.01.2019 at about 5.20 p.m. Later the crime was transferred to the Chengannur Police Station as the incident said to be happened within the limits of the said Police and accordingly, the crime re-registered in terms of Annexure A as FIR in Crime No. 658 of 2019 of Chengannur Police Station for the said offence as per Section 376 of the IPC. The Police after investigation has filed the impugned Annexure B final report/Charge sheet in the instant case which is now pending in committal proceedings, as C.P. No. 1 of 2020 on the file Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Chengannur. This Court has now apprised that committal proceedings has not been completed in the said C.P. No. 1 of 2020. 4. The petitioner seeks quashment of the impugned criminal proceedings on the ground that if the alleged incidents which are said to have taken place as per the impugned criminal proceedings are assumed to be true, still the same could have been happened only on the basis of consensual sexual relationship between the parties and that no case of forcible sexual intercourse so as to make out the offence of Section 376 of the IPC is brought out in the instant case. The petitioner would also have an alternative case that now the 2nd respondent has filed a notarized affidavit dated 06.07.2020 (produced as Annexure F along with Crl. The petitioner would also have an alternative case that now the 2nd respondent has filed a notarized affidavit dated 06.07.2020 (produced as Annexure F along with Crl. M.A. No. 3 of 2020 in the above criminal M.C.) stating that the above said impugned criminal proceedings has arisen on account of the allegations made by her earlier on account of the misunderstanding between the parties and that she has no further grievances against the petitioner and that she has no objections in this Court quashing the impugned criminal proceedings. In that regard, the petitioner would also invite this Court's attention to Annexure R2A letter dated 15.07.2019 said to have been submitted by the 2nd respondent to the 1st respondent investigating officer that she does not wish to continue the impugned prosecution measures in the instant case, etc. 5. It is by now well settled that it may not be right and proper for this Court to consider quashment of serious and grave offence of rape as per Section 376 of the IPC, solely on the ground of settlement between the parties [See Shimbhu vs. State of Haryana, (2014) 13 SCC 318 , Parbatbhai Aahir vs. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641 , Anita Maria Dias vs. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 3 SCC 290 , Sebastian @ Solly vs. State of Kerala, 2015 (1) KLJ 384 , etc]. However, the main ground urged by the petitioner is that, even going by the admitted prosecution materials, more particularly, Annexure A First Information Statement given by none other than 2nd respondent (lady de facto complainant), it can be seen that the alleged incidents therein, if assumed to be true, would have happened only on the basis of consent of the parties and therefore, it does not constitute the vital ingredient of offence of rape as per Sec.376 of the IPC. 6. Before dealing with the facts of this case, it will be pertinent to refer to the legal principles laid down by the Apex Court and various High Courts in the matter regarding the vital distinction between consensual sexual relationship between the parties and forcible sexual intercourse which constitutes the offence of rape as per Section 376 of the IPC. 6. Before dealing with the facts of this case, it will be pertinent to refer to the legal principles laid down by the Apex Court and various High Courts in the matter regarding the vital distinction between consensual sexual relationship between the parties and forcible sexual intercourse which constitutes the offence of rape as per Section 376 of the IPC. It is by now it is well established that there is a substantial and fine distinction between rape as understood in Section 376 of the IPC and consensual sexual relationship between parties and this has been the subject matter of detailed consideration of various judgments of the Apex Court and various High Courts, including this Court. The said issue is the subject matter of a catena of rulings of the Apex Court in decisions as in Uday vs. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46 and Deelip Singh @ Dilip Kumar vs. State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 88 , wherein it has been held that where the woman has voluntarily and consciously consented to have a sexual relationship with the accused, then her consent cannot be said to be in consequence of any misconception of fact as envisaged in Sec.90 of the IPC. In Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, 2019 (1) SCALE 64 the Apex Court has again highlighted about the substantial distinction between rape and consensual sexual relationship. In Shivshankar @ Shiva vs. State of Karnataka and Another (judgment dated 06.04.2018 of the Apex Court in Crl. Appeal No. 504/2018), it has been held that it will be rather difficult to hold sexual intercourse in the course of a relationship which has continued for quite some time is rape especially in the face of the complainant’s own allegation that they lived together. In Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar’s case (supra), the Apex Court had elucidated the principles in that regard and it has laid down clear distinction between rape and consensual sexual relationship and that the acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence under Sec. 376 of the IPC. In Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar’s case (supra), the Apex Court had elucidated the principles in that regard and it has laid down clear distinction between rape and consensual sexual relationship and that the acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence under Sec. 376 of the IPC. It has also been held that breach of promise to marry in such cases will not by itself lead to a scenario, where it can be held that the consent of the woman to undergo sexual relationship was obtained on the basis of misconception of fact as understood in Sec.90 of the IPC. 7. A Division Bench of Culcutta High Court has held in the decision in Jayanti Rani Panda vs. State of West Bengal and Another, 1984 Crl. L.J. 1535 [paragraph 7] that assuming that the lady de facto complainant had believed the accused when he had granted the promise that he would marry her, there has to be clear material to infer that the accused had no intention whatsoever of keeping that promise right from the commencement of the transaction and that the failure to keep the promise at a future uncertain date, due to reasons not very clear on the materials, does not always amount to misconception of fact at the inception of the act itself. Further it has been held that where full grown adults consent the act of sexual intercourse on a promise of marriage and continue to indulge in such activity for quite some time, it is to be held as an act of promiscuity on her part and it cannot be said to be an act consented to by women as induced by misconception of facts and that Section 90 of the IPC cannot be called in aid in such a case to fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court can be assured that from the very inception the accused never really intended to marry her, etc. 8. Now it would be pertinent to refer to the nature of the allegations raised by the 2nd respondent (lady de facto complainant) in the impugned Annexure A FIR and in the Impugned Annexure B final report, more particularly, in Annexure A FIS. 8. Now it would be pertinent to refer to the nature of the allegations raised by the 2nd respondent (lady de facto complainant) in the impugned Annexure A FIR and in the Impugned Annexure B final report, more particularly, in Annexure A FIS. From a reading of Annexure A First Information Statement given by none other than the 2nd respondent (lady de facto complainant), it can be seen that the lady de facto complainant is an unmarried woman, then in the age of 23 years, who had completed the course in B. Pharm and was then working as a Pharmacist. That the accused then was aged 25 years, who is working in the Indian Army. According to the 2nd respondent’s version, as included in Annexure A FIS, given on 07.03.2019, it is stated that she had met the accused on 05.11.2016 when she was studying in B. Pharm in a college and that he had come with the proposal to marry her, seeing her profile in the Whatsapp and that they have fallen in love and they used to frequently telephone to each other. Further that the petitioner/accused belongs to a forward community and that the 2nd respondent belongs to backward community and that the parents of the petitioner/accused had opposed the marriage proposal and that later the petitioner informed her that his marriage with another lady has been arranged. Further that thereupon the engagement function in relation to the 2nd respondent’s proposed marriage with another man was also fixed and conducted on 16.12.2018. Still, both of them used to continue in through chatting and phone calls. Later the marriage of the petitioner/accused was fixed to be conducted on 28.01.2019 and that the 2nd respondent was also invited as a guest for the said function. That on 27.01.2019 (day previous to the marriage of the petitioner), the 2nd respondent had come from her house at Thrissur and had gone to Alappuzha to attend to the marriage of the petitioner on the next day and that the petitioner/accused and three of his friends had then come to her hotel and taken her in the petitioner's car at about 5 p.m. and then the petitioner had taken her to another hotel and had gone to her room in the said hotel. Then the petitioner had placed a yellowthread on her neck as if he was tying the thali knot and that later they had sexual relationship in the said room and that the petitioner had also induced her to have oral sex. After one hour, she had gone back to her friend’s house. Next day (28.01.2019) she had attended to the marriage of the petitioner and reached back to her house. Later the petitioner, after his marriage used to threaten her and the 2nd respondent had divulged these incidents to her proposed husband who then backed out of the marriage. Thereupon, she has given the abovesaid First Information Statement to the Police on 7.3.2019, about the alleged incidents which were said to have happened on 27.01.2019 at about 5.20 p.m. 9. From a reading of the said materials it can be seen that it is an admitted case of the 2nd respondent that she was earlier having a love affair with the petitioner who had then promised to marry her and thereafter, she came to know that the petitioner’s parents, who belong to forward community, were opposing the marriage of the petitioner with the 2nd respondent, who belongs to a backward community. That thereupon the petitioner had informed her that his parents have arranged a marriage for him with another lady. The 2nd respondent would state that at that point of time, she had no dispute whatsoever with the petitioner and that her marriage with another person was also then fixed. That still later they used to continue their chatting through telephone calls, Whatsapp, etc. The petitioner’s counsel would strongly contend that the allegations that the petitioner had taken her to a hotel on 27.01.2019 and had committed sexual acts with her etc. are false and have been made only to wreck vengeance on the petitioner, as admittedly her marriage proposal with the other man had to be cancelled and it is only on account of her shock in relation to that, that she has been made the instant false allegations at a much later date. Further that even if it is assumed that the alleged sexual incidents are true, then it would have happened only on the basis of consent between the parties. Further that even if it is assumed that the alleged sexual incidents are true, then it would have happened only on the basis of consent between the parties. When this Court is examining the impugned criminal case as a whole as it is, then it would not be possible for this Court to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations on the petitioner that the allegations regarding the alleged sexual acts are completely false. This Court would proceed on the premise as if those allegations are broadly correct. If that be so, it can be seen that it is admitted case of the 2nd respondent that she herself had gone in a car along with the petitioner to another hotel on 27.01.2019 at about after 5 p.m. That she had entered the said room voluntarily with the petitioner. That, thereupon the petitioner had tied a yellow thread on her neck and that he had thus tied the thali knot. The implication appears to be that the petitioner has assured her that he would marry her and that her consent to have sexual relationship with him on that day was obtained on the basis of his act of having tying the thali on her neck. It is an admitted case of the 2nd respondent that she had come on 27.01.2019 to attend to the marriage of the petitioner, which was fixed on the next day (28.01.2019). It is also the case of the 2nd respondent that she had no dispute that the petitioner had said that his parents have arranged another marriage for him. It is admitted case of the 2nd respondent that even her marriage with another person was also arranged. Therefore, it is highly unbelievable that a highly educated young lady like the 2nd respondent could believe that by mere act of tying a yellow thread on her neck, it would amount to an act on the part of the petitioner to tie the marital knot and as if she had given her consent to have sexual relationship with the petitioner on the basis of such act. Being an educated lady, it has to be held that by no stretch of imagination, she could have believed that the petitioner is offering to marry her by the said act of tying the yellow thread. Being an educated lady, it has to be held that by no stretch of imagination, she could have believed that the petitioner is offering to marry her by the said act of tying the yellow thread. The marriage of the petitioner admittedly then was fixed on the next day and therefore, no educated young lady placing reliance on the said act of the 2nd respondent could have even remotely be under the impression that the petitioner was offering to marry her and that hence the version of the 2nd respondent as if she had given consent to have sexual relationship between the petitioner from 27.01.2019 on the basis of the said act or representation on the part of the petitioner, cannot be believed and lacks credibility. Therefore, it has to be held that the parties had voluntarily gone to the said hotel room and that they voluntarily had sexual relationship and that they enjoyed the said relationship. In the overall circumstances, there is force in the submission of the petitioner that in view of the subsequent cancellation of marriage of the 2nd respondent with another person, she became frustrated and she would have given the said complaint as per Annexure A FIS. 10. There is yet another important aspect of the matter that the alleged incident is said to have happened on 27.01.2019 at 5.20 p.m. Further, it is also to be noted that the 2nd respondent has no case in Annexure A that prior to 27.01.2019, when the petitioner and the 2nd respondent were having a full bloom love affair that at any time the petitioner had sexual relationship with the 2nd respondent. In fact it is the admitted case of the the 2nd respondent that the affair was going on between the two since 05.11.2016. Therefore, the abovesaid submission of the petitioner that the version of the 2nd respondent as if the petitioner had sexual relationship with the 2nd respondent on a day previous to the marriage of the petitioner with another lady, lacks credibility. In view of the said admitted case of the 2nd respondent that there was no prior sexual relationship between the parties when they were having a full bloom affair since November 2016 onwards. The abovesaid allegations of the 2nd respondent have to be taken with a pinch of salt and those allegations may not be very probable. 11. In view of the said admitted case of the 2nd respondent that there was no prior sexual relationship between the parties when they were having a full bloom affair since November 2016 onwards. The abovesaid allegations of the 2nd respondent have to be taken with a pinch of salt and those allegations may not be very probable. 11. Be that as it may, there is yet another important aspect in this case. The alleged incident is said to have happened on 27.01.2019 at about 5.20 p.m. Whereas Annexure A FIS has been given as late as on 07.03.2019 at 12.00 noon. The prosecution has not given any credible explanation for the substantial delay in the lodging of the FIR. The only excuse put up by the 2nd respondent is to the effect that, subsequently her marriage with other person was cancelled, etc. and thereafter she has given the abovesaid FIS on 07.03.2019. The said explanation cannot be the basis for this Court to hold that the substantial delay in lodging the FIR has been properly explained by the prosecution. On the other hand, the abovesaid aspect highlighted by the 2nd respondent that it is after the cancellation of her marriage with other person that she had given the abovesaid FIS, may in a way reinforce or probabilise the case of the petitioner, coupled with the fact that the 2nd respondent has no case in Annexure A that the petitioner never had any sexual relationship with her prior to 27.01.2019 when their affair was going on earlier, would probabilise the fact that it is only account of her mental shock that occurred due to the cancellation of the marriage fixed with other person, that she would have ventured to give the abovesaid complaint. That apart, it has to be borne in mind that the Apex Court and various high courts including this Court have held in various decisions including the one in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. M. Madhusudhan Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 582 etc. That apart, it has to be borne in mind that the Apex Court and various high courts including this Court have held in various decisions including the one in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. M. Madhusudhan Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 582 etc. that delay in lodging the FIR, more often than not, results in embellishments and exaggerations, which is a creation of an afterthought and a delayed report, not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, but the danger of the introduction of a coloured versions, exaggerated accounts of incident or a concocted story as a result of deliberations and consultations, also creeps in, thus casting a very serious doubt on its veracity. Therefore, it has been held that it is highly essential that the delay in lodging the FIR should be duly and satisfactorily explained by the prosecution. Resultantly, when the substratum of the prosecution case itself is found to be unreliable, prosecution case has to be rejected in its entirety, etc. In the instant case, the delay is quite substantial inasmuch the FIS is given as late as on 07.03.2019 at about 12 noon in respect of the alleged incidents said to have happened on 27.01.2019 at about 5.20 p.m. The very substratum of the case of the 2nd respondent (de facto complainant) would also fall to the ground on account of the abovsaid reasons as even if it assumed that the alleged incident is said to have taken place, then the same could have been happened only on the basis of consent between the parties. Hence in the light of the totality in the facts of this case, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the impugned criminal proceedings is vitiated and its continuance would be an abuse of the process of court and may lead to unnecessary wastage of precious time of the courts and the prosecution machinery. 12. Hence the impugned criminal proceedings would deserve interdiction at the hands of this Court, in exercise of the inherent powers conferred on this Court. 12. Hence the impugned criminal proceedings would deserve interdiction at the hands of this Court, in exercise of the inherent powers conferred on this Court. In that view of the matter, it is ordered that the impugned Annexure B Final Report/Charge sheet filed in the impugned Annexure A FIR in Crime No. 658 of 2019 of Chengannur Police Station, which has now led to the Committal proceedings in C.P No. 1 of 2020 on the files of Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Chengannur as against the petitioner/accused and all further proceedings emanating therefrom as against the petitioner accused will stand quashed and set aside. The petitioner will produce certified copies of this order before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Chengannur as well as the investigating officer concerned for necessary information. With these observations and directions the above Criminal Miscellaneous Case will stand disposed of.