ORDER : These Writ Petitions have been filed at various stages (as detailed below) as regards acquisition of land for establishing Adikavi Nannayya University. Lands that were sought to be acquired are situated in Velugubanda Village, Rajanagaram Mandal, East Godavari District. 2. As all the Writ Petitions are pertaining to the land that was sought to be acquired for the above mentioned purpose, raising common issues and common questions of law, all the Writ Petitions are disposed of by this Common Order. 3. Writ Petition Nos.216, 263, 427 & 428 of 2008 were filed questioning the 4 (1) Notification dated 26.09.2007. Under the said 4(1) Notification, an extent of Ac.293.55 cents was sought to be acquired in different survey numbers situated in Velugubanda Village, Rajanagaram Mandal, East Godavari District for the establishment of Adikavi Nannayya University. By Order dated 08.01.2008, this Court had directed status quo to be maintained with regard to possession in respect of the lands of the Writ Petitioners. 4. In the Stay Vacate Petition filed by the Official Respondents herein, by Order dated 12.02.2009, the earlier order (08.01.2008) came to be clarified/modified by this Court to the effect that the status quo with regard to the possession shall be maintained, but the said Order will not preclude the Authorities from completing all other steps under the Land Acquisition Act, including the conduct of Section 5A enquiry. 5. By virtue of the above clarification, to the effect that the Authorities are not precluded from completing all other steps including conduct of Section 5A enquiry, the Official Respondents have issued Notices under Section 5A on 20.06.2009. Writ Petitioners herein have submitted their objections on 06.07.2009. The District Collector confirmed the Section 5A Notices by rejecting the objections of the Writ Petitioners by Order dated 14.09.2009. It is pertinent to mention here that personal hearing was not accorded to the Writ Petitioners by the District Collector. 6. Having been aggrieved by rejection of objections, the Writ Petitioners herein have filed W.P.Nos.24827, 24828, 24171 & 23925 of 2009 challenging the Rejection Order dated 14.09.2009. By an Interim Order dated 28.04.2010, the learned Single Judge of this Court has ordered status quo to be maintained with regard to possession. 7. 6. Having been aggrieved by rejection of objections, the Writ Petitioners herein have filed W.P.Nos.24827, 24828, 24171 & 23925 of 2009 challenging the Rejection Order dated 14.09.2009. By an Interim Order dated 28.04.2010, the learned Single Judge of this Court has ordered status quo to be maintained with regard to possession. 7. By giving effect to the Interim Order dated 28.04.2010 as regards status quo with regard to possession, the Official Respondents herein have issued declaration under Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act, 1984 (for short ‘the Act’) on 07.02.2010, as they were not precluded from proceeding with the acquisition proceedings. 8. The Writ Petitioners were once again constrained to approach this Hon’ble Court by filing W.P.Nos.4088, 4089 & 4076 of 2010. This Court has, by Order dated 23.02.2010 ordered status quo with regard to possession. 9. It is pertinent to mention herein that by G.O.Ms.No.21 dated 26.02.2009 the Government withdrew an extent of Ac.73.51 cents from acquisition for the underlying reason that it belongs to Koundinya Educational Society, which belongs to the then MLC. 10. Sri K. Venkatesh, learned counsel for the Writ Petitioners (in all the Writ Petitions) had contended that Adikavi Nannayya University was constructed long back and there is no necessity to acquire any more lands, particularly those lands that belongs to the present Writ Petitioners. He had also contended that due to failure of passing of the Award within the statutory period of limitation (two years) from the date of declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act, the acquisition proceedings shall lapse. He had drawn the attention of this Court to Section 11-A of the Act, which reads as under:- “11A. Period within which an award shall be made:- (1) The Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse: Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation:- In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded”. 11. The learned counsel for the Writ Petitioners has also drawn the attention of this Court to the Judgment of the Division Bench rendered by this Hon’ble Court in W.A.No.327 of 2017 dated 01.06.2017. 12. On a perusal of the cited Judgment (W.A.No.327 of 2017 dated 01.06.2017), it seems that the facts in the cited Judgment are identical to the facts of the present batch of Writ Petitions. 13. For the purpose of elucidation, some facts emerging from W.A.No.327 of 2017 are stated hereunder: i. Section 4(1) Notification was issued on 18.05.2007. ii. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 05.01.2009. iii. Aggrieved by declaration under Section 6 of the Act, aggrieved parties filed W.P.No.825 of 2009. iv. Learned Single Judge of this Court passed an Interim Order in W.P.M.P.No.1036 of 2009 on 28.01.2009 granting stay of dispossession alone while making it clear that all further proceedings may go on. (Italics supplied). v. Notices under Sections 9(3) & 10 of the Act were issued and thereafter an Award was passed on 17.01.2012 vi. Interim Order dated 28.01.2009 was limited to stay of dispossession alone with a further clarification that all further proceedings may go on. Section 6 Notification was issued on 05.01.2009, whereas the Award was passed on 17.01.2012. Obviously, this was beyond the period of limitation set out by Statute (Section 11-A of the Act). vii. Learned Single Judge of this Court had set aside the Award by holding that an Award under Section 11-A of the Act was required to be passed within the period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration and if no Award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for acquisition of land shall lapse. viii. Learned Single Judge has clearly observed that there was no stay granted pursuant to the said declaration, and therefore, held that the Award dated 17.01.2012 was beyond the period of two years prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act. 14. viii. Learned Single Judge has clearly observed that there was no stay granted pursuant to the said declaration, and therefore, held that the Award dated 17.01.2012 was beyond the period of two years prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act. 14. The Order of the learned Single Judge was challenged in Appeal vide W.A.No.327 of 2017, wherein and whereby the Division Bench of this Court by Order dated 01.06.2017 had dismissed the Writ Appeal as it did not find any infirmity in the Order of the learned Single Judge. 15. The Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court further clarified by holding as under :- “It is no doubt true that, in view of the Explanation, the period of two years stipulated under Section 11- A(1) of the Act would exclude the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken, pursuant to the said declaration, is stayed by an order of a Court. In the present case, however, the order of stay passed by this Court prevented the appellants only from dispossessing the 1st respondent-writ petitioner and not from passing the award. In fact, the Learned Single Judge, while granting stay of dispossession, made it amply clear that all further proceedings may go on. There was no restraint on the appellants in passing an award in terms of the order of stay passed by this Court earlier. The contention that the period of stay granted by this Court must be excluded, therefore, necessitates rejection. As it is evident that the award was passed beyond the period of limitation stipulated under Section 11-A(1) of the Act, the Learned Single Judge was justified in setting aside the award. We find no error in the order of the Learned Single Judge necessitating interference in proceedings under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent”. 16. Smt. N. Swarna Latha, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Land Acquisition has submitted that the University is in need of the land which is the subject of acquisition for the purpose of future expansion. She has also submitted that the Writ Petitions are not maintainable inasmuch as the issue of statutory limitation raised by the Writ Petitioners cannot be considered in view of the subsisting stay. 17. It is an admitted fact that, even the till date, Award has not been passed in respect of declaration dated 07.02.2010. 18. She has also submitted that the Writ Petitions are not maintainable inasmuch as the issue of statutory limitation raised by the Writ Petitioners cannot be considered in view of the subsisting stay. 17. It is an admitted fact that, even the till date, Award has not been passed in respect of declaration dated 07.02.2010. 18. Having heard the learned counsel, this Court does not agree with the stand taken by the counsel for the Official Respondents herein. This Court finds that the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court, as cited by the learned counsel for the Writ Petitioners, would be squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 19. The stand of the Writ Petitioners is further fortified by the Judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ravi Khullar and Another Vs. Union of India and Others, (2007) 5 SCC 231 , Mohan and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, (2007) 9 SCC 431 ; Mulchand Khanumal Khatri Vs. State of Gujarat and Others, (2012) 5 SCC 365 . 20. In Ravi Khullar and Another Vs. Union of India and Others (supra cited), the Apex Court held in Para Nos.47 to 50 & 54 to 56 as under:- “47. In this appeal apart from other questions which have been raised in this batch of appeals, a question of limitation has been raised. It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that the award made by the Collector in the instant case was barred by limitation under Section 11-A of the Act inasmuch as it was not made within a period of 2 years from the date of the publication of the declaration after excluding the period during which an order of stay granted by the High Court operated. The facts are not in dispute and since this plea became available to the appellant only after the dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court, we permitted the appellant to raise this plea after giving an opportunity to the respondents to reply to the same. Since the facts are not in dispute, we proceed to decide the question of limitation in this appeal. 48. It is not in dispute that the Notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on 23-1-1965. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on 26-12-1968. Since the facts are not in dispute, we proceed to decide the question of limitation in this appeal. 48. It is not in dispute that the Notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on 23-1-1965. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on 26-12-1968. The appellant filed the writ petition before the High Court on 12-9-1986 in which an order for maintenance of status quo was made on 18-9-1986. It is the case of the respondents that in view of the status quo order the award could not be pronounced. While the awards were pronounced in other cases on September 19, 1986, it was not pronounced in the case of the appellant in view of the status quo order. The High Court by the impugned judgment dismissed the writ petition filed by the petitioner on 13-2-2003 whereafter the award was pronounced on 1-3-2003. 49. We may notice that the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 came into force w.e.f. 24-9- 1984. 50. Keeping in view these dates it will be seen that award ought to have been made within a period of 2 years from the date of the publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. However, in a case where the said declaration was published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 the award must be made within a period of two years from such commencement. This is the mandate of Section 11-A of the Act. In the instant case the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on 26-12-1968 i.e. before the commencement of the Amendment Act of 1984. Thus the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 11-A applied and the award was required to be made within a period of two years from such commencement. So calculated the award ought to have been made on or before the 23-9-1986 when the period of 2 years from the commencement of the Amendment Act, 1984 expired. It is not disputed that an order of status quo was made on 18-9-1986 which prevented the Land Acquisition Officer from pronouncing the award. The aforesaid order of status quo operated till 13-2-2003 which period, as rightly submitted by the learned Additional Solicitor General, had to be excluded in calculating the period of 2 years. Thus after excluding the aforesaid period the award should have been pronounced on or before 18-2-2003. The aforesaid order of status quo operated till 13-2-2003 which period, as rightly submitted by the learned Additional Solicitor General, had to be excluded in calculating the period of 2 years. Thus after excluding the aforesaid period the award should have been pronounced on or before 18-2-2003. However, the award was pronounced on 1-3-2003. Ex facie, therefore, the award having not been made within the period prescribed by Section 11-A of the Act, the entire proceeding for acquisition of the land lapsed on 18-2-2003, the last date for pronouncement of the award. 54. In the matter of computing the period of limitation three situations may be visualized, namely (a) where the Limitation Act applies by its own force ; (b) where the provisions of the Limitation Act with or without modifications are made applicable to a special statue ; and (c) where the special statue itself prescribes the period of limitation and provides for extension of time and or condonation of delay. The instant case is not one which is governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act. The Land Acquisition Collector in making an award does not act as a Court within the meaning of the Limitation Act. It is also clear from the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act that the provisions of the Limitation Act have not been made applicable to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act in the matter of making an award under Section 11-A of the Act. However, Section 11A of the Act does provide a period of limitation within which the Collector shall make his award. The explanation thereto also provides for exclusion of the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by an order of a court. Such being the provision, there is no scope for importing into Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act. The application of Section 12 of the Limitation Act is also confined to matters enumerated therein. The time taken for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment is excluded because a certified copy is required to be filed while preferring an appeal/revision/review etc. challenging the impugned order. Thus a court is not permitted to read into Section 11-A of the Act a provision for exclusion of time taken to obtain a certified copy of the judgment and order. challenging the impugned order. Thus a court is not permitted to read into Section 11-A of the Act a provision for exclusion of time taken to obtain a certified copy of the judgment and order. The court has, therefore, no option but to compute the period of limitation for making an award in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act after excluding such period as can be excluded under the explanation to Section 11-A of the Act. 55. Our conclusion finds support from the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act itself. Section 11-A of the Act was inserted by Act 68 of 1984 with effect from 24-9-1984. Similarly, Section 28A was also inserted by the Amendment Act of 1984 with effect from the same date. In Section 28-A the Act provides for a period of limitation within which an application should be made to the Collector for redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court. The proviso to subsection(1) of Section 28-A reads as follows:- "Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this subsection, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded." 56. It will thus be seen that the legislature wherever it considered necessary incorporated by express words the rule incorporated in Section 12 of the Limitation Act. It has done so expressly in Section 28-A of the Act while it has consciously not incorporated this rule in Section 11-A even while providing for exclusion of time under the explanation. The intendment of the legislature is therefore unambiguous and does not permit the Court to read words into Section 11-A of the Act so as to enable it to read Section 12 of the Limitation Act into Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act”. 21. In Mohan and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and others (supra cited), the Apex Court held in Para Nos.7 to 10 as under:- “7. In our opinion the submission of learned counsel for the appellant is clearly correct in view of the clear provision of Section 11-A of the Act. In view of Section 11-A an award has to be made within two years from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6. In our opinion the submission of learned counsel for the appellant is clearly correct in view of the clear provision of Section 11-A of the Act. In view of Section 11-A an award has to be made within two years from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6. Failure to adhere to this time frame is fatal to the award, as the provision is mandatory. 8. Learned counsel …… 9. In our opinion under Section 11-A what has to be seen is the date of last publication of the declaration under Section 6, and not any subsequent corrigendum to the said declaration. The only circumstance under which the period between the declaration under Section 6 and the award can be extended is mentioned in the Explanation to Section 11-A which states : "In computing the period of two years referred to in this Section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court is excluded." 10. There is no mention in Section 11-A that the period after the publication of the declaration under Section 6 and the publication of any corrigendum to the said declaration has also to be excluded. We will be adding words to the statute if we put such interpretation to Section 11A, and it is well settled that the Court should not add or delete words in a statute”. 22. In Mulchand Khanumal Khatri Vs. State of Gujarat and Others (supra cited), the Apex Court held in Para Nos.8 to 12 as under:- “8. Insofar as present case is concerned, there is no dispute that the proviso that follows subsection (1) of Section 11A is attracted because the declaration under Section 6 was published before the commencement of the Amendment Act and the award was made after coming into force of Section 11-A. The period of two years shall thus commence from 24-9-1984 when the amendment to the Act was notified. 9. It is also not in issue that in computing the period of two years, the period during which the interim relief granted by the Gujarat High Court remained operative shall have to be excluded. The stay order of the High Court remained operative for the period 24-9-1984 to 11-1-1996. 9. It is also not in issue that in computing the period of two years, the period during which the interim relief granted by the Gujarat High Court remained operative shall have to be excluded. The stay order of the High Court remained operative for the period 24-9-1984 to 11-1-1996. The question is, whether Section 11A of the Act permits exclusion of time that was taken in obtaining the certified copy of the judgment and order passed by the High Court and the period from the date the certified copy was obtained and it was brought to the notice of the authority. 10. The question with which we are concerned came up for consideration in Ravi Khullar and Another Vs. Union of India and Others, (2007) 5 SCC 231 . In paras 54, 55 and 56 of the report, this Court stated as follows: “54. In the matter of computing the period of limitation three situations may be visualized, namely, (a) where the Limitation Act applies by its own force; (b) where the provisions of the Limitation Act with or without modifications are made applicable to a special statute; and (c) where the special statue itself prescribes the period of limitation and provides for extension of time and/or condonation of delay. The instant case is not one which is governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act. The Land Acquisition Collector in making an award does not act as a court within the meaning of the Limitation Act. It is also clear from the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act that the provisions of the Limitation Act have not been made applicable to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act in the matter of making an award under Section 11-A of the Act. However, Section 11-A of the Act does provide a period of limitation within which the Collector shall make his award. The Explanation thereto also provides for exclusion of the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by an order of a court. Such being the provision, there is no scope for importing into Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act. The application of Section 12 of the Limitation Act is also confined to matters enumerated therein. Such being the provision, there is no scope for importing into Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act. The application of Section 12 of the Limitation Act is also confined to matters enumerated therein. The time taken for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment is excluded because a certified copy is required to be filed while preferring an appeal/revision/review etc., challenging the impugned order. Thus a court is not permitted to read into Section 11-A of the Act a provision for exclusion of time taken to obtain a certified copy of the judgment and order. The Court has, therefore, no option but to compute the period of limitation for making an award in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act after excluding such period as can be excluded under the Explanation to Section 11-A of the Act. 55. Our conclusion finds support from the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act itself. Section 11-A of the Act was inserted by Act 68 of 1984 with effect from 24-9-1984. Similarly, Section 28-A was also inserted by the Amendment Act of 1984 with effect from the same date. In Section 28-A the Act provides for a period of limitation within which an application should be made to the Collector for redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 28-A reads as follows:- "Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded." 56. It will thus be seen that the legislature wherever it considered necessary incorporated by express words the rule incorporated in Section 12 of the Limitation Act. It has done so expressly in Section 28-A of the Act while it has consciously not incorporated this rule in Section 11-A even while providing for exclusion of time under the Explanation. The intendment of the legislature is therefore unambiguous and does not permit the court to read words into Section 11-A of the Act so as to enable it to read Section 12 of the Limitation Act into Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act.” 11. The intendment of the legislature is therefore unambiguous and does not permit the court to read words into Section 11-A of the Act so as to enable it to read Section 12 of the Limitation Act into Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act.” 11. We are in respectful agreement with the above legal position. The period prescribed in Section 11-A is mandatory. The consequence of breach is provided in the provision itself viz., the entire acquisition proceedings get lapsed. Insofar as computation of the period is concerned, the period of two years commences from the date of the publication of the declaration. Where the declaration has been published before the Amendment Act, then the period commences from the commencement of the Amendment Act. The only period that is excludable is the period during which the action or proceedings to be taken pursuant to the said declaration remains stayed under the order of a court and no other. Section 11- A is a special provision for the purposes of the Act and the legislative intent being clear from the bare language of the Explanation appended thereto, we find no justification to read the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 and particularly Section 12 thereof into it. 12. In view of the above legal position and the facts noticed above, we hold as we must, that the award having not been made within the period prescribed in Section 11-A of the Act, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the appellant’s land has lapsed. The High Court was clearly in error in excluding the period from 11-1-1996 to 5-9-1997. This period cannot be excluded under Explanation appended to Section 11-A of the Act”. 23. In view of the foregone discussion, Section 4(1) Notification dated 26.09.2007; Section 5A Notice dated 20.06.2009 and Section 6 Declaration dated 07.02.2010 are hereby quashed by allowing the W.P.Nos. 216, 263, 427, 428 of 2008 & 24828, 24171, 24827, 23925 of 2009 & 4076, 4088, 4089 of 2010. There shall be no order as to costs. 24. Interlocutory Applications, if any pending, stand disposed of in terms of this order.