JUDGMENT : In this writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, namely, Shri Lalit Kumar Singh has put to challenge the enquiry report, dated 01.05.2018, submitted by the Enquiry Officer, (holding that out of 6(six) charges, 4(four) have been proved, one not proved and one partly proved), and the order of punishment, dated 02.06.2018, passed by the disciplinary authority inflicting major punishment of removal of the petitioner from service, with immediate effect and also imposing fine upon him. 2. The factual background leading to filing of the present writ petition is adumbrated herein below:- “The petitioner was serving as Branch Manager in Basar Branch of Arunachal Pradesh Rural Bank. He was suspended vide order dated 24.01.2009, by the respondent No. 2, under Rule 45 of the Arunachal Pradesh Rural Bank Officers’ and Employees Service Regulation, 2001. Thereafter, vide letter dated 20.03.2009, the respondent No. 2 issued show-cause notice to the petitioner on various irregularities committed by him during his tenure as Branch Manager of Basar Branch. The petitioner has submitted his reply on 26.03.2009, denying all the allegations. Then without considering any detail of the Show-cause reply submitted by the petitioner, the respondent authorities charge-sheeted him on 06.05.2009. Thereafter, on 19.05.2009, the petitioner submitted his reply to the Charge-sheet and denied the allegation made in the article of charges. But, without considering the written statement, in its proper perspective, the enquiry was initiated by the Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer on 10.08.2009. The petitioner has participated in the enquiry and at the end, the Enquiry Officer found the petitioner guilty of the allegation and the charges were held to be proved except however, charge No. 3. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority-cum-Chairman of the Bank, while agreeing to the enquiry report, inflicted major penalty on the petitioner vide order dated 10.12.2010, and he was removed from service and also a fine of Rs. 6,28,160/-with interest @ 14% per annum with effect from 05.01.2009, was imposed upon him and the period of suspension was directed to be treated as ‘not on duty’. Thereafter, on 10.01.2011, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Appellate Authority and the same was rejected on 03.8.2011. Though the petitioner preferred an application for review, the same was also rejected vide order, dated 09.03.2012. Thereafter, on 10.01.2011, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Appellate Authority and the same was rejected on 03.8.2011. Though the petitioner preferred an application for review, the same was also rejected vide order, dated 09.03.2012. Then being aggrieved by the order, of punishment and subsequent order passed thereon by the authorities, the petitioner preferred one writ petition before this Court, being WP(C) No.206 (AP)/2012. Then hearing both the sides, this court vide judgment and order dated 21.04.2017, has set aside the enquiry report dated 08.02.2010, and the order of the Disciplinary Authority-cum-Chairman of the Bank, dated 10.12.2010, removing the petitioner from service and imposing a fine of Rs. 6,28,260/-with interest. However, a liberty was given to the Bank to initiate disciplinary proceeding afresh against the petitioner vide Memorandum of Charges, dated 06.05.2009. Thereafter, on 06.06.2017 the respondent authorities reinstated the petitioner and vide letter dated 25.01.2018, the respondent No. 2 had appointed respondent No. 3 as the Enquiry Officer for denovo enquiry. And thereafter, on 05.02.2018, the Enquiry Officer had issued notice to him about the enquiry. And though this Court was pleased to direct the respondent Bank to give all consequential benefit to the petitioner, yet, the said order has not been complied with in respect of the consequential benefits. And in the meantime, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aalo, West Siang District, had taken cognizance of the offence under section 409 IPC, against the petitioner, on the Charge Sheet filed by the investigating agency on the basis of F.I.R. lodged by the bank and summoned the petitioner to appear before it. Under such circumstances, the petitioner made one representation to the Enquiry Officer on 19.02.2018, to keep the disciplinary proceeding in abeyance as continuance of the proceeding would compel him to disclose his defence plea in the criminal proceeding, and thereby, he would be prejudiced. But, the same failed to yield any result. The petitioner then participated in the proceeding which was conducted on 19.02.2018, 23.03.2018, 09.04.2018, and 11.04.2018, and thereafter, the Enquiry Officer had submitted the report on 01.05.2018, to the Disciplinary Authority. Then vide letter dated 01.05.2018, the respondent No. 2 has asked the petitioner to submit his explanation on 08.05.2018, and thereafter, on 02.06.2018, the Disciplinary Authority agreed with the finding of the Enquiry Officer and asked for explanation from him on the proposed penalty. The petitioner then submitted his explanation on 31.05.2019. Then vide letter dated 01.05.2018, the respondent No. 2 has asked the petitioner to submit his explanation on 08.05.2018, and thereafter, on 02.06.2018, the Disciplinary Authority agreed with the finding of the Enquiry Officer and asked for explanation from him on the proposed penalty. The petitioner then submitted his explanation on 31.05.2019. Then vide order dated 02.06.2018, the Disciplinary Authority inflicted the punishment on the Charge basing on the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, wherein the Disciplinary Authority has recorded disagreement on the finding of the Enquiry Officer on one charge not being proved and held the same as partly proved. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed an appeal to the appellate authority on 30.06.2018, but the same having not been disposed of, the petitioner filed another writ petition being WP(C) No. 136(AP)2019 before this Court and the said writ petition was disposed of by this Court directing the respondent bank authorities to dispose of the same within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the order. And Thereafter, vide letter dated 07.05.2019, the respondent bank authorities intimated the petitioner about the dismissal of the appeal by the appellate authority. It is alleged that the disciplinary proceeding was conducted ignoring the principles of natural justice and fair play, wherein numbers of documents were introduced in the enquiry, but, the copy of those documents were not furnished to him. Even the Article of charges was also not furnished by the Enquiry Officer to the petitioner. It is also stated that the disciplinary proceeding and the criminal case both were continued on the same sets of allegations and the witnesses and documents are same in both the proceedings. And the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature, which involves complicated questions of law and facts. And the petitioner, in order to keep his defence undisclosed in the criminal case, filed an application for keeping the disciplinary proceeding in abeyance till the end of the criminal case. But, the same was not considered by the Disciplinary Authority. And the petitioner, in order to keep his defence undisclosed in the criminal case, filed an application for keeping the disciplinary proceeding in abeyance till the end of the criminal case. But, the same was not considered by the Disciplinary Authority. It is also stated that there is absolutely no preponderance of probabilities against the petitioner with regard to the allegations and the charges, and due to irregularity and interestedness, the Enquiry Officer has submitted his report against the petitioner without giving a copy of the report thereof to the petitioner, and he had submitted the same to the respondent No. 2, and further, the witnesses produced by the Presenting Officer were examined and cross-examined by the Enquiry Officer giving no chance to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses and the Enquiry Officer i.e. respondent No. 3 has been appointed by the respondent No. 2, the Disciplinary Authority and respondent No. 3 is completely bent on the petitioner. Being highly aggrieved, the petitioner preferred the present petition for issuing of writ of certiorari to set aside the enquiry report dated 01.05.2018, and the order of punishment dated 02.06.2018, and also to issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits. 3. The respondent authorities have submitted affidavit-in-opposition denying all the averments made in the writ petition. It is stated that the petitioner has specifically admitted his guilt before the Enquiry Officer, and the offence committed by the petitioner is serious in nature and he had committed fraud with the Bank and thereby, caused huge pecuniary loss to the Bank and it also denied that the disciplinary proceeding was conducted by ignoring the principles of natural justice and fair play and that the petitioner participated in the enquiry proceeding and failed to defend his own case, instead he admitted his guilt, and besides the petitioner was given the right to appeal against the order passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority, after examining all the documents on record, upheld the decision of the disciplinary authority but reduced the interest part by 50%. It is also stated that the Enquiry Officer had conducted the enquiry following due process of law and the petitioner was given ample opportunity to examine the witnesses, but, the petitioner deliberately preferred not to examine the witnesses. Therefore, it is contented to dismiss the petition with cost. 4. Mr. It is also stated that the Enquiry Officer had conducted the enquiry following due process of law and the petitioner was given ample opportunity to examine the witnesses, but, the petitioner deliberately preferred not to examine the witnesses. Therefore, it is contented to dismiss the petition with cost. 4. Mr. G. Bhol, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted written argument and supplemented the same by oral argument. Also I have heard Mr. G. Tarak, learned standing counsel for the respondent Bank. 5. Mr. G. Tarak, learned standing counsel for the respondent Bank submits that this court has to see whether the principle of natural justice was violated or not and whether reasonable opportunity of being heard was afforded to the petitioner or not. It is further submitted that the respondent authorities have followed the principle of natural justice, and the petitioner was given reasonable opportunity of being heard and that the order of this Court has been duly complied with and fresh enquiry was initiated against him after giving proper notice, and petitioner was given the chance for preferring appeal against order of his dismissal and the appeal has been disposed of within 6(six) months and as such, the question of violation of the principle of natural justice does not arise. Mr. Tarak further submits that departmental proceeding can go on with the criminal proceedings together and there is no bar in this regard. Mr. Tarak also referred to the following case laws in support of his submission: (i) State of Rajasthan vs. B. K. Meena & Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 417 ; (ii) Y.R. Veeranna vs. State of Karnataka and Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 27 ; (iii) Deokinandan Sharma vs. Union of India and Ors., (2001) 5 SCC 340 ; (iv) State Bank of India and Anr. vs. Bela Bagchi and Ors.: (2005) 7 SCC 435 ; (v) (Administrator, Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli vs. Gulabhia M. Lad : (2010) 5 SCC 775 ; (vi) Prem Nath Bali vs. Registrar, High Court of Delhi & Anr, (2015) 16 SCC 415 6. Having heard the submissions of learned advocates of both sides, I have carefully gone through the pleadings of the parties and the documents placed on record also the written argument and the case laws referred therein by Mr. Bhol, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. G. Tarak, learned standing counsel for the respondents, respectively. Having heard the submissions of learned advocates of both sides, I have carefully gone through the pleadings of the parties and the documents placed on record also the written argument and the case laws referred therein by Mr. Bhol, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. G. Tarak, learned standing counsel for the respondents, respectively. 7. It is averred by the petitioner in paragraph-21 of the petition, that the disciplinary proceeding was conducted ignoring the principle of natural justice and fair play and a number of documents were introduced in the enquiry. But, the copy of those were not furnished to the petitioner even the Article of charge, as required by the petitioner was not furnished to him by the Enquiry Officer and on account of this irregularity, the Disciplinary Proceeding is liable to be set aside. 8. It is further pointed out by Mr. G. Bhol, the learned counsel for the petitioner, in the written argument that the documents were not provided to the petitioner before placing reliance upon the same by the Enquiry Officer. Mr. Bhol also referred one case law, Union of India and Ors. Vs. T. R. Verma, reported in AIR 1957 SC 882 , to contend that the disciplinary proceeding is perverse and it is against the principle of natural justice. 9. Having gone through the record, I find sufficient force in the submission of Mr. Bhol, learned counsel for the petitioner. It appears that the documents which were being relied upon by the disciplinary authority to prove the article of charges against the petitioner were annexed as Annexure-III to the memorandum of charges furnished to the petitioner by the respondent authorities. It also appears that to prove the charge No. 1 the respondent authorities have relied upon 2 (two) documents, and to prove the charge No. 2, the respondent authorities relied upon 5 (five) documents and to prove the charge No. 3, the respondent authorities relied upon 4 (four) documents and to prove the charge No. 4, the respondent authorities relied upon 2 (two) documents and to prove the charge No. 5, the respondent authorities relied upon 3 (three) documents. But, from the daily order sheet dated 23.03.2018, of the departmental proceeding shows that the Presenting Officer had introduced as many as 47 (forty seven) documents and the daily order sheet dated 11.04.2018, reveals that the Exhibits, though shown to the petitioner, a copy of the same have not been furnished to the petitioner. 10. It is worth mentioning here in this context that the averments made by the petitioner in paragraph No. 21 of the writ petition, have not been disputed by the respondent authorities in their counter-affidavit. It has simply denied that the proceeding was conducted by giving good bye to the principle of natural justice and fair play. Mr. G. Tarak, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent also not disputed the submission of Mr. G. Bhol. 11. In the case of T. R. Varma (Supra) referred by Mr. Bhol, learned counsel for the petitioner, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “The law requires that such tribunals should observe rules of natural justice in the conduct of the enquiry, and if they do so, their decision is not liable to be impeached on the ground that the procedure followed was not in accordance with that, which obtains in a Court of law. Stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive, it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them. If these rules are satisfied, the enquiry is not open to attack on the ground that the procedure laid down in the Evidence Act for taking evidence was not strictly followed.” 12. As stated above, in the case in hand, in Annexure-III of the memorandum, the respondent authorities have relied upon altogether 16 (sixteen) documents, but, during enquiry the Presenting Officer has exhibited as many as 47 (forty seven) documents, to prove the charges against the petitioner and it also appears that the petitioner has not been furnished with any copy of the aforesaid documents. Having not been disputed this fact by the respondent authorities, and also in view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of T. R. Varam (supra), I am inclined to hold that the principle of natural justice has not been complied with while conducting the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner by the respondent authorities. 13. It also appears that the enquiry report is also being challenged on another count. It is alleged that the respondent No. 3, Shri Aben Dupak, was appointed as the Enquiry Officer to conduct the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner, by the respondent authorities. Mr. Bhol, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Enquiry Officer was immediate junior to the petitioner and he superseded the petitioner while the petitioner was under suspension. Once the suspension is set aside, the Enquiry Officer would become junior to the petitioner, and as such, he has personal bias and also has subject bias and pecuniary bias and consequently, unfits to hold enquiry against the petitioner. Mr. Bhol also referred one case law, Ashok Kumar Yadav and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors., reported in 1987 AIR 454, to contend that the enquiry conducted by such an interested person and the report submitted by him stands vitiated on account of bias. The learned counsel for the respondent has not disputed the aforementioned contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. And considering the facts and circumstances here in this case, I find that there is substance in the submission of Mr. G. Bhol, the learned counsel for the petitioner and the case law referred by him also fortified his submission. 14. While dealing with the issue of bias, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Yadav and Ors. (supra), observed as under: “We agree with the petitioners that it is one of the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence that no man can be a Judge in his own cause and that if there is a reasonable likelihood of bias it is "in accordance with natural justice and common sense that the justice likely to be so biased should be incapacitated from sitting". The question is not whether the judge is actually biased or in fact decides partially, but whether there is a real likelihood of bias. The question is not whether the judge is actually biased or in fact decides partially, but whether there is a real likelihood of bias. What is objectionable in such a case is not that the decision is actually tainted with bias but that the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of others that there is a likelihood of bias affecting the decision. The basic principle underlying this rule is that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done and this rule has received wide recognition in several decisions of this Court. It is also important to note that this rule is not confined to cases where judicial power stricto sensu is exercised. It is appropriately extended to all cases where an independent mind has to be applied to arrive at a fair and just decision between the rival claims of parties. Justice is not the function of the courts alone; it is also the duty of all those who are expected to decide fairly between contending parties. The strict standards applied to authorities exercising judicial power are being increasingly applied to administrative bodies, for it is vital to the maintenance of the rule of law in a welfare state where the jurisdiction of administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid pace that the instrumentalities of the State should discharge their functions in a fair and just manner.” 15. Again in the case of Manak Lal vs Dr. Prem Chand reported in 1957 AIR 425, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “It is well settled that every member of a tribunal that is called upon to try issues in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings must be able to act judicially; and it is of the essence of judicial decisions and judicial administration that judges should be able to act impartially, objectively and without any bias. In such cases the test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done. As Viscount Cave L. C. has observed in From United Brewerses Co. v. Bath Justices:- (1) "This rule has been asserted not only in the case of Courts of Justices and other judicial tribunals but in the case of authorities which, though in no sense to be called Courts, have to act as judges of the rights of others ". In dealing with cases of bias attributed to members constituting tribunals, it is necessary to make a distinction between pecuniary interest and prejudice so attributed. It is obvious that pecuniary interest, however small it may be in a subject-matter of the proceedings, would wholly disqualify a member from acting as a judge. But where pecuniary interest is not attributed but instead a bias is suggested, it often becomes necessary to consider whether there is a reasonable ground for assuming the possibility of a bias and whether it is likely to produce in the minds of the litigant, or the public at large a reasonable doubt about the fairness of the administration of justice. It would always be a question of fact to be decided in each case. "The principle says Halsbury, "nemo debet esse judex in causaproprta sua precludes a justice, who is interested in the subject matter of a dispute, from acting as a justice therein” (2). In our opinion, there is and can be no doubt about the validity of this principle and we are prepared to assume that this principle applies not only to the justices as mentioned by Halsbury, but to all tribunals and bodies which are given jurisdiction to determine judicially the rights of parties.” 16. In the case in hand, the Enquiry Officer is stated to be junior to the petitioner, who preceded the petitioner, while the petitioner was under suspension and in the event of setting aside his suspension, the Enquiry Officer would become junior to the petitioner and as such, the Enquiry Officer is a person interested in the outcome of the enquiry, and there is no doubt about it and as such, he cannot be an unbiased person. There was not only pecuniary bias, but also subject bias on his part and consequently unfit to hold enquiry. There was not only pecuniary bias, but also subject bias on his part and consequently unfit to hold enquiry. Thus, I am constrained to record my concurrence to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 17. Another count, on which the petitioner has challenged the legality of the disciplinary proceeding is that one criminal proceeding was also initiated against him and one F.I.R. was filed by the respondent authorities against the petitioner and based upon the same, the Officer-in-charge, Basar P.S. has registered a case, being Basar P.S. Case No. 01/2009, under Section 409 of the IPC and after investigation, charge-sheet has been submitted against the petitioner and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aalo, after taking cognizance of the offence, has summoned the petitioner to appear before him and to stand trial. The contention of the petitioner is that he has filed one representation before the respondent authorities to keep the departmental proceeding in abeyance till completion of the trial of the Basar P.S. Case No. 01/2009, under Section 409 of the IPC, but the same has not been considered by the respondent authorities. 18. Mr. Bhol, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the criminal trial and Departmental Proceedings continued in the same set of facts and thereby, irreparable prejudice was caused as the defence plea was required to be disclosed in the criminal trial. Mr. Bhol has referred two case laws Depot Manager, A.P.S.R.T.C. vs. Mohd. Yusuf Miya & Ors., reported in 1997(2) SCC 699 and Captain M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr. reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 , in support of his submission. Though Mr. G. Tarak, learned standing counsel for the respondent authorities submits that there is no bar in proceeding with the criminal trial and departmental proceedings simultaneously, yet in view of the law laid down of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Depot Manager, A.P.S.R.T.C. (supra), where it has been held that unless the charges in the criminal case is of grave nature, involving complicated question of law and facts, there is no bar to proceed simultaneously. The proposition of law, which can be crystallized from the aforesaid decision, is that:- “(i). departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in there being conducted simultaneously, though separately. (ii). The proposition of law, which can be crystallized from the aforesaid decision, is that:- “(i). departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in there being conducted simultaneously, though separately. (ii). If the departmental proceeding in the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of grave nature which involves complicated question of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay a departmental proceeding till a conclusion of the criminal case. (iii). Whether the nature of charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated question of facts and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of an evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge-sheet. (iv). The factors mentioned in (ii) & (iii) cannot be considered in isolation to stay the Departmental Proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the Departmental Proceedings cannot be unduly delayed. (v). If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the Departmental Proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, administration may get rid of him at the earliest.” 19. This issue was again considered in the case of Captain M. Paul Anthony (supra), where it has been held that departmental proceeding and proceeding in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously, as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately. If the departmental proceeding and the criminal case are based on identical and similar sets of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated question of law and facts, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceeding till the conclusion of trial in criminal case. 20. In the case in hand, the petitioner is charge sheeted under section 409 IPC. The facts and circumstances in both the proceeding are same. 20. In the case in hand, the petitioner is charge sheeted under section 409 IPC. The facts and circumstances in both the proceeding are same. But, it appears that the charge in criminal proceeding is grave in nature involving complicated question of law and facts, which carries punishment with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for 10 years and fine. As held in the case of Depot Manager (supra), it was desirable to stay departmental proceeding till conclusion of criminal trial. In the case of State Bank Of India Vs. Neelam Nag: (2016) 9 SCC 491 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has stressed that the court has to keep in mind the broad approach to be adopted in such matter on case to case basis and pendency in case against the delinquent employee cannot be sole basis to suspend the departmental proceeding for an indefinite period. The balance has to be struck between the need for a fair trial to the accused on one hand and in an ongoing disciplinary proceeding on the other hand. Here in this case it has been contended that serious prejudice is caused to the petitioner as his plea of defence in criminal trial is required to be disclosed. The plea made to the Enquiry Officer was not considered. And as such there is force in the submission of Mr. Bhol, the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the given facts and circumstances I record concurrence with the submissions of Mr. Bhol, as right to fair trial is now a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which seems to be impaired here in this case. In holding so I derived authority from a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the State of Rajasthan Vs. B.K. Meena : (1996) 6 SCC 417 . 21. Mr. G. Bhol, the learned counsel for the petitioner, also assailed the order passed by the Appellate Authority dismissing the appeal preferred by the petitioner against his order of dismissal from his service. It is submitted that the appeal is provided under the service regulation and accordingly, the petitioner preferred an appeal and the same was not disposed of till receipt of the order of this Court, dated 06.05.2019, by the Appellate Authority. It is submitted that the appeal is provided under the service regulation and accordingly, the petitioner preferred an appeal and the same was not disposed of till receipt of the order of this Court, dated 06.05.2019, by the Appellate Authority. It is submitted that the Appeal was dismissed by a non-speaking order without giving any reason and in view of the law laid down by Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Girish Chandra Singhal Vs. Vidur Gramin Bank, Bijnor & Ors. reported in 2009 SCC Online All 61, such non-speaking order cannot sustain. Mr. Bhol, learned counsel for the petitioner, further submits that the disciplinary authority, here in this case, is not only a party in the appellate forum, but he also played a vital role in disposal of the appeal, which is bad in the eyes of law as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amar Nath Chowdhury Vs. Braithwaite And Company Ltd. & Ors [ (2002) 2 SCC 290 ]. 22. This limb of submission of Mr. G. Bhol, the learned counsel for the petitioner is not disputed by Mr. G. Tarak, learned counsel for the respondent authorities. While dealing with the issue in Amar Nath Chowdhury (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:- “One of the principles of natural justice is that no person shall be a judge in his own cause or the adjudicating authority must be impartial and must act without any kind of bias. The said rule against bias has its origin from the maxim known as 'Debet Esse Judex in Propria Causa', which is based on the principle that justice not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done. This could be possible only when a judge or an adjudicating authority decides the matter impartially and without carrying any kind of bias. Bias may be of different kind and form. It may be pecuniary, personal or there may be bias as to the subject-matter etc. In the present case, we are not concerned with any of the aforesaid form of bias. What we are concerned with in the present case is whether an authority can sit in appeal against its own order passed in the capacity of Disciplinary Authority. In Financial Commissioner (Taxation) Punjab & Ors. Vs. In the present case, we are not concerned with any of the aforesaid form of bias. What we are concerned with in the present case is whether an authority can sit in appeal against its own order passed in the capacity of Disciplinary Authority. In Financial Commissioner (Taxation) Punjab & Ors. Vs. Harbhajan Singh[ 1996(9) SCC 281 ], it was held that the Settlement Officer has no jurisdiction to sit over the order passed by him as an Appellate Authority. In the present case, the subject-matter of appeal before the Board was whether the order of removal passed by the Disciplinary Authority was in conformity with law. It is not disputed that Shri S. Krishnaswami, the then Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Company acted as a Disciplinary Authority as well as an Appellate Authority when he presided over and participated in the deliberations of the meeting of the Board while deciding the appeal of the appellant. Such a dual function is not permissible on account of established rule against bias. In a situation where such a dual function is discharged by one and the same authority, unless permitted by an act of legislation or statutory provision, the same would be contrary to rule against bias. Where an authority earlier had taken a decision, he is disqualified to sit in appeal against his own decision, as he already prejudged the matter otherwise such an appeal would be termed an appeal from Caesar to Caesar and filing of an appeal would be an exercise in futility. In that view of the matter, in the present case, fair play demanded that Shri Krishnaswmai, the then Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Company ought not to have participated in the deliberations of the meeting of the Board when the Board heard and decided the appeal of the appellant. 23. In the case in hand, it remains uncontroverted that the respondent No. 2, the disciplinary authority, has passed the order on the disciplinary proceeding, whereby, he removed the petitioner from his service and he also took part in the meeting of the Board Members, which decided the appeal of the petitioner. 23. In the case in hand, it remains uncontroverted that the respondent No. 2, the disciplinary authority, has passed the order on the disciplinary proceeding, whereby, he removed the petitioner from his service and he also took part in the meeting of the Board Members, which decided the appeal of the petitioner. And in view of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned case and in view of absence of any statutory provision or act of legislation, such dual function of the respondent No. 2 is not permissible in law and contrary to the rule against bias. 24. Mr. G. Bhol, learned counsel for the petitioner, also submits that initiation of denovoenquiry against the petitioner is bad and that the enquiry report has not been furnished to the petitioner and he was not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses and the enquiry report was not furnished to the petitioner and the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is bad in law and, therefore, Mr. Bhol, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended to allow the petition. 25. Mr. G. Tarak, learned counsel for the respondent authorities, also not controverted the above submission of Mr. G. Bhol, learned counsel for the petitioner. 26. Having considered the submission of Mr. Bhol, learned counsel for the petitioner, and also having carefully gone through the pleadings of the parties and the document placed on record, I find substance in the submission of Mr. Bhol, learned counsel for the petitioner. I have also carefully gone through the case laws referred by Mr. G. Tarak, the learned counsel for the respondent authorities and find that the ratio laid down therein proceeds on their own facts and circumstances and are not applicable in all force to the facts and circumstances herein this case. Therefore, I am not inclined to burden this judgment with discussion of the said case laws. 27. Under the facts and circumstances discussed above, we find that the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the petitioner and the findings so recorded by the disciplinary authority and the consequent order passed thereon and the order of the appellate authority, while tested on the touchstone of the principle of natural justice and fair play, the same failed to withstand the test, and accordingly, the same stands set aside and quashed. 28. 28. In the result, the writ petition stands allowed by setting aside the report of disciplinary proceeding dated 01.05.2018, and the consequent order of punishment dated 02.06.2018, imposed upon the petitioner. In view of setting aside of the disciplinary proceeding and the consequent order passed thereon, the petitioner shall be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits. It is submitted at the bar that the petitioner, in the meantime, retired from service. In such event, the petitioner will be entitled to retirement benefits which he is legally entitled to. The respondent authorities shall settle all such issues within a period of 3 (three) months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment and order. It is being clarified that this judgment would not stand in the way of proceeding against the petitioner by the respondent authorities again if the same is permissible under the law.