ORDER : 1. With the consent of the parties, hearing of the matter has been done through video conferencing and there is no complaint whatsoever regarding audio and/or visual quality. I.A. No. 1096 of 2021 2. The instant interlocutory application has been filed for condonation of delay of 1044 days. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted by referring to the ground taken in the instant delay condonation application to condone the delay since sufficient cause has been shown therein. It has been submitted that since the appellant-writ petitioner is unemployed, sufficient time has been consumed in arranging the money to be incurred in filing the instant appeal. It has further been submitted that the writ petitioner has got good case on merit and, therefore, the instant appeal may not be dismissed on limitation, rather, it may be heard on merit. 4. No counter affidavit, to the instant delay condonation application, has been filed. However, oral objection has been made on behalf of the respondent State of Jharkhand to reject the instant delay condonation application. 5. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and considering the reasons, this Court deems it fit and proper to condone the delay so that the matter may be heard on merit. 6. Accordingly, the delay in filing the instant appeal is condoned. 7. The instant interlocutory application being I.A. No. 1096 of 2021 is allowed. L.P.A. No. 415 of 2020 8. Learned counsel for the parties have consented for hearing the appeal on merit and as such, the same has been heard on merit. 9. The instant appeal, preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 05.02.2018 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in writ petitions being W.P. (S) No. 60 of 2016 with W.P. (S) No. 82 of 2016 whereby and whereunder the writ petition has been dismissed refusing to pass positive direction by directing the respondent State of Jharkhand to relax the cut-off date fixed in “the advertisement” for consideration of candidature of one or the other candidates. 10. 10. Brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ proceeding which are required to be enumerated herein, read as under: The writ petitioner made an application for consideration of his candidature in pursuance to the advertisement published by the Jharkhand Public Service Commission, hereinafter referred as the “Commission” being Advertisement No. 03/2015 for the post of Jharkhand Agriculture Service Class-II (Basic Category) (Assistant Agriculture Director/ Sub Divisional Agriculture Officer and equivalent post). In the advertisement, the cut-off date has been provided as on 01.08.2014 as age limit of different categories of candidates. The writ petitioner has crossed the upper age limit as per the cut-off date 01.08.2014 provided in the advertisement. The writ petitioner, therefore, has raised his grievance for relaxation of the cut-off date so that he would get an opportunity to appear in the examination. The ground was taken before the learned Single Judge that the advertisement has been issued after a long gap of 25 years and, as such, no appointment, on the said post, has been made either in the erstwhile State of Bihar or even after creation of the State of Jharkhand since the year 1989. In the backdrop of the aforesaid fact, the day when the advertisement being Advertisement No. 03/2015 was issued, the writ petitioner had crossed his maximum age and as such, for no fault of his own, he has been deprived from participating in the process of selection. The ground has been taken on behalf of the Commission to the effect that the petitioner has crossed the age limit as per the cut-off date given in the advertisement, therefore, he cannot be permitted to claim for relaxation of the age. According to the Commission, the upper age limit on the basis of the cut-off date was 01.08.2014, but by way of corrigendum, the same has been relaxed to 01.08.2010 and even then the writ petitioner has not come under the fold of consideration so far as the age criteria is concerned. The learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration the rival submission advanced on behalf of the parties, has dismissed the writ petition against which the present intra-court appeal has been preferred. 11. Mr. The learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration the rival submission advanced on behalf of the parties, has dismissed the writ petition against which the present intra-court appeal has been preferred. 11. Mr. Dharmendra Kumar Maltiyar, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner-appellant, has submitted that the learned Single Judge, while dismissing the writ petition, has not considered the fact about issuance of advertisement after a long gap of 25 years and as such, the judgment impugned is not sustainable in the eyes of law for the reason that if the advertisement would have been published either by the erstwhile State of Bihar or the successor State of Jharkhand, the writ petitioner would have got an opportunity to participate in the process of selection but having not done so, the writ petitioner has been deprived from participating in the process of selection and, therefore, the respondent State of Jharkhand ought to have relaxed the age but this has not been taken into consideration. 12. On the other hand, Mr. Piyush Chitresh, learned A.C. to A.G. and Mr. Sanjoy Piprawall, learned counsel appearing for the Jharkhand Public Service Commission, have jointly submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from no infirmity, for the reason, that since the relaxation of age is within the authority of the State by way of policy decision and once the cut-off date has been fixed as on 01.08.2014, it cannot be interfered with by a court of law unless the issue of unreasonableness or arbitrariness will be raised but no such ground has been raised. It has further been submitted that taking into consideration the predicament of the students, the cut-off date which was fixed as on 01.08.2014 was subsequently fixed to 01.08.2010 and as such, it cannot be said that the approach of the respondent State of Jharkhand suffers from unreasonableness or arbitrariness warranting any interference by this Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration this aspect of the matter, has dismissed the writ petition which cannot be said to suffer from an error. The learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration this aspect of the matter, has dismissed the writ petition which cannot be said to suffer from an error. They have also submitted placing reliance upon a judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Reena Kumari and Others vs. Jharkhand Public Service Commission and Others, L.P.A. No. 146 of 2021 wherein similar issue about a direction to relax the cut-off date has been considered and rejected vide order dated 25.08.2021. The aforesaid order passed by this Court has also been affirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in S.L.P. (C) No. 13860 of 2021. 13. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. 14. The fact which is not in dispute in this case is that the writ petitioner claims to be eligible candidate in terms of educational qualification to participate in the process of selection for the post of Jharkhand Agriculture Service Class-II (Basic Category) in pursuance of Advertisement No. 03/2015 issued by the Commission. The writ petitioner was not found under the consideration zone since on the cut-off dated i.e. 01.08.2014, since he had already crossed the maximum age. Therefore, writ petition was filed seeking a direction upon the respondent State of Jharkhand to give relaxation of 10 years in the upper age limit from 01.08.2014 in respect of every category of the candidates so that the writ petitioner gets an opportunity to apply for selection. It is also not in dispute, as would appear from the material available on record, that the cut-off date which earlier was fixed to 01.08.2014, was reduced to 01.08.2010. The ground has been taken by the writ petitioner about non-issuance of advertisement for a long gap of 25 years and in the meanwhile the writ petitioner crossed the maximum age and thereby he has been deprived from a chance of consideration of his candidature. Learned Single Judge has declined to pass positive direction on the ground that the fixation of cut-off date being the policy decision, cannot be interfered with by the court of law sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if the decision does not suffer from irrationality or arbitrariness. Learned Single Judge has declined to pass positive direction on the ground that the fixation of cut-off date being the policy decision, cannot be interfered with by the court of law sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if the decision does not suffer from irrationality or arbitrariness. Assailing the order passed by the learned Single Judge, learned counsel for the appellant has taken the ground that proper consideration has not been given for not conducting the examination for last 25 years and, therefore, the order impugned is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent State of Jharkhand as also the Commission, have taken the plea that merely because the examination could not be conducted for 25 years, the decision to fix the cut-off date cannot be said to suffer from irrationality or arbitrariness. They have also taken the ground that the cut-off date which was earlier fixed to 01.08.2014 was subsequently reduced to 01.08.2010 and, as such, it cannot be said that the action of the respondent authorities suffers from irrationality or arbitrariness. 15. This Court, therefore, is required to answer that whether in the given facts of this case interference is required by this Court in fixing the cut-off date which has been fixed by way of policy decision? 16. It is settled that the policy decision of the State Government is least to be interfered by the High Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India unless it is arbitrary and suffers from malice or any other vice. In the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in K. Nagaraj and Others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another, (1985) 1 SCC 523 wherein the issue was regarding reduction of the age of retirement from 58 to 55 years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold that the same was taken by virtue of policy decision in order to provide employment opportunity to the younger sections of the society and the need to open up promotional opportunities to employees at the lower levels early in their career and since it is based upon reasonable consideration, it was declined to be interfered with. In the case of State of Jharkhand and Others vs. Ashok Kumar Dangi and Others, (2011) 13 SCC 383 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold at paragraph 17 and 18 which are quoted hereunder: “17. The High Court has found that the Government of Jharkhand, till date, had not framed any policy regarding the number of posts to be filled by physical trained candidates. How many posts of primary school teachers be filled up by physical trained candidates, in our opinion, is essentially a question of policy for the State to decide. In framing of the policy, various inputs are required and it is neither desirable nor advisable for a court of law to direct or summarise the Government to adopt a particular policy which it deems fit or proper. It is well settled that the State Government must have liberty and freedom in framing policy. Further, it also cannot be denied that the courts are ill-equipped to deal with competing claims and conflicting interests. Often, the courts do not have the satisfactory and effective means to decide which alternative, out of the many competing ones, is the best in the circumstances of the case. 18. One may contend that providing primary education to the children is essential for the development of the country. Whereas others argue that physical training of the children in the primary schools is must as that would make the nation healthy. As in the present case, the candidates trained in teaching claim that the posts of primary school teachers be filled by them and physical trained candidates be considered for posts of physical trained teachers only as they in the absence of any training in education are not equipped to teach in primary schools, whereas physical trained teachers contend that they should be considered for appointment against both the posts. These competing claims, in our opinion, need to be addressed by the policy-makers. Further, we do not have the statistics as regards to the number of primary schools, the resources which the Government can spend for providing physical trained teachers and their need. These competing claims, in our opinion, need to be addressed by the policy-makers. Further, we do not have the statistics as regards to the number of primary schools, the resources which the Government can spend for providing physical trained teachers and their need. In such a situation, any direction in matters of policy is uncalled for.” Thus, it has been laid down that the State Government must have liberty and freedom in framing policy and further, it has been held that the courts are ill-equipped to deal with competing claims and conflicting interests. Often, the courts do not have the satisfactory and effective means to decide which alternative, out of the many competing ones, is the best in the circumstances of the case. In the case of Census Commissioner and Others vs. R. Krishnamurthy, (2015) 2 SCC 796 , Their Lordships at the Hon'ble Apex Court have been pleased to hold at paragraph 25 as hereunder: “25. Interference with the policy decision and issue of a mandamus to frame a policy in a particular manner are absolutely different. The Act has conferred power on the Central Government to issue notification regarding the manner in which the census has to be carried out and the Central Government has issued notifications, and the competent authority has issued directions. It is not within the domain of the court to legislate. The courts do interpret the law and in such interpretation certain creative process is involved. The courts have the jurisdiction to declare the law as unconstitutional. That too, where it is called for. The court may also fill up the gaps in certain spheres applying the doctrine of constitutional silence or abeyance. But, the courts are not to plunge into policy-making by adding something to the policy by way of issuing a writ of mandamus. There the judicial restraint is called for remembering what we have stated in the beginning. The courts are required to understand the policy decisions framed by the executive. If a policy decision or a notification is arbitrary, it may invite the frown of Article 14 of the Constitution. But when the notification was not under assail and the same is in consonance with the Act, it is really unfathomable how the High Court could issue directions as to the manner in which a census would be carried out by adding certain aspects. But when the notification was not under assail and the same is in consonance with the Act, it is really unfathomable how the High Court could issue directions as to the manner in which a census would be carried out by adding certain aspects. It is, in fact, issuance of a direction for framing a policy in a specific manner.” In Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board vs. Praveen Kumar, 2016 SCC Online SC 1549, it has been held that it is the employer's prerogative to decide the age-limit and academic suitability of candidates which they wish to employ and so long as the same are not contradictory to the academic eligibility as prescribed by the NCTE Act. In the case of Chandigarh Administration through the Director Public Instructions (Colleges), Chandigarh vs. Usha Kheterpal Waie and Others, (2011) 9 SCC 645 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held at paragraph 22 and 23 which read as hereunder: “22. It is now well settled that it is for the rulemaking authority or the appointing authority to prescribe the mode of selection and minimum qualification for any recruitment. The courts and tribunals can neither prescribe the qualifications nor entrench upon the power of the authority concerned so long as the qualifications prescribed by the employer is reasonably relevant and has a rational nexus with the functions and duties attached to the post and are not violative of any provision of the Constitution, statute and rules. [See: J. Ranga Swamy vs. Govt. of A.P. (1990) 1 SCC 288 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 76 and P.U. Joshi vs. Accountant General, (2003) 2 SCC 632 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 191]. In the absence of any rules, under Article 309 or statute, the appellant had the power to appoint under its general power of administration and prescribe such eligibility criteria as it is considered to be necessary and reasonable. Therefore, it cannot be said that the prescription of PhD is unreasonable. 23. The Tribunal and the High Court have held that in the years 1989 and 1991, the Tribunal had accepted that the earlier administrative instructions dated 20-8-1987 which required the UT cadre employees to be considered for the post have to be followed. The fact that at that time PhD degree was not insisted upon, does not mean that for all times to come, PhD degree could not be insisted. The fact that at that time PhD degree was not insisted upon, does not mean that for all times to come, PhD degree could not be insisted. PhD degree was made a qualification because UGC guidelines required it for direct recruitment post and the UPSC approved the same. Therefore, merely because on some earlier occasions, the posts of Principal were filled by UT cadre lecturers without PhD degree, it cannot be argued that the PhD degree cannot be prescribed subsequently.” Thus, it is evident that the interference by way of exercise of power under judicial review is only to the extent if it has been found that the action of the State is arbitrary and suffers from the vice or malice. 17. So far as the fact of the given case is concerned, admittedly, in terms of the cut-off date stipulated in the advertisement being Advertisement No. 03/2015, i.e. 01.08.2014, the writ petitioner was not within the consideration zone and as such, he raised grievance of relaxation in the age. The ground taken is that such selection process has not been initiated for a long gap of 25 years, meaning thereby, the main ground taken for seeking a direction by this Court for relaxation in the cut-off date in fixing the maximum age is not conducting the examination for the last 25 years. This Court is required to see as to whether merely because the examination could not be taken for a long gap, can a direction be issued by the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to relax the age. The aforesaid issue has been answered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Dr. Ami Lal Bhat vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, (1997) 6 SCC 614 , wherein the issue of consideration was interference by the court of law in fixation of cut-off date. The Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to consider it and held that there cannot be any wholesale relaxation because the advertisement is delayed or because the vacancy occurred earlier especially when there is no allegation of any mala-fide in connection with any delay in issuance of advertisement, for ready reference paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the said judgment are being referred as hereunder: “10. It is next contended on behalf of the appellants/petitioners that under all the service rules concerned there is a provision for age relaxation. It is next contended on behalf of the appellants/petitioners that under all the service rules concerned there is a provision for age relaxation. In Rule 11(A) of the Rajasthan Medical Services (Collegiate Branch) Rules, there is a provision for age relaxation by 5 years by the Government in consultation with the Commission. There is also Rule 35 in the said Rules which gives a general power to relax rules in exceptional cases where the Government is satisfied that it is necessary, inter alia, to relax any provision of these Rules with respect to age or experience of any person and this can be done with the concurrence of the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms and in consultation with the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. It is urged that in the case of all those persons who are adversely affected because the advertisement for recruitment is issued later than the occurrence of the vacancy, corresponding age relaxation should be given to all candidates. In other words, what is contended is that if on the date when the vacancy occurred, the candidates were within the maximum age prescribed by reference to the cut-off date, then if the advertisement is delayed, their age should be considered with reference to the cut-off date of 1st January following the date of occurrence of vacancy. For example, if the vacancy has occurred on 1st of April of a given year, and the applicant would be within the maximum age on the 1st of January of the following year, then such a candidate will be considered as eligible even if the advertisement is issued not in April of that year but say February of the following year. All the candidates will get age relaxation of one year. 11. In our view this kind of an interpretation cannot be given to a rule for relaxation of age. The power of relaxation is required to be exercised in public interest in a given case; as for example, if other suitable candidates are not available for the post, and the only candidate who is suitable has crossed the maximum age-limit; or to mitigate hardship in a given case. Such a relaxation in special circumstances of a given case is to be exercised by the administration after referring that case to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. Such a relaxation in special circumstances of a given case is to be exercised by the administration after referring that case to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. There cannot be any wholesale relaxation because the advertisement is delayed or because the vacancy occurred earlier especially when there is no allegation of any mala-fides in connection with any delay in issuing an advertisement. This kind of power of wholesale relaxation would make for total uncertainty in determining the maximum age of a candidate. It might be unfair to a large number of candidates who might be similarly situated, but who may not apply, thinking that they are age-barred. We fail to see how the power of relaxation can be exercised in the manner contended. 12. In the premises we do not see any reason to set aside the cut-off date fixed by the relevant rules. The judgments of the Division Benches of the Rajasthan High Court insofar as they strike down 1st of January of the following year as the cut-off date for determining the maximum age of a candidate for selection, require to be set aside.” Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rajasthan Public Service Commission vs. Smt. Anand Kanwar and Others, 1995 (3) Scale 192 has observed that merely because the respondent has got no chance to participate in the selection process being over-aged, there cannot be any direction by the High Court to relax the age, as would appear from paragraph 3 thereof which is quoted as hereunder: “3. We are of the view that the High Court fell into patent error bordering on perversity in issuing the mandamus on the reasoning quoted above. It is settled proposition of law that the eligibility of a candidate has to be determined on the basis of the terms and conditions of the advertisement in response to which the candidate applies. There is nothing on the record to show that the State Government was in any manner negligent or at fault in not making the direct recruitment during the period 1983-89. Be that as it may, the High Court was not justified in taking the clock back to the period when unfilled vacancies were existing and holding that since the respondent was eligible on the date when vacancies fell vacant, she continues to be so till the time the vacancies are filled. Be that as it may, the High Court was not justified in taking the clock back to the period when unfilled vacancies were existing and holding that since the respondent was eligible on the date when vacancies fell vacant, she continues to be so till the time the vacancies are filled. Due to inaction on the part of the State Government in not filling the posts year-wise, the respondent cannot get a right to participate in the selection despite being over-aged.” Thus, it has been decided in cases as aforesaid that passing direction for relaxation in age by the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be incorrect even in a case where due to inaction of the State, vacancies could not be filled. 18. Therefore, according to our considered view, the main ground taken for seeking a direction for relaxation in age merely because the examination could not be take place for the last 25 years, cannot be a ground to pass direction upon the respondent State of Jharkhand to relax the age. 19. The learned Single Judge has considered this aspect of the matter as also the judgment rendered by Coordinate Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 661 of 2015 [Aftab Adil vs. State of Jharkhand and Others] wherein similar nature of prayer was made i.e. regarding relaxation in the fixation of age and this Court (Co-ordinate Division Bench) has been pleased to hold at paragraph 11 which is as under: “11............In the matter of recruitment, fixation of age limit is the domain of the executive policy and unless there appears to be any arbitrariness in it or any irrational nexus the Court would not interfere in such like policy decision. Herein in the case on hand, we do not find any irrationality or arbitrariness on any count which can be said to be a ground of indulgence. Case of Bhola Nath Rajak (supra) is entirely distinguishable on facts from the case on hand.” The learned Single Judge has taken the view of not exercising the extra ordinary jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, considering the fact that the writ petitioner has failed to make out a case of irrationality or arbitrariness by the State of Jharkhand, which according to our considered view, cannot be said to suffer from an error. 20. 20. It is relevant to refer herein that similar issue fell for consideration before this Court in Reena Kumari and Others vs. Jharkhand Public Service Commission and Others [L.P.A. No. 146 of 2021] wherein this Court, vide judgment dated 25.08.2021, has declined to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge wherein no direction was issued for relaxation of age. We have travelled across the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge and found therefrom that the learned Single Judge has considered the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Hirandra Kumar vs. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and Another, (2019) SCC Online SC 254, laying down the governing principle to determine the cut-off date which can be interfered only when the decision of the State Government suffers from malice and based upon such finding, the conclusion has been arrived at that the writ petitioners have failed to establish any case of malice on the part of the State Government and, therefore, dismissed the writ petitions. The said judgment has been affirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in S.L.P. (C) No. 13860 of 2021, the order is being reproduced as under: “Heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties. In the facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly, considering the fact that the last examination was conducted in the year 2016 and, thereafter, no further examination was conducted for 5 years, 5 years age relaxation has been given through as per the relevant rules applicable, as amended, the cut-off date to be 01.03.2021, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and orders passed by the High Court. Hence, the Special Leave Petitions stand dismissed. Pending applications stand disposed of.” 21. In the entirety of facts and circumstances as also on the basis of the discussions made hereinabove in detail, this Court is of the view that the judgment passed by learned Single Judge requires no interference. 22. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.