JUDGMENT : PRAKASH GUPTA, J. 1. S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 218/2019 has been filed by the petitioners-defendants judgment debtors (for short ‘the defendants-judgment debtors’) against the order dated 29.8.2019, whereby the objections filed by the defendants-judgment debtors under Section 47 read with 151 CPC have been rejected by the Executing Court. S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 270/2019 has also been filed by the defendants-judgment debtors against the order dated 29.8.2019, whereby the application filed by the respondents-plaintiffs-decree holders (for short ‘the plaintiffs-decree holders’) under Section 148 of CPC read with Section 28 of the Specific Performance Act was allowed by the Executing Court. 2. Facts of the case are that Vaidik Shiv Dutt Joshi entered into an agreement on 2.3.1988 with Shakuntala Devi to sell a house (Municipal No. 4136 to 4139 southern side), Chowkdi Purani Basti, Langar Ke Balaji, Jaipur in a sale consideration of Rs. 5,30,000/-. In this regard, Rs. 31,000/- in cash were paid on 2.3.1988 by the plaintiffs-decree holders and a cheque of Rs. 50,000/- of Corporation Bank was given by the plaintiffs-decree holders to the defendants/judgment debtors as a part performance of the agreement. In consequence of the said agreement, on 2.3.1988 actual physical possession of some part of the property was handed over by the defendants-judgment debtors to the plaintiff-decree holders. After having received the amount of the cheque of Rs. 50,000/- actual physical possession of some part of the property was also said to be given by the defendants-judgment debtors to the plaintiffs-decree holders. On 11.3.1988, Vaidik Shivdutt Joshi, original defendant executed a Will in favour of her daughter Smt. Kamleshwari and three grand daughters. 3. In the year 1991, the plaintiffs-decree holders filed a suit, wherein it was pleaded that as per the terms of the agreement, the defendants-judgment debtors did not hand over the entire suit property by getting it vacated from the tenants nor executed sale deed in their favour nor they obtained No Objection Certificate from the Income Tax Department. 4. The defendants-judgment debtors filed written statement, wherein it was pleaded that at the time of agreement, it was in the knowledge of the plaintiffs that tenants are residing in the suit premises. Under the Rent Control Act, unless the grounds of eviction are proved and decree of eviction attains finality, possession could not have been taken from the tenants. 4. The defendants-judgment debtors filed written statement, wherein it was pleaded that at the time of agreement, it was in the knowledge of the plaintiffs that tenants are residing in the suit premises. Under the Rent Control Act, unless the grounds of eviction are proved and decree of eviction attains finality, possession could not have been taken from the tenants. It was further averred that in the agreement, it was nowhere mentioned that the defendants-judgment debtors will hand over the vacant possession of the suit premises. It was further averred that changes were made in the original agreement dated 2.3.1988 and it was agreed that till 24.10.1988, a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- will be paid, but on 24.10.1988, yet another agreement was entered into, according to which the plaintiffs-decree holder paid Rs. 50,000/- to the defendants-judgments on the same day and balance amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- was to be paid by the end of November, 1988. Despite reminders, the plaintiffs- decree holders did not pay the balance amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- by the end of November, 1988, as agreed between the parties, therefore, they are not entitled for specific performance of the agreement. 5. Necessary issues were framed and after hearing the parties, the Trial Court vide its judgment dated 26.9.1994 decreed the plaintiffs' suit. 6. The defendants-decree holders filed S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 63/1995 before this Court. On 16.5.1995, the plaintiffs-decree holders deposited the balance amount of sale consideration i.e. Rs. 3,99,000/- in the trial court and thereafter on 5.7.1995, execution petition was filed in the Executing Court. On 20.9.1995, an oral undertaking was given on behalf of the plaintiffs-decree holders before the Coordinate Bench of this Court that the execution would not be pressed till 5.10.1995, which was continued from time to time. 7. During the pendency of the appeal, on 13.5.1998, Vaidik Shivdutt Joshi passed away, therefore, his daughter and grand daughters, who were named in the Will dated 11.3.1988 were taken on record as L.Rs. Similarly, during the pendency of the appeal, plaintiff no. 2 Hanuman Prasad Agarwal also passed away, therefore, his legal representatives were brought on record. 8. On 16.7.2007, Smt. Sarita Sharma filed an application for her impleadment on the ground that decree holders had executed an agreement in her favour, which was allowed and Smt. Sarita Sharma was impleaded as a party-appellant no. 3 in the appeal. 9. 2 Hanuman Prasad Agarwal also passed away, therefore, his legal representatives were brought on record. 8. On 16.7.2007, Smt. Sarita Sharma filed an application for her impleadment on the ground that decree holders had executed an agreement in her favour, which was allowed and Smt. Sarita Sharma was impleaded as a party-appellant no. 3 in the appeal. 9. Subsequently the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide its judgment dated 15.3.2016 dismissed the first appeal. The defendants-judgment debtors filed a SLP No. 15935/2016 before the Hon'ble Apex Court, which was also dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 6.9.2016 with liberty to the defendants-judgment debtors to raise the plea available to them before the Executing Court with regard to repudiation of contract. 10. The defendants-judgment debtors filed objections under Section 47 read with Section 151 CPC before the Executing Court. The plaintiffs-decree holders filed reply to the said objections. 11. The plaintiff-decree holders also filed an application under Section 148 CPC read with section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 before the Executing Court for extending the time period upto 16.5.1995 in depositing the balance amount of sale consideration i.e. Rs. 3,99,000/- which was replied by the defendants-judgment debtors. 12. The Executing Court vide its order dated 29.8.2019, dismissed the objections filed by the defendants-judgment debtors under Section 47 read with Section 151 CPC and allowed the application filed by the plaintiffs-decree holders filed under Section 148 CPC read with Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 13. Hence, these two revision petitions have been filed by the defendants-judgment debtors against the order dated 29.8.2019 passed by the Executing Court. 14. Learned counsel for the defendants-judgment debtors submits that the defendants-judgment debtors were directed by the trial court vide its judgment dated 26.9.1994 to get the sale deed registered in favour of the plaintiffs-decree holders after having received the balance amount of Rs. 3,99,000/- from the plaintiffs within a month. 14. Learned counsel for the defendants-judgment debtors submits that the defendants-judgment debtors were directed by the trial court vide its judgment dated 26.9.1994 to get the sale deed registered in favour of the plaintiffs-decree holders after having received the balance amount of Rs. 3,99,000/- from the plaintiffs within a month. If the defendants-judgment debtors fail to get the sale deed registered, then the plaintiffs could deposit the aforesaid balance amount in the trial court after a month and entitled to get the sale deed and possession of the suit property through Court, but despite that the said amount was not tendered by the plaintiffs-decree holders within a month nor they showed their readiness and willingness to pay the said amount nor any notice in that regard was given to the defendants-judgment debtors nor they filed an application in the Court seeking extension of time to deposit the amount nor obtained permission from the Court to deposit the amount. Contrarily the amount was deposited by the plaintiffs-decree holders on 16.5.1995 i.e. after a delay of more than 7 months. In this view of the amount of Rs. 3,99,000/- deposited by the plaintiffs-decree holders was not a valid deposit. He further submits that in absence of an application seeking extension of time period, the Executing Court could not have allowed the application of the plaintiffs-decree holders under Section 148 CPC read with Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act and could not have accepted the delayed payment deposited on 16.5.1995, moreso when there cannot be automatic extension of time period merely by moving an application for extension. He further submits that under Section 148 CPC read with Section 28 of Specific Relief Act, time extension can only be granted when sufficient cause for delay has been shown, but in the present case, no justified cause was shown by the plaintiffs-decree holders explaining the delay. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance on the following judgments: (i) M. Parimanam @ Parimana Konar vs. T. Egammai, C.R.P. (MD) No. 122 of 2016 (NPD) and C.M.P. (MD) Nos. 552 to 554, 1624, 1725 of 2016 (ii) Prem Jeevan vs. K.S. Venkata Raman and Another, (2007) 11 SCC 57 (iii) Bhupinder Kumar vs. Angrej Singh, (2009) 8 SCC 766 15. 552 to 554, 1624, 1725 of 2016 (ii) Prem Jeevan vs. K.S. Venkata Raman and Another, (2007) 11 SCC 57 (iii) Bhupinder Kumar vs. Angrej Singh, (2009) 8 SCC 766 15. E-converso, learned counsel for the plaintiffs-decree holders submits that on 15.10.1994, a notice was sent on behalf of the plaintiffs-decree holders to the defendants-judgment debtors to get the sale deed executed and registered in favour of the plaintiffs-decree holders after having received the balance sale consideration of Rs. 3,99,000/- but they did not do so. He further submits that a Civil Suit was filed against the defendants, which was decreed in favour of the plaintiffs-decree holders on 26.9.1994. Thereafter the defendants-judgment debtors filed a Civil First Appeal before this Court, which was also dismissed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide its judgment dated 15.3.2016 and during the pendency of the First Appeal, on 16.5.1995, the plaintiffs-decree holders deposited the balance sale consideration of Rs. 3,99,000/- in the Court. In the Trial Court and in the First Appellate Court, no such objection was raised by the defendants-judgment debtors and they are estopped from raising the same in the executing Court. Subsequently, the defendants-judgment debtors filed a SLP before the Hon'ble Apex Court, which also came to be dismissed as withdrawn. 16. He further submits that in the judgment and decree dated 26.9.1994, no time limit was fixed for depositing the balance sale consideration of Rs. 3,99,000/- nor this was a condition precedent. He has supported the impugned order and stated the same to be just and proper. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance on the following judgments: (i) Surinder Pal Soni vs. Sohan Lal (D) through LRs. and Others, Civil Appeal No. 5360 of 2019 (ii) Mangilal Soni through his Power of Attorney Holder vs. Suresh Chandra Swarnkar, S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 141/2019 (iii) Pandurang Dhondi Chougule and Others vs. Maruti Hari Jadhav and Others, AIR 1966 SC 153 17. Heard. Considered. 18. In the case of Bhupinder Kumar (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: “23. If we apply the above principles to the facts of the present case, the order of the executing court and the High Court cannot be faulted with. Heard. Considered. 18. In the case of Bhupinder Kumar (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: “23. If we apply the above principles to the facts of the present case, the order of the executing court and the High Court cannot be faulted with. The suit for specific performance is in the nature of a discretionary remedy and on equity, the appellant was not entitled to get the decree executed since he failed to place relevant material about his inability to tender or deposit the decreed amount. 24. It is relevant to mention that the sale agreement was executed on 20.11.1990, the suit for specific performance was filed on 13.12.1991 and suit was decreed on 13.10.1998 stipulating that the balance sale consideration was to be paid by 13.1.1999. In fact, only after the judgment-debtor filed an application for rescission of the agreement on 28.5.2001, the application for extension of time was moved on 13.8.2001. 25. As discussed earlier, though the court has the power and discretion to extend the time for fulfillment of the contract, in the case on hand, there is neither any material to show that the appellant was having the required money nor had he tendered or deposited the same as per the terms of the decree. Both the executing court and the High Court found that there was no just and reasonable cause to extend the time for depositing the balance consideration. 26. In the circumstances and the materials placed, we are satisfied that bereft of any acceptable material for extension of time, the executing court rightly declined to extend the time, consequently rescinded the contract as requested by the respondent judgment-debtor. The High Court, after analysing all these aspects and finding that the decision arrived at by the executing court is just and equitable, dismissed the revision.” 19. In the case of Prem Jeevan (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: “8. Reference to Order 20 Rule 12A CPC shows that in every decree of specific performance of a contract, the Court has to specify the period within which the payment has to be made. In the present case, the said period was two months from the date of the decree. 9. Reference to Order 20 Rule 12A CPC shows that in every decree of specific performance of a contract, the Court has to specify the period within which the payment has to be made. In the present case, the said period was two months from the date of the decree. 9. In absence of the said time being extended, the decree-holder could execute the decree only by making the payment of the decretal amount to the judgment-debtor or making the deposit in the court in terms of the said decree. In the present case, neither was the said deposit made within the stipulated time nor extension of time was sought or granted and also no explanation has been furnished for the delay in the making of the deposit. No doubt, as contended by the learned counsel for the decree-holders, relying on the judgment of this Court in Ramankutty Gupta vs. Avara, (1994) 2 SCC 642 , in an appropriate case the Court which passed the decree could extend the time as envisaged in the Specific Relief Act, 1963. In the present case, no such steps have been taken by the decree holders. 20. On the contrary, in the case of Surinder Pal Soni (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: “17. We are unable to accept the submission. The doctrine of merger operates as a principle upon a judgment being rendered by the Appellate Court. In the present case, once the Appellate Court confirmed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, there was evidently a merger of the judgment of the Trial Court with the decision of the Appellate Court. Once the Appellate Court renders its judgment, it is the decree of the Appellate Court which becomes executable. Hence, the entitlement of the decree holder to execute the decree of the Appellate Court cannot be defeated.” (Emphasis supplied by me) 21. In the case of Mangi Lal Soni (supra), the Coordinate Bench of this Court relying upon the various judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: “16. Considering the case in hand in the light of the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments, it transpires that in the application under Order 21 Rule 34 CPC, the respondent-decree holder sought permission of the court to deposit the amount, which was allowed by the court below vide order dated 3.7.2007. 17. Considering the case in hand in the light of the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments, it transpires that in the application under Order 21 Rule 34 CPC, the respondent-decree holder sought permission of the court to deposit the amount, which was allowed by the court below vide order dated 3.7.2007. 17. The Court has discretion and power to extend the time to make payment of the amount or to perform the condition mentioned in the decree for specific performance. Though, in the present case, the respondent-decree holder has offered explanation for delay in depositing the amount directed by the judgment and decree dated 3.4.1987 but even every day's delay is assumed to be not explained by the respondent-decree holder, the Court has discretion to enlarge the time to comply with the conditional decree. 18. The judgment and decree passed by the trial court attained finality when the S.L.P. was dismissed by the Apex Court on 14.9.2007 and amount was deposited in the Court much before the order of the Apex Court dated 14.9.2007. A perusal of the material placed on record does not show that there was a willful default on the part of the respondent-decree holder to make the deposit justifying the court to refuse the extension of time. The right of the respondent-decree holder to get the sale deed executed in his favour can not be taken way merely on technical ground.” (Emphasis supplied by me) 22. In the case of Pandurang Dhondi Chougule (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: “10... It is well settled that a plea of limitation or a plea of res-judicata is a plea of law which concerns the jurisdiction of the Court which tries the proceedings. A finding on these pleas in favour of the party raising them would oust the jurisdiction of the Court, and so, an erroneous decision on these pleas can be said to be concerned with questions of jurisdiction, which fall within the purview of Section 115 of the Code. But an erroneous decision on a question of law reached by the subordinate Court which has no relation to questions of jurisdiction of that Court cannot be corrected by the High Court under Section 115.” 23. But an erroneous decision on a question of law reached by the subordinate Court which has no relation to questions of jurisdiction of that Court cannot be corrected by the High Court under Section 115.” 23. The judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bhupinder Kumar (supra), relied upon by counsel for the defendants does not apply to the facts of the instant case. In the said case, the appellant was not held to get the decree executed since he failed to place relevant materials about his inability to tender or deposit the decreed amount, but in the instant case, the plaintiffs deposited the balance amount of sale consideration i.e. Rs. 3,99,000/-. Even otherwise in the case of Bhupinder Kumar (supra), only after the judgment debtor filed an application for rescission of the agreement on 28.5.2001, the application for extension of time was filed on 13.8.2001 and for this reason, the Hon'ble Apex Court noted that the appellant was not having the required money nor he tendered or deposited the same, but in the instant application, this is not the situation. Further, in the said judgment, time was fixed by which the amount of balance sale consideration was to be paid, but in the instant case, no time was fixed within which the balance sale consideration was to be paid by the plaintiffs-decree holders. 24. The judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Prem Jeevan (supra) relied upon by counsel for the defendants also does not apply in the facts of the present case for the reason that in the said case, time was specified within which the deposit was to be made and no explanation was furnished for the delay in depositing the amount, whereas in the instant case, time was not specified within which the balance amount of sale consideration i.e. Rs. 3,99,000/- was to be deposited, but even when the amount was deposited in the trial court on 16.5.1995 and the same was accepted by the trial court, in my view, it was deemed extension of time to deposit the balance sale consideration of Rs. 3,99,000/-. 25. 3,99,000/- was to be deposited, but even when the amount was deposited in the trial court on 16.5.1995 and the same was accepted by the trial court, in my view, it was deemed extension of time to deposit the balance sale consideration of Rs. 3,99,000/-. 25. On the other hand, in the case of Surinder Pal Soni (supra) relied upon by counsel for the plaintiffs-decree holders, it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court while relying upon its earlier judgments in the case of Kunhayammed vs. State of Kerala, (2000) 5 SCC 359, Khoday Distilleries Ltd. vs. Sri. Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd. (2019) 4 SCC 376 and Chandi Prasad vs. Jagdish Prasad, (2004) 8 SCC 724 that the doctrine of merger operates as a principle upon a judgment being rendered by the Appellate Court. In the present case, once the Appellate Court confirmed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, there was evidently a merger of the judgment of the Trial Court with the judgment of the Appellate Court. Once the Appellate Court renders its judgment, it is the decree of the Appellate Court which becomes executable and in my view, the time period to deposit amount of balance sale consideration would commence from the date of passing the judgment and decree by the Appellate Court i.e. 15.3.2016. 26. The Coordinate Bench of this Court while citing various judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of Mangilal Soni (supra) has held that the Court has discretion and power to extend the time to make payment of the amount or to perform the condition mentioned in the decree for specific performance. The right of the respondent-decree holder to get the sale deed executed in his favour cannot be taken away merely on technical grounds. 27. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sardar Mohan Singh vs. Mangilal @ Mangtya, 1997 (9) SCC 217 has held that from the language of Sub-section (1) of Section 28, it could be seen that the Court does not lose its jurisdiction after the grant of the decree for specific performance nor it becomes functus officio. 27. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sardar Mohan Singh vs. Mangilal @ Mangtya, 1997 (9) SCC 217 has held that from the language of Sub-section (1) of Section 28, it could be seen that the Court does not lose its jurisdiction after the grant of the decree for specific performance nor it becomes functus officio. The very fact that Section 28 itself gives power to grant order of rescission of the decree would indicate that till the sale deed is executed in execution of the decree, the trial court retains its power and jurisdiction to deal with the decree of specific performance. In other words, the Court has the discretion to extend time for compliance of the conditional decree as mentioned in the decree for specific performance. It is not, unlike Section 5 of the Limitation Act, an application for condonation of delay. It is one for, extension of time. Under these circumstances, the executive Court as well as the High Court had exercised discretion and extended the time to comply with the conditional decree. 28. In the case of Chithambaran Ponnappan vs. Viswambaran and Another, AIR 2001 Kerala 205, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that mere failure on the part of the decree holder to deposit amount does not render the decree ineffective or release the judgment-debtor his liability to satisfy the decree. There exists power on the part of the executive court to extend the time even without the application is clear. 29. In the case of Md. Alimuddin vs. Waizuddin and Another, AIR 1997 SC 1995 , the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that when the Court allowed the respondent to deposit the balance consideration, it amounts to extension of time by the Court. 30. Admittedly vide judgment dated 26.9.1994, suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiffs was decreed. nkok oknhx.k fo:) izfroknh] lafonk fnukad 2-3-88 dh fofuZfn"V ikyuk dk fMØh fd;k tkrk gSA izfroknh dks funsZ'k fn;k tkrk gS fd og nks"k jkf'k 3]99]000 :i;s oknhx.k ls izkIrdj ,d ekg es oknhx.k ds i{k es fookfnr lEifŸk dk foØ; i= iathc} djkosA ;fn izfroknh foØ; i= iathc) ugh djkrk gS rks] oknhx.k mi;qDr 'ks"k jkf'k dk ,d ekg i'pkr U;k;ky; es tek dj] foØ; i= o dCtk tfj;s vnkyr fookfnr lEifr dks izkIr dj ysus dk vf/kdkjh gksxkA dsl dh ifjfLFkfr;ksa es nksuks i{kdkj viuk viuk [kpkZ ogu djsxsaA 31. From the aforesaid impugned judgment and decree dated 26.9.1994, it is clear that no time was fixed within which the balance amount i.e. Rs. 3,99,000/- was to be paid by the plaintiffs. On 15.10.1994, although a notice was said to have been sent on behalf of the plaintiffs-decree holders to the defendants-judgment debtors to get the sale deed executed and registered in favour of the plaintiffs-decree holders after having received the amount of Rs. 3,99,000/- but since the same has been disputed by the defendants-judgment debtors, I am not inclined to go in this aspect of the matter. 32. Be that as it may, against the impugned judgment and decree dated 26.9.1994 passed by the trial court, in the year 1995, the defendants filed an appeal which came to be dismissed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 15.3.2016. Before dismissing the civil first appeal, pursuant to the impugned judgment and decree dated 26.9.1994 passed by the trial court, the plaintiffs deposited the amount in the Court below on 16.5.1995 through a challan (Ex.A/7). Thereafter the defendants filed a SLP No. 15935/2016 before the Hon'ble Apex Court, which was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 6.9.2016. Therefore, in view of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Surinder Pal Soni (supra), the judgment passed by the trial court being merged with the judgment passed by the Appellate Court and it is the decree of the Appellate Court, which became executable and in my view the time period to deposit amount of balance sale consideration would commence from the date of passing the judgment and decree by the Appellate Court i.e. 15.3.2016. In the light of the judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court Mangilal Soni (supra), I am of the considered opinion that the Court below had discretion and power to extend the time to deposit the balance amount of sale consideration i.e. Rs. 3,99,000/-. Hence, I find no illegality, perversity or material irregularity or error of jurisdiction in the impugned orders passed by the executing court. For the aforesaid reasons, I find no force in these revision petitions and the same being bereft of any merit, are liable to be dismissed, which stand dismissed. 33. Consequent upon the dismissal of the revision petitions, the stay applications and all pending applications, if any, also stand dismissed accordingly. 34. For the aforesaid reasons, I find no force in these revision petitions and the same being bereft of any merit, are liable to be dismissed, which stand dismissed. 33. Consequent upon the dismissal of the revision petitions, the stay applications and all pending applications, if any, also stand dismissed accordingly. 34. Registry is directed to place a copy of this order in connected file.