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2022 DIGILAW 837 (GUJ)

Rahul @ Bablu @ Babu Sureshbhai Nagardas Panchal v. State of Gujarat

2022-07-04

SANDEEP N.BHATT, VIPUL M.PANCHOLI

body2022
JUDGMENT : Sandeep N. Bhatt, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of conviction dated 19.06.2013 passed by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Kheda at Nadiad in Sessions Case No.47 of 2011 for the offence under sections 302 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the appellant - accused has preferred this appeal under section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("the Code" for short), whereby the appellant - accused is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and is ordered to undergo life imprisonment and fine of Rs. 5,000/-, and in default of fine, is ordered to undergo further six months rigorous imprisonment. 2. The case of the prosecution is that, on 07.12.2010 at about 22:30 hours, when the complainant was watering the wheat crop in the field of Jayantibhai Bhathibhai Zala, at that time, one Suresh, who happens to be the nephew of Vebaben Fatesinh Zala, came and told that there was a phone call from home and therefore, the complainant returned towards his house from there. On the way, the people, who gathered at Hanuman Temple, informed that one dead body of male is lying near the field of Budhaji Fateji, which is situated towards Ghodali Road. Therefore, the complainant, along with the village persons viz., Motibhai Desaibhai Chauhan, Bhaijibhai Bababhai Chauhan, Ravjibhai Chandubhai Chauhan and Rajubhai Laxmanbhai Zala, went to the police station for informing the police. Thus, the complainant - Prabhatbhai Khodabhai Zala lodged the complaint with regard to the incident before the Mahemdabad Police Station, which was registered as C.R.- I No.252 of 2010 for the offences under sections 302 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 3. In pursuance of the complaint lodged by the complainant, investigating agency recorded statements of the witnesses, collected relevant evidence in form of medical evidence and drawn various Panchnamas and other relevant evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. After having found material against the appellant accused, charge-sheet came to be filed in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Mahemdabad. As said Court lacks jurisdiction to try the offence, it committed the case to the Sessions Judge, Kheda at Nadiad as provided under section 209 of the Code. 4. After having found material against the appellant accused, charge-sheet came to be filed in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Mahemdabad. As said Court lacks jurisdiction to try the offence, it committed the case to the Sessions Judge, Kheda at Nadiad as provided under section 209 of the Code. 4. Upon committal of the case to the Sessions Court, Kheda at Nadiad, learned Sessions Judge framed charge at Exh.4 against the appellant - accused for the aforesaid offence. The appellant - accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. In order to bring home charge, the prosecution has examined 35 witnesses, as mentioned in Para 4 of the impugned judgment and order and also produced various documentary evidence before the learned trial Court, more particularly described in para 5 of the impugned judgment and order. 6. On conclusion of evidence on the part of the prosecution, the trial Court put various incriminating circumstances appearing in the evidence to the appellant - accused so as to obtain his explanation/answer as provided u/s 313 of the Code. In the further statement, the appellant - accused denied all incriminating circumstances appearing against him as false and further stated that he is innocent and false case has been filed against him. After hearing both the sides and after analysis of evidence adduced by the prosecution, the learned trial Judge convicted the appellant - accused from the offences, for which he was tried, as the prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. 7. Heard learned advocates. 8.1 Learned advocate Mr. Dave for the appellant - accused has submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish the complete chain of circumstances and to exclude every hypothesis other than guilt of appellant. He has submitted that links in chain of circumstances not established material contradictions like evidence of panchas present in case of prosecution. Therefore, the appellant is entitled for benefit of doubt. He has submitted that the material contradictions and omissions in evidence of witnesses did not prove by the evidence of the investigating officer. 8.2 He has also submitted that material panch witnesses do not support the case of prosecution, therefore, prosecution failed to prove discovery of knife, shirt, Indica car, etc. Therefore, the appellant is entitled for benefit of doubt. He has submitted that the material contradictions and omissions in evidence of witnesses did not prove by the evidence of the investigating officer. 8.2 He has also submitted that material panch witnesses do not support the case of prosecution, therefore, prosecution failed to prove discovery of knife, shirt, Indica car, etc. He has further submitted that no test identification parade held by the investigating officer nor even tries to identify in Court room also, which is fatal to prosecution in establishing the link. He has submitted that as per prosecution case, juvenile accused was ill-treated by the deceased, so he has dispute with deceased, therefore, if at all any grievance is there, it is with him and not with the appellant. 8.3 He has submitted that as prosecution has recovered duplicate R.C. Book of Indica car and xerox of driving licence of accused from Indica car, but it is not produced in evidence of any witness nor both documents are exhibited. Even person from RTO Office is also not examined to establish and prove the ownership of Indica car of the appellant. Therefore, he has submitted that it is missing link and chain is not completed. 8.4 He has submitted that there is no link between accused, deceased, witness - Ghanshyam or any other witness on telephone conversation is established by way of any cogent, convincing and concrete evidence produced by the prosecution. He has submitted that no officer from FSL is examined to prove the contents of FSL Report, Serological Report by the prosecution, therefore, he has submitted that as per the Indian Evidence Act, it cannot be said to be proved documents in absence of examination of the author of the said report(s). He has, therefore, submitted that the said FSL evidence cannot be admissible and reliable evidence in eyes of law. 8.5 He has submitted that the another juvenile accused - Sagar has given fatal blow to the deceased. He has submitted that the trial Court has committed an error by considering the entire panchnamas whose panch witnesses turned hostile, as said panchnama cannot be said to be proved document and cannot be relied upon for guilt of accused. He has submitted that there is exaggeration and contradiction in the evidence of witnesses, which is also fatal to the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. He has submitted that there is exaggeration and contradiction in the evidence of witnesses, which is also fatal to the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. He has submitted that the prosecution is failed to complete the chain of circumstantial evidence. 8.6 Reliance is placed on the following decisions by learned advocate for the appellant - accused in support of his submissions : (i) 2012 (3) GLH 350 - Rameshbhai Hajabhai Chachiya versus State of Gujarat (ii) (2017) 16 SCC 353 - Ganpat Singh versus State of Madhya Pradesh 8.7 He has submitted that the appellant may be acquitted and this appeal may be allowed. 9.1 Per contra, learned APP Mr. Soni for the respondent - State has vehemently opposed this appeal. He has submitted that the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant. He has submitted that the trial Court has considered entire evidence on record and passed the impugned judgment and order. He has submitted that the trial Court has not committed any error in convicting the appellant and therefore, interference of this Court does not warrant. He has submitted that the prosecution has examined many witnesses in support of its case. 9.2 He has submitted that the prosecution has examined PW25 - Ghanshyambhai Jivanbhai Bhavsar at Exh.65. The said witness has seen both the accused and deceased together before the incident. He has clearly stated that he has seen Rahul and Sagar with deceased - Vishal. He has submitted that this witness does support the case of the prosecution. 9.3 He has submitted that looking to the FSL Report at Exh.88, one button (second numbered) of the shirt of appellant was missing and other buttons were found ok. He has submitted that the prosecution has made panchnama of scene of offence at Exh.22, where the said button was found from the place of offence, which was sent to the FSL. He has submitted that the prosecution has, in its recovery panchnama (recovery of clothes), recovered one shirt from the appellant - accused, of which one button was missing. He has submitted that in the FSL report, said shirt was examined and has observed that, the said button, which was found from the scene of offence, was missing from the shirt of the appellant - accused. He has submitted that in the FSL report, said shirt was examined and has observed that, the said button, which was found from the scene of offence, was missing from the shirt of the appellant - accused. He has submitted that the prosecution has rightly adduced the evidence on record and the trial Court has properly evaluated it and passed the impugned order. 9.4 He has submitted that looking to the deposition of PW28 - Firozkhan alias Salim at Exh.68, he has deposed that Rahul has accepted that he has murdered Vishal at Bhumapura Road and Sagar has accompanied him, but he was in drunken condition. The said witness has stated that he has advised Rahul to present himself to the police and he has done so. Learned APP has submitted that looking to the extrajudicial confession by the appellant - accused before the said witness - Firozkhan on telephone, the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant - accused. 9.5 He has submitted that PW33 - Patel Dhananjay Maganbhai at Exh. 76 was examined by the prosecution. He was an officer of FSL, Kheda - Nadiad. He has stated in his deposition that he has done the inspection of the scene of offence. Learned APP has submitted that the said witness supports the case of the prosecution. 9.6 He has submitted that the trial Court has rightly considered the fact that the blood found from the car is of the 'O' group. The deceased and the appellant - accused has 'O' blood group and the appellant was not injured. Therefore, the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant - accused. 9.7 Learned APP has submitted that the trial Court has not committed any error in convicting the appellant - accused, which does not call for any interference by this Court. He has submitted that this appeal may be dismissed. 10. We have heard learned advocates for the rival parties. We have gone through the record and proceedings of the trial. We have also considered the impugned judgment and order passed by the trial Court. We have re-appreciated the entire evidence on record. 10.1 This is a case of circumstantial evidence. 10.2 There is no eye-witness to the incident. 10.3 The complaint given by the complainant is hearsay. 10.4 The deceased - Vishal was a pickpocketer and was a habitual of consuming liquor. We have re-appreciated the entire evidence on record. 10.1 This is a case of circumstantial evidence. 10.2 There is no eye-witness to the incident. 10.3 The complaint given by the complainant is hearsay. 10.4 The deceased - Vishal was a pickpocketer and was a habitual of consuming liquor. 10.5 There are material contradictions in the depositions of prosecution witnesses as well as timings and veracity of recovery panchnama of mobile and its cover. 10.5.1 Looking to the deposition of PW20 - Vanabhai Khodabhai Zala at Exh.58, the said witness does not support the case of the prosecution. He has stated in his deposition that he has seen someone in bleeding condition near the field of Budhaji in torch light. Thereafter, he has gone to his house. The conduct of this witness smacks a lot, but he is an independent witness. If any one shows any injured person or in unconscious condition, the normal reaction of the human being would be to approach the police and/or ambulance/ doctor. This witness has left the scene of offence after seeing the deceased. It is pertinent to note here that the said witness has stated in his deposition that there was a red coloured mobile cover, Nokia mobile and battery lying at that place. He has seen all these at about 21:30 p.m. and the police has taken all these items with him at about 22:30 / 23:00 p.m. 10.5.2 Further, looking to the deposition of PW33 - Patel Dhananjay Maganbhai at Exh.76, who was an officer of FSL, Kheda at Nadiad, he has stated that one saffron coloured mobile cover, Nokia Mobile with Airtel SIM Card and battery was lying at the place of offence. He has stated that he reached at about 9:30 hours on 08.12.2010 at the scene of offence for inspection as he has received wireless message for the same. 10.5.3 Further, looking to the deposition of PW34 - Atulkumar Bhikhalal Valand at Exh.83, who was a senior Police Sub Inspector at Mahemdabad Police Station, he has stated that one Nokia Mobile without SIM Card was recovered from the pocket of the deceased. He has also stated that one saffron coloured mobile cover, one mobile with SIM Card with broken display were lying at the place of incident. He has stated that he has visited the place of incident first time on 07.12.2010 at about 23:15 / 23:30 hours. He has also stated that one saffron coloured mobile cover, one mobile with SIM Card with broken display were lying at the place of incident. He has stated that he has visited the place of incident first time on 07.12.2010 at about 23:15 / 23:30 hours. He has admitted in the cross-examination that the panchnama of the scene of offence has been drawn on 08.12.2010 at about 10:00 hours. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the said witness has stated in cross-examination that the police has not taken any mobile, mobile cover and battery with them before lodging the complaint. 10.5.4 Thus, from the variation of the evidence collected by the investigating officer as well as the deposition of the various prosecution witnesses as noted above, it is clear that they do not support the case of the prosecution. On one hand, the witness has stated that there was a mobile without SIM card and on the other hand, the witness has deposed that there was a mobile with SIM card. There is also a variation about the colour of the mobile cover. The independent witness has stated that it was a red coloured mobile cover, whereas the investigating officer and the FSL Officer have stated that it was a saffron coloured mobile cover. Therefore, these are the material contradictions in the depositions of the prosecution witnesses. 10.6 PW25 - Ghanshyambhai Jivanbhai Bhavsar has given deposition at Exh.65. He has lastly seen the accused - Rahul, Sagar and the deceased together on the day of incident. In the deposition, he has referred to some mobile calls with the brother of the deceased - Sanjay, who happened to be his friend, however, his call details were not produced on record by the prosecution. Therefore, it cannot be said that this witness supports the case of prosecution as there is no corroboration. 10.6.1 In 'RAVI VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA' [ (2018) 16 SCC 102 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows at Paragraphs-3 and 4 thereof; "3. The accused appellants and the deceased along with Suma (PW1) and Rama Nayak (PW2) were together on 26th December, 2004, the precise time being around 1.30 p.m.. The dead body was recovered after a gap of four (04) days i.e. on 30th December, 2004. The accused appellants and the deceased along with Suma (PW1) and Rama Nayak (PW2) were together on 26th December, 2004, the precise time being around 1.30 p.m.. The dead body was recovered after a gap of four (04) days i.e. on 30th December, 2004. The post-mortem report indicated that the death had occurred 30 hours prior to the time of post-mortem examination. The medical evidence, therefore, would be suggestive of the fact that the dead-body was recovered after about two (02) days from 1.30 p.m. of 26th December, 2004. The question that confronts the Court is whether on the basis of the aforesaid evidence the conviction of the accused appellants is sustainable in law. 4. "Last seen together" is certainly a strong piece of circumstantial evidence against an accused. However, as it has been held in numerous pronouncements of this Court, the timelag between the occurrence of the death and when the accused was last seen in the company of the deceased has to be reasonably close to permit an inference of guilt to be drawn. When the time-lag is considerably large, as in the present case, it would be safer for the Court to look for corroboration. In the present case, no corroboration is forthcoming. In the absence of any other circumstances which could connect the accused appellants with the crime alleged except as indicated above and in the absence of any corroboration of the circumstance of 'last seen together' we are of the view that a reasonable doubt can be entertained with regard to the involvement of the accused appellants in the crime alleged against them. The burden under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 would not shift in the aforesaid fact situation, a position which has been dealt with by this Court in Malleshappa vs. State of Karnataka, wherein the earlier view of this Court Mohibur Rahman vs. State of Assam, has been extracted. The said view in Mohibur Rahman (supra) may be profitably extracted below: "10. The circumstance of last seen together does not by itself and necessarily lead to the inference that it was the accused who committed the crime. There must be something more establishing connectivity between the accused and the crime. The said view in Mohibur Rahman (supra) may be profitably extracted below: "10. The circumstance of last seen together does not by itself and necessarily lead to the inference that it was the accused who committed the crime. There must be something more establishing connectivity between the accused and the crime. There may be cases where, on account of close proximity of place and time between the event of the accused having been last seen with the deceased and the factum of death, a rational mind may be persuaded to reach an irresistible conclusion that either the accused should explain how and in what circumstances the victim suffered the death or should own the liability for the homicide. In the present case there is no such proximity of time and place. As already noted the dead body has been recovered about 14 days after the date on which the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused. The distance between the two places is about 30-40 km. The event of the two accused persons having departed with the deceased and thus last seen together (by Lilima Rajbongshi, PW 6) does not bear such close proximity with the death of the victim by reference to time or place. According to Dr. Ratan Ch. Das the death occurred 5 to 10 days before 9-2-1991. The medical evidence does not establish, and there is no other evidence available to hold, that the deceased had died on 24-1-1991 or soon thereafter. So far as the accused Mohibur Rahman is concerned this is the singular piece of circumstantial evidence available against him. We have already discussed the evidence as to recovery and held that he cannot be connected with any recovery. Merely because he was last seen with the deceased a few unascertainable number of days before his death, he cannot be held liable for the offence of having caused the death of the deceased. So far as the offence under Section 201 of the IPC is concerned there is no evidence worth the name available against him. Merely because he was last seen with the deceased a few unascertainable number of days before his death, he cannot be held liable for the offence of having caused the death of the deceased. So far as the offence under Section 201 of the IPC is concerned there is no evidence worth the name available against him. He is entitled to an acquittal." 10.6.2 From the observations made by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision that "last seen, together is certainly a strong piece of circumstantial evidence against an accused, however, the time-lag between the occurrence and the death of the victim and that the accused was last seen in the company of the deceased has to be reasonably close to permit an inference of guilt to be drawn. When the time-lag is considerably large, it would be safer for the Court to look for corroboration." 10.6.3 In 'REENA HAZARIKA VS. STATE OF ASSAM' [(2019) 3 SCC 289], the observations made by the Apex Court at Paragraph-8, reads as follows; "8. The essentials of circumstantial evidence stand well established by precedents and we do not consider it necessary to reiterate the same and burden the order unnecessarily. Suffice it to observe that in a case of circumstantial evidence the prosecution is required to establish the continuity in the links of the chain of circumstances, so as to lead to the only and inescapable conclusion of the accused being the assailant, inconsistent or incompatible with the possibility of any other hypothesis compatible with the innocence of the accused. Mere invocation of the last seen theory, sans the facts and evidence in a case, will not suffice to shift the onus upon the accused under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 unless the prosecution first establishes a prima facie case. Mere invocation of the last seen theory, sans the facts and evidence in a case, will not suffice to shift the onus upon the accused under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 unless the prosecution first establishes a prima facie case. If the links in the chain of circumstances itself are not complete, and the prosecution is unable to establish a prima facie case, leaving open the possibility that the occurrence may have taken place in some other manner, the onus will not shift to the accused, and the benefit of doubt will have to be given." 10.6.4 From the aforementioned observations made by the Apex Court, it can be said that mere invocation of 'last seen, together' theory, sans facts and evidence in a case will not suffice to shift the burden or onus, as provided under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, on the accused, unless, the prosecution establishes a prima facie case, first. When the links in the chain of circumstances, itself, are not complete and the prosecution is unable to establish a prima facie case, leaving open the possibility that the occurrence may have taken place in some other manner, the onus will not shift on the accused and the benefit of doubt will have to be given to the accused. 10.6.5 It is well settled that in the case of circumstantial evidence, 'motive' plays an important role and if, the motive, which is considered to be the starting point of the offence, is not established, then, the conviction, based on the theory of 'last seen, together' only, cannot be sustained. 10.6.6 Here, it would be profitable to refer to the provisions of Sections 101 and 106 of the Evidence Act, which reads thus; "101. Burden of proof.- Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. xxx xxx xxx 106. Burden of proof.- Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. xxx xxx xxx 106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.- When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him." 10.6.7 From the aforesaid provisions contained in the Evidence Act, it can be said that the prosecution has to prove its own case and has to stand on its own legs, on the strength of the foundation of the facts and to prove the case against the accused and thereafter, if, the prosecution successfully proves the case against the accused, then only, burden would shift on the accused, as provided under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, to prove his innocence. 10.6.8 Therefore, it can be said that in absence of proof of other circumstances, the only circumstance of 'last seen, together' and absence of satisfactorily explanation cannot be made the basis for conviction. 10.7 Considering the deposition of PW28 - Firozkhan alias Salim Faruqkhan Pathan at Exh.68, the statement given by him during the examination-in-chief, has not been given by him to the police at all. At this stage, it is noted that the learned APP is harping on the deposition of this witness being extra-judicial confession, as this witness has stated in his deposition that the accused has accepted on telephone that he murdered Vishal in drunken condition and the said witness has told the accused to present himself before the police and the accused has presented himself before the police accordingly. However, looking to the deposition of PW34 - PSI - Mr. Atulkumar Bhikhalal Valand (Exh.83), the said witness has clearly stated in his deposition that the accused (two) were arrested from the house of the Firozkhan alias Salim Faruqkhan Pathan at Juhapura. Therefore, the statement made by Firozkhan (Exh.68) cannot be believable and it does not support the case of the prosecution at all. Thus, the so-called extra-judicial confession made by the accused before Firozkhan alias Salim Pathan (Exh.68) on telephone has not veracity at all. 10.8 Further, PW34 - PSI Mr. Therefore, the statement made by Firozkhan (Exh.68) cannot be believable and it does not support the case of the prosecution at all. Thus, the so-called extra-judicial confession made by the accused before Firozkhan alias Salim Pathan (Exh.68) on telephone has not veracity at all. 10.8 Further, PW34 - PSI Mr. A.B. Valand at Exh.83 in his cross-examination has clearly accepted that he has received the call details during the investigation and has handed over to his successor while he was transferred. However, PW35 - Mr. Rameshbhai Khimjibhai Modia, PSI (Successor) at Exh.85 has stated in his cross-examination that his predecessor (Mr. A.B. Valand, the then PSI) has not handed over any call details. Since the call details of the accused as well as other prosecution witnesses are very important and relevant document, which is missing during the investigation or which is not produced on record by the prosecution, it smacks a lot. Under the circumstances, it tilts the balance towards the accused and benefit of doubt be given in favour of the appellant - accused. 10.9 Further, looking the deposition of PW 1 - Dr. Dineshbhai Ramanbhai Patel at Exh.11, who has carried out the postmortem of the dead body of the deceased, he has stated in his deposition that total 12 injuries were found on the dead body. Out of them, some injuries are incise wound and some are puncture wound. He has admitted in his cross-examination that, he cannot say conclusively that all the injuries of deceased can be possible by knife which is recovered as weapon. Therefore, the said prosecution witness does not support the case of the prosecution. 10.10 Further, looking to the serological report (Page 537) produced on record, the same blood group i.e. 'O' of the deceased as well as accused is found. Therefore, the case of the prosecution is not conclusively proved that blood which is found on shirt of accused is of the deceased. Thus, the same does not support the case of prosecution. 10.11 There is another major contradiction in the evidence. Looking to the deposition of PW1 - Dr. Dineshbhai Ramanbhai Patel at Exh.11, he has stated in his cross-examination that he cannot be said conclusively that all the injuries have been caused due to the knife only. Further, looking to the deposition of PW34 - PSI Mr. 10.11 There is another major contradiction in the evidence. Looking to the deposition of PW1 - Dr. Dineshbhai Ramanbhai Patel at Exh.11, he has stated in his cross-examination that he cannot be said conclusively that all the injuries have been caused due to the knife only. Further, looking to the deposition of PW34 - PSI Mr. A.B. Valand (Exh.83), he has clearly stated in his cross-examination that during his investigation, it is declared before me that Sagar Prajapati (juvenile accused) has given knife blow to the deceased. Further, looking to the recovery panchnama at Exh.43, only knife is recovered at the instance of appellant - accused. Thus, from these depositions as well as panchnama, it cannot be proved that the appellant - accused has given knife blow to the deceased, and further that other weapon is not used in the commission of offence. Thus, it tilts balance in favour of the appellant - accused. 10.12 Considering the deposition of PW-21 - Somabhai Ravjibhai Dabhi at Exh.59 and PW-22 - Dilipsinh Pratapsinh Dabhi at Exh.60, who are the witness of the initial incident. Later on they have left the place of incident. It is noted that even though no T.I. Parade has been carried out by the Investigating Agency. Even any attempts for the identification of the accused was not done in the Court proceedings by the prosecution. Thus, the process of investigation is doubtful and the benefit of doubt would be given to the appellant - accused. 10.13 Looking to the panchnama of the Indica car at Exh.33, duplicate R.C. Book and duplicate driving licence smart card were recovered from the Indica car. It was transferred before few days of the incident in the name of appellant. It is noted that the prosecution has not examined any officer from the RTO Office regarding the veracity of these documents. 10.14 Since this is a matter of circumstantial evidence, the chain of circumstantial evidence is required to be completed, which in the present case is not, as motive is not established by cogent evidence, blood stains are not found in the other part of car, except steering. Though blow of knife was given by Sagar (juvenile accused) when deceased was sitting in the car, even blood group of deceased as well as appellant accused found common i.e. 'O' Positive, which was not conclusively proved. Though blow of knife was given by Sagar (juvenile accused) when deceased was sitting in the car, even blood group of deceased as well as appellant accused found common i.e. 'O' Positive, which was not conclusively proved. More over, timing and manner of recovery of mobile and its cover is also become doubtful as one witness has deposed the timing of midnight at 2:00 O'clock and FSL Officer has deposed the timing of morning at about 9:30 a.m. 10.14.1 Each and every incriminating circumstance must be clearly established by reliable and clinching evidence and the circumstances so proved must from a chain of events from which the only irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the accused can be safely drawn and no other hypothesis against the guilt is possible. In a case depending largely upon circumstantial evidence, there is always a danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof. The Court must satisfy itself that various circumstances in the chain of events must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. When the important link goes, the chain of circumstances gets snapped and the other circumstances cannot in any manner, establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. The Court has to be watchful and avoid the danger of allowing the suspicion to take the place of legal proof, for sometimes unconsciously it may happen to be a short step between moral certainty and legal proof. There is a long mental distance between "may be true" and "must be true" and the same divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. There is a long mental distance between "may be true" and "must be true" and the same divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. 10.14.2 At this stage, this Court would like to refer to the rules for evaluation of Circumstantial Evidence from the "Wills' Circumstantial Evidence" (Chapter VI), which are as under : (1) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt connected with the factum probandum; (2) the burden of proof is always on the part who asserts the existence of any fact, which infers legal accountability; (3) in all cases, whether of direct or circumstantial evidence the best evidence must be adduced which the nature of the case admits; (4) in order to justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation, upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt; (5) if there be any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled as of right to be acquitted. 10.14.3 At this stage, it would be profitable to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in 'ANJAN KUMAR SARMA VS. STATE OF ASSAM, [ (2017) 14 SCC 359 ], wherein, in the similar type of case, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed and held as under at Paragraphs-13, 16 and 21; "13. Admittedly, this is a case of circumstantial evidence. Factors to be taken into account in adjudication of cases of circumstantial evidence laid down by this Court are: (1) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned 'must' or 'should' and not 'may be' established; (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. xxx xxx xxx 16. xxx xxx xxx 16. It is settled law that inferences drawn by the court have to be on the basis of established facts and not on conjectures. (See: Sujit Biswas vs. State of Assam, (2013) 12 SCC 406 13-18) The inference that was drawn by the High Court that the death was caused on 28.12.1992 within the time of 48 hours as mentioned in the post mortem report is not correct. The post mortem examination was conducted on 30.12.1992 at 12:00 noon and it was opined by PW-11 that the death occurred 24 to 48 hours prior to the time of post mortem examination. Even if the time is stretched to the maximum of 48 hours, the death was after 12:00 noon on 28.12.1992. The deceased was in the company of the accused till 9:00 pm on 27.12.1992. The inference drawn by the High Court that the accused have killed the deceased on 28.12.1992 in the night time and thrown the body on the railway track is not on the basis of any proved facts. The Trial Court is right in holding that there is no evidence on record to show that the deceased was with the accused after 12:00 noon on 28.12.1992. xxx xxx xxx 21. It is clear from the above that in a case where the other links have been satisfactorily made out and the circumstances point to the guilt of the accused, the circumstance of last seen together and absence of explanation would provide an additional link which completes the chain. In the absence of proof of other circumstances, the only circumstance of last seen together and absence of satisfactory explanation cannot be made the basis of conviction. The other judgments on this point that are cited by Mr. Venkataramani do not take a different view and, thus, need not be adverted to. He also relied upon the judgment of this Court in State of Goa vs. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC 755 in support of his submission that the circumstance of last seen together would be a relevant circumstance in a case where there was no possibility of any other persons meeting or approaching the deceased at the place of incident or before the commission of crime in the intervening period. It was held in the above judgment as under :- "34. It was held in the above judgment as under :- "34. From the principle laid down by this Court, the circumstance of last seen together would normally be taken into consideration for finding the accused guilty of the offence charged with when it is established by the prosecution that the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were found together alive and when the deceased was found dead is so small that possibility of any other person being with the deceased could completely be ruled out. The time gap between the accused persons seen in the company of the deceased and the detection of the crime would be a material consideration for appreciation of the evidence and placing reliance on it as a circumstance against the accused. But, in all cases, it cannot be said that the evidence of last seen together is to be rejected merely because the time gap between the accused persons and the deceased last seen together and the crime coming to light is after (sic of) a considerable long duration. There can be no fixed or straitjacket formula for the duration of time gap in this regard and it would depend upon the evidence led by the prosecution to remove the possibility of any other person meeting the deceased in the intervening period, that is to say, if the prosecution is able to lead such an evidence that likelihood of any person other than the accused, being the author of the crime, becomes impossible, then the evidence of circumstance of last seen together, although there is long duration of time, can be considered as one of the circumstances in the chain of circumstances to prove the guilt against such accused persons. Hence, if the prosecution proves that in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, there was no possibility of any other person meeting or approaching the deceased at the place of incident or before the commission of the crime, in the intervening period, the proof of last seen together would be relevant evidence. Hence, if the prosecution proves that in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, there was no possibility of any other person meeting or approaching the deceased at the place of incident or before the commission of the crime, in the intervening period, the proof of last seen together would be relevant evidence. For instance, if it can be demonstrated by showing that the accused persons were in exclusive possession of the place where the incident occurred or where they were last seen together with the deceased, and there was no possibility of any intrusion to that place by any third party, then a relatively wider time gap would not affect the prosecution case." As we have held that the other circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are not proved and that the circumstances of last seen together along with the absence of satisfactory explanation are not sufficient for convicting the accused. Therefore the findings recorded in the above judgment are not applicable to the facts of this case." 10.14.4 In the case of circumstantial evidence, each link, unless is connected together to form a chain, may suggest suspicion, but, the same, itself, cannot take place of the proof or evidence and the same cannot be held to be sufficient to convict an accused. 10.14.5 In 'SHAILENDRA RAJDEV PASVAN VS. STATE OF GUJARAT', [ (2020) 14 SCC 750 ], the Apex Court observed as under at Paragraph-17 thereof; "17. It is well settled by now that in a case based on circumstantial evidence the Courts ought to have a conscientious approach and conviction ought to be recorded only in case all the links of the chain are complete pointing to the guilt of the accused. Each link unless connected together to form a chain may suggest suspicion but the same in itself cannot take place of proof and will not be sufficient to convict the accused." 10.14.6 The trial Court has not kept in mind that there must be chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability, the act must have been done by the accused. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. It is now well settled that in case of circumstantial evidence, the evidence should be examined by keeping in mind the aspects mentioned in 'ANJAN KUMAR SARMA VS. STATE OF ASSAM (supra), as noted hereinabove in para : 10.14.13 above. 11.1 It is pertinent to note that the prosecution is required to prove the intention or knowledge of the accused persons, however, it is not necessary that injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted by the accused persons. What is material to attract offence under section 302 of the IPC is the intention / motive or knowledge with which all the acts are done irrespective of its results. In order to attract the offence under section 302 of IPC, we have minutely examined the oral evidence and depositions all the prosecution witnesses, we found that nothing is disclosed with regard to intention / motive or knowledge so as to constitute that there is anything on the part of the appellant - accused to commit act or to commit murder. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to discharge its duty to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the trial Court has committed error in evaluating it. 11.2 We are, therefore, of the opinion that the prosecution has even failed to prove motive on the part of the appellant to commit the offence, punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. 12. We have considered the depositions of the witnesses examined by the prosecution so also the documentary evidences produced by it before the trial Court concerned and re-appreciated the same and also considered the decisions relied on by the learned Advocate Mr. Dave appearing for the appellant and we are of the view that the present one, being a case of circumstantial evidence, it was the duty of the prosecution to prove the complete chain of events by leading cogent and credible evidence. 13. In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the present appellant. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed. 14. 13. In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the present appellant. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed. 14. Looking to the entire evidence on record, medical evidence, panchnama and contradictory statements in the examination-in-chief as well as in cross-examination, it transpires that there are major contradictions in all the statements/depositions. This is a case of murder. No one can play with life imprisonment by over-implicating the innocent person and/or falsely implicating the innocent person. Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on record, the trial Court has committed error in convicting the appellant. 15. From the entire evidence as well as from the various depositions, it is revealed that the deceased had criminal antecedents and had many enemies. It is also conclusively not proved that the deceased and the appellant has some issue regarding money. The deceased was oftenly taking liquor. The deceased was doing illegal work and therefore, he resided separately from his mother. 16. In view of above and on our own analysis and re-appreciation of the evidence, we deem it fit to interfere with the order of conviction recorded by the trial Court. We have also perused the judgment and findings given by the trial Court and find that the same is not in accordance with law. 17. In the result, the present Criminal Appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 19.06.2013 passed by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Nadiad in Sessions Case No.47 of 2011 is hereby quashed and set aside. The bail bond executed by the appellant - accused stands cancelled and he is ordered to be set at liberty, if not required in any other offence. The concerned jail authority is directed to set the present appellant at liberty, forthwith, if, not required in connection with any other case. The amount of fine, if any, paid by the appellant, shall be refunded to him, immediately. The Registry is directed to send the R&P back to the concerned trial Court, forthwith.