RAJEEV RANJAN PRASAD, J.:–The short question which has arisen in the present writ application is whether the Vigilance Investigation Bureau, Department of Vigilance, Government of Bihar, Patna (respondent no. 1) is justified in pursuing the investigation of Special Case No. 16/2017 arising out of Special Vigilance Unit (SUV) P.S. Case No. 01 of 2017 for the offence alleged under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 dated 23rd March, 2017 even after expiry of more than five years notwithstanding the fact that on identical allegations/ charges the petitioner has been exonerated in the departmental proceeding in the light of the inquiry reports submitted one after another by the Principal Secretary, Department of Labour, Govt. of Bihar and the Chief Commissioner of Inquiry, Government of Bihar. Facts in brief 2. The petitioner at the relevant time was posted as Divisional Forest Officer, Research, Training and Public Relation, Patna in the Department of Forest, Govt. of Bihar, Patna. His case is that he was at serial no. 1 in the list of candidates whose case were due for consideration by the Union Public Service Commission for promotion in the Indian Forest Service. At this stage, a complaint was filed against him to the I.G., Special Vigilance Unit (hereinafter ‘SVU’) by one of the employees of the department against whom certain disciplinary action was taken by the petitioner. At the instance of I.G., SVU an inquiry was held by the Chief Vigilance Officer and the Conservator of Forest, Purnea. In course of inquiry, many notices were issued to the complainant but he neither appeared before the Inquiry Officer nor gave any evidence. A report was sent to the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests and the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests sent his report to the Principal Secretary, Environment and Forest Department, Government of Bihar, and it was ultimately decided to drop the allegations. The Chief Vigilance Officer forwarded the decision of the government to I.G., Special Vigilance Unit vide it’s letter no. 3699 dated 08.12.2015. 3. Later, on the basis of an unknown source information the SVU registered SVU P.S. Case No. 01/2017 dated 23.03.2017 under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereafter referred to as the “P.C. Act”) against the petitioner. A copy of the First Information Report (hereinafter ‘F.I.R.”) has been brought on record as Annexure ‘2’. 3. Later, on the basis of an unknown source information the SVU registered SVU P.S. Case No. 01/2017 dated 23.03.2017 under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereafter referred to as the “P.C. Act”) against the petitioner. A copy of the First Information Report (hereinafter ‘F.I.R.”) has been brought on record as Annexure ‘2’. It is submitted that the F.I.R. contains similar allegations which were earlier made by the employee of the department which had been ultimately dropped. (Annexure ‘1’ to the writ application). 4. It is the specific case of the petitioner that unlike other cases in which the SVU is conducting a preliminary inquiry before registering an FIR, in the present case, no preliminary inquiry was conducted and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lalita Kumari Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in 2014(2) SCC 1 which specifically says that in the complaints relating to inter alia a case of corruption the investigating agency may conduct a preliminary inquiry, has not been followed. It is submitted that in haste the SVU registered the F.I.R. According to the petitioner all these exercises were done hurriedly only to deprive the petitioner from getting into the Indian Forest Service. 5. It is further submitted that from the so-called source information, it would appear that there was an oral information to the ‘SVU’ that the petitioner has got assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. The said oral information given by the unknown sources were only vague information and it was desirable to verify the same at the preliminary stage. It is pointed out that a circular of the State Government issued by the Personnel Department vide it’s letter no. 945 dated 24th June, 2005 and circulated to all the departments provided that any complaint against a government servant should be accompanied by an affidavit of the complainant and then only enquiry should be made, but, in the present case the SVU went on to lodge the FIR against the petitioner on oral complaint and without any preliminary enquiry. 6. 945 dated 24th June, 2005 and circulated to all the departments provided that any complaint against a government servant should be accompanied by an affidavit of the complainant and then only enquiry should be made, but, in the present case the SVU went on to lodge the FIR against the petitioner on oral complaint and without any preliminary enquiry. 6. By filing a supplementary affidavit the petitioner has brought on record the two first information reports bearing SVU P.S. Case No. 01/2018 and 02/2018 which were also lodged against two other government officers on the basis of the source information but prior to lodging those FIRs SVU had conducted a preliminary inquiry. Submission is that very surprisingly in the present case the said procedure was not followed, there was otherwise no reason for lodging the FIR against the petitioner in such a haste. It is submitted that any action done in haste would go a long way to show that the action is malafide. Learned senior counsel has relied upon some of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to submit that even though holding of a preliminary inquiry is not a ‘must’ in all the cases but in the facts and circumstances of the present case, a preliminary inquiry was desirable. Initiation of Disciplinary Proceeding on the same set of allegations. 7. It is stated that during pendency of the present case, when this Court vide it’s order dated 17.05.2017 passed an interim order that no coercive step shall be taken against the petitioner, the then Superintendent of Police ‘SVU’ wrote a letter dated 10th July, 2017 calling for an information from the Department of Environment and Forest as to whether the petitioner has been suspended or not and a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated or not. Thereafter, a departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner vide memo no. 3365 dated 17.10.2017. The resolution contains the charges which were totally based on the allegations contained in the FIR of this case (Annexure ‘14’ to the supplementary affidavit). The entire charges were sought to be proved on the strength of the communications received from the ‘SVU’ and the F.I.R. A detail enquiry was conducted against the petitioner by the then Principal Secretary, Labour Resources Department-cum-Additional Departmental Enquiry Commissioner, Bihar, Patna, who vide it’s enquiry report dated 28.08.2018 categorically stated that the charges leveled against the petitioner were not proved. A copy of the enquiry report dated 29.08.2018 has been brought on record as Annexure ‘15’ to the supplementary affidavit. Exoneration of the petitioner in the Disciplinary Proceeding. 8. It is stated that subsequently the Environment, Forest & Climate Change Department of the State Government vide letter no. 11.09.2019 directed for a further enquiry into the charges no. 2 and 3 leveled against the petitioner and accordingly, the then Chief Enquiry Commissioner, Bihar, Patna held the enquiry in relation to the charges. Once again a detail enquiry report was submitted vide memo no. 448 dated 18.06.2021. The Chief Enquiry Commissioner concluded that the charges of holding disproportionate assets by this petitioner were not proved. Subsequently, the said enquiry report was accepted by the government and the departmental proceeding was brought to an end. The petitioner has been exonerated of all the charges leveled against him. Annexure ‘18’ to the supplementary affidavit is the notification as contained in memo no. 1950 dated 28.07.2021 clearly holding that all the three charges leveled against the petitioner were not proved and the petitioner has been exonerated from all the charges. 9. Learned senior counsel relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashoo Surendranath Tiwari Vs. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, EOW, CBI & Anr. reported in (2020) 9 SCC 636 (paragraph 8 to 13) to submit that once the petitioner has been exonerated from all the three charges by the Chief Enquiry Commissioner and the same has been accepted by the Government of Bihar and the petitioner has been issued integrity certificate, there is no reason why the present FIR should continue. In any case, it is submitted that the respondents have failed to complete the investigation for more than 5 ½ years, that further strengthens the case of the petitioner that the SVU was acting in haste in registering the FIR and had they done a preliminary enquiry, the petitioner would have been saved from the damages which he had suffered in his career. 10. 10. It is submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashoo Surendranath Tiwari (supra) held that once the petitioner in the said case has been exonerated on merits by CVC and the allegations found to be not sustainable at all and the accused held innocent, the criminal prosecution on the same set of facts and circumstances, cannot be allowed to continue, on the underlying principle of higher standard of proof in criminal cases. In the said case a charge-sheet had already been filed against the petitioner in the criminal case but the Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceeding and discharged the petitioner. Integrity certificate and promotion to the Indian Forest Service 11. It is submitted that the petitioner has been granted integrity certificate dated 13.09.2021 under the signature of the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar and the State Government has certified the integrity of the petitioner with reference to the entries made in his annual confidential report. The concerned department of the Government of Bihar communicated to the Union Public Service Commission to include the name of the petitioner unconditionally in the select list of the year 2017, 2018 and 2019 and a further request was made for proper recommendation of his promotion to the Indian Forest Service from the select list of 2017. Accordingly selection committee in it’s meeting held on 5th of March, 2021 allocated the Bihar Cadre of the Indian Forest Service to the petitioner and a notification dated 26th October, 2021 has been issued as contained in Annexure ‘22’. Submissions as to prejudice 12. The petitioner has specifically pleaded by filing a second supplementary affidavit sworn on 29.08.2017 that the investigating officer of the case was visiting the department of Forest and Environment and was threatening the senior officer of the department to suspend or initiate the departmental proceeding against the petitioner. To strengthen his submissions he has brought on record a copy of letter dated 10th July, 2017 issued by the Superintendent of Police, Special Vigilance Unit, Bihar wherein he has sought information from the department as to whether the petitioner has been suspended or not and also if any departmental proceeding has been initiated against him or not. It is stated that it is under this threat that the senior officials of the department proceeded ultimately vide memo no. It is stated that it is under this threat that the senior officials of the department proceeded ultimately vide memo no. 2622 dated 21st August, 2017 to initiate a departmental proceeding on the same and similar charges as mentioned in the impugned first information report. 13. The statement made by the petitioner petitioner in it’s supplementary affidavit sworn on 31st August, 2021 and 04th August, 2022 have not been denied by the respondents. This Court finds that the copy of the supplementary affidavits were duly served upon learned Special Public Prosecutor of the Special Vigilance Unit and thereafter the matter was adjourned on the request of learned Special P.P. but the statements made in those two supplementary affidavits have not been controverted. Delay in investigation – Sufferance caused to the petitioner 14. It is lastly submitted that the whole purpose of the institution of the first information report was to debar the petitioner from the zone of consideration and to that extent the rivals/opponents of the petitioner have almost succeeded. Had the petitioner been given the Cadre of Indian Forest Service in the year 2017 itself, he would have superannuated from the post of Conservator of Forest but because of the delay, he superannuated from the post of Deputy Conservator of Forest only resulting into the huge loss of salary during his service period as well as fixation of amount of pension. It is stated that the juniors to the petitioner in the said select list of 2017 were given promotion to the Indian Forest Service in the year 2017 itself. The petitioner has, thus besides suffering from monitory loss suffered humiliation as well. It is stated that even after 5 ½ years from the date of lodging of the FIR, till date the investigation has not been concluded. In the meantime, petitioner has retired from service on 31.12.2021. It is, thus, submitted that there being an inordinate delay of over 5½ years in continuing with the investigation, it has seriously pre-judiced the petitioner and there is an infringement of the fundamental right of the petitioner guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that the F.I.R. is fit to be quashed on this ground alone. Reliance has been placed upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hussainara Khatoon & Ors Vs. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that the F.I.R. is fit to be quashed on this ground alone. Reliance has been placed upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hussainara Khatoon & Ors Vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar [ (1980) 1 SCC 81 ]; Abdul Rehman Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak [ (1992) 1 SCC 225 ]; Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India [ (1978) 1 SCC 248 ]; Bishwanath Prasad Singh Vs. State of Bihar [1994 Supp. (3) SCC 97]; Vakil Prasad Singh [ (2009) 3 SCC 355 ]; Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta and Another Vs. B. Srinivas [ (2008) 8 SCC 580 ]. 15. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that even though there is no hard and fast rule that a preliminary enquiry must be conducted before registering an FIR but a public authority must act sensibly and with a bonafide approach towards each and all, failing which grave injustice may be caused to a person by registering an FIR against him at the time when he was expecting his promotion in the Indian Forest Services. 16. Learned senior counsel further submits that in the nature of the present case the SVU has not come out with any material to justify delay of over 5½ years in completion of investigation. If it is so, the delay in completion of investigation has seriously prejudiced the petitioner who has already retired from service on 31.12.2021. It is submitted that right to speedy investigation is a part and parcel of right to speedy trial which has been held to be imbibed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India as a fundamental right of an accused. Stand of the Special Vigilance Unit 17. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent no. 2 to 4. It is stated that under the P.C. Act the investigating agency gets information from the various sources like government department, banks, private persons, friends/relatives of suspect officer and thereafter the agency registers FIR. The stand is that there is no need of a signed complaint for registering an FIR. Instances have been given to show that a large number of cases under the P.C. Act which are registered by the CBI are based on source information and in substantial number of such cases those have ended in conviction. 18. The stand is that there is no need of a signed complaint for registering an FIR. Instances have been given to show that a large number of cases under the P.C. Act which are registered by the CBI are based on source information and in substantial number of such cases those have ended in conviction. 18. The further stand of the respondents is that the standard practice of registering FIR has been adopted and so far as the judgment of Hon’ble Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Lalita Kumari (supra) is concerned, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had carved out an exception in some category of cases, so far as the corruption cases are concerned only where the complaint/information does not clearly disclose the commission of cognizable offence a preliminary inquiry may be conducted. It is submitted that where there is fear of manipulation by the investigating agency if the F.I.R. is not registered immediately and there is no infringement of the right of an accused if an F.I.R. is registered, in case of a cognizable offence there would be no need to conduct a preliminary inquiry. According to the respondents, the information collected in the present case from different sources prima-facie disclosed the commission of offence and it was not possible to single out a single source who should have signed the information. According to the respondents, the petitioner will be offered an opportunity to give his explanation regarding the acquisition and disposal of movable and immovable properties after conclusion of investigation in this case. 19. In it’s reply cum supplementary counter affidavit the respondents have reiterated their stand and supported the registration of F.I.R. 20. Mr. Arbind Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the Special Vigilance Unit (SVU) has opposed this writ application. This Court has taken note of his submission in it’s order dated 29.08.2022. It is stated that merely because the petitioner has been exonerated in the departmental proceeding, this Court need not interfere with the first information report. 21. Mr. Arbind Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the Special Vigilance Unit (SVU) has opposed this writ application. This Court has taken note of his submission in it’s order dated 29.08.2022. It is stated that merely because the petitioner has been exonerated in the departmental proceeding, this Court need not interfere with the first information report. 21. There is, however, no denial or contest to the submissions of learned senior counsel for the petitioner based on specific statement made in the supplementary affidavits that the petitioner has been exonerated in the departmental proceeding from all the three charges which are identical to the allegations in the first information report and those charges were sought to be proved on the basis of the same set of materials. Consideration 22. Having heard learned senior counsel for the petitioner and learned Special P.P. for the SVU, this Court finds itself in agreement with the submissions of learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the SVU has lodged the FIR against the petitioner in a hot-haste. While it is not in quarrel that in each and every case involving corruption the prosecuting agency need not conduct a preliminary inquiry but at the same time it is also expected that the prosecuting agency shall act sensibly and with complete accountability keeping in mind the nature of allegations and the materials prima-facie available with them to demonstrate commission of cognizable offence. 23. In such cases where the complaint discloses commission of a cognizable offence, there cannot be a second opinion but to lodge the first information report. In the present case, it is the stand of the Vigilance that the FIR was lodged on oral information received from different sources. Instances are available on the record to show that when similar kind of oral informations were received against the two officers who were made accused in Vigilance P.S. Case No. 01/2018 and 02/2018 the SVU decided to conduct a preliminary inquiry and only on being satisfied with the preliminary inquiry report FIRs in the matter of disproportionate assets held by those government servants were lodged. Petitioner has made a specific statement in paragraph 10 of his supplementary affidavit that very surprisingly in the present case, on the basis of so-called information from the source, on the same very date and just after two hours the first information report was lodged even without getting the identity of the so-called source being verified and authenticated. This specific statement of the petitioner has not at all been controverted on behalf of the SVU. 24. In the case of Lalita Kumari (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court concluded it’s directions in paragraph 120 to 120.8 which are being reproduced hereunder:— “120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold: 120.1. Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation. 120.2. If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not. 120.3. If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further. 120.4. The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring officers who do not register the FIR if information received by him discloses a cognizable offence. 120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable offence. 120.6. As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under: (a) Matrimonial disputes/ family disputes (b) Commercial offences (c) Medical negligence cases (d) Corruption cases (e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under: (a) Matrimonial disputes/ family disputes (b) Commercial offences (c) Medical negligence cases (d) Corruption cases (e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay. The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry. 120.7. While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time bound and in any case it should not exceed 7 days. The fact of such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry. 120.8. Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is the record of all information received in a police station, we direct that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said Diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, as mentioned above.” 25. It is evident from perusal of paragraph 120.5 and 120.6 above that as regards the cases in which preliminary enquiry is to be conducted, one of the categories of cases as cited by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is the ‘corruption cases’. Paragraph 120.7 states that while ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time bound and in any case it should not exceed 7 days. Further paragraph 120.8 says that all information received in a police station relating to cognizable offence, whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected. 26. On the question of need to conduct preliminary inquiry that Hon’ble Supreme Court has settled the law that an accused cannot ask for preliminary enquiry as a matter of right. A preliminary inquiry has not been made mandatory by any judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court even in corruption cases. The conditions which will warrant the need of preliminary inquiry before the registration of FIR will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A preliminary inquiry has not been made mandatory by any judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court even in corruption cases. The conditions which will warrant the need of preliminary inquiry before the registration of FIR will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. There is no said format or manner in which the preliminary inquiry is to be conducted. In a situation where there remains an iota of doubt as to whether cognizable offence is made out or not a preliminary inquiry becomes not only permissible but desirable especially in cases where the allegations are of misconduct of corrupt practice acquiring the assets/properties disproportionate to his known source of income. The reason being that not only the reputation of a public servant is on a stake in such situation but also of the department of the government to which such public servant is attached. In the case of Central Bureau of Investigation vs Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi reported in (2021) Online SC 923 = Live Law SC 551; a three Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that preliminary inquiry cannot be asked as a matter of right and an FIR will not stand vitiated because a preliminary inquiry has not been conducted. 27. In the case of K. Veeraswami Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in 1991 (3) SCC 655 which was in the context of Section 5(1)(e) of the old Prevention of Corruption Act,1947 which is similar to Section 13(1)(e) of the P.C. Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the an accused public servant does not have a right to be afforded a chance to explain the alleged disproportionate assets to the Investigating Officer before filing of the charge-sheet, a similar right cannot be granted to the accused before the filing of an FIR by making a preliminary inquiry mandatory. 28. In the case of State of Telangana vs Managipet @ Mangipet Sarveshwar reported in (2019) 19 SCC 87 ; the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that there would be no need of preliminary inquiry unless it is necessary to make out the primafacie case of the commission of cognizable offence. It was also pointed out that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has not held that a preliminary enquiry is a must in all cases. The scope and ambit of a preliminary enquiry being necessary before lodging an FIR depend upon the facts of each case. It was also pointed out that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has not held that a preliminary enquiry is a must in all cases. The scope and ambit of a preliminary enquiry being necessary before lodging an FIR depend upon the facts of each case. There is no set format or manner in which the preliminary enquiry is to be conducted. 29. Notwithstanding the aforementioned judgments the importance of conducting a preliminary enquiry in an appropriate case cannot be under-valued. In the case of Charan Singh Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2021) 5 SCC 469 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in para 15.1 that an enquiry at pre-FIR stage is permissible and not only permissible but desirable, more particularly in cases where the allegations are of misconduct of corrupt practice acquiring the assets/properties disproportionate to his known source of income. After the enquiry at pre-registration of FIR stage/preliminary enquiry, if on the basis of the materials collected during such enquiry, it is found that the complaint is fictitious and/or there is no substance at all in the complaint, the FIR shall not be lodged. However, if the materials discloses prima-facie a commission of offence alleged, the FIR will be lodged and the criminal proceedings will be put in motion and further investigation will be carried out in terms of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 30. Keeping in view the above judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court when the facts and circumstances of the present case are looked into, this Court finds that in this case there was no written complaint and at the stage of lodging of F.I.R. it would have been a prudent approach on the part of the ‘SVU’ to conduct a preliminary inquiry in a time bound manner. This view of the Court further gathers strength from the fact that even after expiry of more than 5½ years by now the ‘SVU’ has not completed it’s investigation. Nowhere it is the stand of the respondent that in course of investigation so far the allegations have been found true. 31. To this Court, thus, it appears that the SVU was in a hurry. Nowhere it is the stand of the respondent that in course of investigation so far the allegations have been found true. 31. To this Court, thus, it appears that the SVU was in a hurry. In these circumstances, the submission on behalf of the petitioner that he was being targeted by his rivals/opponents cannot be easily thrown out when this Court finds from the materials available on the record that after this Court passed an interim order dated 17.05.2017 directing no coercive action to be taken against the petitioner, the then Superintendent of Police, SVU wrote a letter to the department on 10th July, 2017 calling for an information as to whether the petitioner has been suspended or not and also if any departmental proceeding has been initiated against him or not. This Court finds no plausible reason as to why the then Superintendent of Police, SVU would call upon the department to furnish such information. The specific case of the petitioner is that during this period the I.O. of the case was regularly visiting to the department and he was threatening the senior officials of the department to suspend or initiate departmental proceeding against the petitioner. Even as this Court would not record any finding on this issue but a cumulative effect of the above mentioned facts and circumstances would prima-facie impress upon this Court that during the relevant period when the petitioner was waiting for his promotion in the Indian Forest Service and he was at no. 1 in the list, the F.I.R. was lodged in haste and efforts were made further to get initiated a departmental proceeding against him. At this stage, one interlocutory application being I.A. No. 1563/2017 was filed on behalf of the petitioner praying for staying further investigation. On 29.08.2017 this Court directed for listing of I.A. with the writ application for hearing. No interim order of stay on investigation was passed. 32. At this stage, one interlocutory application being I.A. No. 1563/2017 was filed on behalf of the petitioner praying for staying further investigation. On 29.08.2017 this Court directed for listing of I.A. with the writ application for hearing. No interim order of stay on investigation was passed. 32. Be that as it may, this Court is of the considered opinion that only on the ground that a preliminary inquiry was not conducted it would not be lawful, prudent and safe to quash the F.I.R. The submission of learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the FIR was lodged in haste without conducting a preliminary inquiry is to be kept in mind while dealing with his further submissions that in the present case the investigation has been kept pending for more than 5 ½ years without there being any justifiable ground and that no reason at all has been shown to this Court for the delay in completion of investigation. Case laws on the speedy investigation and trial 33. In the case of Hussainara Khatoon & Ors Vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar reported in (1980) 1 SCC 81 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed thus: “We think that even under our Constitution, though speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right, it is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court in Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India reported in (1978) 1 SCC 248 . In the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak reported in (1992) 1 SCC 225 the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court while taking note of the judgment in Hussainara Khatoon (I) noticed as follows:— “The learned Judge, however, posed a question which he left to be answered at a later stage. The question posed was: What is the consequence of denial of this right? Does it necessarily entail the consequence of quashing of charges/trial? That question we shall consider separately but what is of significance is, this decision does establish the following propositions: (1) Right to speedy trial is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21. (2) That unless the procedure prescribed by law ensures a speedy trial it cannot be said to be reasonable, fair or just. That question we shall consider separately but what is of significance is, this decision does establish the following propositions: (1) Right to speedy trial is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21. (2) That unless the procedure prescribed by law ensures a speedy trial it cannot be said to be reasonable, fair or just. Expeditious trial and freedom from detention are part of human rights and basic freedoms and that a judicial system which allow incarceration of men and women for long periods of time without trial must be held to be denying human rights to such undertrials.” 34. In the case of Bishwanath Prasad Singh Vs. State of Bihar reported in 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 97 the Hon’ble Supreme Court noticed that the petitioner in the said case was suspended on 02.07.1977 on the allegation of corruption, he was dismissed from service, his provident fund and gratuity were forfeited. He had crossed the age of superannuation. In the said case investigation remained pending for more than five years but charge-sheet had been filed on 09.02.1983. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed “Maybe, this being a case of misappropriation of public funds, the investigation may have taken a longer time but it cannot certainly take more than five years, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.” The Apex Court, therefore, allowed the Special Leave Petition taking a view that at this stage calling upon the appellant to enter into defence is bound to cause prejudice to him. 35. In the case of Vakil Prasad Singh [ (2009) 3 SCC 355 ] which went to the Hon’ble Supreme Court from the decision of this Court, the Hon’ble Apex Court held in paragraph 19, 20 and 24 as under:— “19.The exposition of Article 21 in Hussainara Khatoon (1) case, (1980) 1 SCC 81 was exhaustively considered afresh by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 . Referring to a number of decisions of this Court and the American precedents on the Sixth Amendment of their Constitution, making the right to a speedy and public trial a constitutional guarantee, the Court formulated as many as eleven propositions with a note of caution that these were not exhaustive and were meant only to serve as guidelines.” “20. Referring to a number of decisions of this Court and the American precedents on the Sixth Amendment of their Constitution, making the right to a speedy and public trial a constitutional guarantee, the Court formulated as many as eleven propositions with a note of caution that these were not exhaustive and were meant only to serve as guidelines.” “20. For the sake of brevity, we do not propose to reproduce all the said propositions and it would suffice to note the gist thereof. These are: (A.R. Antulay case (supra), SCC pp. 270-73, para 86) (i) fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily; (ii) right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial; (iii) in every case, where the speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is — who is responsible for the delay?; (iv) while determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of right to speedy trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on— what is called, the systemic delays; (v) each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of the accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case; (vi) ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh several relevant factors—‘balancing test’ or ‘balancing process’—and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied; (vii) ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to a conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open and having regard to the nature of offence and other circumstances when the court feels that quashing of proceedings cannot be in the interest of justice, it is open to the court to make appropriate orders, including fixing the period for completion of trial; (viii) it is neither advisable nor feasible to prescribe any outer time-limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint; (ix) an objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in the High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis.” “24. It is, therefore, well settled that the right to speedy trial in all criminal persecutions (sic prosecutions) is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution. This right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in court but also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well. The right to speedy trial extends equally to all criminal prosecutions and is not confined to any particular category of cases. In every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the court has to perform the balancing act upon taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances, enumerated above, and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case.” (underline is mine) 36. In the case of Vakil Prasad Singh (supra) the allegation was that of demanding of a sum of Rs. 1000/- as illegal gratification for release of the civil work executed by him and in the trap laid to catch the culprit chemically treated currency notes were recovered from the appellant’s pocket. The FIR was lodged on or about 08.04.1981 and the charge-sheet was filed on 28.02.1982 whereupon the learned Magistrate took cognizance on 09.12.1982, but thereafter nothing substantial happened till 06.07.1987. The FIR was lodged on or about 08.04.1981 and the charge-sheet was filed on 28.02.1982 whereupon the learned Magistrate took cognizance on 09.12.1982, but thereafter nothing substantial happened till 06.07.1987. This Court vide it’s order dated 07.12.1990 quashed the order taking cognizance with a direction to the prosecution to conclude the investigation within a period of three months but thereafter no progress was made in the case till the year 1998. Under these circumstances the appellant moved this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of the entire criminal proceeding against him on the ground that the re-investigation in the matter had not been initiated even after a lapse of seven-and-half years. The High Court dismissed the petition while acknowledging that there had been a substantial delay in conclusion of proceedings against the appellant and some prejudice may have been caused to the appellant. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, however quashed the entire criminal proceedings on the ground of delay. 37. In the case of Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta and Another Vs. B. Srinivas reported in (2008) 8 SCC 580 the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in paragraph ‘10’ as under:— “10. There is no general and wide proposition of law formulated that whenever there is delay on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation, such a delay can be a ground for quashing the FIR. It would be difficult to formulate inflexible guidelines or rigid principles in determining as to whether the accused has been deprived of fair trial on account of delay or protracted investigation; it would depend on various factors including whether such a delay was reasonably long or caused deliberately or intentionally to hamper the defence of the accused or whether the delay was inevitable in the nature of things or whether it was due to dilatory tactics adopted by the accused. It would depend upon certain peculiar facts and circumstances of each case i.e. the volume of evidence collected by the investigating agency, the nature and gravity of the offence for which the accused has been charge-sheeted in a given case. The nexus between whole and some of the above factors is of considerable relevance. Therefore, whether the accused has been deprived of fair trial on account of protracted investigation has to come on facts. He has also to establish that he had no role in the delay. The nexus between whole and some of the above factors is of considerable relevance. Therefore, whether the accused has been deprived of fair trial on account of protracted investigation has to come on facts. He has also to establish that he had no role in the delay. Every delay does not necessarily occur because of the accused.” 38. In the present case, there was no interim order of stay on the investigation, the respondents have not come out with any pleading that the delay in completion of investigation has resulted due to any plausible reason or that the petitioner being an accused has played dilatory tactics. There is no such case of the respondents, thus a presumptive proof of prejudice to the petitioner is very much available in this case. Applying the balancing test, in this case, the Court would come to a conclusion that the unexplained inordinate delay of over 5½ years in completion of investigation has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner and at this stage when he has retired from service and there is no near end of the investigation/inquiry and trial, it is nothing but an infringement of the in alienable right of the petitioner under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 39. In addition to the above, this Court has perused the charges leveled against the petitioner in the departmental proceeding. 39. In addition to the above, this Court has perused the charges leveled against the petitioner in the departmental proceeding. For a ready reference the charges as per Prapatra ‘Ka’ are being reproduced hereunder:— ^^vkjksi izi= ^^d** 1 - uke Jh voèks'k dqekj vks>k] fcñlsñ 2 - inuke ou izeaMy inkfèkdkjh 3 - LFkkiuk 'kksèk izf'k{k.k ,oa tu lEidZ izeaMy] iVuk 4 - osrueku 15600 & 39100 xzsM osru 7600 @& 5 - tUe frfFk 22 - 12 - 1961 6 - lsokfuo`fr dh frfFk 31 - 12 - 2021 Øñ vkjksi dk en vkjksi dk fooj.kh lk{; 1- fcgkj ljdkjh lsod vkpkj   fu;ekoyh] 976 ds fu;e 3 dk mYya?ku Jh voèks'k dqekj vks>k] fcñoñlsñ]  ou  izeaMy inkfèkdkjh] 'kksèk izf'k{k.k ,oa tu lEidZ izeaMy] iVuk ds in ij vki fnukad 01-06-2016  ls inLFkkfir gSA fcgkj ou lsok ds in ij vkids } kjk fnukad 02 - 04 - 1990 dks izFke ;ksxnku fd;k x;k FkkA Hkz"Vkpkj fujksèkd vfèkfu;e] 1988 ds rgr èkkjk 13(2) lg ifgr 13 (1)(e) vUrxZr fo'ks"k fuxjkuh bdkbZ Fkkuk dkaM lañ& 01 @ 17 fnukad 23 - 03 - 17 ntZ fd;k x;k gS] ftlesa vkids fo:) izR;kuqikfrd èkuktZu dk vkjksi gSA ntZ izkFkfedh ds vuqlkj vc rd ds lsok dky esa izFke n`"V;k  vkids ,oa vkidh iRuh }kjk  fofHkUu lzksrks ls  vftZr vk;  :i;k 1 ] 23 ] 30 ] 300 @& ds foijhr  :i;k 66 ] 70 ] 137 @& dk O;; ds i'pkr~  dqy 54 ] 37 ] 137 @& ds cpr rFkk vkidh lEifr ds :i esa :i;s 1 ] 11 ] 28 ] 298 @& dk vkdyu fd;k x;k gSa vr,o ljdkjh lsod ds fy, Kkr lzksrks ls vk; ,oa cpr ds fo:) dqy 56 ] 91 ] 161 @&  :i;s dk izR;kuqikfrd èkukZtu vkids }kjk fd;k x;k gS] tks fcgkj ljdkjh lsod vkpkj fu;ekoyh] 1976 ds fu;e& 3 dk Li"V mYya?ku gSA fo'ks"k fuxjkuh bdkbZ] fo’ks"k fuxjkuh bdkbZ] 350 @ 01 @ 20 17/SVU/ Patna, fnukad 23 - 03 - 2017 dh Nk;kizfr ¼lkuwyXud½ 2 vkns'kksa dk mYya?ku iqfyl egkfujh{kd] fo'ks"k fuxjkuh bdkbZ] fcgkj] iVuk  dk  i=kad 350 @ 01 @ 2017 @ SVU/Patna fnukad 23 - 03 - 2017 dk Nk;kizfr layXu djrs gq, foHkkxh; i=kad 1602 ] fnukad 09 - 05 - 2017 }kjk vkils izR;kuqikfrd èkukZtu ds lacaèk esa ianzg (15) Nk;kizfr fnuksa ds vUnj fLFkfr Li"V djus dk funs'k fn;k x;kA iqu% foHkkxh; i=kad 2076 ] fnukad 22 - 06 - 2017 }kjk okafNr Li"Vhdj.k vfoyEc lefiZr djus gsrq vkidks Lekfjr fd;k x;kA vkids foHkkxh; funs'kks  dk mYya?ku djrs gq, vkius i=kad 402 ] fnukad 11 - 07 - 2017 ds ekè;e ls ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky;]  iVuk }kjk C.W.J.C No. - 747/2017 Awadhesh  Kumar Ojha Vs. The State of Bihar Through  The Director General, Vigilance Investigation Bureau, Department of Vigilance,  Govt. of  Bihar, Patna & Ors. esa ikfjr fnukad 17 - 05 - 2017 dks vkns'k dh Nk;kizfr layXu djrs gq, ;g dgk gS fd ntZ izkFkfedh fofèk lEer ugha gS rFkk vkius izR;kuqikfrd èkukZtu ugha fd;k  gS]  fdUrq Kkr L=ksrks ls vk; ls vfèkd èkukZtu ds lacaèk esa fo'ks"k fuxjkuh bdkbZ ds izfrosnu ds fo:) u rks dksbZ lk{;  fn;k x;k gS vkSj u gh dksbZ Li"Vhdj.kA vkidk ;g vkpj.k Li"V :i ls foHkkxh; vkns'k dk mYya?ku gSA i=kad 1602 ] fnukad 09 - 05 - 2017 ,oa i=kad 2076 ] fnukad 22 - 06 - 2017 dh Nk;kizfr 3 fcgkj ljdkjh lsod vkpkj  fu;ekoyh] 1976 dk fu;e 19 dk mYya?ku fcgkj ljdkjh lsod vkpkj fu;ekoyh] 1976 ds fu;e 19 ds rgr~ izR;sd o"kZ ljdkjh lsod }kjk viuh lEifr ,oa nkf;Roksa dk ?kks"k.kk fd;k tkuk gSa o"kZ 2016 & 17 ds fy, lefiZr lEifr ,oa nkf;Ro ? kks"k.kk  i= esa vkids }kjk mu lEifr;ksa dh ?kks"k.kk ugha dh x;h gS tks fo'ks"k fuxjuh bdkbZ }kjk ik;h x;h lEifr@nkf;Roksa esa vafdr gSa vkidk ;g ÑR; Li"Vr% fcgkj ljdkjh lsod  vkpkj fu;ekoyh] 1976 ds fu;e 19 dk mYya?ku gSA o"kZ 2016 & 17 dk lEifr fooj.kh dh Nk;kizfrA 2 - fo'ks"k fuxjkuh bdkbZ] fcgkj] iVuk dk i=kad 350 @ 01 @ 2017@ SVU/Patna f nukad 23 - 03 - 2017 dh Nk;kizfr ¼lkuqyXud½ gñ@& 09 - 08 - 17 ¼jRus'k >k½ ljdkj ds la;qDr lfpoA** 40. The first charge against the petitioner is a reiteration of the allegations made against him in the F.I.R. Allegations and the alleged amount of disproportionate assets are identically the same and one. It has been sought to be proved on the basis of letter no. 350/01/2017/SVU/Patna dated 23.03.2017. The charge no. 2 is a peculiar kind of charge. It says that when the petitioner was called upon to submit his explanation vide departmental letter no. 1602 dated 09.05.2017 enclosing therewith a copy of letter no. 350/01/2017/SVU/Patna dated 23.03.2017 he violated the department’s direction and vide his letter no. 402 dated 11.07.2017 together with the order dated 17.05.2017 passed by the Hon’ble High Court in Cr.WJC No. 747/2017 took a plea that the FIR has not been lodged in accordance with law. 1602 dated 09.05.2017 enclosing therewith a copy of letter no. 350/01/2017/SVU/Patna dated 23.03.2017 he violated the department’s direction and vide his letter no. 402 dated 11.07.2017 together with the order dated 17.05.2017 passed by the Hon’ble High Court in Cr.WJC No. 747/2017 took a plea that the FIR has not been lodged in accordance with law. The third charge against the petitioner was that he had not declared those assets and liabilities which are mentioned in the letter of the SVU in his declaration of assets and liabilities in the year 2016-17. 41. The charges leveled against the petitioner were enquired into in departmental proceeding no. 43/2017. The list of documents on which the department relied upon to prove the charges are the letters of the SVU, Bihar, Patna. 41. The charges leveled against the petitioner were enquired into in departmental proceeding no. 43/2017. The list of documents on which the department relied upon to prove the charges are the letters of the SVU, Bihar, Patna. The Inquiry Officer concluded in paragraph ‘8’ as under:— ^^8- fo'ys"k.k-µJh voèks'k dqekj vks>k ds Åij yxk;s x;s vkjksi rFkk blds leFkZu esa fn;s x;s lk{; Jh vks>k ds }kjk fn;k x;k foLr`r cpko c;ku ,oa vuqyXud] foHkkx ds }kjk fn;k x;k foHkkxh; earO; ,oa Jh vks>k }kjk fn;s x;s izfrRrj rFkk dh x;h lquokbZ ds vkèkkj ij fuEukafdr fcUnq Li"V gksrs gS%& (i) bl ekeys esa foHkkx }kjk fo'ks"k fuxjkuh bdkbZ }kjk ntZ izkFkfedh ,oa mlds lkFk layXu izfrosnu dks gh foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh dk vkèkkj cuk;k x;k gSA lquokbZ ds nkSjku foHkkx ls ;g Li"V :i ls i`PNk dh x;h Fkh fd os vxj dksbZ xokgh djuk pkgrs gS rks bl lacaèk esa xokg dh lwph nsa rFkk mudh xokgh djk;sa] ijUrq foHkkx }kjk fyf[kr :i esa lwfpr fd;k x;k fd mUgsa bl ekeys esa fdlh xokg dks mifLFkr ugh djkuk gS ,oa bls fnukad & 07-05-2018 dks vkns'k Qyd esa ntZ fd;k x;k gSA (ii) bl ekeys esa foHkkx ds }kjk lk{; ds :i esa dsoy izkFkfedh dh izfr nh x;h gS] ftlesa Jh vks>k dh vk; ,oa O;; fooj.kh rFkk ifjlEifr fooj.kh n'kkZrs gq, blds vkèkkj ij izR;kuqikfrd èkuksiktZu dk ekeyk ekuk x;k gSaA blds vykok dsoy Jh vks>k }kjk nk;j o"kZ 2016&17 ds lEifr fooj.kh dh Nk;k izfr nkf[ky dh x;h gSa fo'ks"k fuxjkuh bdkbZ }kjk fdl vkèkkj ij muds vk; ,oa O;; dk vkadyu fd;k x;k gS bl lacaèk esa dksbZ foLr`r C;kSjk u rks izkFkfedh ds lkFk layXu vuqyXud esa ntZ gS ,oa u gh foHkkx ds }kjk blds ckn fn;k x;k gSA (iii) Jh vks>k us vius cpko c;ku esa vius vk; vkSj O;; dh foLr`r fooj.kh nh gS rFkk lHkh ds leFkZu esa mUgksus izklafxd dkxtkr ;Fkk cSad LVsVesaV dh Nk;k izfr] vk;dj fjVuZ dh Nk;k izfr ,oa 'kiFk i=] vapykfèkdkjh }kjk fuxZr Hkwfe ,oa vk; fooj.kh bR;kfn layXu fd;s gS] ftlds lacaèk esa foHkkx us dksbZ izfrdwy eUrO; ugha fn;k gS ,oa ek= ;g dgk gS fd blesa ls dqN dkxtkr izkFkfedh ntZ gksus dh frfFk ds ckn ds gSaA dkxtkrksa ds lacaèk esa ;g Li"V ugha fd;k x;k gS fd dkSu ls dkxtkr izkFkfedh ds frfFk ds ckn ds gS] ijUrq ,slk izrhr gksrk gS fd mUgksaus 'kiFk i= ds lacaèk esa bafxr fd;k gSA (iv) Jh vks>k }kjk lk{; lfgr fn;s x;s dkxtkr ds vkèkkj ij mudh dqy vk; 1]16]76]791@&¼,d djksM+ lksyg yk[k fNgrj gtkj lkr lkS bdkuosa½ :i;s] mudh iRuh dh vk; 69]49]313@& ¼mugrj yk[k mupkl gtkj rhu lkS rsjg½ :i;s ,oa muds firk dh la;qDr lEifr ls mUgsa izkIr vk; 76]44]013@& ¼fNgrj yk[k pkSokyhl gtkj rsjg½ :i;s bl izdkj dqy 2]62]72]117@& ¼nks djksM+ cklB yk[k cgrj gtkj ,d lkS lrjg½ :i;s gksrh gS] ftlds fo:) muds }kjk dqy O;; 91]78]824@& ¼bdkuos yk[k vBrj gtkj vkB lkS pkSchl½ :i;s ,oa dqy ifjlEifr yxHkx 50-00 yk[k :i;s gksrh gSA bl izdkj dqy feykdj 1]40]00]000@&¼,d djksM+ pkyhl yk[k½ :i;s O;; ,oa ifjlEifr gksrh gSA bl izdkj blesa vk; ls vfèkd lEifr dk ekeyk ugha curk gSA (v) vxj izkFkfedh esa ntZ [kpZ ,oa ifjlEifr dks Hkh ekuk tk; rks izkFkfedh ds vuqlkj dqy O;; 66]70]137@& ¼fN;klB yk[k lrj gtkj ,d lkS rsjg½ :i;s ,oa dqy ifjlEifr;k¡ 1]11]28]298 @& ¼,d djksM+ X;kjg yk[k nks lkS vUBkuosa½ :i;s gksrh gSa bl izdkj dqy feykdj O;; ,oa ifjlEifr;k¡ yxHkx 1-78 djksM+ :i;s dh gksrh gS] blds fo:) tks vk; vkjksfir inkfèkdkjh Jh voèks'k dqekj vks>k ds }kjk fn[kk;h x;h gS] mlds vuqlkj muds la;qDr vk; yXkHkx 2-62 djksM+ dh gksrh gSA bl izdkj bl vuqlkj Hkh vk; ls vfèkd lEifr dk ekeyk ugha curk gSaA (vi) bl izdkj mijksDr fOk'ys"k.k ds vkèkkj ij rFkk cpko C;ku esa fn;s x;s foLr`r fooj.kh ,oa en~okj C;kSjk ftldks foLrkj ls Åij mYys[k fd;k x;k gS] ds vkèkkj ij bl ekeys esa vk; ls vfèkd lEifr dk ekeyk izekf.kr ugh gksrk gSA (vii) vkjksi la[;k&2 Hkh izekf.kr ugha gksrk gS] D;ksafd foHkkx ds }kjk fn;s x;s dkxtkr ds vuqlkj gh Jh vks>k }kjk foHkkx ds i= dk tokc ekg tqykbZ] 2017 esa gh fn;k x;k FkkA lkFk gh Jh vks>k us Li"V fd;k gS dh foHkkx }kjk tc mUgsa izi=&^d* dh izfr nh x;h rc Hkh mUgksaus fuèkkZfjr le;&lhek ds vUnj foHkkx dks mldk tokc lefiZr fd;kA bl izdkj vkjksi la[;k&2 Hkh izekf.kr ugh gksrk gSA (viii) vkjksi la[;k&3 esa vkjksi dh fooj.kh esa ;g Li"V ugha fd;k x;k gS fd fdu ifjlEifr;ksa dks Jh vks>k }kjk mYys[k ugha fd;k x;k gS] ijUrq Jh vks>k }kjk nh x;h rqyukRed fooj.kh ls ;g Li"V gS fd mUgksaus lHkh ifjlEifr;ksa dk mYys[k foHkkx esa nkf[ky okf"kZd lEifÙk fooj.kh esa fd;k gSA bl izdkj ;g vkjksi Hkh muds Åij izekf.kr ugha gksrk gSaA 9- vafre fu"d"kZ-µbl izdkj Åij fn;s x;s foLr`r cpko c;ku] foHkkxh; eUrO; ij fd;s x;s fo'ys"k.k ,oa vkjksfir inkfèkdkjh }kjk fn;s x;s dkxtkr ds vkèkkj ij vkjksfir inkfèkdkjh ds Åij vkjksi la[;k&1 ls 3 izekf.kr ugha gksrk gSA** 42. After the aforementioned enquiry report was submitted, another enquiry was ordered to be conducted on charge no. 2 & 3 vide letter no. 3202 dated 11.09.2019 through the Chief Enquiry Commissioner. After the aforementioned enquiry report was submitted, another enquiry was ordered to be conducted on charge no. 2 & 3 vide letter no. 3202 dated 11.09.2019 through the Chief Enquiry Commissioner. The Chief Enquiry Commissioner conducted the enquiry and concluded as under:— ^^12- fo'ys"k.k ,oa tkap ifj.kke %& 12-1 vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh Jh vo/ks'k dqekj vks>k] ou izeaMy inkf/kdkjh] 'kks/k] izf'k{k.k ,oa tu lEidZ izeaM+y] iVuk ds fo:) fo'ks"k fuxjkuh bdkbZ }kjk nk;j izkFkfedh Fkkuk dkM+ la[;k&01@2017] fnukad 23-03-2017 ds vkyksd es i;kZoj.k ,oa ou foHkkx ds ladYi Kkikad&fc-o-ls-¼vk-½&01@2017&3365@i-o- fnukad 17-10-2017 ds }kjk fcgkj ljdkjh lsod ¼oxhZdj.k dk;Zokgh izkjEHk fd;k x;k FkkA bl foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh dk lapkyu vij foHkkxh; tkWp vk;qDr us iw.kZ dj vius i=kad 1761] fnukad 29-08-2018 ds }kjk izfrosnu lefiZr fd;k] ftlesa vij foHkkxh; tkWp vk;qDr }kjk lHkh vkjksiks¼rhu vkjksiks½ dks izekf.kr ugha ik;k FkkA rRi'pkr iz'kklh foHkkx us bl izfrosnu dh leh{kk dj i=kad 3202] fnukad 11-09-2019 }kjk vkjksi la[;k&¼1½ ds laca/k esa lefIkZr izfrosnu dks Lohdkj djrs gq, la'kksf/kr vkjksi la[;k&¼2½ vkSj la'kksf/kr vkjksi la[;k&¼3½ ds lca/k esa vxzrj tkWp djus dk fu.kZ; fy;k x;kA vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh us viuk cpko c;ku fnukad 09-01-2020 dks lefiZr fd;k Fkk] ftl ij iz'kklh foHkkx viuk earO; ia=kd 640] fnukad 19-02-2020 ds }kjk lefiZr fd;kA vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh us i=kad 'kwU;] fnukad 09-03-2020 dks foHkkxh; earO; ij viuk izR;qrj lefiZr fd;kA lfpo] LokLF; foHkkx≶&tkWp vk;qDr us lquokbZ iwjh dj vkjksi la[;k ¼2½ ds laca/k es viuk izfrosnu fnukad 04-12-2020 dks lefiZr dj fn;k Fkk rFkk vkjksi la[;k &¼3½ ds lanHkZ esa vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh }kjk iz'kklh foHkkx es lefiZr okf"kZd lEifŸk fooj.kh ls cpko c;ku ds lkFk vuqyXud ds :i esa lEifŸk fooj.kh dk feyku djus gsrq izLrqrhdj.k inkf/kdkjh dks funsZ'k fn;k FkkA blh chp vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh ,oa izLrqrhdj.k inkf/kdkjh dk fnukad 09-04-2021 dks vkjksi la[;k&¼2½ ,oa vkjksi la[;k & ¼3½ ds lac/ka es foLr`r :i ls lquk x;kA vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh us vius cpko c;ku es ;g Hkh ftØ fd;k gS fd vxzrj tkWp gsrq l{ke izkf/kdkj dk vuqeksnu izkIr ugha fd;k x;kA bl fcanq ij iz'kklh foHkkx Lo;a leh{kk dj ldrk gSA 12-2 vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh ds fo:) vkjksi la[;k &¼2½ foHkkxh; vkns'k ds mYya?ku ls lacf/kr gSA ftlesa ;g fy[kk x;k gS fd iz'kklh foHkkx ds }kjk ekWxsa x;s Li”Vhdj.k ds vkyksd es vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh us vius dk;kZy; i=kad 402] fnukad 11-07-2017 ds }kjk izR;kuqikfrd /kukZtu ls lcaf/kr vkjksi ls badkj djrs gq, ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; }kjk lh-MCY;w-ts-lh- la[;k&747@2017 es fnukad 17-05-2017 dks ikfjr vkns'k dh izfr yxk dj vkjksi ds fcUnq ij dksbZ rF;kRed lk{k; lfgr viuk i{k ugh j[kkA ijarq bUgh vkjksiksa ds laca/k esa vij foHkkxh; tkWp vk;qDr ds le{k foLr`r tokc lefiZr fd;k gSA bl izdkj vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh }kjk foHkkx ds le{k i{k ugh j[kk x;k] tks fd foHkkxh; vkns'k dks mYya?ku gSA bl vkjksi ds laca/k esa vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh dk dguk gS fd lh-MCY;w-ts-lh- la[;k 747@2017 esa fnukad 17-05-2017 dks ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr vkns'k esa ;g Li"V :i ls fy[kk gqvk gS fd fo'ks"k fuxjkuh bdkbZ dks dksbZ Hkh coercive step ysus ls euk fd;k x;k Fkk vkSj pwWfd fo'ks"k fuxjkuh bdkbZ }kjk muds fo:) ntZ fd;k x;k eqdnek xyr] fof/k&fo:) ,oa vKkr lkslZ ds c;ku ij vk/kkfjr gS] blh vkyksd esa esjs }kjk flQZ U;k;ky; ds vkns'k ls foHkkx dks voxr djkrs gq, izR;kuqikfr /kukZtu ds vkjksi ls badkj fd;k x;k gSA eSus ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds bl vkns'k ds vkyksd esa bl ekeys ds vafre fu"iknu rd fo'ks"k fuxjkuh bdkbZ }kjk nk;j eqdnek ds vkyksd esa fdlh Hkh izdkj ds dkjZokbZ izkjEHk djus ds i'pkr esjs }kjk foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh es iw.kZ lg;ksx djrs gq, lle; cpko c;ku ,oa lHkh lEifŸk dk fooj.k lle; lefiZr fd;k x;k FkkA vij foHkkxh; tkWp vk;qDr }kjk vius izfrosnu ¼i=kad 1761] fnukad 29-08-2018½ es foLr`r leh{kk dj bl vkjksi dks izekf.kr ugha ik;k FkkA iqu% lfpo] LokLF; foHkkx≶&tkWp vk;qDr ds }kjk bl vkjksi dh tkap dh x;h Fkh vkSj mUgksuss vius fnukad 04-12-2020 dks ikfjr vkns'k es Hkh ;g Li"V fd;k gS fd vkjksi la[;k ¼2½ izekf.kr ugha ekuk tk ldrk gSA mi;qZDr rF;ksa ,oa fo'ys"k.k ds vk/kkj vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh ds fo:) vkjksi la[;k¼2½ izekf.kr ugha ik;k tkrk gSAa 12-3 vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh ds fo:) vkjksi la[;k &¼3½ izR;kuqikfrd /kukZtu ls lacf/kr vkjksi gS] ftlesa bl rF; dk ftØ gS fd vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh ,oa mudh iRuh ds uke ls n'kkZ;h x;h uxn ,oa vU; fuos'k dk ;ksx :i;k lefiZr izfrosnu vuqlkj muds ,oa mudh iRuh ds uke ls dqy 23]88]449@& ek= n'kkZ;k x;k gS vFkkZr~ yxHkx 12 yk[k :i;s dk vUrj gSA vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh us bl 12 yk[k :i;s ds vUrj ds lac/ka esa vius cpko c;ku esa foLr`r :i ls ppkZ djrs gq, ;g lefiZr fd;k gS fd lkof/k tek ls lacaf/kr esjs ,oa esjh iRuh ds la;qDr [kkrk la[;k&31841888124 ,oa 31841890223 esa 720896@& :i;s gksus dk mYys[k ntZ izkFkfedh esa gSA esjs cpko c;ku ds vuqyXu ds lkFk layXu lacaf/kr lkof/k tek ds cSad LVsVesV ds vuqlkj mDr lkof/k tek ds cSad LVsVesaV ds vuqlkj mDr lkof/k tek fnukad 27-02-2017 dks can dj nh xbZA esjs }kjk o"kZ 2015&16 dh lEifŸk fooj.kh dh izfr Hkh vius cpko c;ku ds lkFk layXu fd;k x;k gS ftlesa mDr lkof/k tek esa fuos'k dh lwpuk ljdkj dks nh x;h gSA bl izdkj 12 yk[k :i;s ds varj esa ls 7]20]896@& :i;s dk feyku lEifŸk fooj.kh ls gks tkrk gSA izkFkfedh ds vuqlkj cSad [kkrk la[;k&10027615262 esa tek jkf'k 588557 :i;k fn[kyk;k x;k gSA esjs }kjk lefiZr cpko c;ku esa mDr [kkrk dk cSad LVsVesaV layXu fd;k x;k gS ftlls Li"V gksrk gS fd mDr jkf'k 16-01-2017 dh gSA esjs }kjk fnukad 28-02-2017 dks 328262-00 :i;k dk psd fuxZr fd;k x;k Fkk ftldh fudklh fnukad 01-03-2017 ls 07-03-2017 dh vof/k es gqbZA pwWfd ;s lHkh psd lEifr fooj.kh tek djus dh frfFk ds iwoZ fuxZr fd;k x;k Fkk] blfy, lEifr fooj.kh es eSusa bsDfVo cSysal vafdr fd;kA esjs }kjk lefiZr 2016&17 dh lEifŸk fooj.kh es ,y-vkbZ-lh- esa mDr vof/k esa tek fd;s x;s jkf'k dk C;kSjk fn;k x;k gS ftlds vuqlkj esjs vkSj esjh iRuh ds ,y-vkbZ-lh- izhfe;e ds fy, ek= 44782-00 :i;s dk gh fuos'k o"kZ 2016&17 esa fd;k x;k gS ftldh lEiq"Vh cSad LVsVesaV] bude VSDl ds fjVZu ls gksrh gSA bude VSDl fjVZu dh Áfr layXu dh x;h gSA ;g Hkh dguk gS fd ÁkFkfedh esa ntZ 731770-00 :i;s dh jkf'k ls lacaf/kr ikWfylh la[;k vafdr ugha gSA esjs }kjk o"kZ 2010 ls 2016&17 rd o"kZokj lEifRr fooj.kh lefiZr dh xbZ ftlesa ,yŒvkbZŒlhŒ esa ml o"kZ esa fuosf'kr jkf'k crykbZ xbZ gS] ftls foHkkx ds }kjk Lohdkj Hkh fd;k x;k gSA ÁkFkfedh esjs iwjs lsokdky vÁSy 1990 ls ÁkFkfedh ntZ djus dh frfFk 23-03-2017 rd esjs }kjk vftZr laifRr] fuos'k ,oa O;; ds vk/kkj ij ntZ dh x;h gS u dh o"kZ 2016&17 ds fy, fd;s x;s fuos'k ds vk/kkj ijA ;g vyx ckr gS fd ÁkFkfedh ntZ djus ds iwoZ Jksr }kjk eqgS;k djk;h x;h >wBh tkudkjh dh lR;rk dh tkap fo'ks"k fuxjkuh bdkbZ }kjk ugha dh x;hA Li"V gS fd o"kZ 2016&17 esa esjs }kjk ,yŒvkbZŒlhŒ esa ek= 44782-00 :i;s dk fuos'k fd;k x;k gS rFkk lEifRr fooj.kh esa mDr jkf'k gh fn[kykbZ xbZ gSA vxzsRrj tkap esa ntZ ÁkFkfedh ds vk/kkj ij thou chek esa esjs iwjs lsokdky ¼23-03-2017 rd½ dqy tek 731770-00 :i;s dks lfEefyr dj fu"d"kZ fudkyk x;k gS tks lgh ugha gSA oLrqfLFkfr ;g gS fd ÁkFkfedh esa thou chek ikWfyfl;ksa ds fy;s dfFkr :i ls fuosf'kr 731770-00 :i;s dh jkf'k o"kZ 1990 ls ÁkFkfedh ntZ djus dh frfFk 23-03-2017 rd ds fy;s gS u fd o"kZ 2016&17 ds fuos'k dks n'kkZ;k x;k gSA foHkkx us bls 2016&17 dk fuos'k ekurs gq;s vkjksi xfBr dj fn;k gS tks fcYdqy Hkzked gS ,oa xyr gSA vr,o bl en esa o"kZ 2016&17 esa 686988-00 :i;s dk vfrfjDr fuos'k dh ckr >wBh gSA lPpkbZ ;g gS fd o"kZ 2007 esa fcjyk luykbZQ dk ikWfylh fy;k x;k Fkk ftlesa dqy 75000-00 :i;s dk fuos'k o"kZ 2009&10 rd fd;k x;k gS o"kZ 2010&11 dh lEifRr fooj.kh esa bls ljdkj dks fn[kyk;k x;kA blh Ádkj o"kZ 2013 esa ,yŒvkbZŒlhŒ dk ,dy Áhfe;e ds 290467-00 :i;s dk fuos'k fd;k x;k ftls o"kZ 2014 dh lEifRr fooj.kh esa vafdr fd;k x;kA fcjyk luykbZQ ,oa thou chek fuxe dh ,dy ikWfylh dks 2016&17 esa lEifRr fooj.kh esa Hkh esjs }kjk vafdr dj fn;k x;k ftlds dkj.k laHkor;k ;g Hkze dh fLFkfr mRiUu gq;h gSA foHkkx us bl rF; dks laKku esa ugha fy;k ,oa 12 yk[k :i;s dk vUrj dk vkjksi ;kaf=d :i ls tksM+ fy;kA lPpkbZ ;g gS fd fnukad 23-03-2017 rd esjs }kjk thou chek dh fofHkUu ikWfyfl;ksa esa dqy 1378647@& :i;k dk fuos'k fd;k x;k gS tks o"kZ 1991 ls ÁkjEHk gksdj 23-03-2017 ¼ÁkFkfedh ntZ gksus dh frfFk½ rd dk tksM+ gSA bl Ádkj esjs }kjk nh x;h lEifRr fooj.kh ds vkyksd esa ,oa fo'ks"k fuxjkuh bdkbZ }kjk fn[kk;s tk jgs vUrj dh jkf'k dk iw.kZ:i ls Li"V dj fn;k x;k gS vkSj esjs fo:} vk; ls vf/kd lEifRr vftZr djus dk vkjksi Áekf.kr ugha gksrk gSA Á'kklh foHkkx us foHkkxh; earO; esa loZÁFke 12 yk[k :i;s ds vUrj dk ftØ fd;k FkkA tc vxzrj tkap dh dkjZokbZ ÁkjEHk dh x;h rc vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh }kjk lefiZr cpko c;ku ij foHkkx us iqu% earO; lefiZr fd;k] ftlesa ;g vafdr fd;k fd vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh ds fo:} ntZ ÁkFkfedh esa ,yŒvkbZŒlhŒ ,oa vU; chek ikWfyfl;ksa esa fuos'k dh jkf'k 7]31]770@& :i;s fn[kk;h x;h gS] tcfd vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh }kjk cpko c;ku ds lkFk lefiZr fooj.kh esa okf"kZd Áhfe;e ,oa flaxy Áhfe;e lfgr dqy jkf'k flQZ 4]09]042@& gksrk gS vFkkZr~ djhc 3-23 yk[k vUrj dh jkf'k jg tkrh gSA bl laca/k esa vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh us vius cpko c;ku esa Li"V :i ls ftØ fd;k gS fd esjs }kjk fofHkUu o"kksZ chek ikWfyfl;ksa esa tks Áhfe;e tek fd;k x;k gS mldk iw.kZ fooj.k esjs }kjk fofHkUu o"kksZ esa foHkkx esa nkf[ky lEifRr fooj.kh esa Hkh mYys[k gSA ijUrq fuxjkuh vUos"k.k C;wjks }kjk ntZ ÁkFkfedh esa ,d o"kZ esa fuosf'kr Áhfe;e dh jkf'k dk mYys[k u dj fofHkUu o"kksZ esa fuosf'kr Áhfe;e dh jkf'k dks tksM+dj mYys[k dj fn;k x;k gSA ftlds dkj.k vUrj dh jkf'k djhc 3-23 yk[k :i;s gksrk gSA vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh }kjk lefiZr bl rF; dk lR;kiu Á'kklh foHkkx ls djk;k x;k vkSj Á'kklh foHkkx us ftldh iqf"V vius i=kad 731] fnukad 03-03-2021 }kjk fd;k x;kA vkSj lquokbZ ds nkSjku Hkh ÁLrqrhdj.k inkf/kdkjh us Li"V :i ls lefiZr fd;k gS fd foHkkxh; earO; esa vafdr vUrj dh jkf'k djhc 3-23 yk[k :i;s dk vc lek/kku gks tkrk gSA ÁLrqrhdj.k inkf/kdkjh us ;g Li"V fd;k fd vc vk; ls vf/kd /ku vftZr djus ls lacafcr vkjksi inkf/kdkjh ds fo:} mfpr Árhr ugha gksrk gSA vr% mi;qZDr tkap] leh{kk ,oa fo'ys"k.k ds vkyksd esa vkjksi la[;k ¼3½ Áekf.kr ugha ik;k tkrk gSA 13- vafre fu"d"kZ%& Åij dh dafMdk&12 esa fd;s x;s tkap ,oa fo'ys"k.k ds vk/kkj ij vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh Jh vo/ks'k dqekj vks>k] ou ÁeaMy inkf/kdkjh] 'kks/k] Áf'k{k.k ,oa tu lEidZ ÁeaMy] iVuk ds fo:} yxs vkjksiksa dk vkjksiokj fu"d"kZ fuEu Ádkj ls gS%& ¼1½ vkjksi la[;k&¼2½ &&& Áekf.kr ugha gksrk gSA ¼2½ vkjksi la[;k&¼3½ &&& Áekf.kr ugha gksrk gSA ys[kkfir gŒ@& 18-06-2021 ¼lq/khj dqekj½ tkap vk;qDr gŒ@& 18-06-2021 ¼lq/khj dqekj½ tkap vk;qDrA** 43. The report of Chief Enquiry Commissioner was accepted and the petitioner has been exonerated from all the three charges vide memo no. 1950 dated 28.07.2021 (Annexure ‘18’ to the supplementary affidavit dated 31.08.2021). 44. In the case of Ashoo Surendranath Tiwari (supra), an FIR was registered on 09.12.2009 as regards MSME receivable finance scheme operated by the Small Industries Development Bank of India. There were allegations of diversion of funds. The petitioner was one of the accused in the said case and a charge-sheet was filed against him on 26.07.2011. The petitioner relied upon an order of the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) dated 22.12.2011 which went into the facts of the case in great detail and concurred with the competent authority that on merits no sanction ought to be accorded and no offence under the penal code was in fact made out. The High Court, however, brushed aside the said report stating that the CVC could not have come to the aforementioned conclusion unless there was evidence to do so. The Hon’ble Supreme Court went through the report and noticed that according to the report, at the highest, the appellant may be negligent without any criminal culpability. In paragraph 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 & 13 the Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed the case laws on the standard of proof in a departmental proceeding and the standard of proof in a criminal proceeding. The Hon’ble Supreme Court took a view that if the High Court had bothered to apply the parameters, then on a reading of CVC report on the same facts, the appellants should have been exonerated. Those paragraphs are being reproduced hereunder:— “8. A number of judgments have held that the standard of proof in a departmental proceeding, being based on preponderance of probability is somewhat lower than the standard of proof in a criminal proceeding where the case has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In P.S. Rajya Vs. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 897. the question before the Court was posed as follows: (SCC pp. 2-3, para 3) “3. In P.S. Rajya Vs. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 897. the question before the Court was posed as follows: (SCC pp. 2-3, para 3) “3. The short question that arises for our consideration in this appeal is whether the respondent is justified in pursuing the prosecution against the appellant under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 notwithstanding the fact that on an identical charge the appellant was exonerated in the departmental proceedings in the light of a report submitted by the Central Vigilance Commission and concurred by the Union Public Service Commission.” 9. This Court then went on to state: (P.S. Rajya case (supra) SCC (Cri) 897], SCC p. 5, para 17) “17. At the outset we may point out that the learned counsel for the respondent could not but accept the position that the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in a criminal case is far higher than the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in the departmental proceedings. He also accepted that in the present case, the charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal proceedings is one and the same. He did not dispute the findings rendered in the departmental proceedings and the ultimate result of it.” 10. This being the case, the Court then held: (P.S. Rajya case (supra) , SCC p. 9, para 23) “23. Even though all these facts including the report of the Central Vigilance Commission were brought to the notice of the High Court, unfortunately, the High Court took a view that the issues raised had to be gone into in the final proceedings and the report of the Central Vigilance Commission, exonerating the appellant of the same charge in departmental proceedings would not conclude the criminal case against the appellant. We have already held that for the reasons given, on the peculiar facts of this case, the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant cannot be pursued. Therefore, we do not agree with the view taken by the High Court as stated above. These are the reasons for our order dated 27.3.1996 for allowing the appeal and quashing the impugned criminal proceedings and giving consequential reliefs.” 11. In Radheshyam Kejriwal Vs. State of W.B. (2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721, this Court held as follows: (SCC pp. These are the reasons for our order dated 27.3.1996 for allowing the appeal and quashing the impugned criminal proceedings and giving consequential reliefs.” 11. In Radheshyam Kejriwal Vs. State of W.B. (2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721, this Court held as follows: (SCC pp. 594-96, paras 26, 29 & 31) “26. We may observe that the standard of proof in a criminal case is much higher than that of the adjudication proceedings. The Enforcement Directorate has not been able to prove its case in the adjudication proceedings and the appellant has been exonerated on the same allegation. The appellant is facing trial in the criminal case. Therefore, in our opinion, the determination of facts in the adjudication proceedings cannot be said to be irrelevant in the criminal case. In B.N. Kashyap, B.N. Kashyap vs. Crown, 1944 SCC OnLine Lah 46 : AIR 1945 Lah 23 the Full Bench had not considered the effect of a finding of fact in a civil case over the criminal cases and that will be evident from the following passage of the said judgment: (SCC OnLine Lah: AIR p. 27) ‘… I must, however, say that in answering the question, I have only referred to civil cases where the actions are in personam and not those where the proceedings or actions are in rem. Whether a finding of fact arrived at in such proceedings or actions would be relevant in criminal cases, it is unnecessary for me to decide in this case. When that question arises for determination, the provisions of Section 41 of the Evidence Act, will have to be carefully examined.’ *** 29. We do not have the slightest hesitation in accepting the broad submission of Mr Malhotra that the finding in an adjudication proceeding is not binding in the proceeding for criminal prosecution. A person held liable to pay penalty in adjudication proceedings cannot necessarily be held guilty in a criminal trial. Adjudication proceedings are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence of a little higher degree whereas in a criminal case the entire burden to prove beyond all reasonable doubt lies on the prosecution. *** 31. A person held liable to pay penalty in adjudication proceedings cannot necessarily be held guilty in a criminal trial. Adjudication proceedings are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence of a little higher degree whereas in a criminal case the entire burden to prove beyond all reasonable doubt lies on the prosecution. *** 31. It is trite that the standard of proof required in criminal proceedings is higher than that required before the adjudicating authority and in case the accused is exonerated before the adjudicating authority whether his prosecution on the same set of facts can be allowed or not is the precise question which falls for determination in this case.” 12. After referring to various judgments, this Court then culled out the ratio of those decisions in para 38 as follows: (Radheshyam Kejriwal case, Radheshyam Kejriwal vs. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721, SCC p. 598) “38. The ratio which can be culled out from these decisions can broadly be stated as follows: (i) Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution can be launched simultaneously; (ii) Decision in adjudication proceedings is not necessary before initiating criminal prosecution; (iii) Adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings are independent in nature to each other; (iv) The finding against the person facing prosecution in the adjudication proceedings is not binding on the proceeding for criminal prosecution; (v) Adjudication proceedings by the Enforcement Directorate is not prosecution by a competent court of law to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; (vi) The finding in the adjudication proceedings in favour of the person facing trial for identical violation will depend upon the nature of finding. If the exoneration in adjudication proceedings is on technical ground and not on merit, prosecution may continue; and (vii) In case of exoneration, however, on merits where the allegation is found to be not sustainable at all and the person held innocent, criminal prosecution on the same set of facts and circumstances cannot be allowed to continue, the underlying principle being the higher standard of proof in criminal cases.” 13. It finally concluded: (Radheshyam Kejriwal case, [Radheshyam Kejriwal vs. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721.] SCC p. 598, para 39) “39. It finally concluded: (Radheshyam Kejriwal case, [Radheshyam Kejriwal vs. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721.] SCC p. 598, para 39) “39. In our opinion, therefore, the yardstick would be to judge as to whether the allegation in the adjudication proceedings as well as the proceeding for prosecution is identical and the exoneration of the person concerned in the adjudication proceedings is on merits. In case it is found on merit that there is no contravention of the provisions of the Act in the adjudication proceedings, the trial of the person concerned shall be an abuse of the process of the court.” (underline is mine) 45. In the present case, this Court has noticed that both the inquiry reports have categorically held that the charges leveled against the petitioner were not proved. The charges in the departmental proceedings are essentially the same and one which are the subject matter of investigation. There is no denial of the assertions of the petitioner in his two supplementary affidavits sworn on 31.08.2021 and 04.08.2021, copies of which have been duly served upon learned Special P.P. ‘S.V.U.’, Patna. 46. This Court is of the considered opinion that in the given facts and circumstances where the FIR was, though, lodged alleging that the oral source information was sufficient to take a prima-facie view that the petitioner has committed a cognizable offence but despite a lapse of 5½ years so far the investigation has not been concluded and no reason at all has been placed before this Court to explain this inordinate delay, in the meantime, the petitioner has retired from service on 31.12.2021, he has been granted promotion and the government of Bihar has issued integrity certificate to him with reference to his ACRs and apart from that on identical allegations, in the departmental proceeding the charges could not be proved against him and he has been duly exonerated from all the charges, the petitioner has made out a case for quashing of the first information report. 47. In result, the F.I.R. bearing Special Case No. 16/2017 arising out of Special Vigilance Unit (SVU) P.S. Case No. 01/2017 is hereby quashed. Consequently, I.A. No. 1563/2017 is rendered infructuous. 48. This Writ Application is allowed to the extent indicated here-in-above. ?