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2022 DIGILAW 839 (GUJ)

Amulaben Narendrabhai Nimavat v. State of Gujarat

2022-07-05

NIKHIL S.KARIEL

body2022
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Chintan Desai on behalf of the petitioner, learned AGP Mr.Utkarsh Sharma on behalf of State respondents and learned Advocate Mr.Siraj Gori on behalf of respondent No.3. 2. Issue Rule returnable forthwith. Learned AGP waives service of notice of Rule for the respondent State and learned Advocate Mr.Siraj Gori waives service of Rule for respondent No.3. 3. By way of this petition, the petitioner seeks to challenge the inaction on part of the respondent Authorities for regularization of the services of the petitioner and also for being granted benefit of pay-scale and other incidental benefits as available to permanent employees and prays for following reliefs :- “18. (A) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, order or direction to respondents to consider the case of the petitioner herein for regularization of service on the post on which the petitioner is working and further be pleased to direct the present respondents to pay all the benefits including the benefits of pay scale and other incidental benefits at par with the permanent employees of the Gujarat Ayurvedic University; Pending hearing and final hearing of this petition, Your Lordships may kindly be pleased to direct the present respondent No.3 to not to change the service conditions of the present petitioner.” 4. Facts giving rise to the present petition are as under:- 4.1. That the petitioner Amulaben Narendrabhai Nimavat was appointed as ‘Kitchen Worker’ by the respondent No.3 – Gujarat Ayurvedic University, Jamnagar on 7.9.1994 and her service came to be terminated on 30.11.2002. As the said termination was without following the due procedure, the petitioner raised a disputed under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by filing Reference (LCJ) No.13 of 2005 before the learned Labour Court, Jamnagar. Learned Labour Court, after hearing the parties and considering the documents on record had passed an award below Exh. 365 on 29.6.2013, whereby the learned Labour Court partly allowed the Reference and directed the respondent No.3 to reinstate the present petitioner on her original post with continuity of service sans backwages. 4.2. Learned Labour Court, after hearing the parties and considering the documents on record had passed an award below Exh. 365 on 29.6.2013, whereby the learned Labour Court partly allowed the Reference and directed the respondent No.3 to reinstate the present petitioner on her original post with continuity of service sans backwages. 4.2. Being aggrieved by the Award of the learned Labour Court, Jamnagar, the respondent No.3 University had preferred a writ petition before this Court being Special Civil Application No.13572 of 2013 and vide order dated 3.10.2013, this Court had dismissed the said petition, upholding the Award passed by the learned Labour Court. The respondent No.3, as being not satisfied with the order of the learned Single Bench, had preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.1504 of 2013, wherein the Hon’ble Division Bench vide order dated 6.1.2014 had dismissed the said Letters Patent Appeal. Thereafter, the petitioner had made several representations to the respondent University to implement the Award of the learned Labour Court and the respondent No.3 University, vide Office Order dated 13.12.2013 has reinstated the petitioner on her original post of ‘Kitchen Worker’ with continuity in service. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner, though reinstated in service on the sanctioned post, has not been granted regularization of service and all other consequential benefits as granted to other similarly situated employees, who are even juniors to the petitioner. As the case of the petitioner was not being considered for regularization and other consequential benefits, she made representations on 2.3.2019, 9.7.2019 and 18.11.2019, but the respondent Authorities did not pay any heed to the request of the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner sought information with regard to regularization, etc., under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005 and the Public Information Officer of the respondent No.3 University replied to the application of the petitioner vide Communications dated 16.12.2019 and 30.12.2019. It is the case of the petitioner that even after the continuous efforts of the petitioner, she has not been regularized and, therefore, the present petition before this Court. 5. Learned Advocate Mr.Chintan Desai appearing for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner had been appointed as ‘Kitchen Aya’ with the respondent No.3 University w.e.f. 7.9.1994 and the respondent No.3, without following due procedure terminated the service of the petitioner on 30.11.2002. 5. Learned Advocate Mr.Chintan Desai appearing for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner had been appointed as ‘Kitchen Aya’ with the respondent No.3 University w.e.f. 7.9.1994 and the respondent No.3, without following due procedure terminated the service of the petitioner on 30.11.2002. Mr.Chintan Desai would further submit that the petitioner had preferred Reference (LCJ) No.13 of 2005 before the learned Labour Court and vide Award dated 29.6.2013 the respondent No.3 University was directed to reinstate the petitioner in service with continuity in service. It is submitted that the respondent No.3 had thereafter filed a writ petition being Special Civil Application No.13572 of 2013, which came to be dismissed by this Court vide order dated 3.10.2013. Thereafter, the respondent No.3 challenged the said order of the learned Single Bench by preferring Letters Patent Appeal No.1504 of 2013 and the Hon’ble Division Bench vide order dated 6.1.2014 rejected the said LPA. Mr.Chintan Desai would submit that thereafter the petitioner was reinstated in her original post of ‘Kitchen Worker’ with continuity of service vide Office Order dated 13.12.2013. Learned Advocate would further submit that though the petitioner has put in 26 years of service as Class-IV employee and having obtained Award of the learned Labour Court and Orders of this Hon’ble Court in her favour, the respondent No.3 University is adamant in not regularizing the service of the petitioner and granting other consequential benefits. Learned Advocate would further submit that other similarly situated employees have been granted regularization and other benefits as falling from the relevant Pay Commissions, yet the petitioner has been denied such benefits in spite of repeated representations and other persuasive efforts. It is submitted that the petitioner’s appointment is on the sanctioned post and as a statutory Body, respondent No.3 University ought to have followed all the norms and regularized the service of the petitioner as an ideal Employer. Learned Advocate Mr.Chintan Desai would submit that the action on the part of the respondents are arbitrary, discriminatory and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the issue of ‘equal pay for equal work’ is no more res integra, as the same has been decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in several cases. Learned Advocate Mr.Chintan Desai would submit that the action on the part of the respondents are arbitrary, discriminatory and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the issue of ‘equal pay for equal work’ is no more res integra, as the same has been decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in several cases. It is contended that the respondent No.3 University has granted all the benefits like benefits falling from Pay Commissions, etc., to similarly situated employees, that too, juniors to the present petitioner, yet a different treatment has been meted out to the petitioner and, therefore, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to allow the present petition and may please be kind enough to direct the respondents to extend all the benefits as admissible to the petitioner. Learned Advocate Mr.Desai relying upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of State of Karnataka Vs. Uma Devi, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 would submit that the respondent No.3 University ought to have considered the case of the petitioner. Mr.Desai has also relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in case of Mahuva Municipality Vs. Mahesbhai Jinabhai Sarvayya, reported in 2018 JX (Guj) 119, which decision was carried before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 27.8.2018 has upheld the decision of the Hon’ble Division Bench, wherein the Division Bench has considered pay parity as integral part of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, similarly situated employees being treated differently would amount to violation of Article 14 and Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India. Lastly learned Advocate relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of State of Punjab Vs. Jagjit Singh, reported in (2017) 1 SCC 148 and submits that the present case is a fit case for interference by this Hon’ble Court and this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to grant the reliefs as sought for by the petitioner. 6. Learned Advocate Mr.Siraj Gori appearing for respondent No.3 University would vehemently oppose the petition and would submit that the petition is not at all maintainable as no rights, much less any fundamental or constitutional rights of the petitioner are violated as alleged by the petitioner. 6. Learned Advocate Mr.Siraj Gori appearing for respondent No.3 University would vehemently oppose the petition and would submit that the petition is not at all maintainable as no rights, much less any fundamental or constitutional rights of the petitioner are violated as alleged by the petitioner. It is submitted by the learned Advocate Mr.Gori that the petitioner was initially appointed purely on temporary basis, that too for 20 days without following any due procedure as there was an urgent requirement. According to Mr.Gori, her appointment had been continued by different orders on different dates from 1994 to 2002 as and when such demand had arisen. It is further submitted that from the orders of appointments, it is very much clear that her appointment was not on a regular basis and there was lull in between. Learned Advocate Mr.Gori appearing for respondent No.3 would submit that the petitioner was not initially appointed as “Kitchen Worker” from 1994 as alleged by the petitioner, but was appointed on temporary adhoc basis to attend various tasks falling under the criteria of Class-IV employee and it was only in the year 2000 the petitioner was appointed as “Kitchen Aya”. Learned Advocate Mr.Gori would submit that selection of the employees of the respondent University is conducted by the Staff Selection Committee through established selection process, whereas the petitioner has not gone through such procedure and, therefore, she cannot be treated as regularly selected employee, as contended by the petitioner. Furthermore, the petitioner does not have the requisite educational qualification as per the norms of the Recruitment Rules and her appointment having been made on adhoc basis and, therefore, she can not demand pay parity of salary as being paid to the other regular employees of the respondent University. Learned Advocate Mr.Gori, relying upon the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respondent University would submit that this Court may not grant any reliefs as sought for in the present petition as there is no merit in the petition. 7. Learned Advocate Mr.Gori, relying upon the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respondent University would submit that this Court may not grant any reliefs as sought for in the present petition as there is no merit in the petition. 7. Learned AGP Mr.Utkarsh Sharma appearing for the respondent State, adopting the contentions of the learned Advocate Mr.Gori for the respondent University, would submit that the present petitioner was appointed as a daily wager purely on temporary adhoc basis and she does not have any right to demand regularization and pay parity as has been done in the cases of other employees, who have been selected through Staff Selection process as per Recruitment Rules. 8. As against the contentions made on behalf of the respondents, in rejoinder learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has contended that the petitioner was initially appointed as “Kitchen Worker” from the year 1994 and since then, she has been working as Class-IV employee and the said fact has been admitted by the respondent University. It is submitted that the present petitioner was terminated in the year 2002 without following dues process and after the award of the learned Labour Court, she has been reinstated on her original post. It is further submitted that the respondent University, as a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, is bound to follow all requisite norms and ought to have regularized the service of the petitioner. Learned Advocate Mr.Chintan Desai would therefore submit that this Court may kindly allow the present petition and may grant the reliefs as prayed. 9. Heard learned Advocates for the parties, who have not submitted anything further. 10. The petitioner by way of this petition seeks two-fold reliefs inasmuch as the petitioner seeks a direction against the respondents for considering the case of the petitioner for regularization in service and whereas the petitioner also seeks the benefits of pay-scale and other incidental benefits at par with permanent employees on the principle of “equal pay for equal work”. 11. Insofar as the issue of regularization is concerned, the petitioner seeks to pitch her case on the fact that at the time of filing of the petition, the petitioner had put in 26 years of service and whereas she was doing the same work as was being done by other permanent employees. 11. Insofar as the issue of regularization is concerned, the petitioner seeks to pitch her case on the fact that at the time of filing of the petition, the petitioner had put in 26 years of service and whereas she was doing the same work as was being done by other permanent employees. It is also claimed by the petitioner that the petitioner was selected by way of a regular selection process and whereas the petitioner possesses the requisite qualification for appointment on the post in question as per the Recruitment Rules. 12. As against the same, the respondent University has contended that the petitioner had not been selected through a regular legal process and whereas it is also submitted that her services have not been continuously availed of. It is further submitted that the petitioner does not possess requisite educational qualifications. It is also contended by the respondent University that the petitioner had not been appointed on a post in the prescribed set up. It would be further relevant to mention here that the petitioner has not produced any material on record to support her claim that she had been selected through a regular selection process, nor has she placed any material to show that she has the requisite qualifications as per the requirement for the post in question. Having regard to the diverse stand taken by the respective parties, more particularly the contention of the petitioner on facts being disputed by the respondent University, in the considered opinion of this Court, it would not be feasible and plausible for this Court to adjudicate on the said issue, therefore, this Court deems it appropriate to reject such prayer, more particularly reserving liberty in favour of the petitioner to approach the learned Labour Court for grant of relief of regularization, if so advised and if thought it appropriate, and if such an application is preferred by the petitioner, the same shall be considered by the learned Labour Court in accordance with law, without being influenced by the present rejection. 13. As far as the submission with regard to grant of benefits as made available to permanent employees, in the considered opinion of this Court, the same would stand on a different footing. 13. As far as the submission with regard to grant of benefits as made available to permanent employees, in the considered opinion of this Court, the same would stand on a different footing. The petitioner has contended that she has been working with the respondent for around 26 years, and whereas on behalf of the University it is sought to be contended that the petitioner was appointed as a temporary adhoc employee as per the requirement of the University and the hospital. It is also sought to be contended that the petitioner had not served continuously since there were breaks in her service. It is also contended that the petitioner had agreed to work for the respondent on contract basis for a brief period in the interregnum between 3.3.2001 and 2.6.2001. 14. Reading the affidavit-in-reply as well as the documents attached therewith reveals that while the petitioner is stated to have worked intermittently up to the year 1999 and whereas it is also sought to be contended that till such time, the petitioner had been working on ‘six hours part-time’ basis and whereas it appears it appears that after 1999- 2000, the petitioner had worked continuously and an artificial break in service of one day appears to have been deliberately induced after a period of 90 days, with a view to deny benefit of continuity. In the considered opinion of this Court, by inducing such artificial and deliberate break in service, the respondents may not be permitted to claim that the petitioner’s services are not continuous in nature. It also appears that the petitioner had been given designation as “Kitchen Aya” w.e.f. 29.9.2000 and whereas the petitioner had been terminated from service vide order dated 24.2.2003. It also appears that after the petitioner had challenged such order of termination before the learned Labour Court and the learned Labour Court having upheld such challenge and whereas the order of the learned Labour Court had been confirmed up to the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court. It also appears that vide order dated 13.12.2013 the petitioner was reinstated in service and whereas she continued to serve the respondent thereafter. It would be pertinent to mention that the order of the learned Labour Court granted continuity of service also which direction had also not been interfered with by this Court. It also appears that vide order dated 13.12.2013 the petitioner was reinstated in service and whereas she continued to serve the respondent thereafter. It would be pertinent to mention that the order of the learned Labour Court granted continuity of service also which direction had also not been interfered with by this Court. The petitioner has also relied upon cases of co-employees working on the posts of “Kitchen Servant”, on which posts the petitioner was working and whereas according to the petitioner, such co-workers were receiving higher salary than the present petitioner. A specific case of a co-employee being one Shivraj Vishwakarma has also been relied upon by the petitioner and whereas it appears that the said employee was getting salary in the regular payscale. The petitioner has contended that since persons working in the same posts were given much higher salary as compared to the salary being given to the petitioner, therefore, on the principle of “equal pay for equal work” the petitioner also may be granted similar pay-scale. 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of State of Punjab Vs. Jagjitsingh and Ors., reported in (2017) 1 SCC 148 has inter alia adverted to the conclusions drawn by the Hon’ble Apex Court in certain earlier judgement, whereby claim of temporary employees for pay parity had been accepted by the Hon’ble Apex Court applying the principles of “equal pay for equal work”. Paragraph 44 is reproduced herein below for benefit:- “44. The concept of “equal pay for equal work’’ is different from the concept of conferring permanency on those who have been appointed on ad hoc basis, temporary basis, or based on no process of selection as envisaged by the rules. This Court has in various decisions applied the principle of equal pay for equal work and has laid down the parameters for the application of that principle. The decisions are rested on the concept of equality enshrined in our Constitution in the light of the directive principles in that behalf. But the acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a position where the court could direct that appointments made without following the due procedure established by law, be deemed permanent or issue directions to treat them as permanent. Doing so, would be negation of the principle of equality of opportunity. But the acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a position where the court could direct that appointments made without following the due procedure established by law, be deemed permanent or issue directions to treat them as permanent. Doing so, would be negation of the principle of equality of opportunity. The power to make an order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before this Court, would not normally be used for giving the go-by to the procedure established by law in the matter of public employment……..It would not be just or proper to pass an order in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution or in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution permitting those persons engaged, to be absorbed or to be made permanent, based on their appointments or engagements. Complete justice would be justice according to law and though it would be open to this Court to mould the relief, this Court would not grant a relief which would amount to perpetuating an illegality.” 16. A perusal of the above paragraph, more particularly the ground on which the claim of temporary employees had been accepted by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgements summarized by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Punjab Vs. Jagjitsingh and Ors. (supra) would reveal that the primary consideration which weighed with the Hon’ble Apex Court was the fact that the concerned temporary employee was engaged for doing the same work as was being done by a regular employee. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the employees required to discharge similar duties and responsibilities as regular employees, then the claim would be sustainable. Hon’ble Apex Court had also observed that temporary employees are at least entitled to minimum wage paid to a regular employee in corresponding cadre along with dearness allowance and other benefits, which were extended to casual workers. 17. Hon’ble Apex Court in the very judgement at paragraph 45 had also analyzed judgements of the Hon’ble Apex Court where the Hon’ble Apex Court declined to grant benefits of “equal pay for equal work” to temporary employees claiming pay parity, the said paragraph being relevant for the present purpose is reproduced herein below for benefit :- “45. 17. Hon’ble Apex Court in the very judgement at paragraph 45 had also analyzed judgements of the Hon’ble Apex Court where the Hon’ble Apex Court declined to grant benefits of “equal pay for equal work” to temporary employees claiming pay parity, the said paragraph being relevant for the present purpose is reproduced herein below for benefit :- “45. We shall now attempt an analysis of the judgments, wherein this Court declined to grant the benefit of ‘equal pay for equal work’ to temporary employees, in a claim for pay parity with regular employees :- (i) In the Harbans Lal case, daily-rate employees were denied the claimed benefit, under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, because they could not establish, that the duties and responsibilities of the post(s) held by them, were similar/equivalent to those of the reference posts, under the State Government. (ii) In the Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers’ Union case, ad-hoc employees engaged in the Kendras, were denied pay parity with regular employees working under the New Delhi Municipal Committee, or the Delhi Administration, or the Union of India, because of the finding returned in the report submitted by a former Chief Justice of India, that duties and responsibilities discharged by employees holding the reference posts, were not comparable with the posts held by members of the petitioner union. (iii) In State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj, this Court took a slightly different course, while determining a claim for pay parity, raised by daily- wagers (- the respondents). It was concluded, that daily-wagers held no post, and as such, could not be equated with regular employees who held regular posts. But herein also, no material was placed on record, to establish that the nature of duties performed by the daily-wagers, was comparable with those discharged by regular employees. Be that as it may, it was directed, that the State should prescribe minimum wages for such workers, and they should be paid accordingly. (iv) In State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh, this Court held, that for the applicability of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, the respondents who were daily-wagers, had to establish through strict pleadings and proof, that they were discharging similar duties and responsibilities, as were assigned to regular employees. Since they had not done so, the matter was remanded back to the High Court, for a re- determination on the above position. Since they had not done so, the matter was remanded back to the High Court, for a re- determination on the above position. It is therefore obvious, that this Court had accepted, that where duties, responsibilities and functions were shown to be similar, the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would be applicable, even to temporary employees (otherwise the order of remand, would be meaningless, and an exercise in futility). (vi) It is, therefore apparent, that in all matters where this Court did not extend the benefit of ‘equal pay for equal work’ to temporary employees, it was because the employees could not establish, that they were rendering similar duties and responsibilities, as were being discharged by regular employees, holding corresponding posts.” 18. A perusal of the observations would reveal that any decision where the employees were denied the benefits of “equal pay for equal work” was on the ground that the employees could not establish that they were rendering similar duties and responsibilities as being discharged by regular employees. 19. Thus, the crux of the issue to decide the claim of a temporary employee for being paid wages as made available to regular employees was the requirement that the temporary employees were discharging the duties and responsibilities as regular employees. At this stage it would also be relevant to observe that the Hon’ble Apex Court had used the term “temporary employee” in general sense and whereas the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above referred decision had clarified the generality of the expression by observing that temporary employee – differently described as work charge, daily wage, casual, adhoc, contractual and the like, at paragraph 54 of the said decision. Thus, the observations were applicable insofar as an employee working on in such like category. 20. Thus, the observations were applicable insofar as an employee working on in such like category. 20. In the instant case, while the claim of the petitioner being that she had been appointed as a “kitchen Worker” and discharging the same duties and responsibilities as a regularly appointed employee is sought to be questioned by contending that the petitioner had worked as a temporary adhoc employee up till the year 1999, whereas she had accepted the work on contractual basis (for a brief period) as noted herein above in the year 2001 and whereas it appears that from 2001 onwards, though she had worked continuously the said continuity was sought to be broken by artificial mode of giving fresh appointment after a period of 90 days with a break of a day or so in between. It is also sought to be contended by the respondent University that the petitioner is working as a “Kitchen Aya” w.e.f. 29.9.2000 and not as a “Kitchen Worker” as sought to be canvassed. It is also sought to be contended that from 1994 to 2000 the petitioner had been attributed various tasks falling under the criteria of Class-IV worked at different times on purely adhoc basis as a daily wager. At this stage, it would be relevant to note that while the respondents seek to contend that the petitioner was appointed as a “Kitchen Aya”, a perusal of list annexed with the petition of the sanctioned set up with the respondent University reveals that along with the post of “Kitchen Servant” at Sr.66 of the said list, at Sr.65 a specific post of “Aya” was also listed. It would also be relevant to state that the respondents themselves have considered the post of “Aya” and “Kitchen Servant” as inter-changeable, more particularly in the Recruitment Rules and method of Recruitment of the respondent University, which is annexed with the affidavit-in-reply, the requisite qualifications for Class-IV post have been mentioned. It appears that posts falling in similar category, have been demarcated with a “slash” mark, whereas posts belonging to variant categories have been demarcated with a “coma” as far as the posts of “Kitchen Servant” and “Aya” are concerned, they have been described as water maid, Kitchen Servant/Aya, Ward boy, Sweeper/Peon-cum-sweeper. It, thus, appears that except for the nomenclature, the duties and responsibilities of the posts of Kitchen Servant/Aya were primarily similar. It, thus, appears that except for the nomenclature, the duties and responsibilities of the posts of Kitchen Servant/Aya were primarily similar. In any case, it also becomes clear that the post of Aya was a regular post on the set up and whereas while the petitioner may or may not have been appointed against a post in the set up, certainly by giving appointment to the petitioner on a specific post as against an order of appointment which may have stated about the petitioner being appointed as a temporary worker or the worker in Class-IV category, the appointment orders, more particularly order dated 29.9.2000 shows that the petitioner had been appointed against a very specific post of “Kitchen Aya” on a salary of Rs.1,800/- for a fixed tenure of three months. In the considered opinion of this Court, the present petitioner having been appointed against a specific post which post being available in the set up, and the fact that the petitioner had been working all these while continuously though with artificial breaks from 1994 in general and from the year 2000 in particular, and more particularly since there is a clear absence of any specific submission in the affidavit-in-reply whereby the respondents have sought to be controverted the affirmation by the petitioner that she was discharging similar duties as discharged by regularly selected employees, therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, the claim of the present petitioner deserves acceptance. 20.1. At this stage, this Court seeks to rely upon the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the decision of State of Punjab Vs. Jagjitsingh and Ors. (supra) more particularly paragraphs 54, 55, 57, and 58 thereof being relevant for the present purpose are reproduced herein below for benefit:- “54. There is no room for any doubt, that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ has emerged from an interpretation of different provisions of the Constitution. The principle has been expounded through a large number of judgments rendered by this Court, and constitutes law declared by this Court. The same is binding on all the courts in India, under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The parameters of the principle, have been summarized by us in paragraph 42 herein above. The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ has also been extended to temporary employees (differently described as work-charge, daily-wage, casual, ad-hoc, contractual, and the like). The same is binding on all the courts in India, under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The parameters of the principle, have been summarized by us in paragraph 42 herein above. The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ has also been extended to temporary employees (differently described as work-charge, daily-wage, casual, ad-hoc, contractual, and the like). The legal position, relating to temporary employees, has been summarized by us, in paragraph 44 hereinabove. The above legal position which has been repeatedly declared, is being reiterated by us, yet again. 55. In our considered view, it is fallacious to determine artificial parameters to deny fruits of labour. An employee engaged for the same work, cannot be paid less than another, who performs the same duties and responsibilities. Certainly not, in a welfare state. Such an action besides being demeaning, strikes at the very foundation of human dignity. Any one, who is compelled to work at a lesser wage, does not do so voluntarily. He does so, to provide food and shelter to his family, at the cost of his self respect and dignity, at the cost of his self worth, and at the cost of his integrity. For he knows, that his dependents would suffer immensely, if he does not accept the lesser wage. Any act, of paying less wages, as compared to others similarly situate, constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a domineering position. Undoubtedly, the action is oppressive, suppressive and coercive, as it compels involuntary subjugation. 56. xxx 57. Having traversed the legal parameters with reference to the application of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, in relation to temporary employees (daily-wage employees, ad-hoc appointees, employees appointed on casual basis, contractual employees and the like), the sole factor that requires our determination is, whether the concerned employees (before this Court), were rendering similar duties and responsibilities, as were being discharged by regular employees, holding the same/corresponding posts. This exercise would require the application of the parameters of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ summarized by us in paragraph 42 above. However, insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it is not difficult for us to record the factual position. This exercise would require the application of the parameters of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ summarized by us in paragraph 42 above. However, insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it is not difficult for us to record the factual position. We say so, because it was fairly acknowledged by the learned counsel representing the State of Punjab, that all the temporary employees in the present bunch of appeals, were appointed against posts which were also available in the regular cadre/establishment. It was also accepted, that during the course of their employment, the concerned temporary employees were being randomly deputed to discharge duties and responsibilities, which at some point in time, were assigned to regular employees. Likewise, regular employees holding substantive posts, were also posted to discharge the same work, which was assigned to temporary employees, from time to time. There is, therefore, no room for any doubt, that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the temporary employees in the present set of appeals, were the same as were being discharged by regular employees. It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent-employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of the State, that any of the temporary employees would not be entitled to pay parity, on any of the principles summarized by us in paragraph 42 hereinabove. There can be no doubt, that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would be applicable to all the concerned temporary employees, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages, at par with the minimum of the pay-scale of regularly engaged Government employees, holding the same post. 58. In view of the position expressed by us in the foregoing paragraph, we have no hesitation in holding, that all the concerned temporary employees, in the present bunch of cases, would be entitled to draw wages at the minimum of the pay-scale (-at the lowest grade, in the regular pay- scale), extended to regular employees, holding the same post.” 21. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the above referred judgement had reiterated the legal position with regard to temporary employees and whereas the Hon’ble Apex Court had further observed that artificial parameters cannot be determined to deny the fruits of labour. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the above referred judgement had reiterated the legal position with regard to temporary employees and whereas the Hon’ble Apex Court had further observed that artificial parameters cannot be determined to deny the fruits of labour. Hon’ble Apex Court has also observed that any act of less wages as compared to other similarly situated persons constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a domineering position. The Hon’ble Apex Court, after accepting the claim of the temporary employees, for being entitled to the benefits of “equal pay for equal work” had inter alia laid down that temporary employee would be entitled to draw wages at minimum of pay scale extended to regular employees holding the same post. 22. In the considered opinion of this Court, the present petitioner, for the reasons set out herein above, more particularly relying upon the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court would be entitled to draw salary in the minimum of pay scale as available to the regularly situated employees on the post of “Kitchen Servant/Aya”. 23. At this stage, it would also be relevant to mention that while the petitioner is stated to be working from the year 1994, the petitioner appears to have been appointed as “Kitchen Aya”, albeit on temporary basis vide order dated 29.9.2000 and whereas the petitioner had been terminated from service in the year 2003 and reinstated in the year 2013. It appears that the petitioner is working on the said post since the year 2013. It also appears that the petitioner had not been paid any backwages as per the Award passed by the learned Labour Court, which had not been challenged by the petitioner. Having regard to the same, in the considered opinion of this Court, the ends of justice would be met if the respondent University is directed to pay to the petitioner salary in the minimum of pay scale as paid to regularly appointed employees in the post of “Kitchen Worker/Kitchen Aya”. Such salary in minimum of pay scale shall be made available to the petitioner w.e.f. 29.9.2000 and whereas except for the period between the date of termination of the petitioner i.e. 24.2.2003 till the date of reinstatement i.e. 13.12.2013, the petitioner will be entitled for the difference of salary actually paid and the salary payable as per the minimum of pay scale. The petitioner also be entitled to salary in the minimum of pay scale till the petitioner retires. The petitioner shall also be entitled to other emoluments like D.A., etc., as paid to a regular employee albeit taking the salary paid to the petitioner on the minimum of pay scale on the post concerned as the bench-mark. It is also clarified at this stage that for the purpose of calculating the arrears, the period between 24.2.2003 and 13.12.2013 shall be treated as period in service. The respondents are directed to calculate the difference and make appropriate payment of the same to the petitioner within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of this order. 24. The petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. No order as to costs.