JUDGMENT : 1. The present Appeal is directed against the impugned judgment and order in Special Case No. 27 of 2005 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge, Dhrangadhra dated 25.9.2007 recording the acquittal for the charges under Section 323, 504, 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(10) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as “the Atrocities Act”). 2. The facts of the case briefly are that complainant – Lakhabhai Rupabhai Makwana has filed a complaint before the P.S.O. Dhrangadhra Taluka Police Station and according to the complaint, on 17.2.2005, complainant and prosecution witness Naranbhai Prabhubhai were sitting on Otla of Shaktimata’s Mandir at village Virendranagar. At the relevant point of time, the Respondent – Accused, who was going on Motor Cycle was called by the complainant and he was informed to remove stones from his field as he was intending to cultivate the field. Therefore, the Respondent Accused got excited and gave filthy abuses to the complainant and prosecution witnesses relating to the caste of the complainant and gave him a kick and fist blow and also administered threat to cause death. At the relevant point of time, prosecution witness Naranbhai Prabhubhai intervened and saved the complainant from further beating. Therefore, complainant has filed a complaint before Dhrangadhra Taluka Police Station, vide Cr.No. II-08/2005 for the alleged offences under Sections 323, 504, 506(2) of IPC and Section 3(1)(10) of the Atrocities Act. 3. Upon such FIR being filed, investigation started and the Investigating Officer recorded statements of as many as 7 witnesses and produced number of documentary evidence, and after completion of the investigation, Charge-sheet was filed against the accused for the offences in question. The case was committed to the Sessions Court and the learned trial Judge framed the Charge. Since the accused did not plead guilty, trial was proceeded against the accused. Vide impugned judgment and order dated 25.9.2007, the learned trial Judge acquitted the accused person. Being aggrieved by the same, the State has preferred the present appeal. 4. Heard, learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri for the appellant – State and learned advocate Mr. Pravin Gondaliya, learned advocate for the respondent. 5. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has mainly contended that the learned trial Judge has erred in holding that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 4. Heard, learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri for the appellant – State and learned advocate Mr. Pravin Gondaliya, learned advocate for the respondent. 5. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has mainly contended that the learned trial Judge has erred in holding that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The learned APP submitted that the impugned judgment of the trial Court is based on presumptions and inferences and thereby, it is against the facts and the evidence on record. The learned APP further submitted that the learned trial Judge has failed to appreciate the evidence on record in its true and proper perspective and thereby, has erred in recording the acquittal of the respondent – accused. 6. Learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri referred to the judgment and order as well as the testimony of number of witnesses and also the documentary evidence. Learned APP has submitted that the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Judge is contrary to law, evidence on record and principles of justice, hence the same deserves to be quashed and set aside by this Hon’ble Court. It is further contended that the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Court of learned Judge is based on inference not warranted by facts of the case and also on presumption not permitted by law and that the learned Judge ought to have seen that there are direct and indirect evidence connecting Respondent with crime produced in this case. In spite of the fact, learned Judge without appreciating oral as well as documentary evidence on record of the case, straight way arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt for the alleged offences under Sections 323, 504, 506(2) of IPC as well as Section 3(1)(10) of the Atrocities Act. Learned APP has further submitted that the learned Judge has failed to appreciate the fact that the complaint at Exh.11 gets corroboration from the evidence of complainant Lakhabhai Rupabhai at Exh.8. Learned APP has further submitted that the learned Judge has failed to appreciate the fact that the complaint at Exh.11 gets corroboration from the evidence of complainant Lakhabhai Rupabhai at Exh.8. Learned APP has further contended that the learned Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence of complainant Lakhabhai Rupabhai at Exh.11, wherein he has clearly stated the fact that the incident has taken place prior to one and half years and as on date of incident between 11.00 to 12.00 hours, while complainant was sitting on Otla of Mandir, alongwith prosecution witness Naranbhai Prabhubhai, he has called the Respondent accused and informed to pick up stones which were lying in his field. He has further deposed that at the relevant point of time, accused person got excited and denied to pick up stones from field. He has further deposed that accused person has also given filthy abuses to the complainant and prosecution witnesses relating to the caste of complainant as well as gave kick and fist blow and also administered threat to cause death. Thus, so far as evidence of complainant is concerned, he has fully supported the prosecution case, then in that case learned Judge has no reason to disbelieve the prosecution case. Learned APP has further contended that the learned Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence of prosecution witness Lakhabhai Prabhubhai at Exh.12, wherein he has fully supported version of complainant. He has specifically and categorically stated the fact that as on date of incident accused person has given filthy abuses to the complainant as well as given kick and fist blows. Learned APP has further submitted that the learned Trial Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence of Dr. Pravin Jamnadas Sheth at Exh.15, before whom complainant has given history of beating by accused Satubha Natubha with sword. This prosecution witness has also stated the fact that injuries caused to complainant is possible by hard and blunt substance. That the learned Judge has committed error in holding that prosecution witness Naranbhai Prabhubhai at Exh.12 is mere relative of the complainant and therefore, he is an interested witness. This prosecution witness has also stated the fact that injuries caused to complainant is possible by hard and blunt substance. That the learned Judge has committed error in holding that prosecution witness Naranbhai Prabhubhai at Exh.12 is mere relative of the complainant and therefore, he is an interested witness. That the learned Judge has committed error in holding that looking to the evidence of complainant and prosecution witness Naranbhai Lakhabhai, it is crystal clear that respondent accused was possessing sword at the time of incident, but no recovery of muddamal sword has been made from complainant at the time of incident, and therefore, evidence adduced by the Complainant and prosecution witness Naranbhai Lakhabhai is doubtful. That the learned Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence of Anvarkhan Rahematkhan, PSO, at Exh.19, who has recorded complaint of complainant as per say of complainant. This prosecution witness has clearly deposed in his deposition that as there was sufficient evidence connecting respondent with crime produced in this case, offence was registered against the respondent. That the learned Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence of Gulammayuddin Umarmiya Kazi, Dy. S.P. at Exh.28, wherein this prosecution witness has also deposed in his deposition that investigation of the present case has been carried out by him and as there was sufficient evidence, respondent was arrested and produced before the Hon’ble Court. That the learned Judge has committed error in holding that prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt that respondent accused has given filthy abuses to the complainant and prosecution witness relating to the caste of complainant and thereby committed offences under Section 3(1)(10) of Atrocity Act. Learned APP has further submitted that the learned Jduge has committed error in giving undue weightage to minor omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses and therefore the reasons given by the learned Judge while appreciating the evidence as well as while acquitting the accused are improper, perverse and bad in law. Learned Advocate for the Appellant has further submitted that the learned Judge has committed error in holding that the prosecution has failed to produce medical evidence in respect of injuries caused to complainant and his son. Therefore, it is submitted that the present Appeal may be allowed. 7. Learned APP has further contended that as per the FIR which is at Page No.47-50, the aforesaid offence occurred at the public place. Therefore, it is submitted that the present Appeal may be allowed. 7. Learned APP has further contended that as per the FIR which is at Page No.47-50, the aforesaid offence occurred at the public place. She has also read the deposition of PW-2 - Naranbhai Prabhubhai at Exh.12 and also argued on the basis of the cross-examination and also placed reliance upon the deposition of PW-3 - Jadubhai Gamerbhai at Exh.13, deposition of PW-4 Ramjibhai Nathabhai Dalvadi at Exh.14 and also the deposition of PW-5 - Dr. Pravin Jamnadas Sheth at Exh.15 and also placed reliance at Exh.16 – Injury Certificate and has argued that the name of the Assailant Shakubha Natubha is shown. She has also placed reliance upon page no. 69, which is a yadi from the Police Station Dhragandhra to the Medical Officer wherein also the injury is to the complainant – Lakhabhai Rupabhai is observed and also placed reliance upon the testimony of PW-6 - Anvarkhan Rahematkhan at Exh.19 and on all such ground, learned APP has contended that the learned Sessions Judge has committed error in appreciating the evidence. Therefore, this Court may reverse the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge from acquittal into conviction. Learned APP has also taken this Court to the judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Judge coupled with appreciation of evidence and contended that the learned Sessions Judge has committed error in appreciation of evidence. 8. Per contra, learned Advocate Mr. Pravin Gondaliya for the Respondent / Original Accused has heavily contended that in the present case, pursuant to the deposition of the prosecution witnesses, there are number of contradictions and therefore, the learned Sessions Judge has rightly passed the acquittal order. Learned Advocate Mr. Pravin Gondaliya has also placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 267 of 2022 in the case of Odhabhai Dahyabhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat and also Criminal Appeal No. 2502 of 2005 in the case of H.K.Thakur v. Nazir Noormohmed Kara & Ors. and submitted that whenever the judgment is neither perverse nor arbitrary and also not capricious, in that case, there is no requirement to interference by this Hon’ble Court. and submitted that whenever the judgment is neither perverse nor arbitrary and also not capricious, in that case, there is no requirement to interference by this Hon’ble Court. Learned Advocate Mr.Pravin Gondaliya has also urged that even if there are two views in the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, in that case also, the appellate court cannot reverse the judgment of the Sessions Court. He has therefore submitted that the present appeal may not be entertained. 9. In view of the rival submissions made by the learned Advocates for the respective parties, it is required to be considered whether the impugned judgment and order can be sustained or not. 10. Having heard the arguments advanced by both the sides, before we advert to the merits of the case, it would be worthwhile to refer to the scope of this Appeal. 10.1 Before adverting to the facts of the case, it would be worthwhile to refer to the scope of interference in acquittal appeals. It is well settled by catena of decisions that an appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and consider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, the Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is prejudice in favour of the accused, firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. 10.2 Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrive at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person, and therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. 10.3 Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. 10.3 Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. That the duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether the accused is connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged. 10.4 In Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented through Legal Representatives v. State of Karnataka and Others, (2019) 2 SCC 752 , the Apex Court has observed that: “The presumption of innocence which is attached to every accused gets fortified and strengthened when the said accused is acquitted by the trial Court. Probably, for this reason, the law makers felt that when the appeal is to be filed in the High Court it should not be filed as a matter of course or as matter of right but leave of the High Court must be obtained before the appeal is entertained. This would not only prevent the High Court from being flooded with appeals but more importantly would ensure that innocent persons who have already faced the tribulation of a long drawn out criminal trial are not again unnecessarily dragged to the High Court”. 10.5 Yet in another decision in Chaman Lal v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 1229 of 2017 on 03.12.2020, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 988 the Apex Court has observed as under: “9.1 In the case of Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 ), this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. In paragraphs 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under: 12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P (1975) 3 SCC 219 , Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar (1990) 4 SCC 17 , Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P (2003) 1 SCC 761 , Narendra Singh v. State of M.P (2004) 10 SCC 699 , Budh Singh v. State of U.P (2006) 9 SCC 731 , State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh (2007) 13 SCC 102 , S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (2008) 5 SCC 535 , Arulvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206 , Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P (2009) 16 SCC 98 and Ram Singh v. State of H.P (2010) 2 SCC 445 ) 13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227 , the Privy Council observed as under: (IA p. 404) “… the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.” 14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State AIR 1954 SC 1 , Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216 , M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200 , Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar (1970) 2 SCC 450 , Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412 , Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P (2002) 4 SCC 85 and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755 ) 15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 , this Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432, para 42) “(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 16. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P (2008) 10 SCC 450 , this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368 , the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that: (SCC p. 374, para 20) “20. … an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.” 18. In State of U.P. v. Banne (2009) 4 SCC 271 , this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances include: (SCC p. 286, para 28) “(i) The High Court’s decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; (ii) The High Court’s conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; (iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The High Court’s judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; (v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; (vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.” A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State (2009) 10 SCC 401 . 19. 19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.” 9.2 When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under : “20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn (1984) 4 SCC 635 , Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 665, Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad (2001) 1 SCC 501 , Aruvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206 and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P (2009) 10 SCC 636 ).” (emphasis supplied) 9.3 It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1999) 2 SCC 10 , that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. 9.4 In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 , this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. 9.4 In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 , this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In paragraph 31, it is observed and held as under: “31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228 . In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: (SCC p. 233) “10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case.” 31.1. In Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412 , the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p. 416) “8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well-considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court’s judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.” 31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala (1999) 3 SCC 309 , after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 807 , in para 5, this Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 80910) “5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 Cr.P.C came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 Cr.P.C came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence. It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State AIR 1952 SC 52 ; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P AIR 1953 SC 122 ) In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions. 31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. (1979) 1 SCC 355 , this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule.” (emphasis supplied).” 11. At this juncture, a beneficial reference may also be made to a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Lalit Kumar and Ors. v. Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Govt. of W.B. reported in AIR 1989 SC 2134 , wherein the Hon’ble Court has held that: “It is now well settled that the power of an appellate Court to review evidence in appeals against acquittal is an extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions, but that power is with a note of caution that the appellate Court should be slow in interfering with the orders of acquittal unless there are compelling reasons to do so. If a finding reached by the trial Judge cannot be said to be an unreasonable finding, then the appellate Court should not disturb that finding even if it is possible to reach a different conclusion on the basis of the material on record.” 12. In the aforesaid backdrop, as per the evidence of PW-1 – Lakhabhai Rupabhai at Exh.8, though he has deposed on the basis of FIR, but simultaneously, he has admitted that both; complainant and the accused are residing in the same village since long. It is also admitted that Survey Number of captioned land is not shown in the complaint. The prosecution has also examined PW-2 - Naranbhai Prabhubhai at Exh.12 wherein he has stated that there were some normal scuffle between the complainant and the accused, though he had seen the sword in the hands of the accused - Satubha Natubha Zala, but the nature of injury shown in the medical certificate is simple injury. Simultaneously, the Talati-cum- Mantri of Virendragadh Gram Panchayat, who has written a letter to Dy.S.P. wherein it is stated that there is no measurement in the captioned land. Further, it is still not decided whether the stones which were thrown in the so-called land of the complainant, is also not on record. Further, in the deposition of the Investigation Officer - Gulam Umaria, he has also admitted that the statement of Naranbhai Prabhubhai was recorded and he has not stated that the accused was possessing sword during the alleged occurrence. Further, it is an undisputed fact that the prosecution failed to rely on the caste certificate. Further, in the deposition of the Investigation Officer - Gulam Umaria, he has also admitted that the statement of Naranbhai Prabhubhai was recorded and he has not stated that the accused was possessing sword during the alleged occurrence. Further, it is an undisputed fact that the prosecution failed to rely on the caste certificate. Upon all such premises and also on the basis of the judgment as rendered by the learned Sessions Judge, it appears that the learned Sessions Judge has rightly decided that the caste certificate is not produced by the prosecution, and therefore, it cannot be said that it was the intention of the accused prior to the occurrence that attempt be made upon the complainant on the basis of the nature of caste. Further, voluntary hurt by the accused person is also not proved. 13. This Court has also gone through the judgment of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 267 of 2022 wherein the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court has also observed that it is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that in an acquittal appeal if other view is possible, then also, the appellate Court cannot substitute its own view by reversing the acquittal into conviction, unless the findings of the trial Court are perverse, contrary to the material on record, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. (Ramesh Babulal Doshi V. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 ). In the instant case, the learned APP has not been able to point out to us as to how the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are perverse, contrary to material on record, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. The Division Bench has also placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana, AIR 1995 SC 280 . It was held as under: “The powers of the High Court in an appeal from order of acquittal to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusions under Section 378 and 379, Cr.P.C. are as extensive as in any appeal against the order of conviction. It was held as under: “The powers of the High Court in an appeal from order of acquittal to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusions under Section 378 and 379, Cr.P.C. are as extensive as in any appeal against the order of conviction. But as a rule of prudence, it is desirable that the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to the view of the Trial Court with regard to the credibility of the witness, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt and the slowness of appellate Court in justifying a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witness. It is settled law that if the main grounds on which the lower Court has based its order acquitting the accused are reasonable and plausible, and the same cannot be entirely and effectively be dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal. 12. As observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Singh & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2011) 11 SCC 444 and in the case of Bhaiyamiyan Alias Jardar Khan and Another v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2011) 6 SCC 394 , while dealing with the judgment of acquittal, unless reasoning by the learned trial Court is found to be perverse, the acquittal cannot be upset. It is further observed that High Court’s interference in such appeal in somewhat circumscribed and if the view taken by the learned trial Court is possible on the evidence, the High Court should stay its hands and not interfere in the matter in the belief that if it had been the trial Court, it might have taken a different view.” 14. Thus, on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the ocular and the documentary evidence on record, as referred to herein above, it transpires that there are contradictions and omissions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. The learned trial Judge has observed that on considering the evidence on record there appears no trustworthy evidence on record to prove the charge against the accused and the prosecution has failed to bring home the charge against the accused inasmuch as the ingredients of the offence alleged are not fulfilled. The learned trial Judge has observed that on considering the evidence on record there appears no trustworthy evidence on record to prove the charge against the accused and the prosecution has failed to bring home the charge against the accused inasmuch as the ingredients of the offence alleged are not fulfilled. This Court has gone through in detail the impugned judgment and order and found that the learned trial Judge has meticulously considered the depositions of all the witnesses and came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and in the considered opinion of this Court, the learned trial Judge has rightly come to such a conclusion, which does not call for any interference at the hands of this Court. 15. In view of the aforesaid discussion and observations, in the considered opinion of this Court, the prosecution has failed to bring home the charge against accused for want of sufficient material. The findings recorded by the learned trial Judge do not call for any interference. Resultantly, in fleri, the appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly. Impugned judgment and order dated 25.9.2007, passed in Special Case No. 27 of 2005 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge & Special Judge, Dhrangadhra, recording the acquittal is confirmed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. R&P, if received, be transmitted back forthwith.