JUDGMENT : MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA, J. 1. Heard Mr. B.K. Jain, learned counsel for the appellants and Mrs. R.D. Mazumdar, learned counsel for the Insurance Company (respondent no. 2). 2. The appellants have made a challenge to the judgment dated 26.02.2015 passed by the learned Court of the Additional District Judge No. 4, FTC, Kamrup (M), Guwahati in MAC Case No. 1290/2009, wherein compensation of Rs. 3,89,873/- has been awarded to the appellants/claimants along with interest @ 6% per annum, from the date of filing the claim petition till its realisation. The appellants pray that the compensation amount should be enhanced on the ground that the learned Trial Court had computed the compensation amount as if it were an injury case, instead of a death case. 3. The appellants’ case in brief is that on 09.12.2007, while the husband of the appellant no. 1 and father of the appellant nos. 2 to 5 was walking along National Highway 31 at around 7:30 p.m. one Auto Van hit the appellant no. 1’s husband from behind, as a result of which the appellant no. 1’s husband fell down on the road and injured the femur of his left leg. 4. The appellant no. 1’s husband was taken to the Gauhati Medical College and Hospital (GMCH) on 09.12.2007. However, as the husband of the appellant no. 1 was of the view that he was not getting good treatment, he went to Patna by train on 12.12.2007 with PW-2 and got himself admitted in Popular Nursing Home, Patna on 13.12.2007. The deceased remained there with PW-2 until his discharge on 27.12.2007. Thereafter, he came back to Guwahati and was again admitted at Aruna Memorial Hospital, Guwahati on 05.01.2008. The appellant no. 1’s husband was thereafter taken to International Hospital, Guwahati on 09.01.2008, where he expired on 10.01.2008 at around 4:35 p.m. 5. The appellants/claimants thereafter filed a claim petition before the Court of the Additional District Judge No. 4, FTC, Kamrup (M), Guwahati. The learned Trial Court awarded compensation amounting to Rs. 3,89,870/- to the appellants, on the basis of medical expenditure incurred, pain and suffering, loss of income and other miscellaneous expenses. 6. The appellants’ counsel submits that the learned Trial Court had awarded the compensation, by holding that the cause of death of the deceased had no connection with the injury sustained by him during the accident. 3,89,870/- to the appellants, on the basis of medical expenditure incurred, pain and suffering, loss of income and other miscellaneous expenses. 6. The appellants’ counsel submits that the learned Trial Court had awarded the compensation, by holding that the cause of death of the deceased had no connection with the injury sustained by him during the accident. However, the evidence recorded by the learned Trial Court and the evidence given by the doctor of International Hospital, Guwahati proved that the death of the deceased was due to Sepsis with Multi Organ Disfunction Syndrome (MODS), which had a nexus with the injury sustained by the deceased in the vehicular accident that occurred on 09.12.2007. 7. The appellants’ counsel submits that though the injury sustained by the deceased was related to left femur of the deceased, the cause of death which was Sepsis with MODS, had a nexus with the injury sustained by the deceased in the accident. He accordingly submits that the learned Trial Court should have calculated the compensation to be awarded to the appellants, as if the case was a death case and not an injury case. In this respect, the learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon various judgments of various High Courts and the Supreme Court of India, which are as follows: 1. Vidhyawati vs. A. Guruswamy, 2004 (7) Laws (Cal) 42 : 2005 (0) ACJ 433 (DB) 2. Jayarathnamma vs. Mukthiar Singh, 2005 (11) Laws (Kar) 46 : 2007 (0) ACJ 1260 3. Ramathal vs. M.D. Charan Transport Corporation, 2003 (7) Laws (SC) 89 : AIR 2004 SC 3445 : 2003 (10) SCC 53 4. Kiran Bala vs. Rajeev Sharma, 2013 (4) Laws (P&H) 146 8. The appellants’ counsel submits that in a claim made under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the evidence should not be scrutinized in a manner as is done in a civil suit or a criminal case. If there is some evidence to arrive at a finding that itself is sufficient and no nicety, doubt or suspicion should weigh with the tribunal/or Court in deciding a motor accident claim. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Union of India and Others vs. Mrs. Saraswati Debnath and Others, 1995 (2) GLT 17. 9. Mrs. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Union of India and Others vs. Mrs. Saraswati Debnath and Others, 1995 (2) GLT 17. 9. Mrs. R.D. Mazumdar, learned counsel for the Insurance Company, on the other hand submits that as per the evidence on record, the deceased was immediately taken to GMCH on the date of accident, i.e. 09.12.2007 and he remained there till 12.12.2007. However, there is no document produced by the appellants with regard to the medical treatment provided to the deceased in GMCH, despite allegedly being there for three nights. Further no GMCH Admission or Discharge Certificate has been furnished by the appellants. There is nothing to show that any medical examination/tests were taken or medicines purchased for the deceased during his three nights stay in GMCH. She further submits that the deceased allegedly left GMCH on 12.12.2007 for Patna, wherein he allegedly got admitted himself into the Popular Nursing Home. Besides the Popular Nursing Home Admission-cum-Discharge Certificate dated 27.12.2007, there is no other medical documents submitted by the appellants in respect of his stay of 15 days in the Popular Nursing Home before the learned Trial Court. There is no document to show what type of treatment was given to the deceased on the dates prior to the issuance of the Admission-cum-Discharge Certificate dated 27.12.2007. She further submits that no doctor from Popular Nursing Home, Patna was examined by the learned Trial Court to prove that the appellant no. 1’s husband had been admitted in the said nursing home for treatment of the alleged injury sustained by him. 10. The learned counsel for the Insurance Company also submits that the deceased had allegedly stayed in Aruna Memorial Hospital, Guwahati from 05.01.2008 to 09.01.2008, as per the Discharge Certificate dated 09.01.2008. However, there is no document besides the Discharge Certificate in the records. No doctor of Aruna Memorial Hospital, Guwahati has been examined by the learned Trial Court. Further, the Discharge Certificate dated 09.01.2008 issued by the Aruna Memorial Hospital, Guwahati showed that the deceased was suffering from fever and Hepatitis. The Discharge Certificate of Aruna Memorial Hospital, Guwahati also advised the deceased to consult Dr. T. Das or Dr. N. Khound at International Hospital, Guwahati. Further, the Discharge Certificate dated 09.01.2008 issued by the Aruna Memorial Hospital, Guwahati showed that the deceased was suffering from fever and Hepatitis. The Discharge Certificate of Aruna Memorial Hospital, Guwahati also advised the deceased to consult Dr. T. Das or Dr. N. Khound at International Hospital, Guwahati. However, there is no evidence recorded by the witnesses and no document produced to show that Dr. T. Das or Dr. N. Khound had examined the deceased or that the deceased had been treated by Dr. T. Das or Dr. D. Khound. 11. The counsel for the Insurance Company also submits that no Post Mortem Report was made with regard to the deceased. Further, the cross-examination of one Sarbeswar Saikia (PW-2), who was not a friend/acquaintance or a family member of the deceased, shows that he was coincidently present at the time the deceased met with an accident. Further, Sarbeswar Saikia (PW-2) had gone with the deceased to Patna and had allegedly remained there with the deceased. Also, despite no summons being issued to him from the learned Trial Court, the said PW-2 had come on his own volition, as a witness to depose in favour of the deceased. She also submits that no train tickets from Guwahati to Patna and back were produced by the deceased or PW-2. Further, despite the deceased being a Government servant, the deceased did not submit any application for leave of any kind before the concerned authority, for the period he was allegedly treated in various hospitals. 12. The counsel for the Insurance Company further submits that though the Insurance Company has not filed any appeal with regard to the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the Insurance Company can make a challenge to any adverse finding of the learned Trial Court, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shri Saurav Jain and Another vs. M/s A.B.P. Design and Another (Civil Appeal No. 4448/2021, which was disposed of vide judgment dated 05.08.2021). She submits that the learned Trial Court had awarded Rs. 2,13,316/- as part of the compensation amount, on account of “loss of income” even though there was no loss of income on the part of the deceased, who was a Government servant. As such, the appellants should return the amount of Rs. She submits that the learned Trial Court had awarded Rs. 2,13,316/- as part of the compensation amount, on account of “loss of income” even though there was no loss of income on the part of the deceased, who was a Government servant. As such, the appellants should return the amount of Rs. 2,13,316/- to the respondent No. 2, which was awarded as a part of the compensation amount. 13. The counsel for the Insurance Company further submits that the Medical Certificates would have to be proved by doctors, to be admissible in evidence and in this regard she has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Raj Kumar vs. Ajay Kumar and Another, (2011) 1 SCC 343 . She also submits that in terms of the judgment of this Court in MAC Appeal No. 272/2016 (The Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Mrs. Hamida Begum and Others), which was disposed of vide judgment and order dated 11.02.2020, the appellants would have to prove that the deceased was in continuous treatment in connection with the said alleged injury sustained in the accident, till his death, to claim compensation as a death case caused by the accident. She also submits that the appellants did not prove that the deceased person had undergone treatment with regard to his alleged injury or that he had developed serious infections due to the injury sustained in the accident. 14. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 15. In the case of Vidhyawati vs. A. Guruswamy, 2004 (7) Laws (Cal) 42, the High Court of Kolkata has held that whether the victim died in consequence to the accident is a decisive factor in determining the amount of compensation. It has held that if a person is seriously injured in an accident and is taken to a hospital where due to the negligence on the part of the hospital authorities, such victim is infected with Tetanus and ultimately dies of Tetanus. In such a situation, although the cause of death is not actually due to the injury sustained in the accident, it should be presumed that the death occurred as a consequence of the accident. Paragraph 15 and 16 of the judgment passed in Vidhyawati vs. A. Guruswamy (supra) states as follows: “15. Whether the victim died consequent to the accident is the decisive factor in determining the amount of compensation. Paragraph 15 and 16 of the judgment passed in Vidhyawati vs. A. Guruswamy (supra) states as follows: “15. Whether the victim died consequent to the accident is the decisive factor in determining the amount of compensation. If it appears that the death was the direct or consequential effect of the accident, in such a case, the claimant should be entitled to get compensation for the loss of life, even if the deceased ultimately died of a different disease. For instance, if a person is seriously injured in an accident and is taken to a hospital where due to negligence on the part of the hospital authority, such victim is infected with tetanus, and ultimately dies of tetanus, in such a situation, although the cause of death is not actually the accident but infection of tetanus due to negligence of the hospital, it should be presumed that death occurred as a consequence of accident. Because if the victim was not involved in accident, there was no occasion for bringing him to hospital and consequently, he would not have been exposed to tetanus. 16. Therefore, in such a case, although death is not the direct result of an accident but definitely, the outcome of such accident.” The other judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants are in a similar vein. 16. In the case of Raj Kumar (supra), the Apex Court has held that mere production of a Disability Certificate or Discharge Certificate will not prove the extent of disability stated therein, unless the doctor is examined. The relevant portion of paragraph 18 of the judgment and order passed in Raj Kumar (supra) is reproduced below: “18.......The Tribunal may invariably make it a point to require the evidence of the Doctor who treated the injured or who assessed the permanent disability. Mere production of a disability certificate or Discharge Certificate will not be proof of the extent of disability stated therein unless the Doctor who treated the claimant or who medically examined and assessed the extent of disability of claimant, is tendered for cross- examination with reference to the certificate.....” 17. The issue to be decided is whether the deceased had died due to the affect/consequences of the injury sustained by him in the accident that occurred on 09.12.2017. The issue to be decided is whether the deceased had died due to the affect/consequences of the injury sustained by him in the accident that occurred on 09.12.2017. To decide the said issue, the following dates are reproduced below: (i) 09.12.2007 - date of accident (ii) 09.12.2007 to 12.12.2007 - treated at GMCH (iii) 13.12.2007 to 27.12.2007 - treated at Popular Nursing Home, Patna (iv) 05.01.2008 to 09.01.2008 - treated at Aruna Memorial Hospital, Guwahati (v) 09.01.2008 to 10.01.2008 - treated at International Hospital, Guwahati (vi) 10.01.2008 - deceased expired 18. The impugned order dated 26.02.2015 had been made by the learned Trial Court on the basis of the evidence adduced by 4 witnesses. PW-1 is the wife of the deceased and the appellant No. 1. PW-2 is the person who saw the accident, took the deceased to Patna and back to Guwahati. PW-3 is the doctor from International Hospital, Guwahati, while PW-4 is the Government Officer, who proved the salary of the deceased. 19. A perusal of the evidence recorded by the learned Trial Court shows that there had been no post-mortem report made in respect of the death of the deceased. Though the deceased had injured the femur of his left leg and was admitted in the GMCH for 3 nigths and 3 days, there is no record of what had transpired in GMCH. There is nothing to show that any medical examination had taken place, with regard to the injury allegedly suffered by the appellant’s husband. Similarly, there is no document with regard to any treatment being given to the deceased. With regard to the stay of the deceased in Popular Nursing Home, Patna for 15 days and nights, only the certificate dated 27.12.2007 issued by the Popular Nursing Home, Patna is exhibited (Ext.2). No doctor or any person associated with Popular Nursing Home, Patna had been examined as a witness in the learned Trial Court to prove the authenticity of Ext.2. 20. With regard to the stay of the deceased in Aruna Memorial Hospital, Guwahati for 4 nights and 4 days, discharge certificate dated 09.01.2008 and reference letter dated 09.01.2008 have been exhibited as Ext.3 and Ext.4 respectively. With regard to Ext.3, the treatment of the deceased states as follows: “POST OP Case of #Femur (treated at Patna) presented with fever, Hepatitis.” 21. Ext.4 shows that the deceased was referred to International Hospital to consult Dr. With regard to Ext.3, the treatment of the deceased states as follows: “POST OP Case of #Femur (treated at Patna) presented with fever, Hepatitis.” 21. Ext.4 shows that the deceased was referred to International Hospital to consult Dr. T. Das or Dr. N. Khaund. However, no doctor or any other person from Aruna Memorial Hospital was examined in respect of Ext.3 and Ext.4. 22. Ext.5 is the Death Certificate issued by the International Hospital, Guwahati, which states that the deceased was admitted on 09.01.2008 and died on 10.01.2008 at 4:35 pm. The immediate cause of death recorded in the Ext.5 is “Sepsis with M.O.D.S.” The antecedent causes of death, as reflected in the Death Certificate is Pneumonia and fracture left femur. The Death Certificate was signed by Dr. Deepom Sharma, who is PW-3. 23. PW-3, in his evidence, stated that the immediate cause of death of the deceased was Sepsis with multi-organ dis-function syndrom and the antecedent cause was Pneumonia and fracture of left femur. However, during his cross-examination, PW-3 stated that he did not treat the deceased in respect of his fractured femur. He also stated that the deceased took treatment in the International Hospital for Sepsis only and not for fracture of femur. He also stated that healthy people can also die of Pneumonia. He also stated that he could not rule out the fact that Sepsis, which had led to multi-organ failure, might have been caused by infection acquired in the Hospital. He stated that fracture was not the immediate cause of death. 24. A careful consideration of the evidence adduced by PW-3 would go to show that the deceased was not treated for fracture of the femur in the International Hospital. Further, there is nothing to show Sepsis had occurred due to the fracture in the femur, though the same was recorded as a antecedent cause of death in the Death Certificate by PW-3. It is not understood as to how the deceased could have been in GMCH for 3 days and 3 nights and the appellant not being able to produce any document or make any averment with respect to the stay of the deceased in the GMCH. The very question whether there was any fracture of the femur at the time the deceased was admitted in the GMCH is also in doubt. The very question whether there was any fracture of the femur at the time the deceased was admitted in the GMCH is also in doubt. Further, PW-2, who was the eyewitness to the accident, had apparently taken the deceased to Patna and stayed with him for 15 days, even though he was not a friend, acquaintance or had any familial connection with the deceased or the appellants. As no doctors from GMCH, Popular Nursing Home, Patna and Aruna Memorial Hospital were examined as witnesses, this Court is of the view that Ext. 2, Ext.3 and Ext.4 cannot be said to be proved. Further, as can be seen from the evidence recorded, Dr. T. Das or Dr. N. Khaund of International Hospital did not examine the deceased, even though he had been allegedly referred to them vide Ext.4. The question whether the deceased travelled to Patna and was admitted to the Popular Nursing Home, Patna is also in doubt, given the fact that no train ticket was submitted by PW-2, who had apparently taken the deceased to Patna and back. It is also surprising that the deceased nor the appellant No. 1 did not write any letter to the Government authorities praying for leave. 25. On considering the evidence on record and keeping in view the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties, this Court is of the considered view that the appellants have not been able to prove that the death of the deceased had occurred due to the consequences relating to the fracture of the femur of the deceased, which occurred due to a vehicular accident. 26. With regard to the stand taken by the respondent’s counsel that the insurance company can make a challenge to any adverse finding of the learned Trial Court, in terms of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shri Saurav Jain and Another (supra), this Court finds that the Apex Court in the above case was considering the fact that the objection to the jurisdiction of the Trial Court was made before the Trial Court, but not before the High Court and that the principles stipulated in Order XLI Rule 42 of CPC could be applied to petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution, because of the wide powers of the Apex Court to do justice under Article 142 of the Constitution. However, in the present case, as the respondent has not made a challenge to the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, this Court is of the view that the challenge made by the respondent to the impugned judgment cannot survive in the absence of an appeal being filed against the same. Further, Article 142 is not applicable to High Courts. 27. In view of the reasons stated above, this Court does not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgment dated 26.02.2015 passed in MAC Case No. 1290/2009. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Send back the LCRs.