JUDGMENT : 1. This petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India against the order of the appellate authority passed under Section 33 of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976 confirming the order of the competent authority dated 28.2.1984. By the said order, the competent authority has found that the petitioner was holding 14006 sq.mtrs. of excess land. 2. The brief facts giving rise to the present petition are as under :- 2.1 On coming into operation of the Urban Lands (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, the petitioner filed Form No.6 of the said Act in the office of respondent no.2 on 19.8.1976, wherein it mentioned 12 properties held by the petitioner. In column no.14, the petitioner has stated that, in the said property, his four sons have share along with him. On scrutiny of the form, respondent no.2 issued draft statement and notice under Section 8 of the said Act requiring the petitioner to file objection to the said draft statement. Accordingly, the petitioner filed objection on 5.11.1982 contending that he is not holding excess land and property at Survey no.3 paiki, 18 paiki, 482, 499, 418 and 291 are agricultural lands mainly used for agriculture and, therefore, the same cannot be treated as vacant land and his four sons have also share in all the properties. Respondent no.2 authority by order dated 28.2.1984 declared 14006 sq.mtrs. of land as excess land. 2.2 Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed appeal under Section 33 of the Act before the appellate forum contending, inter alia, that the land Survey No.291 is mainly used as agricultural land and manure pit cannot be computed in the ceiling as well as Vaada land also cannot be computed in the ceiling as provided by proviso to Section 2 (q) of the Act. He also reiterated his stand that his sons have share in the property. However, same came to be dismissed by the appellate authority. 2.3 The main contention of the petitioner is that his sons have share in the property and the land is agricultural land and, therefore, there is no excess land available. The competent authority has committed an error of facts and law in declaring excess land. He has also contended that possession has not been taken over by the competent authority. 3. The competent authority has committed an error of facts and law in declaring excess land. He has also contended that possession has not been taken over by the competent authority. 3. Heard learned advocate Mr.M.A.Parekh for the petitioner and learned AGP, Ms.Jyoti Bhatt for the respondent-State at length. Perused the material placed on record. Written submissions produced by learned advocate Mr.Parekh are also considered. 4. Mr.Parekh, learned advocate for the petitioner has vehemently submitted the same facts, which are narrated in the memo of petition and has submitted that the order of competent authority and appellate authority is not proper. He has submitted that during the pendency of the petition, the petitioner-Kantilal Patel has died on 24.11.2009 and the principal Act of 1976 came to be repealed in 1999. According to him, therefore, benefit provided under Section 4 of the repealed Act needs to be extended in the instant case as prima facie petitioner herein-Kantilal died on 24.11.2009 and the order was passed on 7.12.1995, against which status quo is granted in favour of the petitioner. Therefore, no procedure contemplated under Section 10 (5) and 10 (6) of the principal Act was ever initiated, though de jure possession was taken by the government but de facto possession has not been taken by the competent authority. He has submitted that possession of land is still with the petitioner and due to coming into operation of the repealed Act, entire proceedings under the ULC Act 1976 stands abated. While relying upon following decisions, he has prayed to pass appropriate order allowing the petition of the petitioner and holding that in view of repeal of the old Act, matter has been abated. (i) Letters Patent Appeal No.498 and 699 of 1995 in the case of Mavjibhai Parbatbhai Trapasia v. State of Gujarat decided on 4.1.2001. (ii) Special Civil Application No.7812 of 1993 in the case of Maninagar Vaishalipark Co-op. Housing Society Limited v. Competent authority and Deputy Collector decided on 15.2.2006. (iii) Laxmanbhai K. Chokshi v. Competent Authority and Additional Collector (ULC) reported in 2007 (3) GLR 2231 . 5. Per contra, learned AGP, Ms.Jyoti Bhatt has vehemently submitted that there are concurrent findings of fact by the competent authority and appellate authority, which are of the year 1984. She has submitted that decisions relied upon by learned advocate for the petitioner are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 5. Per contra, learned AGP, Ms.Jyoti Bhatt has vehemently submitted that there are concurrent findings of fact by the competent authority and appellate authority, which are of the year 1984. She has submitted that decisions relied upon by learned advocate for the petitioner are not applicable to the facts of the present case. She has submitted that in view of the decisions relied upon by her, petitioners are not entitled to get any benefit of the repealed Act as the possession has already been taken over by the competent authority. According to her submission, as the question of fact is involved in this petition, the same is not maintainable. While relying upon following decisions, she has submitted that the petition deserves to be dismissed and it may be dismissed. (i) State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma and Others reported in (2015) 5 SCC 321 . (ii) Decision of this Court in the case of Heirs of Decd Jethabhai Ishwarbhai in Special Civil Application No.11044 of 2000 decided on 4.10.2016. (iii) Decision of this Court in the case of Heirs of Decd Jethabhai Ishwarbhai in Letters Patent Appeal No.405 of 2017 decided on 22.1.2021. (iv) Decision of this Court in the case of Dineshkumar Jagubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and Others in Letters Patent Appeal No.332 of 2017 and allied appeals decided on 5.3.2021. (v) Decision of this Court in the case of Ganesh Industrail Estate v. Addl. Dy.Collector and Competent Officer decided on 20.4.2021. (vi) Decision of this Court in the case of Ravhjibhai Chhotabhai Patel and others v. Competent Officer and Deputy Collector and Others in Letters Patent Appeal No.941 of 2016 decided on 25.3.2021. (vii) Decision of this Court in the case of Prabhatbhai Shivabhai Solanki through legal heirs v. State of Gujarat and Others in Letters Patent Appeal No.1281 of 2016 decided on 23.3.2021. (viii) Decision of this Court in the case of Chandralal Bulchand Ambavani and Another v. State of Gujarat and Another in Letters Patent Appeal No.1411 of 2016 decided on 22.2.2021. (ix) Decision of this Court in the case of Shivam Developers v. State of Gujarat and Others in Letters Patent Appeal No.1336 of 2014 decided on 31.3.2021. (x) Decision of this Court in the case of Shankarbhai Somabhai Parmar since deceased v. State of Gujarat and Others in Letters Patent Appeal No.8 of 2017 decided on 22.3.2021. 6. (ix) Decision of this Court in the case of Shivam Developers v. State of Gujarat and Others in Letters Patent Appeal No.1336 of 2014 decided on 31.3.2021. (x) Decision of this Court in the case of Shankarbhai Somabhai Parmar since deceased v. State of Gujarat and Others in Letters Patent Appeal No.8 of 2017 decided on 22.3.2021. 6. In rejoinder, learned advocate Mr.Parekh has submitted that the competent authority has not placed on record any document showing that any proceedings under Section 10 (5) and 10 (6) of the ULC Act, 1976 was ever taken and actual possession was taken by the competent authority. He has submitted that decisions relied upon by learned AGP are not applicable to the facts of the present case, as in those cases, actual possession of the land was taken over by the competent authority by following due process under Section 10 (5) and 10 (6) of the Act, whereas in the present case, actual possession of the land has not been taken over by the competent authority. He has prayed to allow present petition. 7. Having considered the submissions made by both the sides coupled with material placed on record and decisions cited at bar, moot question in this matter is as to whether actual possession was taken over by the Government from the petitioner by following procedure prescribed in Section 10 (5) and 10 (6) of the ULC Act, 1976 and whether repealed Act 1999 is applicable to the facts of present case. 8. The Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Hari Ram reported in AIR 2013 SC 1793 had an occasion to deal with the provisions of 1976 Act and the provisions of the repealed Act, wherein after examining Sections 6, 8 and 10 of the 1976 Act and the provisions of Section 3 of the repealed Act, 1999, it is observed as under:- “15. Before examining the impact of the Repeal Act on Act 33 of 1976, particularly, Section 3 of the Repeal Act on subsection (3) to Section 10 of the Act, let us examine whether possession could be taken following the procedure laid down in sub-section (3) to Section 10 of the Act. Before examining the impact of the Repeal Act on Act 33 of 1976, particularly, Section 3 of the Repeal Act on subsection (3) to Section 10 of the Act, let us examine whether possession could be taken following the procedure laid down in sub-section (3) to Section 10 of the Act. Section 6 casts an obligation on every person holding vacant land in excess of ceiling limit to file a statement before the competent authority and after following all the statutory procedures, the competent authority has to pass the order under Section 8(4) on the draft statement. Following that, a final statement has to be issued under Section 9 on the person concerned. Subsection (1) to Section 10 states that after the service of statement, the competent authority has to issue a notification giving particulars of the land held by such person in excess of the ceiling limit. Notification has to be published for the information of the general public in the Official Gazette, stating that such vacant land is to be acquired and that the claims of all the persons interested in such vacant land be made by them giving particulars of the nature of their interests in such land. 16. Sub-section (2) of Section 10 states that after considering the claims of persons interested in the vacant land, the competent authority has to determine the nature and extent of such claims and pass such orders as it might deem fit. Subsection (3) of Section 10 states that after the publication of the notification under sub-section (1), the competent authority has to declare that the excess land referred to in the Notification published under sub-section (1) of Section 10 shall, with effect from such date, as might be prescribed in the declaration, be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government. On publication of a declaration to that effect such land shall be deemed to have been vested absolutely in the State Government, free from all encumbrances, with effect from the date so specified. Legal Fiction: 17. Legislature is competent to create a legal fiction, for the purpose of assuming existence of a fact which does not really exist. Sub-section (3) of Section 10 contained two deeming provisions such as “deemed to have been acquired” and “deemed to have been vested absolutely”. Let us first examine the legal consequences of a ‘deeming provision’. Legal Fiction: 17. Legislature is competent to create a legal fiction, for the purpose of assuming existence of a fact which does not really exist. Sub-section (3) of Section 10 contained two deeming provisions such as “deemed to have been acquired” and “deemed to have been vested absolutely”. Let us first examine the legal consequences of a ‘deeming provision’. In interpreting the provision creating a legal fiction, the Court is to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created and after ascertaining this, the Court is to assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction. This Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company Limited v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 2 SCC 449 held that what can be deemed to exist under a legal fiction are facts and not legal consequences which do not flow from the law as it stands. …………. 20. Let us test the meaning of the expression “deemed to have been acquired” and “deemed to have been vested absolutely” in the above legal settings. The expression “acquired” and “vested” are not defined under the Act. Each word, phrase or sentence that we get in a statutory provision, if not defined in the Act, then is to be construed in the light of the general purpose of the Act. As held by this Court in Organo Chemical Industries v. Union of India (1979) 4 SCC 573 that a bare mechanical interpretation of the words and application of a legislative intent devoid of concept of purpose will reduce most of the remedial and beneficial legislation to futility. Reference may also be made to the Judgment of this Court in Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan (1994) 3 SCC 440 . Words and phrases, therefore, occurring in the statute are to be taken not in an isolated or detached manner, it is associated on the context but are read together and construed in the light of the purpose and object of the Act. 21. This Court in S. Gopal Reddy v. State of U.P. (1996) 4 SCC 596 held: “it is well known rule of interpretation of statutes that the text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in a statute. 21. This Court in S. Gopal Reddy v. State of U.P. (1996) 4 SCC 596 held: “it is well known rule of interpretation of statutes that the text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in a statute. The Courts must look to the object, which the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the provisions of the Act. A purposive approach for interpreting the Act is necessary…….” 22. In Jugal Kishore Saraf v. M/s Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. AIR 1955 SC 376 , Justice S.R. Das stated: “The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally that is, by giving to the words used by legislature their ordinary natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation.” 23. The expression “deemed to have been acquired” used as a deeming fiction under sub-section (3) of Section 10 can only mean acquisition of title or acquisition of interests because till that time the land may be either in the ownership of the person who held that vacant land or to possess such land as owner or as a tenant or as mortgagee and so on as defined under Section 2(1) of the Act. The word “vested” has not been defined in the Act, so also the word “absolutely”. What is vested absolutely is only the land which is deemed to have acquired and nothing more. The word “vest” has different meaning in different context; especially when we examine the meaning of vesting on the basis of a statutory hypothesis of a deeming provision which Lord Hoffmann in Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Zielinski Baker and Partners (2004) 2 All E.R. 141 (at 11) described as “heroic piece of deeming”. …………… 25. Vest/vested, therefore, may or may not include “transfer of possession” the meaning of which depends on the context in which it has been placed and the interpretation of various other related provisions. ……………. 30. …………… 25. Vest/vested, therefore, may or may not include “transfer of possession” the meaning of which depends on the context in which it has been placed and the interpretation of various other related provisions. ……………. 30. Before we examine sub-section (5) and sub-section (6) of Section 10, let us examine the meaning of sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Act, which says that during the period commencing on the date of publication under sub-section (1), ending with the day specified in the declaration made under subsection (3), no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift or otherwise, any excess vacant land, specified in the notification and any such transfer made in contravention of the Act shall be deemed to be null and void. Further, it also says that no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant land. Therefore, from the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1) and ending with the date specified in the declaration made in sub-section (3), there is no question of disturbing the possession of a person, the possession, therefore, continues to be with the holder of the land. Peaceful dispossession 31. Sub-section (5) of Section 10, for the first time, speaks of “possession” which says where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 10, the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person, who may be in possession of it to surrender or transfer possession to the State Government or to any other person, duly authorized by the State Government. 32. If de facto possession has already passed on to the State Government by the two deeming provisions under sub-section (3) to Section 10, there is no necessity of using the expression “where any land is vested” under sub-section (5) to Section 10. Surrendering or transfer of possession under sub-section (3) to Section 10 can be voluntary so that the person may get the compensation as provided under Section 11 of the Act early. Once there is no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession, necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in writing under sub-section (5) to Section 10 to surrender or deliver possession. Subsection (5) of Section 10 visualizes a situation of surrendering and delivering possession, peacefully while subsection (6) of Section 10 contemplates a situation of forceful dispossession. Forceful dispossession 33. Once there is no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession, necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in writing under sub-section (5) to Section 10 to surrender or deliver possession. Subsection (5) of Section 10 visualizes a situation of surrendering and delivering possession, peacefully while subsection (6) of Section 10 contemplates a situation of forceful dispossession. Forceful dispossession 33. The Act provides for forceful dispossession but only when a person refuses or fails to comply with an order under subsection (5) of Section 10. Sub-section (6) to Section 10 again speaks of “possession” which says, if any person refuses or fails to comply with the order made under sub-section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land to be given to the State Government and for that purpose, force - as may be necessary - can be used. Sub-section (6), therefore, contemplates a situation of a person refusing or fails to comply with the order under sub-section (5), in the event of which the competent authority may take possession by use of force. Forcible dispossession of the land, therefore, is being resorted only in a situation which falls under subsection (6) and not under subsection (5) to Section 10. Subsections (5) and (6), therefore, take care of both the situations, i.e. taking possession by giving notice that is “peaceful dispossession” and on failure to surrender or give delivery of possession under Section 10 (5), than “forceful dispossession” under sub-section (6) of Section 10. 34. Requirement of giving notice under sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 is mandatory. Though the word ‘may’ has been used therein, the word ‘may’ in both the sub-sections has to be understood as “shall” because a court charged with the task of enforcing the statute needs to decide the consequences that the legislature intended to follow from failure to implement the requirement. Effect of non-issue of notice under sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) of Section 11 is that it might result the land holder being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the word ‘may’ has to be read as ‘shall’. ……….. Effect of the Repeal Act 38. Let us now examine the effect of Section 3 of the Repeal Act 15 of 1999 on sub-section (3) to Section 10 of the Act. The Repeal Act 1999 has expressly repealed the Act 33 of 1976. ……….. Effect of the Repeal Act 38. Let us now examine the effect of Section 3 of the Repeal Act 15 of 1999 on sub-section (3) to Section 10 of the Act. The Repeal Act 1999 has expressly repealed the Act 33 of 1976. The Object and Reasons of the Repeal Act has already been referred to in the earlier part of this Judgment. Repeal Act has, however, retained a saving clause. The question whether a right has been acquired or liability incurred under a statute before it is repealed will in each case depend on the construction of the statute and the facts of the particular case. 39. The mere vesting of the land under sub-section (3) of Section 10 would not confer any right on the State Government to have de facto possession of the vacant land unless there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land before 18.3.1999. State has to establish that there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or surrender and delivery of peaceful possession under subsection (5) of Section 10 or forceful dispossession under subsection (6) of Section 10. On failure to establish any of those situations, the land owner or holder can claim the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The State Government in this appeal could not establish any of those situations and hence the High Court is right in holding that the respondent is entitled to get the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act.” 9. It is pertinent to note that so far as reliance placed on decision in the case of State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma and Others, reported in (2015) 5 SCC 321 is concerned, in that case, decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh (supra) has been distinguished. The fact was to the effect that the original owner, who was dispossessed in the year 1991, has not challenged said action of dispossession and, thereafter, there was other transaction and after many years, stand was taken that there was no legal possession by following provisions of Section 10 (5) and 10 (6) of the ULC Act. Considering that fact, the Apex Court has held that it will not affect the case of the State in any way. The observations made therein are to the following effect:- “11. Considering that fact, the Apex Court has held that it will not affect the case of the State in any way. The observations made therein are to the following effect:- “11. Section 3 of the Repeal Act postulates that vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of Section 10, is subject to the condition that possession thereof has been taken over by the competent authority or by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government. The expression "possession" used in Section 3 (supra) has been interpreted to mean “actual physical possession” of the surplus land and not just possession that goes with the vesting of excess land in terms of Section 10(3) of the Act. ………… 13. The case of the appellant is that actual physical possession of the land was taken over on 7th December, 1991 no matter unilaterally and without notice to the erstwhile land owner. That assertion is stoutly denied by the respondents giving rise to seriously disputed question of fact which may not be amenable to a satisfactory determination by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. But assuming that any such determination is possible even in proceedings under Article 226 of the constitution, what needs examination is whether the failure of the Government or the authorised officer or the competent authority to issue a notice to the land owners in terms of Section 10 (5) would by itself mean that such dispossession is no dispossession in the eye of law and hence insufficient to attract Section 3 of the Repeal Act. Our answer to that question is in the negative. 14. We say so because in the ordinary course actual physical possession can be taken from the person in occupation only after notice under Section 10(5) is issued to him to surrender such possession to the State Government, or the authorised officer or the competent authority. There is enough good sense in that procedure inasmuch as the need for using force to dispossess a person in possession should ordinarily arise only if the person concerned refuses to cooperate and surrender or deliver possession of the lands in question. That is the rationale behind Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act. There is enough good sense in that procedure inasmuch as the need for using force to dispossess a person in possession should ordinarily arise only if the person concerned refuses to cooperate and surrender or deliver possession of the lands in question. That is the rationale behind Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act. But what would be the position if for any reason the competent authority or the Government or the authorised officer resorts to forcible dispossession of the erstwhile owner even without exploring the possibility of a voluntary surrender or delivery of such possession on demand. Could such use of force vitiate the dispossession itself or would it only amount to an irregularity that would give rise to a cause of action for the aggrieved owner or the person in possession to seek restoration only to be dispossessed again after issuing a notice to him. It is this aspect that has to an extent bothered us.” 10. So far as the decisions relied upon by learned AGP are concerned, in the facts of those cases, it was found that actual possession of the land was already taken over by competent authority and in one of the cases, it was found that the petitioner had prepared forged order of the competent authority to show that he is in possession. Considering peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court, in the aforesaid decisions, which have been relied upon by learned AGP has upheld the contention of the competent authority that possession was with the Government and, ultimately, the petition/Letters Patent Appeal came to be rejected holding that repealed Act would not be applicable to the facts of the case. 11. Considering the aforesaid observations, it is incumbent upon the competent authority to be in actual possession of the property for substantiating its stand that the provisions of repeal Act would not be applicable. Now, in the present case, it is an admitted fact that no notice under Section 10 (5) or Section 10 (6) has been issued to the petitioner. There is no documentary evidence produced by the competent authority to show that actual possession was taken over by the competent authority from the petitioner of the alleged excess land. It is also an admitted fact that during the pendency of this petition, ULC Act 1976 came to be repealed. There is no documentary evidence produced by the competent authority to show that actual possession was taken over by the competent authority from the petitioner of the alleged excess land. It is also an admitted fact that during the pendency of this petition, ULC Act 1976 came to be repealed. Section 3 of the repealed Act provides as under :- “Section 3 in The Urban land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 3. Saving.-(1) The repeal of the principal Act shall not affect— (a) the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of Section 10, possession of which has been taken over the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority; (b) the validity of any order granting exemption under subsection (1) of Section 20 or any action taken thereunder, notwithstanding any judgment of any court to the contrary; (c) any payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20. (2) Where— (a) any land is deemed to have vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the principal Act but possession of which has not been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority; and (b) any amount has been paid by the State Government with respect to such land then, such land shall not be restored unless the amount paid, if any, has been refunded to the State Government. 4. 4. Abatement of legal proceedings- All proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the principal Act pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, before any Court, tribunal or other authority shall abate: Provided that this section shall not apply to the proceedings relating to sections 11,12,13 and 14 of the principal Act insofar as such proceedings are relatable to the land, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority.” 12. Thus, in the present case, no possession of vacant land has been obtained by the State by following procedure under Section 10 (5) and 10 (6) of ULC Act, 1976 and only de jure possession can be deemed to be vested with the Government. However, on failure to establish any of the situation enumerated in Section 10 of the ULC Act, the land owner or holder can claim the benefit of Section 3 of the repeal Act. In the present case, as the State Government could not establish any of the situation enumerated in Section 10, the petitioner is entitled to get benefit of Section 3 of the repeal Act. 13. In view of above, present petition is required to be allowed. Accordingly, it is allowed. Proceedings of ULC stand abated in view of provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the repealed Act. Since the proceedings have abated, impugned order of the appellate authority passed under Section 33 of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976 confirming the order of the competent authority dated 28.2.1984 is quashed. No order as to costs.