JUDGMENT : N.V.ANJARIA, J. Heard learned senior advocate Mr.Navin Pahwa with learned advocate Mr.Nachiket Dave for the appellant and learned advocate Ms.Harshal Pandya for the respondent, at length. 1.1 Learned advocate for the respective parties stated and submitted that they argued the appeal finally. They further stated that the appeal papers contained the relevant record which was before the court below, for which they are ad-idem which they relied on in course of hearing of this appeal. 1.2 Learned advocates for both the sides also stated that the pleadings are completed and that they do not want to add to or supplement them. 2. Preferred under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, this appeal is directed against judgment and order dated 11.3.2022 passed by learned Judge, Commercial Court, City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, whereby Commercial Civil Miscellaneous Application No.73 of 2020 came to be dismissed. It was an application filed by the appellant under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 praying for interim measures. 3. The prayer made in the said application was to restrain the respondent No.1 from invoking and encashing the bank guarantee No.066CM09180860001 dated 23.7.2018 for Rs.47,36,520/-. A direction was prayed for against respondent No.2 Bank for not making the payment to respondent No.1 under the said bank guarantee. 3.1 The facts are inter alia that the appellant Lite Bite Goods Foods Private Limited, engaged in the retail business of food and beverages was granted a contract pursuant to the tender process by respondent No.1 Airport Authority of India, for food court facility at the Domestic Terminal at Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel Airport, Ahmedabad. A licence to occupy the space to run the food court was awarded on 20.3.2018 by executing licence agreement. The licence period was of one year commencing from 19.5.2018 upto 18.5.2019. The agreement was extended by amendment upto 30.6.2020. The licence fee was agreed to be paid at monthly Rs.20,07,000/- plus GST and other taxes. Clause 18 of the agreement was Arbitration Clause which laid down the mechanism for resolution of disputes between the parties by arbitration. The other conditions of licencee are referred to hereinafter wherever necessary. 3.1.1 Alongwith the licence agreement, the petitioner executed bank guarantee dated 23.7.2018 for Rs.47,36,520/-. Period of bank guarantee was mentioned to be expiring on 30.6.2020 and the date due for the claims thereunder was stated to be 30.9.2020. The other conditions of licencee are referred to hereinafter wherever necessary. 3.1.1 Alongwith the licence agreement, the petitioner executed bank guarantee dated 23.7.2018 for Rs.47,36,520/-. Period of bank guarantee was mentioned to be expiring on 30.6.2020 and the date due for the claims thereunder was stated to be 30.9.2020. The food court facility was operated by the appellant at the place allotted to it in the airport premises. The licence agreement stood terminated by efflux of time. 3.1.2 Before the expiry of the licence period on 30.6.2020, the respondent No.1 sent e-mail communication to the appellant on 24.6.2020 seeking appellant’s willingness for extension of contract period to which the appellant replied to convey that he was willing to accept the extension subject to commercial consideration and keeping in view the pandemic situation. Respondent conveyed on 25.6.2020 that extension could be considered on the existing terms and conditions of the contract including 10% escalation. In reply dated 26.6.2020, the applicant proposed to pay revenue share plaintiff 18% on actual sales till the situation was stabilized. 3.1.3 On 3.7.2020 the applicant sent another e-mail requesting for executing new contract, to which respondent No.1 stated that 10% escalation alongwith the existing conditions would have to be abided by. The applicant sent e-mail on 9.7.2020 asking for new contract at revenue share of 12% on actual sale. The respondent No.1 again stated that escalation of 10% and other conditions would apply. 3.1.4 It appears that though the correspondence as above took place, nothing fructified. On 16.7.2020 respondent No.1 asked the appellant to pay the outstanding dues with interest and thereafter on 22.7.2020 and again on 5.8.2020 addressed letters to the appellant requesting for extension of the bank guarantee. As the dues were not paid by the appellant, finally on 26.8.2020 respondent No.1 specifically stated that in case of failure to pay, the bank guarantee would be encashed. 3.1.5 Respondent No.1 by e-mail dated 18.9.2020 raised invoices for the months of April, 2020 to June, 2020 demanding the amounts due from the appellant. The invoices were dated 16.9.2020 and 26.9.2020. The appellant was also requested to furnish the details of payments made on 4.9.2020 and 9.9.2020. The appellant was conveyed that it was required to pay Rs.13,54,454.84 ps. which was subsequently revised after adjustments to Rs.1,01,895.56 ps. The invoices were dated 16.9.2020 and 26.9.2020. The appellant was also requested to furnish the details of payments made on 4.9.2020 and 9.9.2020. The appellant was conveyed that it was required to pay Rs.13,54,454.84 ps. which was subsequently revised after adjustments to Rs.1,01,895.56 ps. 3.1.6 Further requests were made by respondent No.1 by e-mails and letters including the last dated 23.9.2020 to clear the dues. In response, at this stage, the appellant stated about the pandemic situation. Respondent No.1 sent e-mail dated 24.9.2020 to applicant sending Space Licence Fee Bills from the period from July, 2020 to September, 2020. 3.1.7 As the appellant did not pay the dues demanded, the respondent authority communicated that it would invoke the bank guarantee on 29.9.2020. The appellant- applicant filed application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter mentioned as ‘the Act’) on 28.9.2022 seeking interim measure in the nature of injunction against invocation of bank guarantee. 3.2 It was the case of the appellant-applicant in the application for seeking interim measure to seek restrain the respondent Airport Authority from encashing the bank guarantee inter alia that the bills were raised which were beyond the date mentioned in the bank guarantee. It was claimed that the credit of certain payments were not given by the respondent. It was stated that the amount of Rs.13,54,454.80 ps. demanded by respondent authority in e-mail dated 22.4.2019 was required to be adjusted by giving credit to the amount of Rs.2,86,084/- towards TDS related payment, Rs.2,00,000/- on account of security deposit and Rs.7,66,475/- in respect of credit note for duration of lockdown. According to the appellant what was payable by it, was only Rs.1,01,895.56 ps. and that the said payment was already processed. 3.2.1 It was contended that there was no valid reason on part of the respondent No.1 authority in sending the invoices for the duration from July, 2020 to September, 2020. It was contended that period of bank guarantee expired on 30.6.2020. It was further contended that pro forma invoices were issued in such a manner that ten days period for making payment expires on 26.9.2020, thereby respondent No.1 wanted itself to be enable to make the claim before the date of expiry of the bank guarantee, which was 30.9.2020. It was submitted that the bank guarantee had its expiry date as 30.6.2020 and the claim expiry was to be 30.9.2020. It was submitted that the bank guarantee had its expiry date as 30.6.2020 and the claim expiry was to be 30.9.2020. According to the applicant all the dues were discharged by the applicant upto the date 30.6.2020, when the licence agreement stood terminated by efflux of time. It was contended that the issuance of invoices for the period beyond was a malafied and fraudulent act on part of the respondent No.1. 3.2.2 It was further contended that it was not permissible for respondent No.1 to seek encashment of bank guarantee to demand the amount which were frivolous claims and had allegedly arisen post licence agreement period and after expiry of bank guarantee period. It was reiterated that respondent’s demanding e-mail dated 22.9.2022 was for the amount of Rs.13,54,454.84 which was adjusted or paid in terms of reply email dated 26.9.2020 and that no outstanding amount remained to be paid. It was also contended that COVID-19 was an event of force majeure and since the said event continued for more than 120 days, respondent No.1 could not have charged anything towards the said period of force majeure. 3.2.3 On the basis of all the above facts, terming the encashment of bank guarantee to be fraudulent. It was contended that if the encashment was to be permitted, it would result into irreversible and irreparable loss to the applicant. It was claimed that the balance of convenience would lie in favor of the applicant. 3.2.4 It was on the other hand the case of the respondent that bills were prepared on 16.9.2020 and the appellant was conveyed and explained about that telephonically but the appellant sat tight. The appellant was requested to furnish the details of payments made on 4.9.2020 and 9.9.2020. The appellant had initially conveyed that Rs.13,54,455/- was required to be paid, which amount was later revised as stated above. 4. Elaborating the case and the contentions raised in the application under Section 9 and further highlighting that the demand for payment forwarded through the bills was in respect of the period subsequent to the expiry date mentioned in the bank guarantee, it was vehemently submitted by learned senior advocate that for the claims of such nature, it was not permissible for the respondent authority to encash the bank guarantee and that it amounted fraudulent approach and conduct and further that it would lead to irretrievable damage to the applicant. 4.1 Learned advocate for the petitioner relied on the decision of this court in Wires And Cables India Pvt. Ltd. vs Voltamp Transformers Pvt. Ltd. in Special Civil Application No.9581 of 2005 decided on 12.12.2006 to contend on the basis of observations and paragraphs Nos.22 and 23 that in the facts of the case, it is settled proposition in law that the bank guarantee should be invoked in consonance with the terms of bank guarantee. 4.2 By relying on the decision of the Delhi High Court in M/s.Meena Advertisers Vs. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited, it was submitted that the performance bank guarantee cannot be allowed to be invoked after defect liability period has expired and also that the larger amount covered under bank guarantee cannot be permitted to be encashed for a small portion of dues. It was submitted that where the invocation of the bank guarantee is not in accordance with the terms of the bank guarantee, it offers a situation which would obligate the bank to refuse the payment, and such principle was sought to be highlighted from another decision of Delhi High Court in Ansal Properties and Industries (P) Limited Vs. Engineering Project (India) Limited [AIR 1998 Delhi 176]. 4.3 Respondent filed reply to application under Section 9 setting out the facts and the relevant clauses of the agreement. It was also specifically stated that though the pandemic situation was a ground raised, the applicant retained the possession of the licenced premises unauthorizedly and had failed to handover the possession of premises after expiry of the term of the agreement. It was stated that the possession was not handed over, eventhough there was phase-wise opening announced by the Government upon decision of the pandemic and the in-and-out movement was not restricted. It was stated that the appellant continued to occupy the licenced premises even after the contract period, which was the act and conduct not lawful or authorized on part of the licensee. 4.3.1 On the basis of various contentions raised in the reply, learned advocate for the respondent authority contended that before the date of termination of licence agreement, extension in the period of the agreement period was proposed to the appellant but the appellant did not agree and whiled away the time in correspondence which was not a bona fide approach. 4.3.1 On the basis of various contentions raised in the reply, learned advocate for the respondent authority contended that before the date of termination of licence agreement, extension in the period of the agreement period was proposed to the appellant but the appellant did not agree and whiled away the time in correspondence which was not a bona fide approach. 4.3.2 Making reference of the Clause 20 of the licence agreement, it was stated that the appellant- licensor did not vacate and continue to occupy the licenced space even after licence period got over and the agreement ended by efflux of time, hence the appellant was liable to pay exponential penalty in the nature of double licence fees per month in form of demurrage charges. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that the respondent licensor had taken lenient view in view of the pandemic situation and instead of charging the penalty of demurrage at the rate double the licence fees, the invoices were raised on the basis of commercial manual, 2019 guidelines. 4.3.3 The respondent gave the details of the amount chargeable from the appellant for its occupation and possession of the licenced premises beyond the licence period and the actual amount charged. It was stated by giving details that under the agreement Rs.2,09,01,768/- chargeable and leviable under the agreement, the invoices were raised to the extent of Rs.51,95,505/-. 5. Having noticed the contours of the controversy and the rival contentions, revisiting with the basic facts and aspects, about the licence agreement was executed on 9.4.2018 period of one year ending on 18.5.2019. The licence fee was fixed to be the monthly amount Rs.20,07,000/- plus GST and other taxes. Clause No.7 contemplated the deposit of the amount equivalent to two months licence fee as security deposit. The conditions include Condition No.18 which was an arbitration clause providing that ‘all disputes and differences arising out of’ or ‘in any way ‘touching or concerning this agreement’, shall in the first instance be referred to a Dispute Resolution Committee (DRC) set up at the Airports, for which an application to be submitted by party and the points clearly spelt out.’ It was further provided that if the dispute is not resolved within fortyfive days then the case shall be referred to a sole arbitrator to be appointed by Tender Accepting Authority. In other words, all the differences ‘arising out of’ or ‘in any way touching’ or ‘concerning the agreement’, are agreed to be referred to and decided by arbitral mechanism. 5.1 Clause 20 of the licence agreement was in the nature of exit clause. The termination could happen in three ways, normal termination for cause and termination for convenience. The penal clause was included therein about the penalty for unauthorized occupation of the licence premises, stating that ‘exponential penalty on licensees double the licence fee per month in form of demurrage charge can be imposed in licensees unauthorized occupying the premises after expiry of contract period.’ In the present case, it is the stand of the respondent authority, that though the applicant was liable to vacate the licenced premises upon expiry of the licenced period, but since did not vacate and continued the unauthorised occupation, was liable to subjected to levy of penalty at the rate provided in clause No.20, but the same was changed at much reduced rate in view of COVID-19 situation. 5.2 Now, the bank guarantee is extracted herein for its contents, “Date : 18-FEB-20 Airports Authority of India S.V.P. International Airport Ahmedabad-380003 Bank guarantee no: 066GM09180860001 Dated : 27-Mar-18 Amount : INR 4,736,520.00 Amount in words : Indian Rupees Four Million Seven Hundred Thirty Six Thousand Five Hundred Twenty Only Amendment no. : 2 Amendment date : 18-feb-20 We yes bank limited, at the request of applicant Lite Bite Foods (P) Ltd do hereby amend our above mentioned bank guarantee as follows: Amendment clauses are 1. Expiry date of the bank guarantee extended from 04- Apr-2020 to 30-Jun-2020 2. Claim date of the bank guarantee extended from 04- Jul-2020 to 30-Sep-2020 All other terms and conditions remain unchanged. This letter will form an integral part of guarantee number 066GM09180860001 dated 27-Mar-18 and attached thereto Notwithstanding anything contained herein above; 1. Our liability under this guarantee shall not exceed INR 4,736,520.00 Indian Rupees Four Million Seven Hundred Thirty Six Thousand Five Hundred Twenty Only 2. This bank guarantee shall be valid upto 30-Jun-20 and 3. This letter will form an integral part of guarantee number 066GM09180860001 dated 27-Mar-18 and attached thereto Notwithstanding anything contained herein above; 1. Our liability under this guarantee shall not exceed INR 4,736,520.00 Indian Rupees Four Million Seven Hundred Thirty Six Thousand Five Hundred Twenty Only 2. This bank guarantee shall be valid upto 30-Jun-20 and 3. We are liable to pay the guaranteed amount or any part thereof under this bank guarantee only and if you serve upon us a written claim or demand on or before 30-Sep-20 at: Yes Bank Limited Ground floor Khasra No. 919-921,925- 926, 928-933, Old Delhi, Gurgaon Highway, New Delhi – 110037.” 5.3 The law relating to invocation of bank guarantees comprises in the settled consistent principles. The Supreme Court in Ansal Engineering Projects Limited Vs. Tehri Hydro Development Corporation Limited [ (1996) 5 SCC 450 ], observed and held, “It is settled law that bank guarantee is an independent and distinct contract between the bank and the beneficiary and is not qualified by the underlying transaction and the validity of the primary contract between the person at whose instance the bank guarantee was given and the beneficiary. Unless fraud or special equity exists, is pleaded and prime facie established by strong evidence as a triable issue, the beneficiary cannot be restrained from encashing the bank guarantee even if dispute between the beneficiary and the person at whose instance the bank guarantee was given by the Bank, had arisen in performance of the contract or execution of the Works undertaken in furtherance thereof. The Bank unconditionally and irrevocably promised to pay, on demand, the amount of liability undertaken in the guarantee without any demur or dispute in terms of the bank guarantee. The object behind is to inculcate respect for free flow of commerce and trade and faith in the commercial banking transactions unhedged by pending disputes between the beneficiary and the contractor.” (Para 4) 5.3.1 It was further observed, “The Court exercising its power cannot interfere with enforcement of bank guarantee/letters of credit except only in cases where fraud or special equity is prime facie made out in the case as triable issue by strong evidence so as to prevent irretrievable injustice to the parties.” (Para 5) 5.4 It was held in Hindustan Construction Company Limited Vs. State of Bihar [ (1999) 8 SCC 436 ]. State of Bihar [ (1999) 8 SCC 436 ]. “What is important, therefore, is that the Bank Guarantee should be in unequivocal terms, unconditional and recite that the amount would be paid without demur or objection and irrespective of any dispute that might have cropped up or might have been pending between the beneficiary under the Bank Guarantee or the person on whose behalf the Guarantee was furnished.” (Para 9) 5.5 In more recent decision in Standard Chartered Bank Vs. Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited, [ (2020) 13 SCC 574 ], following was stated, after surveying the principles regarding invocation of bank guarantee, the Apex Court stated, “The settled position in law that emerges from the precedents of this Court is that the bank guarantee is an independent contract between bank and the beneficiary and the bank is always obliged to honour its guarantee as long as it is an unconditional and irrevocable one. The dispute between the beneficiary and the party at whose instance the bank has given the guarantee is immaterial and is of no consequence. There are, however, exceptions to this Rule when there is a clear case of fraud, irretrievable injustice or special equities. The Court ordinarily should not interfere with the invocation or encashment of the bank guarantee so long as the invocation is in terms of the bank guarantee.” (Para 23) 5.6 The Supreme Court in Standard Chartered Bank (supra) analyzed the law with reference to several decisions including in Himadri Chemicals Industries Limited Vs. Coal Tar Refining Co. [ (2007) 8 SCC 110 ], and in Gujarat Maritime Board Vs. Larsen & Toubro Infrastructure Development Projects Limited and Another [ (2006) 6 SCC 293 ], noticed the principles for grant or refusal for invocation of bank guarantee or a letter of credit. Coal Tar Refining Co. [ (2007) 8 SCC 110 ], and in Gujarat Maritime Board Vs. Larsen & Toubro Infrastructure Development Projects Limited and Another [ (2006) 6 SCC 293 ], noticed the principles for grant or refusal for invocation of bank guarantee or a letter of credit. [Himadri Chemicals Industries Limited (supra)], reproducing them, “From the discussions made hereinabove relating to the principles for grant or refusal to grant of injunction to restrain enforcement of a bank guarantee or a letter of credit, we find that the following principles should be noted in the matter of injunction to restrain the encashment of a bank guarantee or a letter of credit: (i) While dealing with an application for injunction in the course of commercial dealings, and when an unconditional bank guarantee or letter of credit is given or accepted, the beneficiary is entitled to realise such a bank guarantee or a letter of credit in terms thereof irrespective of any pending disputes relating to the terms of the contract. (ii) The bank giving such guarantee is bound to honour it as per its terms irrespective of any dispute raised by its customer. (iii) The courts should be slow in granting an order of injunction to restrain the realisation of a bank guarantee or a letter of credit. (iv) Since a bank guarantee or a letter of credit is an independent and a separate contract and is absolute in nature, the existence of any dispute between the parties to the contract is not a ground for issuing an order of injunction to restrain enforcement of bank guarantees or letters of credit. (v) Fraud of an egregious nature which would vitiate the very foundation of such a bank guarantee or letter of credit and the beneficiary seeks to take advantage of the situation. (vi) Allowing encashment of an unconditional bank guarantee or a letter of credit would result in irretrievable harm or injustice to one of the parties concerned.” 6. Reverting to the facts in the present controversy, the case of the appellant- applicant was that the duration of the licence period expired on 30.6.2020, while the pro-forma invoices sent by the respondent authority demanding the amount towards space-rent etc. were for the months of July to September, 2020. Reverting to the facts in the present controversy, the case of the appellant- applicant was that the duration of the licence period expired on 30.6.2020, while the pro-forma invoices sent by the respondent authority demanding the amount towards space-rent etc. were for the months of July to September, 2020. It was therefore sought to be contended by learned senior advocate on the basis of the above judgments that the bank guarantee could not have been invoked for the period beyond the expiry which was also 30.6.2020 and the time limit to lodge the claims was 30.9.2020. As against this aspect, it is also the inextricable limb of the dispute between the parties that the licencee retained the possession of the licened premised beyond the period of licence. The bills of demand raised by the respondent pertained to and extend to such period. 6.1 While considering the case of the applicant that the invoices raised were beyond the validity period, and therefore the bank guarantee could not be invoked, the dispute about the continued possession of the licencee beyond the period of licence could not be disregarded. The occupation of the licencee even after the licence period got over by efflux of time is not in dispute. The licencee’s case is that the Covid period did not permit it to handover the possession, and the specific case of the respondent authority has been that though the lock-down was eased and phase-wise permission and opening of the affairs and activity in the society by the Government and that it was possible for the licencee to vacate the premises, it remained in unauthorized possession and occupation of the licenced space. 6.2 It is also the case of the respondent- authority that in charging the penalty for beyond-the-period occupation of the appellant, a lenient view was taken having regard to the pandemic period. It is the case however that the invoices raised demanding the amount towards rent etc. pertained to the period when the licencee had been continuing its possession occupation. 6.2 It is also the case of the respondent- authority that in charging the penalty for beyond-the-period occupation of the appellant, a lenient view was taken having regard to the pandemic period. It is the case however that the invoices raised demanding the amount towards rent etc. pertained to the period when the licencee had been continuing its possession occupation. 6.3 In light of the cumulative operation of the facts as above, the disputes between the parties which are in the nature whether the bills were correctly raised, whether they were for inclusive period, what amount was payable by the appellant applicant towards the amounts claimed including the aspect as to whether the possession of the licenced premises was retained by the appellant-applicant authorizedly or it was unlawful occupation even after the licence stood terminated by efflux of time, etc. are all the disputes travelling in the realm of arbitration. 6.4 The trial court has come to a specific finding that the licencee did not vacate the licenced premises, recording as under. “(a) It is not much in disputes that the lease agreement is terminated with effect from 30.06.2020, therefore it was the duty of the applicant to hand over the vacant possession of such leased area immediately as early as possible after the 30.06.2020. (b) From the record its also become clear that even the lease period is terminated on 30.06.2020 till today the application themselves failed to hand over the vacant possession of lease area and on that basis the opponent had raised the disputed performa invoices for the period of July, August and September, 2020 on the basis of sub clause provided after clause 20(d) of lease agreement.” 6.5 These are the disputes which do not represent any fraudulent element in the conduct of the beneficiary seeking to invoke the bank guarantee but the disputes clearly partake the disputes under the agreement. They are the disputes ‘touching’ and ‘concerning’ the agreement, ‘arising out of’ the agreement. They relate to acting upon and applying the terms of contract. When parties are at conflict about the payment liability under the contract vis-à-vis and the question of invocation of bank guarantees vis-à-vis such issues, no fraud exists, much less egregious fraud. The disputes of the category where the application and interpretation of contract come into play, they travel into the territory of arbitrability to become arbitral disputes. When parties are at conflict about the payment liability under the contract vis-à-vis and the question of invocation of bank guarantees vis-à-vis such issues, no fraud exists, much less egregious fraud. The disputes of the category where the application and interpretation of contract come into play, they travel into the territory of arbitrability to become arbitral disputes. 6.6 None of these disputes in their kind and nature have the character of fraud much less egregious fraud. They arise from the terms of the licence agreement, touching and concerning such terms. The element of irretrievable injury is also absent inasmuch as at the conclusion of arbitration proceedings, the applicant could be compensated if establishes its case. 6.7 In General Electric Technical Services Vs. Kunj Sons (P) Limited [ (1991) 3 SCR 412 ] the Supreme Court stated that the fraud must be an egregious nature so as to vitiate the entire underlying transaction of the bank guarantee. It was observed that party not only should necessarily plead but produce all the evidence in proof of fraud, when alleged, in execution of the contract. 6.8 In Hindustan Steel Word Construction Limited Vs. Tarapore and Company [ AIR 1996 SC 2268 ] it was on the ground that the counterclaim was referred to the arbitrator, the injunction was sought for against invocation of the bank guarantee. It was held that when there was serious dispute about the question that who committed breach of the contract and whether the amount payable by the contractor to the appellant till the making of the award were in dispute, it was not a case exceptional in nature or giving rise to special equity justifying inference to restrain the appellant from enforcing the bank guarantee. 7. Nor it could be said that the invocation of the bank guarantee is required to be arrested on any consideration of any special equities. The fact of the case does not suggest that the special equities are created in favour of the appellant. The aspect of special equities and the question of irretrievable justice often become twins, conceptually nearer to each other. The special equities are those which warrant immediate repair of rights and grant of relief to the sufferer party. The irretrievable injuries are one, which if allowed to occur, it would not be possible to remedy in future. The aspect of special equities and the question of irretrievable justice often become twins, conceptually nearer to each other. The special equities are those which warrant immediate repair of rights and grant of relief to the sufferer party. The irretrievable injuries are one, which if allowed to occur, it would not be possible to remedy in future. The disputes about payability of amount demanded, the extend thereof, the breach of condition of the contract and termination of contract, retention of possession, post- licence expiry and the nature of possession thereafter etc. do not bring out a situation where the appellant would not, even if it succeeds in its case in the arbitration proceedings, suffer irreparable loss much less irretrievable loss. 8. The decision of the Delhi High Court in Ansal Properties and Industries (supra) relied on by the petitioner stand true on its own facts. On the facts here it was inapplicable, rather the following observations made by the court become relevant, “One thing is however is clear that the allegation of breach of contract by the other party to the contract do not entitle a person who has given the bank guarantee to seek stay or invocation and encashment of bank guarantee because issues of breach of contract, that is who is guilty of breaches are to be decided in the arbitration proceedings and not in the proceedings which seek stay of encashment of the bank guarantee. The law in respect of the course interdicting the payments under the unconditional and on demand without demur the bank guarantees such as the present one is that there has to be a egregious fraud. Invocation may be permitted where there is an element of special equities.” 9. The principles governing the powers for grant of interim measures under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act are set out by the Supreme Court in its decisions including in Adhunik Steels Limited Vs. Orissa Manganese and Minerals Limited, [ (2007) 7 SCC 125 ] holding that the well recognized principles applicable to exercise of general powers to grant interim relief including specific injunctive relief under Order XXXIX Rule 1, 2 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Specific Relief Act would be applicable to exercise the powers under Section 9 of the Act. It was observed in para 11 of the decision that, “...it is not possible to keep out the concept of balance of convenience, prima facie case, irreparable injury and the concept of just and convenient while passing interim measures under Section 9 of the Act.” 9.1 When it comes to the question of granting injunction against the invocation and encashment of bank guarantee, the prima facie case for granting such injunction would consist in the factors of egregious fraud, special equities or irretrievable injury. These would also be aspects to determine the balance of convenience. On neither of the aforementioned three counts, the prima facie case arises or exists for the appellant. 9.2 The bank guarantee is a document of irrevocable committee solemnly given by the bank in the favor of the beneficiary therefore it is made well settled that the bank guarantee shall be honoured when presented for encashment. The exceptions as noted above are that the invocation is actuated by egregious fraud or guided by special equity or irretrievable justice to the parties is to be prevented. The court in exercise of its powers cannot interfere with the enforcement of the documents such as bank guarantee or letters of credit except in the above three category of cases where above circumstances are made out. On facts, as discussed none of the circumstances applicable and relevant to justify the arresting of invocation of the bank guarantee in question are available in the present case. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, no interference is warranted in the impugned order dated 11.3.2020 passed by the Commercial Court, City Civil Court, Ahmedabad dismissing Commercial Civil Miscellaneous Application No.73 of 2020. The appeal stands meritless, liable to be dismissed. It is dismissed. All interim orders are vacated. Since appeal is dismissed, no order is required in the Civil Application. Accordingly it is disposed of. FURTHER ORDER At this stage, learned advocate Mr. Nichiket Dave prayed for stay of the aforesaid order inter alia stating that the Commercial Court had granted the stay which operated throughout during the pendency of the present appeal and till date, to approach the higher forum. Learned advocate Ms. Harshal Pandya objected to the request for extension of stay further. Having regard to the only aspect that the stay was granted by the court below and operated till date, that stay shall stand extended upto 22nd August, 2022.