JUDGMENT : 1. The present Appeal is preferred by the Appellant - State of Gujarat under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, against the impugned judgment and order in Sessions Case No. 45 of 2004 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No.7, Gondal at Dhoraji, dated 12.9.2007 recording the acquittal for the charges under Sections 323, 324, 504 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 3(1)(10) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as "the Atrocities Act") as well as under Section 37(1) and 135 of the B.P. Act. 2. The facts of the case briefly are that on 6.1.2002, PW-1 - Jayantibhai Kalabhai Harijan - the Complainant has filed a complaint against the Respondent - Deepakbhai Govindbhai Vadodaria - Original Accused in Dhoraji Hospital. It is the case of the prosecution that on 6.1.2002 at about 15:00 hours, while the complainant was passing through Harijanvas of village Bhola, the Respondent Accused Deepak Govindbhai Patel was standing with his vegetable lorry near Harijan Vas and at that time he has demanded vegetable of Rs.1/- on credit. The Respondent Accused Deepakbhai has not given vegetable of Rs.1/- and on the contrary gave filthy abuses to the complainant. It is further the case of prosecution that at the relevant point of time, complainant has requested not to give filthy abuses, the accused person got excited and inflicted knife blow on back side of complainant, therefore, elder brother of complainant, PW-2 - Muljibhai Ramjibhai Pardhi intervened and snatched away the knife from the hands of the accused. It is further the case of prosecution that witness Muljibhai has also received injuries on right hand fingers, therefore, he was taken to hospital for treatment, where complaint was filed against respondent before Police Constable Dhoraji which was registered at Patan Vav Police Station, vide Cr No. I-001/2002 for the offences as aforestated. 3. Upon such FIR being filed, investigation started and the Investigating Officer recorded statements of as many as 11 witnesses and produced number of documentary evidence, and after completion of the investigation, Charge-sheet was filed against the accused for the offences in question. The case was committed to the Sessions Court and the learned trial Judge framed the Charge. Since the accused did not plead guilty, trial was proceeded against the accused. The case was committed to the Sessions Court and the learned trial Judge framed the Charge. Since the accused did not plead guilty, trial was proceeded against the accused. Vide impugned judgment and order dated 12.9.2007, the learned trial Judge acquitted the accused person. Being aggrieved by the same, the State has preferred the present appeal. 4. Heard, learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri for the appellant - State. This Court has passed the following order on 13.6.2022 : "Though served, none has remained present for Respondent No.1. Office Note states that bail bond is already executed for Respondent No.1. It appears that none is appeared, therefore, when the bailable warrant is issued and non has appeared, Issue non-bailable warrant against the Respondent No.1 through the concerned Police Station." Today, none has remained present on behalf of the Respondent. 5. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has mainly contended that the learned trial Judge has erred in holding that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The learned APP submitted that the impugned judgment of the trial Court is based on presumptions and inferences and thereby, it is against the facts and the evidence on record. The learned APP further submitted that the learned trial Judge has failed to appreciate the evidence on record in its true and proper perspective and thereby, has erred in recording the acquittal of the respondent - accused. 6. Learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri referred to the judgment and order as well as the testimony of number of witnesses and also the documentary evidence. Learned APP has submitted that the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Judge is contrary to law, evidence on record and principles of justice, hence the same deserves to be quashed and set aside by this Hon'ble Court. It is further contended that the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Court of learned Judge is based on inference not warranted by facts of the case and also on presumption not permitted by law and that the learned Judge ought to have seen that there are direct and indirect evidence connecting Respondent with crime produced in this case. In spite of the fact, learned Judge without appreciating oral as well as documentary evidence on record of the case, straight way arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt for the alleged offences under Sections 323, 324, 504 of IPC, and Sections 3(1)(10) of the Atrocity Act and also under Sections 37(1) and 135 of B.P.Act. That the learned Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence of complaint Jayantibhai Kalabhai who is injured witness at Exh. 27, wherein this prosecution witness has clearly deposed in his deposition that while he was passing through Harijan Vas of village Bhola, the respondent accused was standing with his lorry of vegetable near Harijan Vas and has demanded vegetable of Rs.1/- on credit. He has further deposed that the accused person has not given vegetable and on the contrary gave filthy abuses to the complainant. He has further deposed that the accused person has inflicted knife blow on the back of the complainant. He has further deposed that PW-2 Muljibhai Ramjibhai tried to snatch away the knife from the hands of respondent accused and while snatching away the knife, he has received injuries on right hand fingers, and therefore, he was taken to government hospital, Dhoraji, where the complaint was filed against the respondent accused. This prosecution witness has also identified the muddamal knife and accused person before Hon'ble Court. Thus, so far as the evidence of this witness is concerned, he has fully supported the prosecution case, then in that case, the learned Judge has no reason to disbelieve the prosecution case. Under such circumstances, learned Judge has committed error in acquitting the respondent accused. 7. The learned APP has further submitted that the learned Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence of PW-2 Muljibhai Ramjibhai at Exh.28, wherein he has fully supported the prosecution case and stated the fact that at the time of incident, accused Deepakbhai Govindbhai Vadodaria has inflicted knife bow to the complainant and has tried to snatch away the muddamal knife, he has also received injuries of knife on right hand. He has also deposed in this deposition that the accused Deepakbhai Govindbhai Vadodaria has given filthy abuses to the complainant relating to his caste by using words like "Sala Dhedha". He has also deposed in this deposition that the accused Deepakbhai Govindbhai Vadodaria has given filthy abuses to the complainant relating to his caste by using words like "Sala Dhedha". Thus, so far as evidence of this witness is concerned, he has fully supported the prosecution case, then in that case learned Judge has no reason to disbelieve prosecution case. Under the circumstances, the judgment and order of acquittal deserves to be quashed and set aside by this Hon'ble Court. 8. Learned APP has further submitted that the learned Judge has committed error in disbelieving evidence of PW-3 Kalabhai Ramabhai at Exh.29 as well as PW-4 - Kantaben Kalabhai at Exh.30 only on the ground that they have not seen the incident and they have received information from injured and as such their evidence is hearsay evidence. Not only that they are relatives of the complainant and therefore, they are interested witnesses. 9. Learned APP has further submitted that the learned Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence of PW-10 Dr. RajeshkumarVallabhdas Patel at Exh.50, before whom at about 3:30 hours, injured complainant Jayantibhai Kalidas was produced for medical treatment. The evidence of complainant as well as injuries caused to the complainant gets corroboration from the evidence of Medical Officer, inspite of the fact, learned Judge has committed error in disbelieving evidence of Medical officer only on the ground that no name of the accused has been given while history before the Medical Officer. 10. Learned APP has further submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has failed to appreciate that prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt that the accused person, with intention to insult the complainant in public at large, has given filthy abuse to the complainant relating to his caste and beaten the complainant and that the learned Sessions Judge has committed error in holding that the incident has taken place in public and at the relevant point of time, independent witnesses were available, inspite of the fact no independent witnesses are examined by the prosecution, and merely interested witnesses have been examined. 11. Learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri has further submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has committed error in giving undue importance to minor omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses. Learned APP Ms. 11. Learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri has further submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has committed error in giving undue importance to minor omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses. Learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri has further submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence of PW-11 Advin Anetsing, Dy. S.P. SC ST Cell at Exh.55 wherein this prosecution witness has clearly deposed that investigation of the present case has been carried out by him, and as there was sufficient evidence against him, charge sheet was filed before the the trial Court. 12. Learned APP has therefore submitted that the learned Judge has committed error in giving undue weightage to minor omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses and therefore the reasons given by the learned Judge while appreciating the evidence as well as while acquitting the accused are improper, perverse and bad in law. Therefore, it is submitted that the present Appeal may be allowed. 13. It is true that Rule was duly served upon the accused person. Further, the office note states that bailable warrant was also issued against the accused persons but none has preferred to remain present before this Court and thereafter non-bailable warrant was also issued. Today, also none has appeared. Since the matter touches the year 2008, the Court has proceeded with the merits of the case. 14. In view of the submissions made by the learned APP, it is required to be considered whether the impugned judgment and order can be sustained or not. 15. Having heard the arguments advanced by the learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri, before we advert to the merits of the case, it would be worthwhile to refer to the scope of this Appeal. 15.1 Before adverting to the facts of the case, it would be worthwhile to refer to the scope of interference in acquittal appeals. It is well settled by catena of decisions that an appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and consider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. 15.1 Before adverting to the facts of the case, it would be worthwhile to refer to the scope of interference in acquittal appeals. It is well settled by catena of decisions that an appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and consider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, the Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is prejudice in favour of the accused, firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. 15.2 Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrive at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person, and therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. 15.3 Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. That the duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether the accused is connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged. 16. In Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented through Legal Representatives v. State of Karnataka and Others, (2019) 2 SCC 752 , the Apex Court has observed that : "The presumption of innocence which is attached to every accused gets fortified and strengthened when the said accused is acquitted by the trial Court. 16. In Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented through Legal Representatives v. State of Karnataka and Others, (2019) 2 SCC 752 , the Apex Court has observed that : "The presumption of innocence which is attached to every accused gets fortified and strengthened when the said accused is acquitted by the trial Court. Probably, for this reason, the law makers felt that when the appeal is to be filed in the High Court it should not be filed as a matter of course or as matter of right but leave of the High Court must be obtained before the appeal is entertained. This would not only prevent the High Court from being flooded with appeals but more importantly would ensure that innocent persons who have already faced the tribulation of a long drawn out criminal trial are not again unnecessarily dragged to the High Court". 17. Yet in another decision in Chaman Lal v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 1229 of 2017 on 03.12.2020, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 988 the Apex Court has observed as under : "9.1 In the case of Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 ), this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. In paragraphs 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under: 12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P., (1975) 3 SCC 219 , Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar, (1990) 4 SCC 17 , Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P., (2003) 1 SCC 761 , Narendra Singh v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 , Budh Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 9 SCC 731 , State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 102 , S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy, (2008) 5 SCC 535 , Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 , Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P., (2009) 16 SCC 98 and Ram Singh v. State of H.P., (2010) 2 SCC 445 ) 13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227 , the Privy Council observed as under: (IA p. 404) "… the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." 14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State, AIR 1954 SC 1 , Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 216 , M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200 , Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar, (1970) 2 SCC 450 , Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 , Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P., (2002) 4 SCC 85 and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC 755 ) 15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , this Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432, para 42) "(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 , this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 17. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh, (2009) 9 SCC 368 , the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that: (SCC p. 374, para 20) "20. … an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused." 18. In State of U.P. v. Banne, (2009) 4 SCC 271 , this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances include: (SCC p. 286, para 28) "(i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; (ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; (iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; (v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; (vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal." A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 401 . 19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference." 9.2 When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under: "20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn., (1984) 4 SCC 635 , Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE, 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 665, Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad, (2001) 1 SCC 501 , Aruvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P., (2009) 10 SCC 636 )." (emphasis supplied) 9.3 It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 , that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. 9.4 In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 , this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In paragraph 31, it is observed and held as under: "31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228 . This Court considered catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In paragraph 31, it is observed and held as under: "31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228 . In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: (SCC p. 233) "10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case." 31.1. In Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 , the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p. 416) "8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p. 416) "8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well-considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court's judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case." 31.2. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case." 31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 309 , after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 807 , in para 5, this Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 809-10) "5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 Cr.P.C came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 Cr.P.C came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence. It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State, AIR 1952 SC 52 ; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P., AIR 1953 SC 122 ) In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions. 31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 , this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule." (emphasis supplied)." 18. To substantiate the charges levelled against the Accused Persons, the prosecution has testified PW-1 Jayantibhai Kalabhai at Exh. To substantiate the charges levelled against the Accused Persons, the prosecution has testified PW-1 Jayantibhai Kalabhai at Exh. 27. He tried to depose in accordance with the recital of the complaint, but in his cross-examination, he has admitted that he is not able to read, write or sign. He has not studied up to 10th standard, he is only 4th Class Pass. Further it is admitted in the cross-examination that there were cordial relations between the complainant and the accused person prior to the date of occurrence. Further, it is also admitted that if any scuffle happens than the surrounding persons or the nearby resident hear the voice but he has also admitted the fact that whether the complaint was given in the hospital or at home, he was not having the material facts so far as lodging of complaint is concerned. It is also admitted by the complainant in cross-examination that so longer as material allegation for inflicting the knife blow upon the complainant is also not on the notice of the complainant since he is not remembering the same. Upon such premises it appears that the learned Sessions Judge has rightly arrived at the benefit of doubt. Further, it is to be noted that pursuant to the medical evidence also, as such, by perusing the testimony of PW-10 Dr. Rajeshkumar Vallabhdas Patel at Exh.50, who, in his cross-examination has admitted that no history was given by the complainant so longer as the accusation of only accused person is concerned. Upon such premises also, the learned Sessions Judge has rightly arrived at the acquittal of the accused persons. The prosecution has also testified PW-2 Muljibhai Ramjibhai at Exh.28. He has categorically tried to say what he has stated before the police under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. But in his cross-examination, he admitted that at the captioned time, he was at his own work and therefore it may be said that he is not an eyewitness and he is as good as hearsay witness. 18.1 The prosecution has also testified PW-3 - Kalabhai Ramabhai at Exh.29. He tried but in his chief examination what he has stated before the police but simultaneously in cross-examination he has admitted that he had been informed by his son while they were in Rickshaw. 18.1 The prosecution has also testified PW-3 - Kalabhai Ramabhai at Exh.29. He tried but in his chief examination what he has stated before the police but simultaneously in cross-examination he has admitted that he had been informed by his son while they were in Rickshaw. In short, this witness is also termed as a hearsay witness and therefor it loses the the value in credibility of witness. 18.2 The prosecution has also testified PW-4 Kantaben Kalabhai at Exh.30. In chief examination it is admitted that at the time of occurrence she was going to fill water and therefore also she is not an eyewitness but she is an hearsay witness. It is also admitted in cross-examination that the Rickshaw of Karsanbhai was available when she completed filling the water. In short, she has not supported the prosecution witness. 18.3 The prosecution has also testified PW-5 - Jasubha Dilubha Jadeja at Exh. 31. He appears to be the panch witness but this witness turned hostile and therefore this witness has not supported the prosecution case. The prosecution has also testified PW-6 Kantibhai Savjibhai Macwana at Exh.32, who also appears to be a panchwitness, he has not supported the case of the prosecution. The prosecution has also testified PW-7 Danubha Nathubha Jadeja at Exh.36. He appears to be PSO at the respective time i.e. on 6.1.20002. He tried to depose what he did for registration of charge sheet. He has admitted in the cross-examination that the complainant has not stated any unparliamentary words against the accused persons. Even, so longer as the possession of knife is concerned with the accused person, same has also not been disclosed. Upon all such premises, it appears that the learned Sessions Judge has rightly arrived at the benefit of doubt to the Respondent Accused and has rightly acquitted the Respondent Accused. 18.4 The prosecution has also examined PW-8 Jagatsinh Vakhatsinh Parmar at Exh.40. He appears to be PSO at the respective time and his role is just to register the crime in the Police Station and no more. Further, he has also admitted in the cross-examination that he has no personal knowledge about the complaint. 18.5 The prosecution has also testified PW-9 - Bachuji Jivaji Gameti at Exh.46. He appears to be PSI at Patanvav Police Station on 6.1.2002. He completed all the proceedings. 18.6 The prosecution has also testified PW-10 Dr. Further, he has also admitted in the cross-examination that he has no personal knowledge about the complaint. 18.5 The prosecution has also testified PW-9 - Bachuji Jivaji Gameti at Exh.46. He appears to be PSI at Patanvav Police Station on 6.1.2002. He completed all the proceedings. 18.6 The prosecution has also testified PW-10 Dr. Rajeshkumar Vallabhdas Patel at Exh.50 for which this Court has already discussed above in detail. 18.7 The Prosecution has also examined PW-11 Advin Anetsinh at Exh.55. Infact it is stated that the deposition that he has taken over the investigation from PSI Bachuji Jivaji Gameti but as discussed earlier that the prosecution witnesses are not supporting fully beyond reasonable doubt. Upon such premises, the learned Sessions Judge has rightly arrived at the acquittal of the accused persons. 19. Thus, on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the oral as well as documentary evidence on record, as referred to herein above, it transpires that there are contradictions and omissions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. The learned trial Judge has observed that on considering the evidence on record there appears no trustworthy evidence on record to prove the charge levelled against the accused and the prosecution has failed to bring home the charges levelled against the accused inasmuch as the ingredients of the offence alleged are not fulfilled. This Court has gone through in detail the impugned judgment and order and found that the learned trial Judge has meticulously considered the depositions of all the witnesses and came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and in the considered opinion of this Court, the learned trial Judge has rightly come to such a conclusion, which does not call for any interference at the hands of this Court. 20. In view of the aforesaid discussion and observations, in the considered opinion of this Court, the prosecution has failed to bring home the charge against accused for want of sufficient material. The findings recorded by the learned trial Judge do not call for any interference. Resultantly, in fleri, the appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly. Impugned judgment and order dated 12.9.2007, passed in Special Case No. 45 of 2004 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge & Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No.7, Gondal at Dhoraji, recording the acquittal is confirmed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. Resultantly, in fleri, the appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly. Impugned judgment and order dated 12.9.2007, passed in Special Case No. 45 of 2004 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge & Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No.7, Gondal at Dhoraji, recording the acquittal is confirmed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. R&P, if received, be transmitted back forthwith. Since Non-Bailable Warrant is issued, a copy of this judgment and order be sent to the concerned Police Station.