JUDGMENT : Shaji P. Chaly, J. The above appeal is preferred by the petitioner in W. P. (C) No. 17966 of 2022 challenging the judgment dated 03.06.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge whereby the following reliefs sought for in the writ petition were declined :- “A. To issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the respondents to erect appropriate sign boards specifying the speed limits applicable in stretch of roads owned and managed by the respondents 1 to 8; B. To issue appropriate directions and guidelines to the 1st respondent to make it mandatory to install speed limiting mechanisms or such other alerting devices in the vehicles plying in the public road for the proper implementation of directives enshrined in S.112 of the Motor Vehicle Act as provided under Exhibit P5; C. To call for the records leading to Ext P2 to P3 and such other further communications may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari to quash the same.” 2. Brief material facts for the disposal of the appeal are as follows:- 3. Appellant is the registered owner of a motor car. He is served with Exts. P2 and P3 charge memos by the Inspector of Police, High-Tech Traffic Enforcement Control Room, Thiruvananthapuram, the 9th respondent, for speeding and imposing a fine of Rs. 1,500/-. The case of the appellant is that the 9th respondent does not have any jurisdiction or authority to issue the charge memos without erecting sign marks on each and every road stretch, cautioning general public regarding speed limits applicable on the roads managed and maintained by the Union of India, State Government and other statutory authorities. It is also submitted that the 9th respondent has no jurisdiction to issue the impugned charge memos since the charge memos can be issued only by the jurisdictional Police or the competent authority under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the rules thereto. 4. That apart it is contended that Exts. P2 and P3 charge memos are not accompanied with any electronic record regarding the speed at the point of time when the charge has occurred, and without availability of the said electronic record, no action can be taken against the appellant. 5. 4. That apart it is contended that Exts. P2 and P3 charge memos are not accompanied with any electronic record regarding the speed at the point of time when the charge has occurred, and without availability of the said electronic record, no action can be taken against the appellant. 5. The learned Single Judge after taking into account the contentions advanced by the petitioner has dismissed the writ petition holding that imposition of fine for over speeding of vehicles is a summary proceeding, which cannot be challenged in a writ petition, as it involves disputed questions of fact. 6. Basically it is contended that the dismissal of the writ petition by the learned Single Judge is without assigning any reasons and therefore interference is required to the said judgment. It is also submitted that the issues raised by the appellant have severe ramifications since the action of the 9th respondent by issuing Exts. P2 and P3 has caused serious prejudice to the rights of the appellant. 7. That apart it is contended that the learned Single Judge misdirected himself and dismissed the writ petition since the challenge made in the writ petition was to the jurisdiction of the impugned authority to take cognizance and adjudicate on the over-speeding of the vehicle in question owned by the appellant for the alleged offence. 8. It is also pointed out that when issues were raised in the writ petition attributing interference with rights and liberties of the appellant, the learned Single Judge ought to have considered the issue taking into account the fundamental rights guaranteed to the appellant under the Constitution of India. 9. We have heard Sri. Rinu Sreejaya Aswan, the appellant appearing in-person, Sri. S. Manu, learned Deputy Solicitor General of India and Sri. V. Tekchand, learned Senior Government Pleader and perused the pleadings and material on record. 10. First of all, we are dealing with the primary issue raised by the appellant with respect to the jurisdiction exercised by the Inspector of Police, High-Tech Traffic Enforcement Control Room, Thiruvananthapuram. We are of the considered opinion that the power is conferred on the said authority by the State Government / the statutory authority in order to discharge the functions in contemplation of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. We are of the considered opinion that the power is conferred on the said authority by the State Government / the statutory authority in order to discharge the functions in contemplation of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. When such a power is conferred on the said authority to discharge the functions taking advantage of the development of Information Technology, the action so taken cannot be said to be bad or illegal. This is for the basic reason that, in order to protect the larger public interest and public safety, such methods are adopted by the State Government / the statutory authority under the Act 1988. 11. Moreover, merely because the 9th respondent has issued charge memos in question-based on the duty and power conferred on him, it has not caused any manner of prejudice to the appellant. Therefore the jurisdictional issue raised by the appellant has no force or basis to secure any relief on account of the said contention. Now the sole question to be considered is whether the appellant has driven the vehicle in excess speed in violation of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 12. In order to resolve the said issue, it would be better to discuss the statutory provisions first. Section 112 of the Act 1988 deals with limits of speed, which reads thus:- “112. Limits of speed.-(1) No person shall drive a motor vehicle or cause or allow a motor vehicle to be driven in any public place at a speed exceeding the maximum speed or below the minimum speed fixed for the vehicle under this Act or by or under any other law for the time being in force: Provided that such maximum speed shall in no case exceed the maximum fixed for any motor vehicle or class or description of motor vehicles by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette. (2) The State Government or any authority authorised in this behalf by the State Government may, if satisfied that it is necessary to restrict the speed of motor vehicles in the interest of public safety or convenience or because of the nature of any road or bridge, by notification in the Official Gazette, and by causing appropriate traffic signs to be placed or erected under Section 116 at suitable places, fix such maximum speed limits or minimum speed limits as it thinks fit for motor vehicles or any specified class or description of motor vehicles or for motor vehicles to which a trailer is attached, either generally or in a particular area or on a particular road or roads: Provided that no such notification is necessary if any restriction under this section is to remain in force for not more than one month. (3) Nothing in this section shall apply to any vehicle registered under Section 60 while it is being used in the execution of military manoeuvres within the area and during the period specified in the notification under sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Manoeuvres, Field Firing and Artillery Practice Act, 1938 (5 of 1938).” 13. Therefore, it can be seen that when speed limits are fixed by the Central Government, every driver of the vehicle is duty bound to follow the limit prescribed therein. It may be true that the State Government by virtue of the powers conferred under Section 116 of Act 1988 read with Sub-section (2) of Section 112 is duty bound to fix traffic signs showing the speed limits, but once the maximum speed limit is fixed by the Central Government by notification in the official gazette, the said speed limit is legally presumed to be known to every driver driving vehicles on the road, depending on the nature of the road and the speed limits earmarked for such routes. This in our view, is a mandatory requirement under section 112(1) and the proviso to it, of the Act 1988. 14. By virtue of the powers conferred under Section 112 of Act 1988, the Central Government was successively issuing notification with respect to the speed limit on various roads, and as of now, the issue is guided by a notification bearing No. 1522(E) dated 06.04.2018 and the maximum speed limit per hour in kilometers on roads in India are as follows:- 16. Therefore, once a notification is issued by the State Government further limiting the speed, it may have to erect the traffic sign boards as contemplated under Section 112 (2) read with Section 116 of Act 1988. Whatever that be, every driver on the road is expected to know the maximum speed that has to be maintained in the streets based on the notification issued by the Central Government, irrespective of the reduced maximum speed limit fixed by the State as per its notification on certain routes as extracted above. This means if the petitioner has exceeded the speed limit notified by the Central Government on any roads, the 9th respondent was vested with the power to issue a charge memo under Section 183 of the Act 1988. It is accordingly that Exts. P2 and P3 charge memos are issued by the 9th respondent. 17. If the appellant has a case that traffic signs are not put up so as to identify the reduced maximum speed limits on various stretches of the roads, in accordance with the notification issued by the State Government, it is a factual circumstance to be identified by a fact finding body. It is not for this Court to enter into any finding as to whether, in the area in question where the appellant crossed the speed limit, the State Government has put up any traffic sign board concerning the speed, exercising the powers conferred under article 226 of the Constitution of India. That is to say, as rightly noted by the learned Single Judge; it is an aspect surrounded by facts. 18. That said, if the appellant has a case that he was not driving the vehicle at an excessive speed in violation of the speed limit prescribed by the Central Government, then it is for the appellant to defend the case before the competent Magistrate court, especially when it is a factual aspect, which could be found out only on a fair trial conducted by the competent Magistrate. Considering the above aspects, we are of the view that the appellant has not made out any case to interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge, though for our reasons. Needless to say, the writ appeal fails. Accordingly, it is dismissed.