P. B. Bajanthri, J.—Heard learned counsels for the respective parties. 2. In the instant appeal, appellant has assailed the order of the learned Single Judge dated 02.07.2018 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 6898 of 2002. 3. The appellant was subjected to disciplinary proceedings and it was concluded in imposition of penalty of dismissal from service on 02.05.2000 and it was affirmed by the appellate authority on 30.04.2002. Still aggrieved by the order of the disciplinary and appellate authorities, appellant invoked remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution before this Court in filing C.W.J.C. No. 6898 of 2002 and it was decided against appellant on 02.07.2018. Hence the present L.P.A. 1235 of 2018. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant restricted his argument for the time being that appellate authority’s order dated 30.04.2002 is not a speaking order with reference to memorandum of appeal dated 23.05.2000. Appellate authority’s order reads as under:— ^^eèkqcuh {ks=h; xzkeh.k cSad izèkku dk;kZy;] ifj"kn cktkj] eèkqcuh rkj % xzkeh.k cSad] nwjHkk"k&0627623414, QSDl&0627624194 i=kad % vñ lkñ % vkns'k % 24@2002@04 lañ 14 fnukad % 30-04-2002 vkns'k Jh èkqzo ukjk;.k >k] 'kk[kk inkfèkdkjh] eèkqcuh {ks=h; xzkeh.k cSad dks vuq'kklfud izkfèkdkj ds }kjk izèkku dk;kZy; i=k vñlkñ@vkns'k@22@05@2000@lañ 03 fnukad 2 ebZ 2000 ls nf.Mr fd;k x;k FkkA Jh >k us mDr vkns'k ds fo:) cSad ds vihysV vFkksfjVh ¼funs'kd e.My½ ds le{k vihy fd;k FkkA vihysV vFkksfjVh ds }kjk muds vihy ij fnukad 13-02-2002 dks fopkj fd;k x;kA vihysV vFkksfjVh us Jh >k ds vihy ij fopkj ds Øe esa muds mij yxk;s x;s vkjksiksa] tk¡p lEcfUèkr dkxtkr] tk¡p inkfèkdkjh ds izfrosnu] vuq'kklfud izkfèkdkj ds fu.kZ;] mudk fiNyk vlaxr O;ogkj ij iw.kZ fopkjksijkUr ik;k fd Jh >k ds }kjk 'kk[kk jk?kksiqj cjgksa esa vusd izdkj dk dnkpkj fd;k x;k ftlesa cSad jkf'k dk xcu@diV ,oa cSad dkxtkrksa dks xk;c@u"V djuk Hkh 'kkfey gS] ftlls cSad dks vkfFkZd {kfr gqbZ vkSj cSad dk Nfo èkwfey gqvkA Jh >k dks tk¡p dk;Zokgh ds nkSjku cpko gsrq leqfpr volj iznku fd;k x;k FkkA muds vuqlkj ,sls vfèkdkjh dk cSad lsok esa cuk jguk vokaNuh; gSA vr,o] vuq'kklfud izkfèkdkj }kjk ikfjr n.M ^^cSad lsok ls gVk;k tkuk tks Hkfo"; ds fu;kstu ds fy, fujgÙkkZ ugha gksxk** cjdjkj j[kk x;kA muds dkj.k cSad dks gqbZ vkfFkZd {kfr ds fy;s muds fo:) fofèk lEer dkjZokbZ dh tk;A izsf"kr] Jh èkqzo ukjk;.k >k] cSad dkWyksuh] iqjkuh pV~Vh] 'kadj pkSd ds utnhd] eèkqcuh ¼vkj-,u-luxgh½ vè;{k** 5. Prima facie the appellate authority has not considered each of the contentions stated in the memorandum of appeal dated 23.05.2000. It was bounden duty of the appellate authority to examine each of the contentions raised by the appellant in his memorandum of appeal. Apex Court in the case of Secretary and Curator, Victoria Memorial Hall vs. Howrah Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity and Others reported in (2010) 3 SCC 732 held that appellate authority’s order must be reasoned and speaking order. Further in the case of Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. vs. Masood Ahmed Khan reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496, Para 47 elaborately considered as how the judicial, quasi-judicial and other orders should be. Para 47 reads as under:— “47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the Judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37] .) (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija vs. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)] , wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, “adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions”. (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due process”. 6. In the light of the aforesaid principles laid down by the Apex Court, order of the appellate authority dated 30.04.2002 and learned Single Judge order dated 02.07.2018 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 6898 of 2002 stand set aside. Matter is remanded to the appellate authority to consider the appellant’s memorandum of appeal dated 23.05.2000 afresh in the light of principles laid down in the Apex Court decisions cited supra. 7. Appellate authority is hereby directed to decide appellant’s appeal afresh within a period of four months from the date of receipt of this order and communicate the decision to the appellant. 7. Appellate authority is hereby directed to decide appellant’s appeal afresh within a period of four months from the date of receipt of this order and communicate the decision to the appellant. Appellate authority is also hereby directed to take note of Regulation No. 77 – Repeal and Savings of the Regulation called the Uttar Bihar Gramin Bank (Officers and Employees) Service Regulations, 2010.