JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. L.K. Borah, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner and Mr. G. Kakoti, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents. 2. This is an application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) challenging the judgment and decree dated 8/10/2021 passed in Title Appeal No. 53/2019 whereby the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsiff No. 2 on 04/09/2015 in Title Suit No. 254/2014 was upheld thereby dismissing the appeal. 3. Before entering into the facts of the case, it would be relevant to note that the Petitioner herein have invoked the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code. It is no longer res-integra that the revisional jurisdiction is limited in scope inasmuch as the said jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct error of facts. However gross or even errors of law unless the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself. A plain reading of Sub-Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 115 of the Code is in reference to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court not vested in the Court by law or has failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested in Court. Clause (c) is in relation to exercise of jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity. Therefore, under Section 115 of the Code a jurisdictional question may arise not only where the Court acts solely without jurisdiction but also in a case where jurisdictional errors are committed while exercising jurisdiction. There may be various facets of jurisdictional error for example the findings arrived at is perverse, based on no evidence or misreading of evidence or such findings have been arrived at by ignoring or overlooking material irregularities or such findings so grossly erroneous that if allowed to stand would occasion miscarriage of justice. In other words, interference with an incorrect finding of fact recorded by the Court below for the purpose of exercising revisional jurisdiction must be understood in the context, where such findings are perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of evidence or is grossly erroneous that if allowed to stand it would occasion gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Baharsingh reported in (2014) 9 SCC 70, the Supreme Court observed that the Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code is required to satisfy itself as regards the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order and cannot exercise its power as an Appellate Court to re-appreciate or reassess the evidence to a different finding of fact. It is also made clear that this Court while exercising the revisional jurisdiction is not and cannot be equated with the power of re-consideration of all question of facts as the Court of First Appeal. 4. In the backdrop of the above proposition, the facts material for adjudication of the dispute involved in the instant case are taken up for consideration. For the purpose of convenience, the parties herein are referred to in the same status as they stood before the Trial Court. 5. The Respondents herein as Plaintiffs had instituted a suit being Title Suit No. 254/2014 against the Petitioner who was the Defendant in the said suit. The case of the Plaintiffs in the said suit was that the Plaintiffs were the owner of the suit premises and the Defendant was a tenant who was occupying an Assam Type House measuring approximately 900 square feet at a monthly rent of Rs. 800/-only per month and had been enjoying all the facilities which a tenant has generally over the suit premises. It was stated that the Defendant instituted a suit being Title Suit No.375/2013 against the Plaintiffs in respect to the suit premises praying for permanent injunction against the Plaintiff No. 1 and thereafter the Defendant stopped paying the monthly rent on and from May 2012 and accordingly is a defaulter in payment of rent since then. It was claimed that the Defendant is liable to pay arrear rent @ Rs. 800/-x 29 months= 23,000/-from the month of May 2012 to September 2014 prior to the filing of the suit and also for future monthly rent at the approximate rate until ejectment from the suit permission along with interest @18% per annum on the amount till realization. It was claimed that the Defendant is liable to pay arrear rent @ Rs. 800/-x 29 months= 23,000/-from the month of May 2012 to September 2014 prior to the filing of the suit and also for future monthly rent at the approximate rate until ejectment from the suit permission along with interest @18% per annum on the amount till realization. Further to that, it is also the case of the Plaintiffs that the suit premises was urgently needed by the Plaintiffs for their own residential use as there is a pressing need for the Plaintiffs family for additional space as the existing space was inadequate. 6. On the basis of the above, the suit was filed. Summons were issued upon the Defendant. The Defendant filed the written statement stating inter alia that she has been a tenant in respect to the suit premises for the last more than 37 years. According to the defendant, she has been paying the monthly house rent to the Plaintiffs and when the Plaintiffs refused to accept the rent tendered by the Defendant, she had been depositing the rent in the Court till date. It was denied that the Defendant never stopped paying the monthly rent from the month of May, 2012 for which the question of the Defendant being a defaulter does not arise. The Defendant further denied that the Plaintiffs had bona fide requirement to the suit premises. 7. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, as many as 7 issues were framed, which were:- 1. Whether there was any cause of action for the suit ? 2. Whether the defendant is defaulter in payment of rent to the plaintiff ? 3. Whether the Plaintiffs have bona fide requirement of the suit premises ? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of arrear rent as prayed for ? 5. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for eviction of the Defendant from the suit premises ? 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree as prayed for ? 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other relief of reliefs as sought for ? 8. During the course of trial, the Plaintiffs adduced the evidence of one witness and exhibited various documents. The Defendant also examined one witness and exhibited certain documents. 9. 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree as prayed for ? 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other relief of reliefs as sought for ? 8. During the course of trial, the Plaintiffs adduced the evidence of one witness and exhibited various documents. The Defendant also examined one witness and exhibited certain documents. 9. At this stage, it may be relevant herein to mention that from the challans exhibited as Exhibit A series, it would show that the challans in question are from the period from May,2012. It further appears that for the months of August, September and October, 2014, the deposit of rent was made on 14/11/2014. Again for the months of May, June and July, 2014, the deposit of rent was made on 26/6/2014. For the month of January, February, March and April, 2014, the deposit of rent was made on 11/4/2014. For the month of August, September, October November and December, 2013, the rent was deposited on 12/12/2013 and so on. Therefore, it would be seen from the various challans that there was no compliance to Section 5(4) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972. 10. The Trial Court vide the judgment and decree dated 19/11/2019 decreed the suit in favor of the Plaintiffs thereby ordering a decree for eviction of the Defendant from the suit premises by removing the Defendant, her men, materials therefrom; recovery of khas possession over the suit premises; recovery of Rs. 23,200/-from the Defendant towards the arrear rent from the Defendant for the English Calendar months from May 2012 to September 2017 @ Rs.800/-per month; realization of future monthly rent until ejectment of the Defendant from the suit premises. The Trial Court in the judgment dated 19/11/2019 while deciding the issue No. 2 which pertains to as to whether the Defendant was a defaulter in payment of rent, came to a finding that the Defendant was depositing the rent 3 or 4 months together at a time for which the Defendant was not entitled to the benefit of Section 5(4) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act,1972 and consequently it was held that the Defendant was a defaulter in payment of rent. On the question of bona fide requirement which was issue No. 3, the Trial Court came to a finding on the basis of the evidence of PW-1 that there was bona fide requirement of the suit premises by the Plaintiffs as the Plaintiffs were a family of five people and were not able to accommodate themselves in a small space and require the tenanted premises for accommodation of the family members. In view of the issue No. 2 and 3 decided in favor of the plaintiffs, the rest of the issues were also decided in favor of the Plaintiffs and on the basis thereof the above mentioned decree was passed. 11. Feeling dissatisfied and aggrieved, the Defendant preferred an appeal before the Court of the Civil Judge, Sr. Div. No. 3, Kamtup(M) at Guwahati which was registered and numbered as Title Appeal No. 53/2019. The First Appellate Court on the basis of the grounds of objection so taken in the Memo of appeal and after hearing the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant framed the point of determination as to whether the judgment and order of the learned Trial Court is good in law and facts or needs interference by the Court. The First Appellate Court after taking into account the provisions of Section 5(4) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 came to a finding that the Trial Court had rightly decided the issue No. 2 that the defendant was a defaulter in payment of rent. As regards the issue No. 3, the First Appellate Court had also upheld the decision of the Trial Court that the Plaintiffs have bona fide requirement of the suit premises. On the basis thereof, the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court on 4/9/2015 in Title Suit No. 254/2014 was upheld and consequently the appeal was dismissed. 12. The instant application thereupon has been filed by the Defendant by invoking the exercise of jurisdiction under 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As already noted herein above, the powers of the Revisional Court are constricted. 13. Be that as it may, I have perused the judgment and decree passed by the trial court as well as the First Appellate Court and have also gone though the evidence on record. 14. As already noted herein above, the powers of the Revisional Court are constricted. 13. Be that as it may, I have perused the judgment and decree passed by the trial court as well as the First Appellate Court and have also gone though the evidence on record. 14. As already observed herein above and from the Exhibit A-series, it is apparent on the face of the record that the defendant had deposited the rents on various occasions for 3/4 months together before the Court. A perusal of Section 5(4) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 provides that when the landlord refuses to accept the lawful rent offered by the tenant, the tenant may within a fortnight of it becoming due, deposit in the Court the amount of such rent together with process fee for service of notice upon the landlord and on receiving such deposit, the Court shall cause a notice of the receipt of such deposit to be served on the landlord and the amount of deposit may thereafter be withdrawn by the landlord on application made by him to the Court in that behalf. It is only upon due compliance to Section 5(4), a tenant who has made such deposit shall not be treated as a defaulter under Clause(e) of the proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 5.The use of the words “may within a fortnight of it becoming due” is a pointer to the fact that the rent has to be deposited within a fortnight of it becoming due. 15. In the instant case, if the Exhibit A series is looked into, it would show that for the months of March, April, May, June, July, 2013, the date of payment by way of challan was on 30/7/2013. Similarly for the month of August, September, October, November, December, 2013 the date of payment by was of challan was on 12.12.2013 and so on. This clearly goes to show that there was no deposit of rent within a fortnight of the rent becoming due as it is an admitted fact that the rent was to be paid each month. Under such circumstances, this Court does not find any material irregularity or any jurisdictional error of the Court below in deciding the issue No. 2. 16. Under such circumstances, this Court does not find any material irregularity or any jurisdictional error of the Court below in deciding the issue No. 2. 16. Now coming to the issue No. 3 which pertains to as to whether the Plaintiffs have bona fide requirement of the suit premises, this Court finds it relevant to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Raghunath G. Panhale (Dead) BY LRs Vs. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co. reported in (1999) 8 SSC 1 Paragraph 9 10, 11 of the said judgment being relevant is quoted herein below : “9. Next comes the decision of this Court in A.K. Veeraraghava Iyengar v. N.V. Prasad. In that case, this Court observed that the need was bona fide and that the tenant failed to adduce any evidence against the “experience of landlord, his financial capacity and his readiness and willingness to start jewellery shop”. In Vinay Kumar v. District Judge, Ghazipur it was contended for the tenant that the son of the landlord whose requirement was pleaded, was in government service and, therefore, he could not have any bona fide need to start a private practice as a doctor. This contention was rejected. In Rena Drego v. Lalchand Soni it was observed that in the light of the factual position in that case, “when the landlady says that she needs more accommodation for her family, there is no scope for doubting the reasonableness of the requirement”. It was held that the circumstances of the case raised a presumption that the requirement was bona fide and that “tenant has failed to show that the demand for eviction was made with any oblique motive”. It was held that in the absence of such evidence by the tenant, the presumption of the bona fide need stood unrebutted. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. it was again observed that the court should not proceed on the assumption that the requirement of the landlord was not bona fide and that the tenant could not dictate to the landlord as to how he should adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. It was stated in Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan and in Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar v. Traders and Agencies that the landlord was the best judge of his requirement. It was stated in Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan and in Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar v. Traders and Agencies that the landlord was the best judge of his requirement. In Sheela Chadha v. Dr Achharaj Ram Sehgal it was held that the landlord had the discretion to determine his need. See also in this connection the judgment of this Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr Mahesh Chand Gupta. In Raj Kumar Khaitan v. Bibi Zubaida Khatun this Court had even stated that it was not necessary for the landlord to state in the pleadings, the nature of the business he proposed to start. 10. In the light of the above principles, we shall now examine the decision of the courts below. In this case, Plaintiff 1/3 (one of the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff) came forward with the plea that he was in the service of Metal Box Co. and since January 1988, due to lockout, the Company was closed down and he was not having any source of income and therefore he wanted to earn his livelihood by opening a grocery shop. The trial court and the first appellate court observed that it was necessary that the plaintiff should prove that he had lost his job and was unable to maintain his family. This, according to the said courts, was belied by the fact that in the amendment application and affidavit, Plaintiff 1/3 described his occupation as “service” and that, therefore his evidence was not acceptable. It was further held that his evidence that he lost his job on 15-1-1988 must also be rejected. The envelope containing notice of the lockout from the Company and the news item in the newspaper would not, it was observed, prove the lockout. The notice showed only an intention to lockout from 5-2-1988. It was stated that no documentary evidence was produced to prove that the said plaintiff lost his job. The trial court in fact went into the definition of “lockout” in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and held that by a lockout, the plaintiff would not lose his job permanently and that he would get his wages when the lockout was lifted. As the plaintiff also admitted that there was a signboard at his house, with the words “Ganesh Water Supply”, the plaintiff must be deemed to have started some other business. As the plaintiff also admitted that there was a signboard at his house, with the words “Ganesh Water Supply”, the plaintiff must be deemed to have started some other business. The plaintiff’s evidence that he was maintaining himself by taking loans from friends was not proved by adducing other evidence. He had not taken steps to purchase furniture to furnish the proposed grocery shop and never thought of the capital required for the business. On this material, it was held that no case was made out that he was not able to maintain his family. Yet another reason was that during his father’s lifetime, he, the plaintiff never thought of running a grocery shop. The plaintiff admitted that he did not resign his job. He thus had no intention of permanently running a grocery shop. It was not proved he had knowledge of the grocery business. These are the reasons given by the trial court and the first appellate court for rejecting the appellant’s case. The High Court rejected the application under Article 227 on the ground that the concurrent findings of fact could not be interfered with. 11. It will be seen that the trial court and the appellate court had clearly erred in law. They practically equated the test of “need or requirement” to be equivalent to “dire or absolute or compelling necessity”. According to them, if the plaintiff had not permanently lost his job on account of the lockout or if he had not resigned his job, he could not be treated as a person without any means of livelihood, as contended by him and hence not entitled to an order for possession of the shop. This test, in our view, is not the proper test. A landlord need not lose his existing job nor resign it nor reach a level of starvation to contemplate that he must get possession of his premises for establishing a business. The manner in which the courts have gone into the meaning of “lockout” in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 appears to us to be nothing but a perverse approach to the problem. One cannot imagine that a landlord who is in service should first resign his job and wait for the unknown and uncertain result of a long-drawn litigation. If he resigned his job, he might indeed end up in utter poverty. One cannot imagine that a landlord who is in service should first resign his job and wait for the unknown and uncertain result of a long-drawn litigation. If he resigned his job, he might indeed end up in utter poverty. Joblessness is not a condition precedent for seeking to get back one’s premises. For that matter assuming the landlord was in a job and had not resigned it or assuming that pending the long-drawn litigation he started some other temporary water business to sustain himself, that would not be an indication that the need for establishing a grocery shop was not a bona fide or a reasonable requirement or that it was motivated or was a mere design to evict the tenant. It is not necessary for the landlord to adduce evidence that he had money in deposit in a bank nor produce proof of funds to prove his readiness and willingness as in a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale of immovable property. So far as experience is concerned, one would not think that a grocery business was one which required extraordinary expertise. It is, therefore, clear that the entire approach of both the courts was absolutely wrong in law and perverse on fact. Unfortunately the High Court simply dismissed the writ petition filed under Article 227 stating that the findings were one of fact. That is why we think that this is an exceptional case calling for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.” 17. It is clear that for the purpose of bona fide requirement of a landlord what is required is that there must be something more than a mere desire but need not certainly be a compelling or absolute or dire necessity. Therefore a bona fide requirement is something in between a mere desire or wish on one hand and a compelling or dire or absolute necessity on the other hand. The facts of the instant case as it would be seen from the evidence on record, it would show that the Plaintiffs who is the family of five now is in dire need for additional space and under such circumstances the said requirement of the plaintiffs of the suit premise cannot be categorized as a mere desire or wish. The facts of the instant case as it would be seen from the evidence on record, it would show that the Plaintiffs who is the family of five now is in dire need for additional space and under such circumstances the said requirement of the plaintiffs of the suit premise cannot be categorized as a mere desire or wish. Consequently, this Court also does not find any infirmity in the findings recorded in the judgments passed by both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court in respect to issue No. 3. 18. On 6.8.2022 when the matter was taken up for hearing this Court had asked the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner to take instructions as to whether the petitioner would require some time to vacate the suit premises in the eventuality the instant petition is dismissed. Mr. L.K. Bora, the learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the petitioner is an aged lady and this Court may be gracious enough to grant the petitioner some time to search an alternative accommodation. 19. I have also heard in that regard Mr. G. Kakoti who submits that he has no objection if only a reasonable time is being granted taking into account that the Petitioners has been in occupation of the suit premises for more than a decade. Taking into consideration the said submission made by the learned counsel for the Petitioner, this Court is of the opinion that it would be just and reasonable to grant the petitioner 6 months of time to vacate the suit premises provided the petitioners submits an undertaking before the Trial Court within 22nd of August 2022 to the effect that she would vacate the suit premises within a period of 6 months from today i.e. to vacate on or before 9/2/2023. Failure to submit the undertaking within the said period, the Plaintiff shall be entitled to initiate appropriate execution proceedings for evicting the defendant. It is also pertinent to mention herein that this period of 6 months is granted to the petitioner is on the basis of the submission being made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and the same would also be taken as an undertaking given before the Court. 20. It is also pertinent to mention herein that this period of 6 months is granted to the petitioner is on the basis of the submission being made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and the same would also be taken as an undertaking given before the Court. 20. It is clarified that during this period of 6 months the petitioner shall continue to make payment of Rs.800/-per month in the form of compensation to the Respondents herein. It is further observed that granting of extension of the period of 6 months subject to filing of undertaking as aforesaid and the payment of Rs. 800/-per month during this period of 6 months shall not create any right or interest in favor of the Petitioner herein in respect to the suit premises. It is further clarified that during this period of 6 months the petitioner shall remain in possession of the suit premises as the custodian of the Respondents herein and shall not do any act or acts which may affect the rights of the Respondents herein over the suit premises in any manner whatsoever, 21. The Respondents herein shall be entitled to the rent for the period of the eviction proceedings either through adjustment from the rent already deposited in the Court or making an application before the Executing Court to decide on their entitlement of the rent during the pendency of the eviction proceedings and the executing court would permit the petitioner herein to controvert the allegation of nonpayment of rent during the pendency of the eviction proceedings and thereupon decide in accordance with law. 22. In view of the above, there is no case made out for interference to the impugned judgment and decree dated 8/10/2021 passed in T.A. No. 53/2019 for which the instant petition stands dismissed. However, in the facts of the instant case no cost is being imposed. 23. The Registry is directed to send back the records forthwith to the Court below.