JUDGMENT : SANDEEP N. BHATT, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of conviction dated 15.04.2013 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sabarkantha at Himmatnagar, Camp at Modasa in Sessions Case No.117 of 2012 for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the appellant – accused has preferred this appeal under section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“the Code” for short), whereby the appellant – accused is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and is ordered to undergo life imprisonment and fine of Rs.5,000/-, and in default of fine, is ordered to undergo further rigorous imprisonment of six months. 2. The complainant - Mayuddin Rahimbhai Kherada was residing in joint family. The family consists his parents, grand-mother, brothers, sister-in-laws, sister and their children. The dispute was between parents of the complainant. The accused is the father of the complainant - Abdulrahim Umarbhai Kherada, who is the present appellant before this Court and the deceased - Mumtazben was the mother of the complainant. The case of the prosecution is that, on 31.07.2012 at about 20:15 hours, when all the family friends were sitting in the chowk near his house, at that time, his cousin brother viz., Saddam, son of his uncle – Yunusbhai told the complainant that there was a quarrel between your parents and your father has given Dhariya blow to his mother. Therefore, he rushed to his house. He saw that his mother was fallen down in the front portion - lobby of his house in bloodied condition. Due to Dhariya blow, she has received grievous head injuries and was bleeding. The root cause of the incident was the quarrel between the husband and wife. The husband was not doing any job since last three months and the wife was oftenly scolded him regarding the unemployment. Thus, such incident has happened. After the incident, the appellant – accused ran away from the scene of offence along with the weapon – Dhariya. The said fact has given by the sister of the complainant viz., Nilofar. The husband was not doing any job since last three months and the wife was oftenly scolded him regarding the unemployment. Thus, such incident has happened. After the incident, the appellant – accused ran away from the scene of offence along with the weapon – Dhariya. The said fact has given by the sister of the complainant viz., Nilofar. Thus, the complainant lodged the complaint with regard to the incident before the Modasa Town Police Station, which was registered as C.R.- I No. 41 of 2012 for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. 3. In pursuance of the complaint lodged by the complainant, investigating agency recorded statements of the witnesses, collected relevant evidence in form of medical evidence and drawn various Panchnamas and other relevant evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. After having found material against the appellant accused, charge-sheet came to be filed in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Modasa. As said Court lacks jurisdiction to try the offence, it committed the case to the Sessions Judge, Sabarkantha at Modasa as provided under section 209 of the Code. 4. Upon committal of the case to the Sessions Court, Modasa, learned Sessions Judge framed charge at Exh.3 against the appellant - accused for the aforesaid offence. The appellant - accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. In order to bring home charge, the prosecution has examined 15 witnesses, which is mentioned in para : 6 of the impugned judgment and order and also produced various documentary evidence before the learned trial Court, which is mentioned in para 7 of the impugned judgment and order. 6. On conclusion of evidence on the part of the prosecution, the trial Court put various incriminating circumstances appearing in the evidence to the appellant - accused so as to obtain his explanation/answer as provided u/s 313 of the Code. In the further statement, the appellant - accused denied all incriminating circumstances appearing against him as false and further stated that he is innocent and false case has been filed against him. After hearing both the sides and after analysis of evidence adduced by the prosecution, the learned trial Judge convicted the appellant - accused from the offences, for which he was tried, as the prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. 7. After hearing both the sides and after analysis of evidence adduced by the prosecution, the learned trial Judge convicted the appellant - accused from the offences, for which he was tried, as the prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. 7. Heard learned advocates. 8.1 Learned advocate Mr. Thakkar for the appellant – accused has submitted that the trial Court has committed serious error of law as the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its charge against the appellant and the star witness of the prosecution – the complainant as well as other witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution. He has submitted that the trial Court has committed serious error of law merely on the strength of recovery or discovery at the instance of accused which was the basis to pass an order of conviction. He has further submitted that the trial Court ought to have held that in fact, the recovery or discovery can never be considered as substantial piece of evidence, rather than it can be considered as corroborative piece of evidence. He has submitted that otherwise also, the recovery shown at the instance of accused is not believable inasmuch as panchas to the recovery panchnama have not supported the case of the prosecution. He has submitted that in fact, the evidence of independent witnesses and also the evidence of start witness have not supported the case of prosecution. He has submitted that if witnesses are found to be not believable, no reliance can be placed with said evidence. He has submitted that under the circumstances, from the evidence of Investigating Officer and the statement recorded under Section 162 of the Cr.P.C. which could not have been relied upon by the trial Court, therefore, the order impugned is liable to be quashed and set aside. 8.2 He has further submitted that the trial Court ought to have taken into consideration that the weapons stated to have been found at the instance of the accused is in fact no evidence in the eyes of law in absence of any other independent witness available to sustain charge alleged against the appellant. 8.2 He has further submitted that the trial Court ought to have taken into consideration that the weapons stated to have been found at the instance of the accused is in fact no evidence in the eyes of law in absence of any other independent witness available to sustain charge alleged against the appellant. He has submitted that in the cross-examination of the doctor also, the narration of the injuries as stated so and merely doctor has suggested about the likelihood of the injury caused with the help of weapon which was seized, can never be termed as a substantial piece of evidence and then to infer the entire case of the prosecution against the petitioner on the basis of so-called recovery and on the basis of so-called weapon as stated by the prosecution. 8.3 He has also submitted that the eye-witness of the incident turned hostile. He has submitted that the panchas do not support the case of prosecution and also turned hostile. Therefore, he has submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. 8.4 In support of his submission, he has relied upon the following decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court : (i) (1997) 10 SCC 44 – Mohd. Aman versus State of Rajasthan (ii) (2011) 11 SCC 724 – Mustkeem alias Sirajudeen versus State of Rajasthan 8.5 He has submitted that the appellant may be acquitted and the present appeal may be allowed. 8.6 He has alternatively submitted that the case of appellant can be considered for conviction under Section 304 (Part I/II) of the Indian Penal Code. 9. Per contra, learned APP Mr. Hardik Soni for the respondent – State has vehemently opposed the appeal. He has submitted that the trial Court has not committed any error in recording conviction. He has submitted that the trial Court has rightly considered the evidence – oral as well as documentary on record and passed the conviction order. He has submitted that though all the witnesses are declared hostile, the trial Court has rightly considered the incident vis-a-vis the postmortem report and serological report. He has further submitted that the trial Court has rightly considered the deposition of the Investigating Officer, so also the medical evidence. He has submitted that the trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order, therefore, no interference is required by this Court in it. 10. He has further submitted that the trial Court has rightly considered the deposition of the Investigating Officer, so also the medical evidence. He has submitted that the trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order, therefore, no interference is required by this Court in it. 10. We have heard learned advocates appearing for the respective parties. We have perused the record and proceedings of the trial Court. We have gone through the impugned judgment and award passed by the trial Court. We have re-appreciated the entire evidence on record. 11.1 This is a case of murder of wife by husband in their residential house. The husband has given Dhariya blow on the head of the wife – deceased. The complainant and all the witnesses, including eye-witnesses are the family members of the appellant. They declared hostile during the trial, which is obvious. 11.2 It is required to be noted that the appellant – accused was doing job of a driver. He was unemployed since last three months before the incident. The appellant was aged about 48 years at the time of incident. Naturally, there were some discussion between husband and wife regarding income. They have four sons and one daughter as well as grand-mother. All were residing in joint family. 11.3 Due to some altercations on that day between the appellant and his wife as appellant was not going to his service for last three months, the appellant has inflicted Dhariya blow on the vital part of the body – head of his wife, who succumbed to the said injuries immediately. 11.4 Looking to the depositions of PW-1 to PW9 at Exh.6 to Exh.14, all these witnesses are the family members of the appellant and obviously, they do not support the case of the prosecution, as all the witnesses have given deposition on the same line and in favour of the appellant. At this juncture, it is required to be considered the other evidence on record i.e. postmortem report, FSL report, serological report, deposition of the doctor(s) and the investigating officer(s). It is relevant to refer to the decision in the case of Achhar Singh versus State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2021) 5 SCC 545, more particularly paras : 25 to 27, which are as under : “25. It is vehemently contended that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is exaggerated and thus false. It is relevant to refer to the decision in the case of Achhar Singh versus State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2021) 5 SCC 545, more particularly paras : 25 to 27, which are as under : “25. It is vehemently contended that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is exaggerated and thus false. Cambridge Dictionary defines "exaggeration" as "the fact of making something larger, more important, better or worse than it really is". Merriam-Webster defines the term "exaggerate" as to "enlarge beyond bounds or the truth". The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines it as "enlarged or altered beyond normal proportions". These expressions unambiguously suggest that the genesis of an 'exaggerated statement' lies in a true fact, to which fictitious additions are made so as to make it more penetrative. Every exaggeration, therefore, has the ingredients of 'truth'. No exaggerated statement is possible without an element of truth. On the other hand, Advance Law Lexicon defines "false" as "erroneous, untrue; opposite of correct, or true". Oxford Concise Dictionary states that "false" is "wrong; not correct or true". Similar is the explanation in other dictionaries as well. There is, thus, a marked differentia between an 'exaggerated version' and a 'false version'. An exaggerated statement contains both truth and falsity, whereas a false statement has no grain of truth in it (being the 'opposite' of 'true'). It is well said that to make a mountain out of a molehill, the molehill shall have to exist primarily. A Court of law, being mindful of such distinction is duty bound to disseminate 'truth' from 'falsehood' and sift the grain from the chaff in case of exaggerations. It is only in a case where the grain and the chaff are so inextricably intertwined that in their separation no real evidence survives, that the whole evidence can be discarded. 26. Learned State counsel has rightly relied on Gangadhar Behera (Supra) to contend that even in cases where a major portion of the evidence is found deficient, if the residue is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused, conviction can be based on it. This Court in Hari Chand v. State of Delhi, (1996) 9 SCC 112 . held that: "24. This Court in Hari Chand v. State of Delhi, (1996) 9 SCC 112 . held that: "24. ...So far as this contention is concerned it must be kept in view that while appreciating the evidence of witnesses in a criminal trial especially in a case of eyewitnesses the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus cannot apply and the court has to make efforts to sift the grain from the chaff. It is of course true that when a witness is said to have exaggerated in his evidence at the stage of trial and has tried to involve many more accused and if that part of the evidence is not found acceptable the remaining part of evidence has to be scrutinised with care and the court must try to see whether the acceptable part of the evidence gets corroborated from other evidence on record so that the acceptable part can be safely relied upon..." (emphasis supplied) 27. There is no gainsaid that homicidal deaths cannot be left to judicium dei. The Court in their quest to reach the truth ought to make earnest efforts to extract gold out of the heap of black sand. The solemn duty is to dig out the authenticity. It is only when the Court, despite its best efforts, fails to reach a firm conclusion that the benefit of doubt is extended.” 11.5 Considering the deposition of PW12 – Dr. Kalpit Shivubhai Sharma at Exh.17, who has performed the postmortem of the deceased, wherein he has clearly mentioned the various injuries seen on the body of the deceased. He has specifically stated in his deposition that the injuries of the deceased could be possible by a weapon like Dhariya and due to that, it could be possible to succumb to the injuries. Now, looking to the postmortem certificate at Exh.19, it is specifically stated in the said certificate that the cause of death is haemorrhage and shock due to head injuries. Further, looking to the postmortem report at Exh.18, it can be seen that there were approximately nine wounds, which were by sharp cutting edge of Dhariya. The appellant has inflicted nine blows on the head of the deceased. All are Dhariya blows. Further, there was a skull fracture at left parietal occipital and temporal bone. Further, looking to the postmortem report at Exh.18, it can be seen that there were approximately nine wounds, which were by sharp cutting edge of Dhariya. The appellant has inflicted nine blows on the head of the deceased. All are Dhariya blows. Further, there was a skull fracture at left parietal occipital and temporal bone. At this stage, the recovery panchnama at Exh.16/1 is required to be considered, whereby the weapon – Dhariya used in the commission of offence by the appellant – accused is recovered from other place, where blood stain and hair were found from the said weapon – Dhariya. During the investigation, the investigating agency has collected one Tile as muddamal, wherefrom blood stain and hair were found. Now, from the serology report given by the FSL, it can be found that the blood and hair which are found from the piece of tile as well as from the weapon – Dhariya are of the deceased. Thus, it is clear from the corroboration of these evidence that the prosecution has rightly proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. It is fruitful to refer to Sections 299 and 300 of the Indian Penal Code, which is reproduced as under : “Sec.299. Culpable homicide : Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide. Explanation 1.- A person who causes bodily injury to another who is labouring under a disorder, disease or bodily infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death of that other, shall be deemed to have caused his death. Explanation 2.- Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment the death might have been prevented. Explanation 3.- The causing of the death of a child in the mother's womb is not homicide. But it may amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child, if any part of that child has been brought forth, though the child may not have breathed or been completely born. Sec.300. Explanation 3.- The causing of the death of a child in the mother's womb is not homicide. But it may amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child, if any part of that child has been brought forth, though the child may not have breathed or been completely born. Sec.300. Murder : Except in the case hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or 2ndly.- If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or 3rdly.- If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or 4thly.- If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. Exception 1.- When culpable homicide is not murder.- Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. The above exception is subject to the following provisos :- First.- That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person. Secondly.- That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant. Thirdly.- That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence. Explanation.- Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact. Thirdly.- That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence. Explanation.- Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact. Exception 2.- Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence. Exception 3.- Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused. Exception 4.- Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Explanation.- It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault. Exception 5.- Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.” It is also relevant to refer to Section 293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for further reference, which is as under : “Sec.293 (of Cr.P.C.) : Reports of certain Government scientific experts - (1) Any document purporting to be a report under the hand of a Government scientific expert to whom this section applies, upon any matter or thing duly submitted to him for examination or analysis and report in the course of any proceeding under this Code, may be used as evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code. (2) The Court may, if it thinks fit, summon and examine any such expert as to the subject-matter of his report. (2) The Court may, if it thinks fit, summon and examine any such expert as to the subject-matter of his report. (3) Where any such expert is summoned by a Court and he is unable to attend personally, he may, unless the Court has expressly directed him to appear personally, depute any responsible officer working with him to attend the Court, if such officer is conversant with the facts of the case and can satisfactorily depose in Court on his behalf. (4) This section applies to the following Government scientific experts, namely :- (a) any Chemical Examiner or Assistant Chemical Examiner to Government; [(b) the Chief Controller of Explosives;] (c) the Director of the Finger Print Bureau; (d) the Director, Hafkeine Institute, Bombay; (e) the Director a[,Deputy Director or Assistant Director] of a Central Forensic Science Laboratory or a State Forensic Science Laboratory; (f) the Serologist to the Government. c[(g) any other Government scientific expert specified, by notification, by the Central Government for this purpose.]” At this stage, it is also relevant to refer to the definitions of ‘Evidence’, ‘Proved’ and ‘Disproved’ of Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act for further reference, which are as under : “Sec.3 - ‘Evidence’ - “Evidence” means and includes - (1) all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry, such statements are called oral evidence; (2) [all documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the Court], such documents are called documentary evidence. ‘Proved’ - A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. ‘Disproved’ - A fact is said to be disproved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes that it does not exist, or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist. ‘Disproved’ - A fact is said to be disproved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes that it does not exist, or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist. ‘Not proved’ - A fact is said not to be proved when it is neither proved nor disproved.” 11.6 Thus, considering the deposition of PW-14 – Kanubhai Jaychandbhai Chaudhary, who is the Investigating Officer, was examined at Exh.24 vis-a-vis the panchnamas are also proved vis-avis the entire evidence of the FSL, which is scientific evidence admissible in view of Section 293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which the defence could not succeed to rebut and in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of Rameshbhai Hajabhai Chachiya versus State of Gujarat reported in 2012 (3) GLR 2250 , the panchnamas are proved by deposition of Investigating Officer. Para : 11 is relevant from the above judgment, which is as under : “11. Bearing in mind the above principles of law, we have scrutinized scrupulously and examined carefully the circumstances appearing in this case against the accused. We propose to deal with circumstance of discovery of weapon and discovery of the valuables as heavily relied upon by the prosecution first. It appears that the accused was arrested on 4th February, 2004 at 15.30 hours and arrest panchnama to that effect was also drawn which is Exh.44. On the very same day and at the very same hour it is the case of the prosecution that the accused stated before the Investigating Officer that on his own free will and volition he was ready to point out the place at which he has put the axe used in the commission of offence. The Investigating Officer for the purpose of discovery called two panchas and is said to have drawn the discovery panchnama thereby showing discovery of weapon at the instance of the accused. Both the panch witnesses i.e. PW 7 Exh.22 and PW 8 Exh.25 did not support the case of the prosecution and failed to prove the contents of the discovery panchnama of the weapon of offence. Both the panch witnesses i.e. PW 7 Exh.22 and PW 8 Exh.25 did not support the case of the prosecution and failed to prove the contents of the discovery panchnama of the weapon of offence. The question is as to what would be the evidentiary value of such a piece of circumstance sought to be relied upon by the prosecution, more particularly when two independent witnesses to the panchnama did not support the prosecution. The trial Court believed and placed reliance on this piece of evidence saying that though the panchas have turned hostile, the Investigating Officer in his evidence has said that the weapon was discovered in the presence of two independent panch witnesses on accused making a statement of disclosure. The Supreme Court in Modan Singh V/s. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1978 SC 1511 held that if the evidence of the Investigating Officer who recovered the material objects is convincing, the evidence as to recovery need not be rejected on the ground that the seizure witnesses do not support the prosecution version. While there cannot be any quarrel with this proposition of law, but still the requirement of law needs to be fulfilled before accepting the evidence of discovery and that is by proving the contents of the panchnama. The Investigating Officer in his deposition is obliged in law to prove the contents of the panchnama and it is only if the Investigating Officer has successfully proved the contents of the discovery panchnama in accordance with law then in that case the prosecution may be justified in relying on such evidence and the trial Court may also accept the evidence. In the present case, what we have found from the deposition of the Investigating Officer PW 16 Exh.77 is that he has not proved the contents of both the discovery panchnamas and all that he has deposed is that as the accused was willing to point out the weapon of offence the same was recovered under a panchnama. Same is the statement so far as the discovery of valuables is concerned. We have minutely gone through this part of the evidence of the Investigating Officer and we are convinced that by no stretch of imagination it could be said that the Investigating Officer has proved the contents of both the discovery panchnamas. Same is the statement so far as the discovery of valuables is concerned. We have minutely gone through this part of the evidence of the Investigating Officer and we are convinced that by no stretch of imagination it could be said that the Investigating Officer has proved the contents of both the discovery panchnamas. There is a reason why we are laying emphasis on proving the contents of the panchnama at the end of the investigating officer, more particularly when the independent panch witnesses have turned hostile and have not supported the prosecution. In order to enable the Court to safely rely on the evidence of the Investigating Officer, it is necessary that the exact words attributed to an accused, as statement made by him, be brought on record and, for this purpose the Investigating Officer is obliged to depose in his evidence the exact statement and not by merely saying that a discovery panchnama of weapon of offence was drawn as the accused was willing to take it out from a particular place.” From the aforesaid observations made by the Division Bench of this Court, it is clear that an investigating officer is obliged in law to prove the contents of a panchnama in his deposition and it is only after the investigating officer has successfully proved the contents of the discovery panchnama in accordance with law, then only, the prosecution can be said to be justified in relying on such a piece of evidence and the trial Court may also exhibit such an evidence. It is proved that the present appellant has committed offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act, which the trial Court has rightly declared. The medical evidence also supports the case of the prosecution. The trial Court has, therefore, not committed any error in recording conviction. 12. With regard to the alternate submission made by learned advocate for the appellant, it is pertinent to note that from the evidence produced by the prosecution, it can be said that the appellant has given nine Dhariya blows to her wife on the vital part of the body – head and therefore, she succumbed to the injuries immediately. 12. With regard to the alternate submission made by learned advocate for the appellant, it is pertinent to note that from the evidence produced by the prosecution, it can be said that the appellant has given nine Dhariya blows to her wife on the vital part of the body – head and therefore, she succumbed to the injuries immediately. Further, the manner and method in which the incident has taken place, looking to the several injuries received by deceased shows that the accused has acted in cruel manner without any grave or sudden provocation, this Court is of the view that the case of the appellant does not fall under Section 304 (Part I) or (Part II) of the Indian Penal Code, as contended by the learned advocate for the appellant. This Court has considered the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy vs State of A.P. reported in 2006 (11) SCC 444 , more particularly para 29, which is reproduced as under: “29. Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters plucking of a fruit, straying of a cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under section 302, are not converted into offences punishable under section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under section 302. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under section 302, are not converted into offences punishable under section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under section 302. The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances : (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any pre- meditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention. Be that as it may.” 13. We have gone through the decisions upon which the reliance is placed by the learned advocate for the appellant. However, the said decisions would not render any assistance to the appellant in the facts of the present case. 14. Upon re-appreciation of all the documentary as well as oral evidence on record minutely, we do not agree with the submissions made by learned advocate Mr. Thakkar appearing for the appellant – accused. The appeal, therefore, needs to be dismissed. The trial Court has rightly evaluated the entire evidence and has not committed any error and rightly convicted the accused – appellant, which need not be interfered with by this Court. The impugned judgment and order passed by the trial Court therefore need to be confirmed and accordingly confirmed. 15. The present appeal is dismissed accordingly.