JUDGMENT : 1. Rule returnable forthwith. Mr. Utkarsh Sharma, learned AGP appearing for respondent no. 1 and Mr. H.S. Munshaw, learned advocate appearing for respondent no. 2 waive service of notice of rule. 2. This petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India prays for issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the notification dated 20.05.2020 issued by the State of Gujarat appointing an inquiry officer for carrying out denovo preliminary inquiry. The challenge to this notification is on two grounds namely (i) the State has no authority to inquire into the omissions or allegations against the petitioner who happens to be an officer of the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation and (ii) once an earlier preliminary inquiry report had exonerated him, a second inquiry was not justified. 3. Facts in brief would indicate that the petitioner was working as a Chief Personnel Officer at the relevant time. Advertisements were issued on 15.01.2016 and 04.02.2017 for filling up the posts in various cadres including the post of Conductors. The manner and the method of recruitment was a subject matter of scrutiny before this court in petitions filed by certain candidates in which this court had set aside the recruitment initially by an order passed by a learned Single Judge of this court. Complaints were made to the Vigilance Commission with regard to the irregularities in the method of selection as a result of which the petitioner was subjected to an inquiry conducted by one Mr. R.V. Suthar. 4. Mr. Shalin Mehta, learned Senior Counsel appearing with Mr. Hemang Shah, learned advocate for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner was an employee of the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation (for short 'the Corporation'). The impugned notification dated 20.05.2020 appointing one Mr. A.J. Raval by the State to hold an inquiry against the petitioner was without jurisdiction. Inviting the attention of the court to Section 36 of the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 (for short 'the Act'), he would submit that under the said Section the State Government can only hold an inquiry in respect of the powers and duties of the Corporation and not inquire into the conduct of an officer of the Corporation under Section 36. 4.1 Mr. 4.1 Mr. Mehta would also challenge the order of suspension dated 22.02.2021 on the ground that it is an order without jurisdiction and authority of law as the same was passed by the Chief Administrative Officer of the Corporation. For the purposes of supporting his submissions with regard to the suspension, Mr. Mehta would rely on the Gujarat State Road Transport Employees Service Regulations issued under Section 45 of the Act. Referring to Regulations 80 and 82 of the Regulations, he would submit that for the acts of misconduct and omissions which are specified, a procedure is prescribed for dealing with cases of acts of misconduct. Regulation 82 provides that an employee charged with any misconduct is liable to be suspended by the competent authority pending inquiry in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Regulation 80. Not only is the suspension bad as there is no pending inquiry against the petitioner but even in accordance with the service regulation which provides for a list of competent authorities under the Regulations, an employee can be suspended by an authority appointed for the purpose in the procedure prescribed under Regulation 80. According to him, by virtue of Regulation 80 of the Service Regulations, the Discipline and Appeal Procedure for the corporation employees would indicate that for the acts of misconduct, the procedure dealing with Class-I and Class-II officers of the department, like the petitioner the competent authority to award punishment is the Vice Chairman and the General Manager of the Corporation and in the present case, since the order of suspension is passed by the Chief Administrative Officer, the order is without jurisdiction and therefore must be quashed and set aside. 4.2 Mr. Shalin Mehta would also invite the court's attention to an earlier preliminary inquiry report annexed to the petition where an inquiry was carried out by one Mr. R.V. Suthar levelling a number of allegations and imputations against the petitioner, where, however there were adverse findings only with regard to charge nos. 4 and 7. Even otherwise, when the final finding of the charges is read, what was finally stated in the charge was there was no substance in the charge as far as the other charges are concerned. Even charge no. 4 of the finding was that there was no substance in the charge in question. 4 and 7. Even otherwise, when the final finding of the charges is read, what was finally stated in the charge was there was no substance in the charge as far as the other charges are concerned. Even charge no. 4 of the finding was that there was no substance in the charge in question. Therefore, he would submit that once an exercise of undertaking an inquiry was already conducted there was no need for the State to exercise powers under Section 36 and to appoint another inquiry officer Mr. A.J. Raval. He would reiterate his submission that Section 36 had to be read in inasmuch as the inquiry had to be done in context of the affairs of the Corporation and not the officers or a particular employee. 4.3 Mr. Mehta would further submit that the order of suspension is dated 22.02.2021. No departmental proceedings are held against the petitioner. It is well settled that the suspension cannot be indefinitely continued. In absence of any charge-sheet, there is no reason why more than one year after the suspension order is passed, departmental proceedings having not been initiated, the suspension should not be continued. 4.4 Mr. Mehta would invite the court's attention to the orders passed by this court in Special Civil Application No. 2294 of 2017 dated 22.03.2017 and submit that as a result of the selection which was set aside where it was the GTU which was responsible for the assessment, that was the grouse for which the petitioner was facing the inquiry proceedings. That order of the court was set aside by the Division Bench in an appeal. Inviting the Court's attention to the operative portion of the appellate order, he would submit that the principle of negative marking was held to be correct and therefore there was no reason why inquiry with regard to the recruitment undertaken should have been the subject matter of the proceedings in inquiry. 4.5 Mr. Mehta would submit that even the Managing Director at the relevant point of time had written a letter supporting the stand of the petitioner and requested the State that no inquiries be conducted into the affairs or the omissions of the petitioner. 4.6 Mr. Mehta would further submit that the appointment of Mr. A.J. Raval as an inquiry officer was misconceived. 4.6 Mr. Mehta would further submit that the appointment of Mr. A.J. Raval as an inquiry officer was misconceived. He would submit that the notification of the State Government appointing the inquiry officer would indicate that at no point of time Mr. Raval was appointed as an inquiry officer by the State in the notifications issued by the State Government. Inviting the court's attention to the notifications issued by the State, Mr. Mehta would submit that such appointment is therefore bad and a second inquiry is misconceived. 5. Mr. H.S. Munshaw, learned advocate appearing for the Corporation would invite the court's attention to the affidavit-in-reply filed by one Mr. Subodh Harshe, the Chief Personnel Officer of the Corporation and submit that the impugned notification dated 20.05.2020 appointing a second officer for a denovo inquiry is justified. He would submit that as far as the recruitment in question is concerned, one L.J Foundation was entrusted with the task of holding the written test. Several complaints were addressed to various authorities, to which Mr. Munshaw would draw the court's attention to with regard to the entire recruitment process. A complaint was received by the Vigilance Commission, Gandhinagar, Gujarat and therefore it was within the domain of the State, the Corporation being a State undertaking to inquire into the affairs of an officer who at the relevant point of time was a Chief Personnel Officer incharge of the process of recruitment. He would submit that the corporation being under the total administrative control and supervision of the Corporation of the State exercise in accordance with the provisions of Section 36 was just and proper. 5.1 Mr. Munshaw would futher submit that the inquiry officer's report of Mr. R.V. Suthar annexed to the petition is not the correct report and infact the report of Mr. Suthar would reveal that the petitioner was found to be amiss in the duties. It was decided to hold a second inquiry by appointing Mr. Raval, a retired Chief Mechanical Engineer of the corporation as the report of Mr. Suthar was not conducive and when the inquiry was conducted by Mr. Suthar all the documents were under the custody of the petitioner. 5.2 Mr. It was decided to hold a second inquiry by appointing Mr. Raval, a retired Chief Mechanical Engineer of the corporation as the report of Mr. Suthar was not conducive and when the inquiry was conducted by Mr. Suthar all the documents were under the custody of the petitioner. 5.2 Mr. Munshaw would further submit that as far as the decision of suspension is concerned, the stand of the learned counsel for the petitioner that it is without authority of law or jurisdiction is misconceived and it was the Vice Chairman and Managing Director who had taken a decision on file to suspend the petitioner on 22.02.2021. Pursuant to the request of the court, Mr. Munshaw has filed two relevant pages of the corporation's file notings to which Mr. Mehta has no objection to for the perusal of the court in support of his submission. He would therefore submit that the order of suspension is in consonance with the Regulations 80 and 82 of the Service Regulations of the Corporation. 5.3 Mr. Munshaw would further submit that the involvement of the petitioner in various irregularities relating to overall recruitment process was of vital importance which needed to be inquired into and therefore the petition at the preliminary stage challenging the action of the corporation of initiation of preliminary inquiry is misconceived. 5.4 Mr. Munshaw would submit that only because of the pendency of the petition that the corporation in due deference has not proceeded further to issue a departmental charge-sheet lest it be misconstrued as over reaching the court's process and therefore continuous of suspension cannot be held to be unjustified as submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner. 5.5 He would further submit that it was necessary to place the petitioner under suspension considering the gravity of the complaint. 6. Mr. Utkarsh Sharma, learned AGP for the State would also refer to the reply filed on behalf of the State and support the impugned notification. He would submit that the State has the power to issue notification under Section 36 of the Act. He would submit that series of events and the perusal of the report of Mr. Suthar would indicate that since the earlier inquiry was initiated and undertaken without a formal procedure expected of an inquiry, a fresh inquiry was indicated and sought to be held by the notification under challenge. He would submit that series of events and the perusal of the report of Mr. Suthar would indicate that since the earlier inquiry was initiated and undertaken without a formal procedure expected of an inquiry, a fresh inquiry was indicated and sought to be held by the notification under challenge. He would submit that no fault can be found with the procedural aspect of the appointment of Mr. A.J. Raval as the second inquiry officer. Reliance was placed on the government circular dated 08.07.1970 setting out the circumstances under which an employee can be suspended. 7. Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for the respective parties, only two issues require a brief adjudication i.e. (I) whether the exercise of holding a denovo inquiry by the impugned notification was without authority of law inasmuch as it was not open for the State to exercise powers under Section 36 of the Act to hold an inquiry against an officer (II) whether the order of suspension is without jurisdiction. 8. Discussing the second question with regard to the validity of the order of suspension first, perusal of the regulations 80 and 82 of the Act read with the Procedure envisaged under the Discipline and Appeal Rules, would indicate that it is the Vice Chairman/M.D. or the General Manager who has to pass an order of suspension and it is not the Chief Administrative Officer. During the course of arguments and even in the contents of the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the Corporation the order of suspension was justified on the ground of it being within jurisdiction by an averment in the affidavit-in-reply stating that it was the Vice Chairman and Managing Director of the Corporation who had taken the decision to suspend the petitioner. To satisfy itself about the exercise carried out, particularly when an affidavit-in-reply stated that a decision was taken on the file by the Vice Chairman and the Managing Director of the Corporation, Mr. Munshaw was requested to submit various relevant pages of the file for the perusal of the court to which the learned counsel for the petitioner registered a no objection. Munshaw was requested to submit various relevant pages of the file for the perusal of the court to which the learned counsel for the petitioner registered a no objection. File notings dated 22.02.2021 would indicate that the Vice Chairman and the Managing Director after having referred to the provisions of Regulations 80 and 82 took a decision that the petitioner should be suspended and his headquarters be shifted to Junagadh and the Chief Administrative Officer be authorised to issue such an order under his signature. What is therefore borne out from the file notings is that the order of suspension was in fact under the authority of the Vice Chairman and the Managing Director and therefore cannot be held to be one without jurisdiction. 8.1 As far as continuing the suspension indefinitely, the argument is self destructive. The petitioner has come forth before this court challenging the notification dated 20.05.2020 of holding departmental proceedings and a preliminary inquiry and contended that such a preliminary inquiry is without authority of law. The order of suspension was also under challenge on the ground that it was without authority of law. The court has issued notice and the petition awaited consideration of this court. 8.2 The court would agree with the submission of Mr. Munshaw that pending the challenge, the corporation was justified in due deference to the pending challenge to desist itself from proceeding further and issue a charge-sheet lest it be taken as overreaching the process of the court. The stand of the petitioner therefore that the suspension has been continued indefinitely and has been issued without any pending inquiry cannot be accepted. 9. Coming to the challenge to the authority of the State to hold an inquiry against the petitioner and the support taken under Section 36 of the Act needs to be considered. Sections 36 and 37 of the Act read as under : "36. Power to order inquiries.- (1) The State Government, with a view to satisfy itself that the powers and duties of a Corporation established by that Government are being exercised and performed properly, may, at any time, appoint any person or persons to make inquiries into all or any of the activities of the Corporation and to report to the State Government the result of such inquiries. (2) The Corporation shall give to the person or persons so appointed all facilities for the proper conduct of the inquiries and shall produce before, or furnish to, the person or persons any document, account or information in the possession of the Corporation which such person or persons demand for the purposes of the inquiries. 37. Power to control a part of the undertaking of a Corporation.-(1) If on receipt of the report of any inquiry held under section 36 or otherwise, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do in the public interest, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, authorise any person to take over from the Corporation, and so long as that notification is in force, to administer in accordance with such directions as may be issued from time to time by the State Government such part of the undertaking of the Corporation as may be specified in the notification, and any person so authorised may, for the purpose of so administering the said part of the undertaking exercise all or any of the powers of the Corporation or of any officer of the Corporation under this Act, issue such directions as he thinks fit to the [officers or other employees] of the Corporation and employ any outside agency. (2) The State Government may by such notification direct that all charges and expenses incurred by the person so authorised together with such remuneration as the State Government may allow from time to time to such person shall be paid within such time as may be fixed by the State Government from the fund of the Corporation, and if the expenses are not so paid, the State Government may make an order directing the persons having the custody of that fund to pay to the person so authorised such expenses in priority to any other charges against such fund and he shall, so far as the funds to the credit of the Corporation admit, comply with the order of the State Government. [(3) Every notification issued under this section together with a report on the circumstances leading to its issue shall be laid before [each House of Parliament], as soon as may be, after it is issued.] 9.1 Reading of the sections quoted above would indicate that if the State is of the opinion that the powers and duties of a Corporation are not being exercised and performed properly, it may appoint any person or persons to make inquiries into all or any of the activities of the corporation and report to the State Government, the result of such inquiries. Reading Section 37 of the Act would indicate that it is a consequential provision which provides that on receipt of an inquiry under Section 36 of the Act, the State Government may in public interest authorize any person to take over the Corporation or issue such directions to the officers or other employees of the Corporation. 9.2 Reading both these provisions together would indicate that the Corporation which is fully controlled by the State, it cannot be said that the authority of exercising powers was without jurisdiction. Reading Section 36 and the language of Section 37 would indicate that when the Corporation acting through its officers commits certain acts which the State perceives to be not in accordance with the established procedure, it can certainly inquire into such aspects by appointing an inquiry officer. Though the corporation may be a legal entity, it acts only through its officers and servants as stipulated under Section 14 of the Act. 9.3 Thus, it cannot be said that the power exercised is without authority of law and without jurisdiction and therefore the stand of the Corporation that when it was found, pursuant to several complaints received by the State and particularly by the Vigilance Commission, it was in the appropriateness of things that the State undertakes to exercise its power under Section 36 to inquire into the allegations of misconduct against the petitioner. 10. 10. With regard to holding of a second inquiry, the court would not want to get into the aspect of holding a second inquiry because there are two reports on record, one in the perception of the petitioner holding that the charges against him were unjustified whereas the Corporation in its reply has disputed the version of the preliminary inquiry report submitted by Shri R.V. Suthar disputing the correctness of the report submitted by the petitioner. That brings forth more reason to be apprehensive without branding the petitioner's stand as misleading to suggest that the authority exercised by the State by virtue of the impugned notification dated 20.05.2020 is just and proper. 11. For all the aforesaid reasons, therefore, the petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No costs.