ORDER : C.S.Sudha, J. This rent control revision under Section 20 of the Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (the Act) is filed against the judgment dated 12/04/2016 in R.C.A.No.22/2008 on the file of the Rent Control Appellate Authority-I, Thiruvananthapuram. The appeal was preferred by the petitioner/landlord against the order dated 21/02/2008 dismissing R.C.P.No.28/1988. The respondent/tenant in the R.C.P. and the respondent before the Appellate Authority is the revision petitioner herein. The respondents herein are the legal representatives of the original petitioner. The parties and documents will be referred to as described in the R.C.P. 2. The R.C.P. was filed seeking eviction of the respondent/tenant under Sections 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Act. The petitioner alleged that the petition schedule building along with 2.90 cents of property had been purchased by him from Harihara Iyer as per Ext.A1 sale deed dated 10/09/1986. The respondent is the tenant of the building on a monthly rent of Rs.60/-. The respondent had paid rent by way of money order to Harihara Iyer till the execution of Ext.A1 sale deed. After execution of Ext.A1 sale deed, the respondent was intimated that the ownership of the property had passed to the petitioner and was also requested to pay the future rent to the latter. However, the respondent refused to attorn to the petitioner. The respondent has defaulted payment of rent from September 1986 onwards. The petitioner is residing in a rental building for a monthly rent of Rs.600/-. The petitioner has no other building of his own in his possession within the city. Therefore he bona fide needs the petition schedule building for his own residence with family. Though the respondent was requested to vacate the building, he has refused to do so and hence the R.C.P. claiming eviction under Sections 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Act. The petitioner has also denied the contention raised by the respondent in his reply that he is a Kudikidappukaran of the petition schedule building. According to the petitioner, the building is not a hut and also that the respondent, a Government servant, is not entitled to claim Kudikidappu right over the building. 3. The respondent/tenant filed counter to the R.C.P. denying the existence of any landlord-tenant relationship between the parties. According to the petitioner, the building is not a hut and also that the respondent, a Government servant, is not entitled to claim Kudikidappu right over the building. 3. The respondent/tenant filed counter to the R.C.P. denying the existence of any landlord-tenant relationship between the parties. According to him, the building was initially taken on rent by his mother Gouri Amma from Harihara Iyer in the year 1958 on a monthly rent of Rs.3/-. Gouri Amma who was residing in the building along with her family, passed away in the year 1975 and her leasehold right over the building devolved on her husband and five children including the respondent. The husband of Gouri Amma passed away in the year 1976 and the leasehold right has now vested on the five children of Gouri Amma. The building, a hut as defined under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (the KLR Act), is more than 50 years old. At the time of its construction, the cost was less than Rs.750/-. Gouri Amma and thereafter the respondent had reconstructed the building at their own expense. The respondent has been in peaceful possession of the building along with his mother and subsequent to his mother's death, the respondent has been paying rent without default in continuation of the rental arrangement. The respondent is not having any land or building other than the schedule building and therefore he is a Kudikidappukaran as defined under the provisions of the KLR Act. After the demise of the respondent's father, Harihara lyer, the original landlord, had made several attempts to evict the respondent and his family members from the scheduled building, but was unsuccessful. It is thereafter Ext.A1, a sham document, has been created in favour of the petitioner, though Harihara lyer had no alienable right over the property. The petition is devoid of any bona fides. The allegation that rent at the rate of Rs.60/-was being paid, is false and incorrect. The need alleged is only a ruse for eviction. Therefore, the contention is that the petitioner is not entitled to the reliefs prayed for in the petition. 4. The petition is devoid of any bona fides. The allegation that rent at the rate of Rs.60/-was being paid, is false and incorrect. The need alleged is only a ruse for eviction. Therefore, the contention is that the petitioner is not entitled to the reliefs prayed for in the petition. 4. In the present third round of litigation between the parties, the respondent-tenant is challenging in revision the judgment dated 12/04/2016 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority (RCAA) rejecting his claim of kudikidappu and allowing the claim for eviction of the petitioner-landlord under sections 11(2)(b) 11(3), thereby reversing the order of dismissal of the R.C.P. by the Rent Control Court (RCC) dated 21/02/2008. The present case has a long and checkered past or history, to which we will refer to shortly. 5. In the revision petition, the following legal issues have been raised by the respondent-tenant, namely - (i) Is not a decision on Kudikidappu right by the RCC without reference to the Land Tribunal, illegal and void? (ii) Is not a remand order by an Appellate Authority, taking away the exclusive jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal and conferring jurisdiction to decide on an issue of Kudikidappu on the RCC, illegal and void? (iii) Is it legal or proper to fix the cost of construction at the P.W.D. rates of 1999 and to project it backwards by 45 years by applying depreciation to arrive at the probable cost of construction in 1958? (iv) When the petitioner, whose need was projected, had passed away pending the litigation and his legal representatives had failed to amend pleadings or tender evidence of their need for the premises in spite of grant of opportunity, is it legal or proper to ignore the subsequent event of the death of the Petitioner and order eviction? 6. Heard Sri. P.B. Krishnan, the learned counsel for the appellant and Sri. G.S. Regunath, the learned counsel for the respondents. 7. We will first consider point no.(i) to (iii) referred to hereinabove. In the first round of litigation, the RCC referred the matter under Section 125(3) of the KLR Act to the Land Tribunal in the light of the claim of the respondent/tenant that he is entitled to Kudikidappu right over the petition schedule building. The Land Tribunal, in turn, found Kudikidappu in favour of the tenant. In the first round of litigation, the RCC referred the matter under Section 125(3) of the KLR Act to the Land Tribunal in the light of the claim of the respondent/tenant that he is entitled to Kudikidappu right over the petition schedule building. The Land Tribunal, in turn, found Kudikidappu in favour of the tenant. The RCC accepting the findings of the Land Tribunal dismissed the R.C.P. by order dated 17/07/1991. The petitioner/landlord took up the matter in appeal as R.C.A.No.73/1991. The RCAA found that the Land Tribunal had erred in drawing an adverse inference against the petitioner-landlord in failing to prove that the cost of the building at the time of its construction was less than Rs. 750/-and also that the report of the Revenue Inspector to the effect that the cost of construction of the building was Rs.1400/-is unsatisfactory, as it is without any basis and so of no help to the court in assessing the cost of construction of the building. Therefore, it concluded that the matter required to go to the RCC for a fresh disposal. On the question as to whether a second reference was necessary or not, the RCAA relying on a Division Bench decision of this court in Parameswaran Thampi v. Podiyan Thomas, 1984 KHC 231, answered the same in the negative and held that when the case is remanded back to the trial court, the said court has jurisdiction to decide the question of Kudikidappu irrespective of the embargo contained under Section 125 of the KLR Act. Hence the finding of the Land Tribunal and the RCC were set aside and the R.C.P. was remanded to the RCC for a fresh disposal by judgment dated 27/11/1992. The RCC was directed to appoint an advocate commissioner at the expense of the respondent/tenant to determine the cost of construction of the building as well as the rental value at the time of its construction. The parties were given the liberty to adduce further evidence on these aspects. On the basis of the evidence thus obtained, the RCC was directed to decide whether the respondent is entitled to the protection under the KLR Act. The parties were given the liberty to adduce further evidence on these aspects. On the basis of the evidence thus obtained, the RCC was directed to decide whether the respondent is entitled to the protection under the KLR Act. There was also a further direction to the RCC to decide whether the petitioner is entitled to an order of eviction on any of the grounds referred to in the R.C.P. The respondent/tenant aggrieved by the order of remand, preferred revision as C.R.P.No.860/1993. This Court as per order dated 08/06/1993 dismissed the revision confirming the findings of the RCAA. 8. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent/tenant that the Apex Court has overruled the decision of this court in Parameswaran Thampi (Supra) relied on by the RCAA in its remand order to clothe the RCC with the jurisdiction to decide the matter without reference to the Land Tribunal, by the dictum in Mathevan Padmanabhan @ Ponnan, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 479. Relying on the decisions in Director of Settlements, A.P. v. M.R.Apparao, 2003 KHC 226 and M/s.Shenoy and Co., Bangalore v. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle II, Bangalore, 1985 KHC 607, it was pointed out that the decision of the Apex Court being the law of the land under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, is binding on all courts and parties. Therefore, any decision running counter to the dictum of the Apex Court, the law of the land, is void and a nullity. It was also pointed out that Section 105(2), Order 41 Rule 23 CPC etc. which are a complete package in itself, are not applicable to the present proceedings in the light of Sections 20A and 23 of the Act. As per Section 23 certain specific provisions referred to in the said Section alone have been made applicable to rent control proceedings. As section 105(2) CPC is inapplicable, it is immaterial that the order of this court in C.R.P. 860/1993 dated 08/06/1993, by which the void order of the RCAA has been confirmed, had not been challenged by the respondent/tenant, as he is entitled to ignore the same. As section 105(2) CPC is inapplicable, it is immaterial that the order of this court in C.R.P. 860/1993 dated 08/06/1993, by which the void order of the RCAA has been confirmed, had not been challenged by the respondent/tenant, as he is entitled to ignore the same. It was further pointed out relying on the decision in Govindan v. Subaida Beevi, 1997 KHC 167, that the principle of res judicata or constructive res judicata is not applicable and that it is only the principle contemplated under Section 15 of the Act that is applicable in rent control proceedings. It was on the matter of jurisdiction of the RCC, a pure question of law, that has been wrongly decided by the RCAA. Therefore, relying on the decision in Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, AIR 1971 SC 2355 , it was argued that the said wrong decision on a pure question of law is not res judicata and cannot bind the respondent/tenant. Hence for the aforesaid reasons, the order of remand of the RCAA, i.e., the order dated 27/11/1992 in R.C.A.No.73/1991 and all subsequent orders based on the said order, which is null and void, do not in any way bind the respondent-tenant and hence all such orders are liable to be ignored, goes the argument. 9. Per contra, on behalf of the petitioner-landlord, it was submitted relying on the decisions in Devaki Amma v. Philipose 1992 (2) KLT 281 ; 1992 KHC 345; Kunjan v. Janaki 1980 KLT 796 ; Ananthayya Gowder v. Sama Goundan, 1986 KLT 927 ; Kunju Kunju v. Aley, 1987 (1) KLT 553 and Rosamma v. Narayana Pillai 1989 (2) KLT SN 35 (C. No. 42) that a second reference to the Land Tribunal is uncalled for and that the appellate court is fully justified in passing the order of remand. 10. There cannot be a quarrel on the proposition advanced that under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the decisions of the Apex Court are the law of land and that all parties and courts are bound by it. However, the dictum of the Apex court in M/s. Shenoy and Co., Bangalore v. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle II, Bangalore, 1985 KHC 607 submitted on behalf of the respondent-tenant does not seem to be applicable to the facts of the present case. However, the dictum of the Apex court in M/s. Shenoy and Co., Bangalore v. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle II, Bangalore, 1985 KHC 607 submitted on behalf of the respondent-tenant does not seem to be applicable to the facts of the present case. In Shenoy and Co., a large number of writ petitions were filed challenging certain provisions in the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into local areas for Consumption, Use or Sale therein Act, 1979. All those writ petitions were grouped together, heard together and were disposed of by the High Court by a common Judgment. No petitioner had advanced any contention peculiar or individual to his petition, not common to others. To be precise, the dispute in the cause of controversy between the State and each petitioner had no personal or individual element in it or anything personal or peculiar to each petitioner. The challenge to the constitutional validity of the 1979 Act proceeded on identical grounds common to all petitioners. This challenge was accepted by the High Court by a common judgment and this common judgment was the subject matter of appeal before the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M/s. Hansa Corporation, AIR 1981 SC 463 . When the Supreme Court repelled the challenge and held the Act to be constitutionally valid, it in terms disposed of not the appeal in Hansa Corporation's case alone, but all petitions in which the High Court issued mandamus on the non-existent ground that the 1979 Act was constitutionally invalid. It was held that the law laid down by the Supreme court in that judgment would bind not only Hansa Corporation but the other petitioners against whom the State of Karnataka had not filed any appeal. To hold otherwise, would be to ignore the binding nature of a judgment of the Supreme Court under Art.141 of the Constitution. 10.1. Here we refer to the decision in Achuthan Nair v. Raman, 1979 KHC 49 in which a similar situation arose. To hold otherwise, would be to ignore the binding nature of a judgment of the Supreme Court under Art.141 of the Constitution. 10.1. Here we refer to the decision in Achuthan Nair v. Raman, 1979 KHC 49 in which a similar situation arose. In the said case, based on the dictum in Anantha Narayana Iyer v. Paran, 1976 KLT 403 , that in view of S.125 (3) of the KLR Act, the civil court has no jurisdiction to decide the question whether a person is a tenant and that the question should be referred to the Land Tribunal, this court set aside the judgment and decree of the courts below and remitted the case back to the trial Court with a direction to proceed with the matter in accordance with that decision. Pursuant to the order of remand, the trial court referred the matter to the Land Tribunal. By the time the records reached the Land Tribunal, the Supreme Court in Eapen Chacko v. Provident Investment Co., 1977 KLT 1 overruled Anantha Narayana Iyer v. Paran, 1976 KLT 403 holding that S.125(3) of the KLR Act as amended by Act 35 of 1969 was prospective in operation and that cases pending before the civil courts on 1-1-1970, the date of commencement of the Act, need not be referred to the Land Tribunal. Relying on that decision the Land Tribunal returned the records to the Munsiff for necessary action. The Munsiff considered the issue afresh and held that the Land Tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide whether a reference made to it was legal or proper and that under S.125(4) of the KLR Act if a reference is made under S.125(1), the Land Tribunal is bound to decide the question of tenancy. The Court also held that the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Eapen Chacko v. Provident Investment Co. ( 1977 KLT 1 ) did not make the order of remand in the second appeal inoperative or invalid and that it was binding on the parties unless and until vacated in appropriate proceedings. Holding the above view, the Court directed retransmission of the records to the Land Tribunal. It was against the said order the revision petition was filed. 10.2. Holding the above view, the Court directed retransmission of the records to the Land Tribunal. It was against the said order the revision petition was filed. 10.2. On behalf of the revision petitioner, it was contended that the direction in the order of remand based as it was on Anantha Narayana Iyer v. Paran ( 1976 KLT 403 ) was unsustainable in view of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court; that the order of remand by this Court would not confer jurisdiction and relying on the decision in S. F. P. Cement Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1967 Pat. 315 it was contended that under Art.141 of the Constitution, the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts within the territory of India, and so the Munsiff was bound to follow the decision in Eapen Chacko v. Provident Investment Co. ( 1977 KLT 1 ). It was also contended that in view of the later decision of the Supreme Court, there is no bar of res judicata and the trial Court is competent to decide whether it should refer the question of tenancy to the Land Tribunal. 10.3. S. F. P. Cement Co. (Supra) arose under the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965. There was an order for payment of interim bonus under S.10 and 33 of the Payment of Bonus Ordinance. S.33 of the Payment of Bonus Act which replaced S.33 of the Ordinance was held invalid by the Supreme Court. Though the decision was delivered after the order of interim bonus, it was held that the law as laid down by the Supreme Court should be followed. The learned Single Judge held that the principles in S. F. P. Cement Co. have no application in a case where the invalidity of a statute is not involved, and where a civil court of competent jurisdiction enforces its decision in relation to rights of parties inter se. No doubt, if a statute is struck down as unconstitutional, no person is entitled to claim rights on the basis of the provisions which have been so struck down. But a wrong interpretation given to a statute is different from declaration that the statute itself is unconstitutional. No doubt, if a statute is struck down as unconstitutional, no person is entitled to claim rights on the basis of the provisions which have been so struck down. But a wrong interpretation given to a statute is different from declaration that the statute itself is unconstitutional. In fact, the underlying principle behind the theory of prospective overruling mentioned in L.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1643 is that settled matters should not be raked up on the basis of a subsequent declaration of the law by the Supreme Court. It is this principle which has been recognised by the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Hemant Kumar, AIR 1966 SC 1061 wherein it has been held that a wrong decision by a court of a competent jurisdiction is as much binding between the parties as a right one and may be superseded only by appeals to higher tribunals or other procedure like review which law provides. The scope of a decision of the Supreme Court should be decided by applying the principles of interpretation laid down by that court. The revision petition was thus dismissed holding that subordinate Courts and the Land Tribunal are bound by the order of remand passed in the case. 11. We are in respectful agreement with the dictum in Achuthan Nair (Supra), as in the case on hand also there is no invalidity of a statute involved and at best it can only be said the order of remand is a wrong decision of a competent court. 12. Further, in Parameswaran Thampi (Supra), a Division Bench of this Court held that by a statutory fiction, when the finding of the Land Tribunal becomes the finding of a Civil Court, it is amenable to examination and correction by the Appellate Court, as that power inheres in every appellate jurisdiction. This Court sitting in appeal has thus the jurisdiction and duty to examine whether the finding regarding the lease is justified on facts and is supportable in law. In examining the correctness of the finding, the Appellate Court can, (i) set aside the finding and enter its own finding on the basis of the evidence tendered; (ii) admit additional evidence and then decide the issue afresh or (iii) call for a finding from the trial Court, and (iv) remand the matter to the trial court for fresh determination. In examining the correctness of the finding, the Appellate Court can, (i) set aside the finding and enter its own finding on the basis of the evidence tendered; (ii) admit additional evidence and then decide the issue afresh or (iii) call for a finding from the trial Court, and (iv) remand the matter to the trial court for fresh determination. When these powers available to the Appellate Court have not been statutorily curtailed, there is no doubt that this Court has got the power to set aside the finding of the trial court on the question of lease and send the matter back to that court for a fresh finding and that there is no necessity thereafter for the trial court to make another reference to the Land Tribunal. The trial court is bound by the remand order and when the remand order directs a fresh finding, that finding has to be given by the trial court and not by the Land Tribunal. Thus, it was held that a second reference to the Land Tribunal is not contemplated under Section 125 of the Act. 13. It was on the basis of the aforesaid decision of this court, the RCAA had passed the order of remand dated 27/11/1992 in R.C.A.No.73/1991. Therefore, the RCAA cannot be faulted for following the dictum of this Court in Parameswaran Thampi (Supra), which it was bound to follow. In C.R.P.No.860/1993 filed before this Court by the respondent/tenant against the aforesaid order of remand, an argument was advanced that the direction of the RCAA to the RCC to decide the question whether the tenant is a kudikidappukaran or not, is without jurisdiction. It was also argued that the dictum in Parameswaran Thampi (Supra) was against the spirit, tenor and the direct provisions contained in section 125 of the KLR Act. However, the Division Bench rejected the said argument and finding no error in the remand order confirmed the same and dismissed C.R.P. by order dated 08/06/1993. 14. The first order of remand dated 27/11/1992 was passed when the dictum in Parameswaran Thampi (Supra) was very much in force. Therefore, the said order cannot be said to be a void order or a nullity. Even assuming for a moment that it is a void order, the same ought to have been challenged. 14. The first order of remand dated 27/11/1992 was passed when the dictum in Parameswaran Thampi (Supra) was very much in force. Therefore, the said order cannot be said to be a void order or a nullity. Even assuming for a moment that it is a void order, the same ought to have been challenged. Whenever an adverse order is passed against a person, unless the same is challenged before the appropriate forum, within the prescribed time limit, the said order will become final and the person, affected by it, will also be bound by it. A few authorities on the point are-In State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, 1992 KHC 209: AIR 1991 SC 2219 , orders passed by competent statutory authorities were not challenged before the higher forum or the Supreme Court and were allowed to become final. In such circumstances, it has been held that those orders are to be treated as valid and that they cannot be ignored or treated as void ab initio and therefore, of no effect now. 14.1. In Pune Municipal Corpn. v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 KHC 3234: AIR 2007 SC 2414 , the Apex Court has observed that no order can be ignored altogether unless a finding is recorded that it is illegal, void or not in consonance with law. Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia v. Bombay Environmental Action Group, 2011 KHC 4094: AIR 2011 SC 1140 , and M. Meenakshi v. Metadin Agarwal (dead) by L. Rs., 2006 KHC 1420: 2006 (7) SCC 470 , affirm the same view. 14.2. In Jose. T. A. & Company v. State of Kerala, 2009 (3) ILR 62), a learned Single Judge of this court has dealt with the issue of nature of orders which are supposed to be void and the remedial measures to be taken in that regard. After comprehensively surveying the various precedents in that regard, it has been held that an irregular or illegal order can be avoided only if it is set aside in appropriate proceedings before a competent forum. 14.3. In State of Kerala v. M. K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, 1996 KHC 633: AIR 1996 SC 906 , the Supreme Court has held that the word "void" has a relative rather than an absolute meaning. It only conveys the idea that the order is invalid or illegal. It can be avoided. 14.3. In State of Kerala v. M. K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, 1996 KHC 633: AIR 1996 SC 906 , the Supreme Court has held that the word "void" has a relative rather than an absolute meaning. It only conveys the idea that the order is invalid or illegal. It can be avoided. There are degrees of invalidity, depending upon the gravity or the infirmity, as to whether it is, fundamental or otherwise. 14.4. In State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, 1992 KHC 209: AIR 1991 SC 2219 , the issue was one concerning limitation governing the suit for declaration by a dismissed employee that he continues to be in service since his dismissal was void and inoperative. The High Court observed that if the dismissal of the employee is illegal, void or inoperative being in contravention of the mandatory provisions of any rules or conditions of service, there is no limitation to bring a suit for declaration that the employee continues to be in service. Reversing the above findings, the Apex Court has held that the impugned dismissal order has at least a de facto operation unless and until it is declared to be void and null by a competent body or Court. In this regard, the Supreme Court has relied on the oft -quoted remark of the House of Lords in Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, wherein Lord Radcliffe observed: (All ER p. 871) "An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders." Further, the Supreme Court also quoted with approval the observations of Prof. Wade: "The truth of the matter is that the Court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The order may be hypothetically a nullity, but the Court may refuse to quash it because of the plaintiff's lack of standing, because he does not deserve a discretionary remedy, because he has waived his rights, or for some other legal reason. In any such case the 'void' order remains effective and is, in reality, valid. The order may be hypothetically a nullity, but the Court may refuse to quash it because of the plaintiff's lack of standing, because he does not deserve a discretionary remedy, because he has waived his rights, or for some other legal reason. In any such case the 'void' order remains effective and is, in reality, valid. It follows that an order may be void for one purpose and valid for another; and that it may be void against one person but valid against another." 14.5. In Custodian Vested Forest Palakkad v. P.V.Kunhiraman, 2018(3) KHC 768 a Division Bench of this court relying on another Division Bench of this court in Cochin College v. Ajith Kumar K., 2014 KHC 650 held that law is trite that even a void order should be declared to be void and unenforceable by a superior judicial forum. 14.6. It is now fairly settled that a wrong decision of a court having jurisdiction is as much binding between the parties as a right one and is superseded only by appeals to higher tribunals or other procedure like review which the law provides (State of West Bengal v. Hemant Kumar, AIR 1966 SC 1061 ). Therefore, if the respondent/tenant in the case on hand was aggrieved by the order in C.R.P.No.860/1993 confirming the order of remand by the RCAA, he should have challenged the same, which admittedly has not been done. 15. It is true that the principle of res judicata or constructive res judicata as contemplated under Section 11 CPC is not applicable in rent control proceedings. Here we refer to the decision in Abdul Kharim Rowther v. Veeran, 2005(2) KLT SN 66 (C.No.80), (brought to our notice in all fairness by the learned counsel for the respondent-tenant). In the said case it was held that in the light of the authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in Mathevan Padmanabhan @ Ponnan, the view taken in Parameswaran Thampi (Supra) that the question of tenancy can be decided by the Civil Court without reference to the Land Tribunal is no more good law. In the said case it was held that in the light of the authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in Mathevan Padmanabhan @ Ponnan, the view taken in Parameswaran Thampi (Supra) that the question of tenancy can be decided by the Civil Court without reference to the Land Tribunal is no more good law. Relying on the decisions in Achuthan Nair v. Raman, 1979 KLT 119 and Rugmini Amma v. Abdulla, 1986 KLT 769 , the learned Single Judge held that the plaintiff who is a party to the remand order is bound by the view taken by this Court and he cannot take advantage of a subsequent pronouncement of law rendered in some other case. If he is aggrieved, he should have challenged the view taken by the High Court by preferring an SLP before the Supreme Court and canvassing the correctness of the decision, if not he would be bound by the remand order. 16. Further, the argument that Section 105(2) CPC is not applicable in the light of Section 23 of the Act also does not seem to be correct. Sub-section (2) to Section 105 CPC says, notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), where any party aggrieved by an order of remand from which an appeal lies does not appeal therefrom, he shall thereafter be precluded from disputing its correctness. In Haneefa v. Subhalekshmi Ammal, 1980 KHC 162, the question that arose was whether the District Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under section 20 of the Act had the power to restore a revision petition dismissed for default (This was before the notification, namely, S.R.O. No. 1631/89 was issued by the Government in exercise of its powers under clause (a)sub-section (1) of section 18 of the Act empowering the District Judges to act as appellate authorities). The District Judge/ the revisional court in the said case, rejected the application stating that it had no power for restoring the application dismissed for default. This Court held that the District Judge is not acting as a persona designata. The matter comes to the District Court in the hierarchy of the civil courts. If that be so, then all the powers of a District Court as a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, could be exercised by that court in hearing the revision. This Court held that the District Judge is not acting as a persona designata. The matter comes to the District Court in the hierarchy of the civil courts. If that be so, then all the powers of a District Court as a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, could be exercised by that court in hearing the revision. This has been held to be in accordance with the well settled principle of law succinctly stated by Viscount Haldane L. C. in National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Post Master General, 1913 AC 546 in these terms: "When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attaches." 16.1. It was also noticed that the same view has been expressed by the Privy Council in Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekhara Thevar, AIR 1948 PC 12 where it was said: "Where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal." 16.2. The observations in Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao, AIR 1916 PC 21 to the following effect was also held to be of relevance. "It was contended on behalf of the appellant that all further proceedings in Courts in India or by way of appeal were incompetent, these being excluded by the terms of the statute just quoted. In their Lordships' opinion this objection is not well founded. Their view is that when proceedings of this character reach the District Court, that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country with regard to whose procedure, orders and decrees the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code apply." These decisions have received the approval of the Supreme Court in National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. Chidambaram James Chadwick and Bros. Ltd., AIR 1953 SC 357 . 16.3. This court therefore concluded that it is apparent from S.20 that revisional power is exercised by a District Judge as a District Court. Ltd. Chidambaram James Chadwick and Bros. Ltd., AIR 1953 SC 357 . 16.3. This court therefore concluded that it is apparent from S.20 that revisional power is exercised by a District Judge as a District Court. S.23 of the Act by which only certain provisions of CPC are made applicable, has reference only to the Accommodation Controller, the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority. Regarding the powers of the revisional court under the Act, namely, the District Court and in some cases the High Court, such powers are not enunciated in the Act, because even otherwise they have got the necessary powers, being established courts under the Code of Civil Procedure. That being the position, the argument advanced on behalf of the respondent herein that the first order of remand is a void order, not binding on the respondent-tenant is found to be unsustainable. 17. Pursuant to the order of remand, the matter went back to the RCC and on the basis of the directions in the remand order, an advocate commissioner and an expert, namely, an Engineer from P.W.D., Building Division, Thiruvananthapuram, were appointed for determining the cost of construction of the petition schedule building. The Engineer and the advocate commissioner were examined as PW2 and PW3 respectively. Ext.C1 is the report of the Engineer as per which, the cost of construction of the building has been stated to be Rs.598.35. Relying on the evidence let in, the RCC found the cost of construction of the building to be below Rs.750/-and hence concluded that the respondent/tenant is a Kudikidappukaran and thus proceeded to dismiss the R.C.P. by order dated 12/06/1996. The petitioner/landlord took up the matter in appeal before the RCAA as R.C.A.No.47/1996. Ext.C1 report did not find favour with the RCAA who held that the report prepared without any scientific basis does not in any way help the court in properly assessing the value of the building and hence set aside the same and the findings of the RCC and again remanded the matter for a fresh consideration. The said judgment of the RCAA is dated 22/05/2003, by which time the dictum in Parameswaran Thampi (Supra) was overruled by the Apex Court by the judgment dated 30/11/1994 in Mathevan Padmanabhan @ Ponnan (Supra). The said judgment of the RCAA is dated 22/05/2003, by which time the dictum in Parameswaran Thampi (Supra) was overruled by the Apex Court by the judgment dated 30/11/1994 in Mathevan Padmanabhan @ Ponnan (Supra). The Apex court held that in view of the scheme of the KLR Act, the High Court went wrong in divesting the jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal to determine the dispute of tenancy as engrafted in sub-section (1) of Section 125 of the KLR Act and confer jurisdiction on the Civil Court which it inherently lacks and any decision by the Civil Court by itself is a nullity. The interpretation given by the High Court has been held to be, in the teeth of the peremptory language used by Section 125(1) of the KLR Act and so unsustainable. The direction issued by the High Court in the remand order, conferring jurisdiction on the Civil Court was set aside and the dispute was remitted to the Land Tribunal which was directed to determine the matter in the light of the observations made in the judgment and to submit its report before a Civil Court for decision according to law. 18. The second order of remand, that is, the judgment of the RCAA in R.C.A.No.47/1996 dated 22/05/2003 was challenged before this court in R.C.R.No.16/2004 by the respondent-tenant. In the said proceedings no argument is seen raised that the direction in the order of remand to the RCC to decide on the question of cost of construction of the building is illegal, void and a nullity in the light of the dictum of the Apex court in Mathevan Padmanabhan @ Ponnan (Supra). This court by order dated 13/06/2006 dismissed the revision and confirmed the second order of remand by the RCAA. The said order has not been challenged by the respondent-tenant till date and hence in the light of the aforesaid precedents, he cannot challenge the said order at this point of time. 19. After the second order of remand, the RCC appointed a fresh advocate commissioner along with a qualified Engineer for assessing the cost of construction. Exts.C2, C3 and C3(a) are the reports filed. The advocate commissioner and the engineer were examined as CPWs.1 and 2 on behalf of the respondent-tenant. 19. After the second order of remand, the RCC appointed a fresh advocate commissioner along with a qualified Engineer for assessing the cost of construction. Exts.C2, C3 and C3(a) are the reports filed. The advocate commissioner and the engineer were examined as CPWs.1 and 2 on behalf of the respondent-tenant. As per the valuation statement of the expert, the cost of construction of the building at the time of its construction in the year 1958 comes to Rs.12,877/-. However, the RCC declined to accept the said report, finding that the petitioner/landlord though in possession of the best evidence relating to the value of the building had failed to produce the same and therefore concluded that claim of the respondent/tenant that he is a Kudikidappukaran of the building stands established and proceeded to dismiss the R.C.P. by order dated 21/02/2008. 20. Aggrieved, the petitioner/landlord took up the matter in appeal as R.C.A.No.22/2008. The RCAA by order dated 02/04/2016 accepted the valuation report of the expert to the effect that the cost of construction of the building at the time of the letting out was in excess of Rs.750/-and hence found that the respondent/tenant is not entitled to the benefit of the KLR Act. The RCAA proceeded to consider the grounds for eviction under Section 11 (2) (b) and (3), found the same in favour of the petitioner -landlord and so ordered eviction of the respondent-tenant, thus reversing the order of the RCC. 21. It was argued on behalf of the respondent-tenant that the RCAA erred in relying on Exts.C2, C3 and C3(a) reports of the advocate commissioner and the expert in the light of the dictum in Thomas Antony v. Varkey, 2000 KHC 3. In the said case it has been held that the trial court under section 125(5) of the KLR Act is bound by the decision of the Land Tribunal on the question referred to it, and by virtue of sub-section (6), the decision of the Land Tribunal shall for the purposes of appeal, be deemed to be part of the finding of the civil court. The appellate court gets the power or jurisdiction to go into the correctness of the same only because the decision of the Land Tribunal becomes part of the finding of the trial court. In the case on hand, there is no finding of the Land Tribunal on the point. The appellate court gets the power or jurisdiction to go into the correctness of the same only because the decision of the Land Tribunal becomes part of the finding of the trial court. In the case on hand, there is no finding of the Land Tribunal on the point. The decision of the RCAA is based on Exts.C2, C3 and C3(a) reports obtained by the RCC. Therefore, the argument is that the situation contemplated under sub-section (6) of the Act is not attracted here. Reference was also made to the decision in Kesava Bhat v. Subraya Bhat, 1979 KHC 346, to canvass the point that the decision of a Civil Court on the question of Kudikidappu without referring the matter to the Land Tribunal under Section 125(3) is a nullity and hence liable to be ignored. 22. As noticed earlier, so far as parties to the present proceedings are concerned, they are bound by the orders of remand. An order of remand falls under two classes, those falling under O.41 R.23, CPC where an appeal is provided under O.43 R.1 (u) and those which are not appealable. In the former case the order of remand would become final unless appealed against. Where no appeal is provided, the order will be treated as an interlocutory one and the party concerned can challenge the findings in the remand order in an appeal filed against the final decision in the case. But where the appellate court has acted within its jurisdiction in remanding a case, it is the duty of the subordinate court to carry out the terms of the order of remand because but for the order of remand it has no seisin of the case. The jurisdiction to retry the case is circumscribed by the terms of the order of remand. This is so even in cases where the order of remand is not otherwise sustainable in law (K. Mudaliar v. K. Pillai, AIR 1970 Mad. 328 ). It is also not open to the Subordinate Court to criticise the order of remand passed by the High Court and refuse to act upon it. (Sultan v. Ayyappan, AIR 1952 TC 538). The court to which a case is remanded has no jurisdiction to enter into questions which fall outside the terms of the remand order (Achuthan Nair v. Raman, 1979 KLT 119 ). (Sultan v. Ayyappan, AIR 1952 TC 538). The court to which a case is remanded has no jurisdiction to enter into questions which fall outside the terms of the remand order (Achuthan Nair v. Raman, 1979 KLT 119 ). 22.1 In Nainsingh v. Koonwarjee, AIR 1970 SC 997 , the appellate court entered findings on certain issues and remanded the case to the trial court for decision on some other points. When the case came up before the High Court in second appeal after it was disposed of afresh by the trial court, the High Court reversed some of the findings of the courts below entered before the remand of the case, presumably under its inherent powers. The Supreme Court held that the High Court, erred in holding that the correctness of the remand order was open to review by it. The order in question was made under Rule 23, O.41 CPC. That order was appealable under O.43. As the same was not appealed against, its correctness was no more open to examination in view of S.105 (2) CPC. 22.2. In Achuthan Nair v. Raman, 1979 KLT 119 it has been held that even assuming that the order of remand is interlocutory in nature and it is open to the Supreme Court to consider the legality of the order of remand and the findings entered, in an appeal from the final decision, so far as the High Court and the subordinate Courts are concerned, it is a binding decision. This principle has been recognised by the Supreme Court in Satyadhan v. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941 . The dictum has been followed in Ganapathi Thevar v. S. N. Devasthanam, AIR 1969 SC 764 and Jesraj v. Hemrai, AIR 1977 SC 1011 . In Achuthan Nair (Supra) it has also been held that even if a second appeal is preferred against the ultimate decision in the case, it may not be open to the High Court to reconsider the correctness of the order of remand. If the High Court is not competent to review the decision, there can be no doubt that the subordinate Courts which are bound by the order of remand are also not expected to ignore the directions in the remand order. 23. If the High Court is not competent to review the decision, there can be no doubt that the subordinate Courts which are bound by the order of remand are also not expected to ignore the directions in the remand order. 23. In the light of the aforementioned precedents, the RCAA in the case on hand, could not have gone behind or beyond the order of remand. It could have only decided the matter on the basis of the evidence that came on record after the order of remand. That being the position the arguments to the contrary are only liable to be rejected. 24. Now coming to the scope of Section 20 of the Act, which says that, the High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under the Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and it may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. It is true that this Court under Section 20 is not expected to reappraise the evidence produced by the parties in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction and the limited question that falls for its consideration is whether the procedure followed by the RCC and the Appellate Authority is illegal, irregular or improper. However, it is well settled that the powers of S.20 are wider than that is conferred under S.115 CPC. The nature and scope of the powers of revision under S.20 has been considered by the Apex Court in the decision in Nalakath Sainuddin v. Koorikadan Sulaiman, 2002 KHC 762: 2002 (6) SCC 1 . It has been held that when the aid of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side, it is done because it is a superior Court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error of the Court below. Subject to limitations placed on the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, it remains a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of a superior Court in a wider and larger sense. It has been further held that, a jurisdiction to examine the propriety of the order or decision carries with it the same jurisdiction as the original authority to come to a different conclusion on the said set of facts. It has been further held that, a jurisdiction to examine the propriety of the order or decision carries with it the same jurisdiction as the original authority to come to a different conclusion on the said set of facts. If any other view is taken, the expression "propriety" would lose its significance. It was further held in that-(i) There is no reason to read and interpret S.20 of the Act narrowly and limit the scope of revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court thereby. (ii) Once a revision petition is entertained by the High Court, whichever be the party invoking the revisional jurisdiction, the High Court acquires jurisdiction to call for and examine the records of the authority subordinate to it. The records relating to "any order" and / or any proceedings, are available to be examined by the High Court for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the (a) legality, (b) regularity, or (c) propriety of the impugned order, including any part of the order, or proceedings. The only limitation on the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction is that the order or proceedings sought to be scrutinized must be of the subordinate authority. Any illegality, irregularity or impropriety coming to its notice is capable of being corrected by the High Court by passing such appropriate order or direction as the law requires and justice demands. The Court can examine whether the findings rendered by the appellate authority are plausible and to consider that aspect, the Court can refer to the pleadings and evidence adduced by the parties. A pedantic approach cannot be made while examining the issue in the light of the requirement of the Act (Simon v. Rappai, 2008 (2) KHC 863 ). 25. Keeping the aforesaid principles in mind, we will now consider the matter before us. On a reading of the contentions raised in the counter filed by the respondent-tenant to the R.C.P., we have our own doubts as to whether the issue of Kudikidappu actually arises for consideration in this case. In the counter, the case of the respondent is that the petition schedule building had been taken on rent by his mother from Harihara Iyer in the year 1958 for a monthly rent of Rs.3/-. In the counter, the case of the respondent is that the petition schedule building had been taken on rent by his mother from Harihara Iyer in the year 1958 for a monthly rent of Rs.3/-. It is further contended that the building is more than 50 years old and that at the time of construction, the cost of the same was less than Rs.750/-and therefore the building is a hut as defined under the KLR Act. It is also contended that subsequent to the occupation of the building by his mother and thereafter the respondent, have reconstructed the building at their own cost. There is no case in the counter that the building that was initially taken on rent was a hut or that it was a thatched one room hut to which alterations and additions had been made subsequently. On going through the reports of the Advocate Commissioner, by no stretch of imagination, the building as it stands can be stated to be a hut as contemplated under the KLR Act. From the records we find a commission report dated 15/12/1993 filed before the RCC in which it is stated that the building a tiled and electrified one, has a verandah, a puja room, three rooms, a bathroom, a hall, a toilet, a kitchen and a work area. This report is not seen marked. In Ext. C1 report dated 03/11/1995, the position is the same. In Ext. C2 report dated 08/12/2003, the status of the building seems to be the same except an addition of a toilet. The building is stated to have a verandah, a hall, dining room, 4 other rooms, kitchen, work area, a bathroom and two toilets. One of the bedrooms is stated to be air conditioned. The floor of the hall is tiled. A water tank is reported to be installed in the courtyard. According to the advocate commissioner, the building though old and the rooms therein small in size, the same has been constructed with all modern amenities. 25.1 The aforesaid facts were noticed by the RCAA in the judgment in RCA 73/91 dated 27/11/1992, who even observed that the respondent realizing the unlikelihood of his claim succeeding, raised a new contention before the Land Tribunal that the building as it exists, is not the building that originally existed which had been rented out to his mother. 25.1 The aforesaid facts were noticed by the RCAA in the judgment in RCA 73/91 dated 27/11/1992, who even observed that the respondent realizing the unlikelihood of his claim succeeding, raised a new contention before the Land Tribunal that the building as it exists, is not the building that originally existed which had been rented out to his mother. However, there is no such case in the counter filed to the R.C.P. Therefore, the RCAA held that the question whether any alteration or modification had been affected to the tenanted premises subsequent to the lease of the building by the original tenant assumes importance. The RCAA also noticed that the petition scheduled building is admittedly situated quite near the Secretariat building, the seat of administration of the Government of Kerala, in Thiruvananthapuram. Therefore, neither the respondent nor his mother could have made any additional structures or constructions without obtaining necessary plan and license from the Corporation. The respondent/tenant, a Government servant had never a case that he had obtained any plan or license for making any additional constructions. Apart from his interested testimony before the Land Tribunal, there was no evidence to prove that the mother of the respondent/tenant or the respondent had effected any additional structures or modifications to the petition schedule building. Therefore, the RCAA held that the respondent/tenant had failed to prove that any modification, construction, alteration or reconstruction had been effected in the petition schedule building after it had been let out and that it must have been the present structure that had been leased out. So, it held that the cost of construction of the petition schedule building and the rental value of the building at the time it was let out required to be determined. As the report of the Revenue Inspector was found to have been prepared without any basis, the same was set aside and the RCC was directed to appoint a fresh advocate commissioner to assess the cost of construction and its rental value at the time of its construction. 25.2. One another aspect that is worth mentioning which has been pointed out on behalf of the petitioner is the extracts of the property tax demand register produced by both sides. Ext. B5 extract of the year 1954-55 shows the rental value to be Rs. 48/-. As per Ext. A6 for the year 1959-60, A5 for the year 1965-66, Ext. 25.2. One another aspect that is worth mentioning which has been pointed out on behalf of the petitioner is the extracts of the property tax demand register produced by both sides. Ext. B5 extract of the year 1954-55 shows the rental value to be Rs. 48/-. As per Ext. A6 for the year 1959-60, A5 for the year 1965-66, Ext. A7 for the year 1972-73 and Ext. A4 for the year 1978-79, the rental value is Rs. 204/-.; Rs. 420/-and Rs. 720/ respectively. In Ext.A7 the purpose for which the building is used is shown as lodge. 25.3. Yet another aspect to be noted is that the claim of the petitioner-landlord that the monthly rent of the building at the rate of Rs. 60/-per month is in default from September 1986 is disputed by the respondent who contends that there is no landlord tenant relationship between the parties. He further contends in the counter to the R.C.P. that the original landlord, namely, Harihara Iyer had refused to accept the rent long before 1986. Before the Land Tribunal he contended that the rent at the time of the lease was Rs.3/-and that after his mother’s death he has been promptly paying the rent without default in continuation of the rental agreement. The petitioner-landlord before the Land Tribunal produced three money order receipts to substantiate his case regarding rent and its arrears. 25.4. It is true that the petitioner was unable to give the details as to who had sent the money orders and in his cross examination before the Tribunal, admitted that such coupons could be obtained by any person. The explanation of the respondent-tenant relating to the same is that the coupons are relating to money sent relating to some chitty transaction he is supposed to have had with late Harihara Iyer, the original landlord. There is no such case in the counter filed before the RCC. On the other hand, his case is that several attempts to evict him had been made by Harihara Iyer and when all such attempts failed, he executed Ext. A1 sale deed in favour of the petitioner herein, which document is a sham document and as Harihara Iyer had no alienable right in the property, he could not have assigned any right in the property to the petitioner. A1 sale deed in favour of the petitioner herein, which document is a sham document and as Harihara Iyer had no alienable right in the property, he could not have assigned any right in the property to the petitioner. It is in this background the explanation of the respondent-tenant that the money order coupons are relating to some chitty transactions with a landlord who even according to him had been making all attempts to evict him by hook or crook has to be analyzed. The Land Tribunal went completely wrong in placing the entire burden on the petitioner. It is true that the initial burden to establish the case pleaded in the R.C.P. is on the petitioner, for which he has produced the money order coupons. The respondent has not completely distanced himself from the same, on the other hand he has given a bare statement, without any further proof that they relate to some chitty transaction, which explanation seems to be wholly improbable and unbelievable in the aforesaid circumstances. It is not proof beyond reasonable doubt that is required. It is sufficient if preponderance of probabilities is shown by the petitioner, which he has done in this case. Therefore, the Land Tribunal was wrong in basing its decision on some imaginary chitty transaction put forward by the tenant. 25.5. Further, the Land Tribunal has also completely misdirected itself by placing the burden on the landlord to disprove the claim of the respondent. As rightly held in the first remand order, the KLR Act being a beneficial legislation, the burden to prove that the benefit of its provision is on the person who claims the same, that is, the respondent-tenant herein. However, the Land Tribunal found fault with the petitioner in not examining the heirs of Harihara Iyer to bring in evidence as to the rate of rent and the cost of the building and hence drew an adverse inference against the petitioner. The report of the Revenue Inspector to the effect that the cost of construction of the building in the year 1958 would have been Rs. 1400/-was disbelieved. After rejecting the report of the Revenue Inspector, the Land Tribunal held that when the respondent-tenant asserts that rate of rent is only Rs. The report of the Revenue Inspector to the effect that the cost of construction of the building in the year 1958 would have been Rs. 1400/-was disbelieved. After rejecting the report of the Revenue Inspector, the Land Tribunal held that when the respondent-tenant asserts that rate of rent is only Rs. 3/-and that his mother, the original tenant, had taken it out on lease in the year 1958, there is no reason to disbelieve him and as the petitioner is ignorant of the position that existed prior to 1974, it can be concluded that the cost of construction at the time of letting was less than Rs. 750/-and that the rent was only Rs. 3/-. Finding so it concluded that the respondent is a kudikidappukaran of the building. Mere assertions on the part of the respondent-tenant without anything more are seen accepted by the Land Tribunal to accept his case, whereas the same standard has not been applied in the case of the petitioner-landlord. 25.6. There is an essential distinction between burden of proof under Section 101 and onus of proof under Section 103 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Burden of proof always lies upon the person who has to prove a fact and it never shifts, but the onus of proof shifts. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. Burden of proof has two distinct meanings, namely, (i) the burden of proof as a matter of law and pleadings, and (ii) the burden of proof as a matter of adducing evidence. S.101 of the Evidence Act deals with the former and S.102 of the Evidence Act with the latter. The first remains constant but the second shifts. When evidence had been adduced by both the parties the question of onus of proof pales into insignificance and the Court will have to decide the question in controversy in the light of the evidence on record. (Raghavamma v. Chenchamma, AIR 1964 SC 136 ; 1982 KHC 1678; 1997 KHC 1299 SC and AIR 1998 SC 2028 ). 25.7. In the case on hand, it is the respondent-tenant, the applicant before the Land Tribunal, who has claimed the benefit of the KLR Act. Therefore, the initial burden to prove the same was on him and not on the petitioner-landlord. 25.7. In the case on hand, it is the respondent-tenant, the applicant before the Land Tribunal, who has claimed the benefit of the KLR Act. Therefore, the initial burden to prove the same was on him and not on the petitioner-landlord. Apart from the bare assertions made by the respondent in his oral testimony before the Land Tribunal, there is absolutely no evidence to support his claim. However, the Land Tribunal, totally misdirecting itself accepted his bare assertions, rejected the money order coupons produced by the petitioner-landlord probabilising his case relating to rent and drew an adverse inference against the latter for failing to produce evidence to disprove the claim of kudikidappu by the respondent. 25.8. We fail to understand as to why the RCAA in spite of noticing all the aforesaid facts and the overwhelming evidence and probabilities against the claim set by the respondent, still remanded the matter for assessing the cost of the building. This case appears to be a typical example of a tenant, that too a Government servant, raising a fanciful claim of kudikidappu, succeeding in prolonging the litigation for more than three decades and still going strong by hotly contesting the matter. Be that as it may, we are also bound by the earlier orders of this court in the revisions filed by the respondent wherein the orders of remand have been confirmed and as the said orders have attained finality, we cannot also go behind the said orders. We felt compelled to refer to the aforesaid facts as the courts below missed to notice the same resulting in these several rounds of litigation. 26. After the second order of remand, a fresh Advocate Commissioner and an expert engineer was appointed by the RCC. Exts.C2, C3 are the reports of the advocate commissioner and C3(a) is the valuation statement of the expert, as per which, the cost of the building is stated to be Rs.12,827/-. The RCC again disbelieved the case of the petitioner/landlord and dismissed the R.C.P. on the ground that he had failed to produce the prior title deeds of Ext.A1 sale deed, which according to the RCC would have clearly shown the nature of the tenanted premises and also due to non-examination of the legal heirs of Harihara Iyer, who had assigned the property to the petitioner. Therefore, the burden of proving that the building is a hut and that the cost of construction at the time of its letting is less than Rs. 750/-seems to have been placed on the petitioner/landlord. This apparently is wrong in the light of the aforesaid principles. 27. The finding of the RCC that the prior title deeds of Ext. A1 sale deed had not been produced also is incorrect because the respondent/tenant himself has produced these documents and got them marked as Exts.B1 and B2 while PW1, the petitioner was cross examined before the RCC. The prior title deeds also describe the building in the property as a building and not as a hut. Therefore, the RCC has totally misdirected itself by concluding that the petitioner in possession of best evidence relating to the nature of the building and its value has not produced the same and so, the respondent/tenant is entitled to the benefit of the Kudikidappu claim. 28. When PW1 was examined, he deposed that rent @ Rs. 60/-per month had been paid to Harihara Iyer till the month before he had purchased the property, which means till August 1986 and that Ext. A2 series are the three money order receipts to evidence the same. It is true that PW1 admitted in the cross examination that Ext. A2 series do not show the details of the sender or the recipient. However, the only suggestion put to PW1 is that they have been created to suit his case. There is no case for the respondent-tenant that Ext. A2 series are relating to some chitty transaction which he is supposed to have had with Harihara Iyer as contended by him before the Land Tribunal. The respondent-tenant did not adduce any oral evidence before the RCC to disprove Ext. A2 series. In spite of this the RCC accepted the claim of kudikidappu solely due to the failure of the petitioner in not examining the heirs of Harihara Iyer, who according to the RCC in all probability must be in the know how of the nature of the building and the rate of rent. The RCC also held that the petitioner has failed to disprove the contention of the respondent that Ext. The RCC also held that the petitioner has failed to disprove the contention of the respondent that Ext. A1 had been executed by Harihara Iyer to the petitioner in order to defeat his rights in the property and that Harihara Iyer in all probability must have known the claim of the tenant and that must be the reason for incorporating a recital in Ext.A1 sale deed that the vendor has no liability or responsibility in evicting the tenant. It also held that the version of CPW1, the advocate commissioner and CPW2, the engineer and their reports to be unbelievable and unreliable, without assigning any reasons for rejecting the same. Drawing an adverse inference against the petitioner for failing to produce the prior title deeds of Ext.A1 sale deed and for not examining the heirs of Harihara Iyer, the RCC believing the bare assertions in the counter filed by the tenant to the R.C.P. proceeded to dismiss the R.C.P. This approach of the RCC is absolutely wrong in the light of the principles referred to herein above. 29. In the absence of any evidence whatsoever to show that the tenanted premises had been reconstructed or alterations or additions made by the respondent/tenant either at the time of letting out or thereafter, it can only be concluded that the petition schedule building as it exists had been taken on rent by the respondent's mother in the year 1958. The respondent does not refer to the year of construction of the building. However, it is apparent and also admitted that the building was in existence even before Gouri Amma had taken it on lease. In Ext. C3(a) dated 02/01/2003, it is stated that the rates prevailing in 1958 is not available and hence the valuation has been done based on the 1999 rates and thereafter the depreciation for 45 years has been deducted. The cost of construction is stated to be Rs. 12, 827/-. If the rates of 1958 were very much available, then the respondent/ tenant ought to have produced the same to enable the expert to assess the value on the basis of the said rates. He has no case that though the rates of 1958 were made available, the expert had ignored the same. Instead, he himself has filed an affidavit before the court below to the effect that the 1958 rates are not available. He has no case that though the rates of 1958 were made available, the expert had ignored the same. Instead, he himself has filed an affidavit before the court below to the effect that the 1958 rates are not available. An argument was also advanced on behalf of the respondent-tenant that if the 1958 rates was not available, then the rates for the nearest period or year should have been taken to assess the cost and the depreciation deducted which would have reduced the margin of error in assessing the value. After having insisted all along that the valuation must be assessed on the basis of the 1958 rates, it is too late in the day for the respondent to now contend that the rates of the period nearest to 1958 ought to have been adopted. The RCC also appears to be labouring under the mistaken impression that it is for the landlord to prove that the cost of construction is less than Rs.750/-. That being so, the report of the valuation of the building given in Ext. C3 (a) appears to be probable and therefore, there is no irregularity or illegality in the RCAA accepting the same and the finding that the respondent/tenant is not a Kudikidappukaran entitled to the benefit of the same under the KLR Act. We agree with the conclusion of the RCAA though for different reasons. 30. Yet another aspect that is worth mentioning is that after the first order of remand, the petitioner -landlord is seen to have filed I.A. 2821/1996 before the RCC pointing out that the decision on the basis of which the RCAA had passed the first remand order has been overruled by the Apex court and so if the court feels that a claim of kudikidappu arises for consideration, then the matter may be referred to the Land Tribunal. On the other hand, if it feels that the claim does not arise for consideration, then it may hold so and proceed to consider the R.C.P. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioner-landlord that this petition had been objected to by the respondent-tenant and that the latter never wanted a second reference. The order passed in the said application does not refer to any objection having been filed or raised by the respondent. The order passed in the said application does not refer to any objection having been filed or raised by the respondent. However, by order dated 12/06/1996 the application was dismissed by the RCC holding that it was bound by the order of remand. Therefore, the petitioner in all bonafides seem to have taken steps even for a second reference. However, the same was rejected by the court below. In such circumstances the respondent cannot be heard to contend that a second remand was necessary and as the same has not been done, the orders pursuant to the first order of remand are void. 31. Now coming to point no. iv. In the R.C.P. it is alleged that the bona fide need is for the petitioner and his family. Admittedly, the original petitioner is no more and his wife and children have been impleaded as additional petitioners. It was argued on behalf of the respondent/tenant that on the death of the original petitioner, the need under Section 11(3) no longer survives because the original petitioner had no case that his family members are dependent on him for the purpose of a residential building and that the said position was never considered by any of the courts. Therefore, on the death of the original petitioner, the need came to an end and so his heirs or legal representatives cannot claim eviction under Section 11(3). In support of this argument reference was made to the decisions in Chella Rowther v. Remabhai, 2007(1) KHC 666, Sumathi T.K. v. Kundantavida Rabia, 2012(1) KHC 589 , Alavi K.P v. Jameela P.P, 2013 KHC 3699 and Puthampurayil Mariyam v. Sunenda @ Suganda, 2013 (2) KHC 2. 32. On the other hand, referring to the decisions in Pratap Rai Tanwani v. Uttam Chand, 2004 KHC 1593; Iritti Co-operative Hospital Society Ltd. v. C.C. Damodaran, 2010(4) KHC 368 ; Alavi v. Jameela, 2013 (4) KLT SN 80 (C. No. 74) and Viswan v. Kochanthony, 2010 (2) KLT SN 8 (C. No. 9) it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner when the need of the landlord is that the building is required for residence of his family also, the same would not eclipse with the death of the landlord. 33. 33. It is true that on the death of the landlord, the legal representatives or heirs can succeed only if they show that the need survives and that the need projected is their need also. In the case on hand, the specific case in the R.C.P. is that the petition schedule building is bona fide required for the petitioner and his family for their own occupation. It is alleged that the petitioner and his family are residing in a rental building. Therefore, the need projected is not only of the petitioner but also of his family. It is true that after the death of the original petitioner, the pleadings in the petition have not been amended. However, that does not seem necessary because the need projected is not the need of the petitioner alone but the need of his family also. The respondent/tenant does not have a case that the additional petitioners are not the wife and children of the original petitioner. No evidence has been brought into show that the wife and children have acquired any other building in the city. Therefore, when the need alleged is that of the petitioner and his family, it cannot be stated that the death of the original petitioner has resulted in the need coming to an end. 34. In these circumstances, we agree with the conclusion of RCAA that the additional petitioners in the R.C.P. have succeeded in establishing the ground under section 11 (2)(b) and the need projected under Section 11(3) of the Act. No illegality, impropriety or irregularity in the order of the RCAA has been made out. Therefore, this revision petition is dismissed with costs confirming the judgment dated 12/04/2016 in R.C.A.No.22/2008. The respondent/tenant is directed to vacate the petition schedule building within a period of one month from the date of this order. Interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.