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2022 DIGILAW 884 (MP)

Subhash Kumar Golhani v. State of Madhya Pradesh

2022-06-30

MANINDER S.BHATTI

body2022
JUDGMENT 1. The petitioner has filed this petition praying for following reliefs:- "7.(i) The entire relevant record in respect of appointment of Panchayat Karmi in pursuance of advertisement dated 31-07-2007 issued by Gram Panchayat, Barela be called for from Gram Panchayat, Barela and Janpad Panchayat, Ghansaur be called. (ii) The petitioner be appointed as "Panchayat Karmi" of Gram Panchayat, Barela. (iii) The Gram Panchayat, Barela be directed to return the original mark-sheets of Class 10th and 12 standards to the petitioner. (iv) Appropriate enquiry be directed against the erring officers responsible for declining appointment to the petitioner. (v) In the alternative the petitioner granted compensation for the loss suffered on account of inaction of the respondents. (vi) Any other relief to which the petitioner is entitled to be also granted. (vii) Cost of the petition.' 2. The petitioner by way of this petition is seeking appointment of Panchayat Karmi in pursuance to advertisement which issued in the year 2007. 3. This petition has been filed after a delay of almost 11 years on 06-02-2018 and while issuing notice this Court vide order dated 20-02-2018 observed that the question of delay in filing the writ petition shall remain open. 4. Thus, on the question delay, the counsel while referring to paragraph-4 of the petition submits that there was inaction on the part of the respondents in not appointing the petitioner as "Panchayat Karmi" in the year 2007-08. Thereafter, the then Sarpanch of the Gram Pachayat was extending assurance of appointing the petitioner however, lateron, the then Sarpanch expired and thereafter, again the petitioner was pursuing the authorities and lateron sought information under the Right to Information Act, 2005 from the office of Gram Panchayat, Janpad Panchayat and Additional Collector, Seoni. However, when the information was not supplied to the petitioner thus, the petitioner has filed this petition. 5. The petitioner submits that the delay has been satisfactorily explained in paragraph-4 of the petition and in submission of the petitioner, the delay is bonafide and inadvertent and therefore, submit that the matter requires to be adjudicated on merits. 6. However, when the information was not supplied to the petitioner thus, the petitioner has filed this petition. 5. The petitioner submits that the delay has been satisfactorily explained in paragraph-4 of the petition and in submission of the petitioner, the delay is bonafide and inadvertent and therefore, submit that the matter requires to be adjudicated on merits. 6. Per contra, counsel for the respondent/State submits that the petitioner was sitting tight over the matter for a period of more than 10 years and after a period of more than 10 years, the petitioner moved an application under Right to Information Act, 2005 in January, 2018 and thus, since there is unexplained and inordinate delay, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. Having heard the rival submissions of parties and upon perusal of the record, it is evident from the relief clause that the petitioner is seeking a direction to appoint him as "Panchayat Karmi" on the basis of advertisement that was issued on 31-07-2007. The other prayer of the petitioner is that the Gram Panchayat, Barela be directed to return the original mark-sheet of the petitioner of 10th and 12th standard. If paragraph-4 of the Writ Petition is scrutinised carefully, the same reflect that there is unexplained delay from 2007 till 2018. The petitioner's only explanation that there was some assurance by the then, Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, who eventually died and thereafter, the petitioner made efforts to collect the information under Right to Information Act, 2005. 8. The application under Right to Information Act, 2005 was moved by the petitioner in the month of January, 2018 which is evident from the perusal of Annexure P/7 to Annexure P/:. Thus, prior to January, 2018, there was no efforts made by the petitioner to agitate his grievance. The petitioner was sitting tight over the matter and therefore, does not deserves any equity. It is trite law that rules of limitations are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties but, the parties should not take recourse to dilatory tactics and the delay should not be deliberate. By efflux of time, reluctance weighs more than interference. 9. The petitioner was sitting tight over the matter and therefore, does not deserves any equity. It is trite law that rules of limitations are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties but, the parties should not take recourse to dilatory tactics and the delay should not be deliberate. By efflux of time, reluctance weighs more than interference. 9. Admittedly, the entire memorandum of petition is conspicuously silent as regards the delay of more than 10 years and therefore, interference with the matter, at this belated stage, will amount to revival of a stale claim and will compel the respondents to confront a litigation, which has virtually rendered redundant by efflux of inordinate delay of 10 years. 10. The Apex Court in para 21 to 22.4 in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Ors. reported in (2013) 12 SCC 644 has held as under :- 21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms "ÃÂÃÂsufficient cause"ÃÂÃÂ should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bonafides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:- 22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a hapha9ard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.' 11. Therefore, in the considered view of this Court, that the petitioner has made attempt to revive a stale claim by filing this petition after an inordinate delay of 11 years. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to consider the merits of the case. Thus, since the cause suffers from inordinate delay and laches, the Writ Petition stands dismissed.