JUDGMENT : K. BABU, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment and decree dated 13.08.2008 in A.S. No. 123 of 2004 passed by the District Court, Alappuzha. A.S. No. 123 of 2004, arose from the judgment and decree dated 15.06.2004 in O.S. No. 154/1997 passed by the Additional Subordinate Judge’s Court Alappuzha. 2. The plaintiff and Defendant No. 4 are the appellants. Appellant No. 2 died during the course of proceedings and his legal representatives were impleaded as additional appellants 3, 4 and 5. Defendants 1, 2 and additional defendants 5 to 7 are the respondents. 3. The plaint schedule property originally belonged to one Shri Cheriyan. On 02.12.1983, Shri Cheriyan executed a Will in respect of the plaint schedule property. On 10.12.1993, Shri Cheriyan cancelled the Will No. 39 dated 02.12.1983 and executed another Will in respect of the plaint schedule property bequeathing the properties to the plaintiff and defendants 1, 3 and 4. The genuineness of Ext.A3 Will is under challenge in this appeal. 4. Shri Cheriyan married one Smt. Achamma in the year 1960. They had no issues. Smt. Achamma died in the year 1980. Thereafter, Shri Cheriyan married Smt. Saramma Cheriyan, defendant No. 1. Saramma Cheriyan also had no issues in her wedlock with Shri Cheriyan. 5. Defendant No. 2 is the brother of Smt. Saramma Cheriyan. Defendant No. 3 is the servant of Shri Cheriyan. Defendants 5 to 7 are the legal representatives of defendant No. 3. Defendant No. 4 is the son of one of the brothers of Shri Cheriyan. The plaintiff in the suit is the son of another brother of Shri Cheriyan. 6. The case of the plaintiff is that as per Will No. 39/1983 dated 02.12.1983, Shri Cheriyan bequeathed the plaint schedule properties in favour of him and defendant No. 4. Later, Shri Cheriyan cancelled the said Will and Ext.A3 Will dated 10.12.1993 was executed bequeathing the properties to plaintiff and defendants 1, 3 and 4. According to the plaintiff, at the time of execution of Ext.A3 Will, the testator Cheriyan had no mental capacity to execute the Will. At the time of execution of the Will, he was admitted in the Medical College Hospital, Alappuzha. He was a chronic diabetic patient. He was suffering from kidney failure. Shri Cheriyan died on 17.12.1993. Ext.A3 Will dated 10.12.1993 was executed by the Shri Cheriyan one week before his death. At the time of execution of the Will, he was admitted in the Medical College Hospital, Alappuzha. He was a chronic diabetic patient. He was suffering from kidney failure. Shri Cheriyan died on 17.12.1993. Ext.A3 Will dated 10.12.1993 was executed by the Shri Cheriyan one week before his death. The plaintiff pleaded that Shri Cheriyan was extremely weak and incapable of understanding his affairs and forming a rational judgment concerning his rights over his properties. The Will dated 10.12.1993 was caused to be executed at the instance of defendants 1 to 3. The defendants with fraudulent intention of defeating the rights of the plaintiff got executed Ext.A3 Will. 7. Defendant No. 1 had filed O.P. (Probate) No. 39/1994 to probate Ext.A3 Will. The plaintiff had challenged the application to probate the Will. The said application was later withdrawn. 8. Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 resisted the plaint contending that Ext.A3 Will is the last Will of late Cheriyan, who had a sound disposing state of mind at the time of executing the Will. Late Cheriyan was undergoing treatment in the Medical College Hospital, Alappuzha from 03.12.1993 to 13.12.1993 due to hypertension. While undergoing treatment in the hospital, he was perfectly in a sound disposing state of mind. Ext.A3 Will was executed by him with his free will. Shri Cheriyan himself went to the Sub Registrar’s Office and affixed his signature in Ext.A3 Will. 9. The parties went to trial. During the trial, PWs. 1 to 4 and DWs. 1 to 4 were examined. Exts.A1 to A3 were marked on the side of the plaintiff and Exts.B1 and B2 were marked on the side of the defendants. Ext.X1 was marked as a third party Exhibit. 10. The Trial Court decreed the suit cancelling the Will Dated 10.12.1993, by declaring the same as null and void. 11. Defendants 1 and 2 challenged the decree and judgment passed by the Trial Court in A.S. No. 123/2004 in the District Court, Alappuzha. The First Appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and dismissed the Original Suit holding that the suit is barred by limitation and also that Ext.A3 Will was executed by late Cherian with his free will and the propounders (defendants) removed all suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will. 12. The First Appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and dismissed the Original Suit holding that the suit is barred by limitation and also that Ext.A3 Will was executed by late Cherian with his free will and the propounders (defendants) removed all suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will. 12. The plaintiff and defendant No. 4 are in appeal before this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court. 13. On 18.11.2019, this Court admitted the appeal and the following substantial questions of law were raised: “(i) Is not the decree of the lower appellate court perverse when it disturbed the decree of the trial court which specifically held that the suit is not hit by Article 59 of the Limitation Act? (ii) Is not the decree of the lower appellate court perverse when it held that the appellants cannot claim the exclusionary clause in Section 14 of the Limitation Act on the basis of Ext.A2 proceeding? (iii) Is not the decree of the lower appellate court perverse when it disturbed the decree of the trial court with regard to Ext.B1, Will which lacks the requirements contained in Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act?” 14. Heard Shri Sasthamangalam M. Ajith Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Shri M. Krishna Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 15. The dispute in this case centres around the execution of Ext.A3 Will (Ext.B1) by the testator Shri Cheriyan. The case of the plaintiff is that Shri Cheriyan was not in a sound disposing state of mind at the time of execution of Ext.A3 Will. According to the plaintiff, the Will was executed at the instance of defendants 1 to 3, who got it executed with fraudulent intention and to defeat the lawful rights of the plaintiff. 16. The challenge of the respondents/contesting defendants is that Shri Cheriyan executed the Will in a sound disposing state of mind. The contesting defendants denied the plea of fraudulent intention and their role in the execution of Ext.B1 Will. 17. 16. The challenge of the respondents/contesting defendants is that Shri Cheriyan executed the Will in a sound disposing state of mind. The contesting defendants denied the plea of fraudulent intention and their role in the execution of Ext.B1 Will. 17. Before going through the merits of the rival contentions on the genuineness of Ext.A3 Will and the suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the same, I shall first consider the sustainability of the finding of the First Appellate Court that the suit is barred by limitation. 18. Ext.A3 Will was executed on 10.12.1993. Shri Cheriyan died on 17.12.1993. The plaintiff instituted the original suit for cancellation of Ext.A3 Will declaring it as null and void and for other ancillary reliefs. As rightly held by the First Appellate Court, Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 governs the period of limitation for the institution of the suit. As per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, to cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the recession of a contract, the period of limitation is three years which begins to run from the date on which the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him. 19. Going by the pleadings in the plaint, the cause of action for the institution of the suit initially arose on 10.12.1993, the date on which the Will was executed. Ext.B2 is the copy of the O.P. (Caveat) No. 39/94 lodged by the plaintiff before the District Court, Alapuzha. Ext.B2 was lodged on 04.04.1994. The plaintiff had specifically pleaded in Ext.B2 that Ext.A3 Will was executed by Shri Cheriyan at the instance of defendant No. 1. Therefore, the plaintiff got knowledge of the execution of Ext.A3 Will at least on 04.04.1994. Therefore, the suit based on the pleadings in the plaint should have been filed on or before 03.04.1997. The plaintiff instituted the original suit on 15.12.1997. However, the plaintiff has raised a contention that he is entitled to the exclusion of the time during which he resisted the O.P. (Probate) No. 39/94 instituted by defendant No. 1 before the District Court. The O.P. (Probate) was dismissed as withdrawn on 11.09.1997, as is evident from Ext.A2. 20. The plaintiff instituted the original suit on 15.12.1997. However, the plaintiff has raised a contention that he is entitled to the exclusion of the time during which he resisted the O.P. (Probate) No. 39/94 instituted by defendant No. 1 before the District Court. The O.P. (Probate) was dismissed as withdrawn on 11.09.1997, as is evident from Ext.A2. 20. The question that falls for consideration is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Section 14 of the Limitation Act reads thus: “14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona-fide in court without jurisdiction: (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under rule 1 of that Order, where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature. Explanation: For the purposes of this section: (a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted. (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding. Explanation: For the purposes of this section: (a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted. (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding. (c) mis-joinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.” 21. On the requirements of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, in T.R Desai’s Commentary on The Limitation Act, the learned author writes thus: “In order to attract the application of Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the party, seeking its benefit, must satisfy the Court that: (a) it (party seeking benefit of section 14(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963), as plaintiff was prosecuting another civil proceeding with due diligence. (b) the earlier proceeding and later proceeding relate to the same matter in issue. (c) the former proceeding was being prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. To be more explicit and exhaustive: (a) the suit must be between the same adversaries to both the litigation. (b) the plaintiff should have been prosecuting with due diligence and/or good faith. (c) another civil proceeding. (d) in a Court of first instance, or appeal or revision. (e) both the proceedings (i.e. between the same adversaries) should pertain to same matter. (f) The previous civil proceedings should not be entertainable by the Court, because of a defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature.” 22. The learned counsel for the appellants Shri Sasthamangalam M. Ajith Kumar vehemently contended that the plaintiff has satisfied all the requirements of Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act to sustain that the suit is filed within the period of limitation. 23. Per contra, the learned counsel for the contesting respondents/defendants Shri Krishna Kumar M. submitted that the benefit of Section 14(1) is available to only a litigant against the bar of limitation when he institutes a proceeding which, by reason of the defect of jurisdiction or other cause of the like nature, ended in dismissal. 24. 23. Per contra, the learned counsel for the contesting respondents/defendants Shri Krishna Kumar M. submitted that the benefit of Section 14(1) is available to only a litigant against the bar of limitation when he institutes a proceeding which, by reason of the defect of jurisdiction or other cause of the like nature, ended in dismissal. 24. In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises and Another vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and Others, 2008 (7) SCC 169 : 2008 KHC 6312, a three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in paragraph 12 of the judgment, held thus: “12. S.14 of the Limitation Act deals with exclusion of time of proceeding bona-fide in Court without jurisdiction. On analysis of the said Section, it becomes evident that the following conditions must be satisfied before S.14 can be pressed into service: (1) Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party. (2) The prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith. (3) The failure of the prior proceeding was due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature. (4) The earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must relate to the same matter in issue. (5) Both the proceedings are in a Court. The policy of the Section is to afford protection to a litigant against the bar of limitation when he institutes a proceeding which by reason of some technical defect cannot be decided on merits and is dismissed. While considering the provisions of S.14 of the Limitation Act, proper approach will have to be adopted and the provisions will have to be interpreted so as to advance the cause of justice rather than abort the proceedings. It will be well to bear in mind that an element of mistake is inherent in the invocation of S.14. In fact, the section is intended to provide relief against the bar of limitation in cases of mistaken remedy or selection of a wrong forum.” 25. The learned counsel for the appellants relying on Consolidated Engineering Enterprises and Another vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and Others (Supra) and Mohinder Singh vs. Paramjit Singh, (2018) 5 SCC 698 contended that a liberal interpretation of the statutory provision is mandated and that the finding of the First Appellate Court that the suit is barred by limitation cannot be sustained. The learned Counsel relies on Aildas Madhowdas and Others vs. Sobhomal Pursoomal and Others, AIR 1938 Sind 50 to contend that the law does not insist that the benefit of Section 14 is applicable to a litigant against the bar of limitation only when he institutes a proceeding. In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises and Another vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and Others (Supra), a case in which an Arbitrator forwarded the Award to the Court and the plaintiff/claimant filed execution proceedings seeking enforcement of the same, was under consideration. On the question whether the period during which the plaintiff/claimant therein proceeded with the matter could be excluded or not, it was held that as the plaintiff therein was enforcing the Award of the Arbitrator, he is entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The facts considered in the above case are different from those under consideration in the present case. 26. In Ramachandran vs. M/s Sundaram Finance Pvt. Ltd. 2017 (3) KHC 307 , a Single Bench of this Court held that in order to get the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the party who claims the benefit should show and satisfy that he has initiated the proceedings with due diligence and in good faith and also prosecuted the same with due diligence and in good faith all along with the proceedings till it was rejected or dismissed by that Court on the ground of defect of jurisdiction or error in jurisdiction. 27. In Chintamaneni Netaji vs. Jonnalagadda Hanumantho Rao, 2003 (1) AIC 207 A.P. the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that for claiming benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the plaintiff is required to establish that he was prosecuting a proceeding in another Court and that Court did not entertain those proceedings. It was further held that the benefit is not available to the defendant in the earlier suit. 28. In Mac-N-Hom Systems vs. P.S. Varrier, 2003 (3) KLT 1179 , this Court held that in order to attract the application of the section, the subsequent suit must be against the defendant in the previous case and in the two proceedings there should be the same subject matter, and the Court in which the earlier suit was being prosecuted should be unable to entertain it from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature. 29. 29. In Gurubx Kaur vs. Hari Singh, MANU/DE/0143/2003, the Delhi High Court held that the word “plaintiff” used in the section would connote a person prosecuting legal action. 30. The Apex Court specifically held in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises and Another vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and Others (Supra) that the policy of the Section is to afford protection to the litigant against the bar of limitation when he institutes proceeding which by reason of technical defect cannot be decided on merits and is dismissed. 31. In the instant case, the plaintiff never instituted any proceeding in respect of the subject matter initially. The fact that he resisted the application for probate, O.P. (Probate) No. 39/94, instituted by defendant No. 1 before the District Court, Alapuzha will not confer any protection against the bar of limitation as provided under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Hence this Court holds that the finding of the First Appellate Court that the Original Suit is barred by limitation and the plaintiff is not entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Act requires no interference and is confirmed. 32. Now, I shall come to the merits of the rival contentions on the execution of Ext.A3 Will and the discharge of evidentiary burden by the respective parties in support of the pleadings. Late Cheriyan is the testator. Defendant No. 1 is his wife. Defendant No. 3 was a servant employed by him to manage the agricultural activities. Defendants 5 to 7 are the legal representatives of defendant No. 3. Defendant No. 4 is the son of one of the brothers of late Cheriyan. Plaintiff is also the son of another brother of the testator. There is no dispute regarding the execution of Ext.A3 Will. Ext.A3 Will was executed on 10.12.1993. Shri Cheriyan had earlier executed Will dated 39/83 on 02.12.1983 which was cancelled with the execution of Ext.A3 Will. Shri Cheriyan died on 17.12.1993. 33. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff vehemently contended that at the time of execution of Ext.A3 Will, Shri Cheriyan was not in a sound disposing state of mind. He relied on Ext.X1 medical report to substantiate his contentions. The challenge of respondents/contesting defendants is that Sri. Cheriyan had no mental incapacity at the time of execution Ext.A3 Will and he executed the Will with his free will. 34. He relied on Ext.X1 medical report to substantiate his contentions. The challenge of respondents/contesting defendants is that Sri. Cheriyan had no mental incapacity at the time of execution Ext.A3 Will and he executed the Will with his free will. 34. It is well settled principle that the onus to prove a Will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of a Will, proof of testamentary capacity and proof of the signature of the testator as required by law would be sufficient to discharge the onus. However, where there are suspicious circumstances, the onus would again be on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before the Will could be accepted as genuine. 35. In the present case, there is no serious challenge on the question as to whether the propounder has adduced evidence in terms of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. Defendant No. 2 is one of the attesting witnesses in Ext.A3 Will. He was examined as DW-1. The other attesting witness was examined as DW-4. Both those witnesses gave evidence that late Cheriyan, while undergoing treatment in the Medical College Hospital, Alappuzha, went to the office of the Sub Registrar and affixed his signature in Ext.B1 Will in their presence and each of them had seen the other witnesses affixing the signature. They also gave evidence that late Cheriyan was mentally sound and after properly understanding the questions put by the Sub-Registrar, he affixed his signature. Therefore, it is to be concluded that the requirements contained in Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act read with Sections 67 and 68 of the Evidence Act have been satisfied in the execution of Ext.A3 Will. 36. Now, what remains is whether the propounder could remove the existence of suspicious circumstances brought out on record. 37. In H. Venkatachala Iyengar vs. B.N. Thimmajamma and Others, AIR 1959 SC 443 , the Apex Court enumerated the following circumstances to be relevant for determination of the existence of suspicious circumstances: “(i) When a doubt is created with regard to the condition of mind of the testator despite his signature on the Will. (ii) When the disposition appears to be unnatural or wholly unfair in the light of relevant circumstances. (iii) Where propounder himself takes a prominent part in the execution of Will which confers on him substantial benefit.” 38. (ii) When the disposition appears to be unnatural or wholly unfair in the light of relevant circumstances. (iii) Where propounder himself takes a prominent part in the execution of Will which confers on him substantial benefit.” 38. The specific case of the appellants is that late Cheriyan had no sound disposing state of mind at the time of execution of Ext.A3 Will. Admittedly, at the time of execution of Ext.A3 Will late Cheriyan was undergoing treatment in the Medical College Hospital, Alappuzha. He remained in the hospital from 03.12.1993 to 13.12.1993. It was on 10.12.1993 he executed Ext.A3 Will. The testator died on 17.12.1993. The learned counsel for the appellants relying on Ext.XI contended that the entry therein to the effect that late Cheriyan had ‘altered sensorium” is a strong suspicious circumstance surrounding the execution of the Will. PW2, a Surgeon attached to the Medical College Hospital, Alappuzha and DW-3, a Lecturer in Medicine, Medical College Hospital were examined. Both the witnesses deposed that Cheriyan was admitted in the Surgery department and treated in the departments of Surgery and Medicine. PW-2, the Surgeon, stated that he was on leave during the period in which Cheriyan was undergoing treatment in the hosptial. Therefore, his evidence on the mental condition of Cheriyan during the period in which he was undergoing treatment has no evidentiary value. 39. DW-3, the Professor in Medicine could not state whether he had treated late Cheriyan. Both those witnesses were incapable of giving any reliable evidence as to the mental condition of late Cheriyan while he was undergoing treatment in the hospital. Referring to the entry in Ext.X1, DW-3 stated that the Doctor who wrote the entry had meant that late Cheriyan was not talking properly. It has come out in the oral evidence and from the medical records that late Cheriyan was undergoing treatment for Diabetes, Hypertension and kidney trouble. There is also nothing to show that any treatment was given to late Cheriyan for the condition altered sensorium. The First Appellate Court relying on the oral evidence of the witnesses and Ext.X1 held that there is nothing to show that late Cheriyan was incapable of understanding things while undergoing treatment. The First Appellate Court also held that from the oral evidence of PW-2 and DW-3, it could only be found that he was suffering from Diabetes, Renal failure and Hypertension. The First Appellate Court also held that from the oral evidence of PW-2 and DW-3, it could only be found that he was suffering from Diabetes, Renal failure and Hypertension. The First Appellate Court also found that the hospital authorities permitted late Cheriyan to leave the hospital to execute Ext.A3 Will. Relying on these circumstances, the First Appellate Court held that the testator was mentally fit to execute the Will in dispute. The Court below also relied on the oral evidence of DW-2, a relative of Cheriyan to hold that he was fully conscious though he was suffering from pain during his inpatient treatment. 40. It has come out in evidence that while walking from Hospital to the Sub Registrar’s Office his wife, defendant No. 1, was holding him. The First Appellate Court held that defendant No. 1 was holding him would not suggest any mental weakness or incapability of understanding things. The plaintiff has a case that late Cheriyan was taken to the Sub Registrar’s Office by lifting his hand. The First Appellate Court disbelieved this version of the plaintiff relying on the admissions of PW1 to the effect that he talked with the deceased till December 1993. The First Appellate Court also relied on the admission of PW1 to the effect that Cheriyan had no disease other than Diabetes. This Court finds nothing to record that the findings of the First Appellate Court as to the mental condition of the testator at the time of execution of the Will was perverse. 41. Yet another suspicious circumstance projected by the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff is that the disposition in which defendant No. 1, his wife, was given 4.44 Acres of land appears to be unnatural and wholly unfair in the light of the relevant circumstances. Admittedly, late Cheriyan had no issues in his marital relationship with defendant No. 1. Indisputably wife of late Cheriyan, defendant No. 1, lived with him and supported him till his death. It is quite natural that the love and affection of the testator will have more leanings towards her than the plaintiff and the 4th defendant who are the issues of his brothers. Therefore, this Court is unable to accept the contention that the disposition appears to be unnatural or wholly unfair. It is quite natural that the love and affection of the testator will have more leanings towards her than the plaintiff and the 4th defendant who are the issues of his brothers. Therefore, this Court is unable to accept the contention that the disposition appears to be unnatural or wholly unfair. There is also no convincing evidence to establish that the propounder has taken a prominent part in the execution of Ext.A3 Will. 42. The plaintiff has a case that defendants 1 to 3 with fraudulent intention succeeded in executing Ext.A3 Will with the intention to defeat his lawful rights. There is lack of specific pleadings as to the alleged fraud as required under Order VI Rule 4 of the CPC. This Court, on a careful examination of the materials, is of the view that the propounder has proved the due execution of Ext.A3 Will, in the touchstone of Sections 67 and 68 of the Indian Evidence Act and Section 63 of Indian Succession Act. The propounder could also remove all the suspicious circumstances projected from the side of the appellants. This Court finds no reason to record that the findings of the First Appellate Court are perverse. The First Appellate Court has correctly appreciated the facts and circumstances of the case and drawn the necessary inferences and presumptions that would apply to the facts of the case. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly against the appellants. 43. The Regular Second Appeal is dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their respective costs. 44. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand closed.