JUDGMENT : Heard Sri V. V. Satish, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri G. Naresh Kumar, learned counsel, representing Sri M. Manohar Reddy, learned standing counsel for respondent No.2. 2. This writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the following reliefs: “…to declare the orders passed in Notice No.3102/1073/VMC/UC/2021, dated 30.08.2022 by the 2nd respondent as illegal, arbitrary and violation of principles of natural justice besides violative of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India and to consequently set aside the same insofar as petitioner’s Flats No.1 & 2, 4th floor in “Lakshmi’s D Enclave” covered by RS No.48/3, Ramalingeswara Nagar, Vijayawada are concerned and pass such other order or orders…..” 3. The petitioners are challenging the impugned confirmation order dated 30.08.2022 passed by the 2nd respondent-Vijayawada Municipal Corporation, represented by its Commissioner, by which the notice dated 24.08.2022 given to the owners of the building in question, directing them to show cause as to why the unauthorized constructions commenced at the said building shall not be removed/altered or pulled down within a specified period, failing which further action for removal shall be taken up departmentally, has been confirmed. 4. The petitioners claim to be the bona fide purchasers from the owners through their General Power of Attorney (in short ‘GPA’) Holder. The 1st petitioner purchased Flat No.1 in 4th floor on 31.12.2021 and the 2nd petitioner purchased Flat No.2 in 4th floor on 07.07.2022. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners are the absolute owners and possessors of the flats in the building, mentioned above, by virtue of the sale deeds from the owners, but the petitioners were not served with any show cause notice/the provisional order and any opportunity of hearing was not afforded to them, before passing the order of confirmation. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners next submitted that the notice/provisional order dated 24.08.2022 was issued to the owners under Section 452 (1) and 461 of Andhra Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act 1955 (in short ‘APMC Act 1955’) and the order of confirmation was also passed under the same sections of the same Act, whereas APMC Act 1955 does not apply to the Vijayawada Municipal Corporation (in short ‘VMC’) in view of Section 1 (2) of APMC Act 1955 and for VMC there is a separate Act, namely, Vijayawada Municipal Corporation Act 1981. Consequently, the notice/provisional order as also the confirmation order are without jurisdiction. 7. Sri G. Naresh Kumar, learned counsel, representing Sri M. Manohar Reddy, learned standing counsel for respondent No.2, submits that the notice dated 24.08.2022 was issued to the owners of the building who were raising construction without any building permit, unauthorizedly, and after affording opportunity of hearing to them and after hearing their GPA Holder the order of confirmation was passed, perfectly in accordance with law. He further submits that the petitioners are not entitled for any notice and from the notice dated 24.08.2022 itself it is evident that they purchased the flats in the building in question during the proceedings being taken with respect to ‘such’ unauthorized construction. 8. Sri G. Naresh Kumar further submits that in the exercise of powers conferred under Section 101 of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Act 2014 (Central Act 6 of 2014), the State Government issued G.O.Ms.No.32, dated 23.02.2015, (in short “the Order dated 23.02.2015”) and as per para-2 of the said Government Order, Section 455-AA of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 has been extended to Vijayawada Municipal Corporation as well. He further submits that the Vijayawada Municipal Corporation Act 1981 itself applies the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act for the Vijayawada Municipal Corporation and consequently, there is no illegality in the order of confirmation. 9. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the parties and perused the material on record. 10. The second submission of the petitioners’ counsel is being taken first for consideration. 11. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners the provisional order/notice dated 24.08.2022 and the confirmation order dated 30.08.2022 have been passed under Section 452 (1) and 461 of the APMC Act 1955 but the said Act does not apply to Vijayawada Municipal Corporation. On this aspect there is no dispute that in view of Section 1 (2) of the Andhra Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act 1994, which is reproduced below, the Andhra Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act 1994 does not extend to the local areas covered by Vijayawada Municipal Corporation. “1. Short title, extent and commencement -(1) This Act may be called the Andhra Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1994. (2) It extends to the whole of the State of Andhra Pradesh, except to the local areas covered by the Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada Municipal Corporations. “1. Short title, extent and commencement -(1) This Act may be called the Andhra Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1994. (2) It extends to the whole of the State of Andhra Pradesh, except to the local areas covered by the Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada Municipal Corporations. (3) It shall be deemed to have come into force with effect on and from the 4th July, 1994.” 12. Section 14 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act 1994 also provides that the provisions of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act 1955 shall apply mutatismutandisto the corporations constituted under the A.P.Municipal Corporation Act. The Vijayawada Municipal Corporation has not been constituted under A.P.Municipal Corporation Act, but under the Vijayawada Municipal Corporation Act 1981 and therefore, from Section 14 of the A.P.Municipal Corporation Act also it is clear that APMS Act 1994 does not apply to Vijayawada Municipal Corporation. 13. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners on the above aspect, though may be correct, but does not advance the cause of the petitioners any further and on that ground the impugned order of confirmation would not become illegal. The reason is that Vijayawada Municipal Corporation Act 1981 applicable to Vijayawada Municipal Corporation, by Section 7 (1) also makes applicable all the provisions of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act mutatismutandisto the Vijayawada Municipal Corporation. 14. Section 7 of the Vijayawada Municipal Corporation Act 1981 reads as under: “7. Application of the provisions of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporations Act, 1955 to the Corporation: -(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided herein, all the provisions of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporations Act, 1955 (Act II of 1956)(hereinafter in this section called "this said Act") including the provisions relating to the levy and collection of any tax or fee, are hereby extended to and shall apply mutatis mutandis to the Corporation and the said Act shall, in relation to the Corporation be read and construed as if the provisions of the Act had formed part of this Act. (2) For the purpose of facilitating the application of the provisions of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 to the Corporation, the Government may, by notification in Andhra Pradesh Gazette, make such adaptations and modifications of the said Act and the rules and bye-laws made thereunder, whether by way of repealing, amending or suspending any provision thereof, as may be necessary or expedient and thereupon the said Act and the rules made thereunder, shall apply to the Corporation subject to the adaptations and modifications so made. (3) Notwithstanding that no provision or insufficient provision has been made under sub-section (2) for the adaptation of the provisions of the said Act, or the rules made thereunder, any Court, Tribunal or authority required or empowered to enforce these provisions may, for the purpose of facilitating their application to the Corporation, construe these provisions in such manner, without affecting the substance, as may be necessary or proper regard to the matter before the court, tribunal or authority.” 15. In view of the aforesaid legal provision, at the most it can be said that the provisional order/notice and the confirmation order have been passed mentioning incorrect name of the Act i.e., APMC Act 1994 instead of the correct Act i.e., Vijayawada Municipal Corporation Act 1981. Section 452 (1) and 461 of APMC Act are the same as in the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act 1955 which Section 452 (1) and 461 of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act applies mutatis mutandis to Vijayawada Municipal Corporation by virtue of Section 7 of the Vijayawada Municipal Corporation Act 1981. 16. It is not a case of lack of jurisdiction in the Commissioner of Vijayawada Municipal Corporation to pass the provisional order/notice or and the confirmation order. The Commissioner has got the jurisdiction under the same provisions of Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act read with Section 7 of the Vijayawada Municipal Corporation Act. 17. I am of the considered view that mere mentioning of wrong provision or wrong Act would not vitiate the provisional order/notice and the confirmation order, when the authority i.e. Commissioner, Vijayawada Municipal Corporation, had the jurisdiction to pass such orders and the power and jurisdiction is traceable to Section 7 of Vijayawada Municipal Corporation Act 1981. 18. 17. I am of the considered view that mere mentioning of wrong provision or wrong Act would not vitiate the provisional order/notice and the confirmation order, when the authority i.e. Commissioner, Vijayawada Municipal Corporation, had the jurisdiction to pass such orders and the power and jurisdiction is traceable to Section 7 of Vijayawada Municipal Corporation Act 1981. 18. In MIG Cricket Club v. Abhinav Sahakar Education Society, (2011) 9 SCC 97 the Hon’ble Apex Court held that it is trite that the validity of the order does not depend upon the section mentioned in the order. Wrong provision mentioned in the order itself does not invalidate the order, if it is found that the order could be validly passed under any other provision. 19. Paragraph-27 of MIG Cricket Club (supra) is reproduced as under: “27. It seems that the High Court misdirected itself by considering the Notification dated 10-4-1985 to be the sanction of the development plan under Section 37(2) [sic Section 31(1)] of the Act and the Notification dated 24-4-1992 to be the modification of the final development plan which has rendered its order illegal. It is trite that the validity of the order does not depend upon the section mentioned in the order. Wrong provision mentioned in the order itself does not invalidate the order, if it is found that order could be validly passed under any other provision. However in a case, like the present one, contrary to what has been mentioned in the notifications the Court cannot say that such powers were not exercised to render the notification illegal if in fact such power exists.” 20. Now I proceed to consider the first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners. 21. The confirmation order was passed after issuing notice dated 24.08.2022 to the owners of the building to show cause as to why the unauthorized construction shall not be removed/altered or pulled down within the specified period from the date of receipt of that notice. It was further provided that failing to comply with the notice further action will be taken departmentally. The owners through their GPA holder 4th respondent – Smt.Pydipamula Lakshmi Kumari contested the matter, and after considering their submissions, the order of confirmation was passed. 22. From perusal of the order of confirmation, it is evident that the owners admitted that the construction was unauthorized and without any building permission. The owners through their GPA holder 4th respondent – Smt.Pydipamula Lakshmi Kumari contested the matter, and after considering their submissions, the order of confirmation was passed. 22. From perusal of the order of confirmation, it is evident that the owners admitted that the construction was unauthorized and without any building permission. The Commissioner has recorded that the alleged permission was fake one. The opportunity of hearing was thus given to the owners who had constructed the building without building plan. The order was passed in consonance with the principles of natural justice. 23. It is not the case of the petitioners that the construction was raised after obtaining the building permission. In this respect, nothing has been brought on record to submit that what the owners of the building admitted in the proceedings before the Commissioner was not correct. 24. Further, it is also evident from the notice dated 24.08.2022 that the proceedings with respect to the building were already pending, as the notice makes reference to the office note No.3102/1073/VMC/UC/2021, dated 21.12.2021 and office note No.3102/1073/VMC/UC/2021, dated 01.02.2022 and both the sale deeds in favour of the petitioners are of the date subsequent to 21.12.2021. 25. In view of the aforesaid, the petitioners can have no right to ask for any opportunity of hearing. 26. On a specific query made to the learned counsel for the petitioners that if the opportunity is given to the petitioners what would be their reply to the contents of the confirmation order that there is no sanction plan and the construction is unauthorized, he could not dispute that there is no sanction plan but submitted only this much that the petitioners are the bona fide purchasers of two flats in the building in question. 27. This Court is therefore of the view that even if the opportunity is given to the petitioners, that would be an exercise in futility, as, what has been stated in the confirmation order could not be disputed nor could be denied. 28. Though this Court is of the considered view that there is no violation of the principles of natural justice, still it is apt to add that the principles of natural justice as is well known has exceptions. 28. Though this Court is of the considered view that there is no violation of the principles of natural justice, still it is apt to add that the principles of natural justice as is well known has exceptions. One of the exceptions has been laid down in S.L.Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that where on the admitted or undisputed facts only one conclusion is possible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice, but because Courts do not issue futile writs. 29. It is apt to refer para-24 of S.L.Kapoor(supra) as under: “24. The matter has also been treated as an application of the general principle that justice should not only be done but should be seen to be done. Jackson's Natural Justice (1980 Edn.) contains a very interesting discussion of the subject. He says: “The distinction between justice being done and being seen to be done has been emphasised in many cases. . . . The requirement that justice should be seen to be done may be regarded as a general principle which in some cases can be satisfied only by the observance of the rules of natural justice or as itself forming one of those rules. Both explanations of the significance of the maxim are found in Lord Widgery, C.J.'s judgment in R. v. Home Secretary [ (1977) 1 WLR 766 , 772], ex. p. Hosenball, where after saying that “the principles of natural justice are those fundamental rules, the breach of which will prevent justice from being seen to be done” he went on to describe the maxim as “one of the rules generally accepted in the bundle of the rules making up natural justice”. It is the recognition of the importance of the requirement that justice is seen to be done that justifies the giving of a remedy to a litigant even when it may be claimed that a decision alleged to be vitiated by a breach of natural justice would still have been reached had a fair hearing been given by an impartial tribunal. The maxim is applicable precisely when the court is concerned not with a case of actual injustice but with the appearance of injustice or possible injustice. The maxim is applicable precisely when the court is concerned not with a case of actual injustice but with the appearance of injustice or possible injustice. In Altco Ltd. v. Sutherland [(1971) 2 Lloyd's Rep 515] Donaldson, J., said that the court, in deciding whether to interfere where an arbitrator had not given a party a full hearing was not concerned with whether a further hearing would produce a different or the same result. It was important that the parties should not only be given justice, but, as reasonable men, know that they had had justice or “to use the time hallowed phrase” that justice should not only be done but be seen to be done. In R. v. Thames Magistrates' Court, ex. p. Polemis [(1974) 1 WLR 1371] , the applicant obtained an order of certiorari to quash his conviction by a stipendiary magistrate on the ground that he had not had sufficient time to prepare his defence. The Divisional Court rejected the argument that, in its discretion, it ought to refuse relief because the applicant had no defence to the charge. It is again absolutely basic to our system that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done. If justice was so clearly not seen to be done, as on the afternoon in question here, it seems to me that it is no answer to the applicant to say: ‘Well, even if the case had been properly conducted, the result would have been the same. That is mixing up doing justice with seeing that justice is done (per Lord Widgery, C.J. at p. 1375).” In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because courts do not issue futile writs. We do not agree with the contrary view taken by the Delhi High Court in the judgment under appeal.” 30. Learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that it is also evident from the order dated 30.08.2022 that the owners requested to grant time for re-submission of the building proposals afresh along with proper title deeds and other required documents after removing the violated portions to comply with the building rules in force, upon which 7 days time was granted to them to do the needful, but the owners did not submit any such proposal. 31. Vide G.O.Ms.No.32 Municipal Administration & Urban Development (M1) Department dated 23.02.2015 (in short ‘Order 2015’) Section 455AA as amended vide para-2 of the Order of 2015 was also applied to Vijayawada Municipal Corporation, vide para-7 of the Order 2015. 32. Order 2015, is being reproduced as under: “GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH ABSTRACT Acts – Adaptation of Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 (Act II of 1956) and the Rules made thereunder with certain modifications for the State of Andhra Pradesh – Orders – Issued. MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION & URBAN DEVELOPMENT (M1) DEPARTMENT G.O.Ms.No.32 Dated 23.02.2015 Read the following:- (1) Andhra Pradesh Re-organization Act, 2014 (Act No. 6 of 2014). (2) Circular Memo No 13665/SR/2014, GA (SR) Dept. dt: 26-5-2014. MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION & URBAN DEVELOPMENT (M1) DEPARTMENT G.O.Ms.No.32 Dated 23.02.2015 Read the following:- (1) Andhra Pradesh Re-organization Act, 2014 (Act No. 6 of 2014). (2) Circular Memo No 13665/SR/2014, GA (SR) Dept. dt: 26-5-2014. *** ORDER:- Whereas, section 101 of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Act, 2014, empowers the appropriate Government i.e., the State of Andhra Pradesh by order, to make such adaptations and modifications of any law as defined in section 2(f) of the said Act made before 2-6-2014, whether by way of repeal or amendment as may be necessary or expedient, for the purpose of facilitating the application of such law in the State of Andhra Pradesh, before expiration of two years from 2-6-2014, and thereupon every such law shall have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made until altered, repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other Competent Authority; 2. And whereas, it has become necessary to adapt and modify the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 and the Rules made thereunder for the purpose of facilitating their application in relation to the State of Andhra Pradesh; 3. Accordingly, the following notification shall be published in Part – I, Extraordinary of the Andhra Pradesh Gazette: NOTIFICATION In exercise of the powers conferred by section 101 of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Act, 2014 (Central Act No.6 of 2014), the Governor of Andhra Pradesh hereby makes the following order, namely:- 1. (1) This Order may be called the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 (Act II of 1956) and the rules made thereunder (Andhra Pradesh Adaptation) Order, 2015. (2) It shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from 2-6-2014. 2. In section 455-AA of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955, for the expression “as on the date of commencement of the Andhra Pradesh Municipal Laws and Urban Areas (Development) (Second Amendment) Act, 2008”, the expression “as on 31-12-2014” shall be substituted. 3. The Andhra Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1891 applies for the interpretation of this Order as it applies for the interpretation of a State Act. 4. In the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955, throughout the Act (except occurring as it applies in the citation of other Acts), for the words, “Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation”, the words “Municipal Corporations” shall be substituted. 5. 4. In the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955, throughout the Act (except occurring as it applies in the citation of other Acts), for the words, “Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation”, the words “Municipal Corporations” shall be substituted. 5. As and from the appointed day, the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Rules mentioned in the Schedule shall, until altered, repealed or amended by a Competent Legislature or other Competent Authority, have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications directed by that Schedule. 6. For the purpose of this Order, and the Act and the Rules adapted herein, the expression “the State” shall have the meaning and area as specified in section 4 of the A.P. Reorganization Act, 2014 (Central Act No. 6 of 2014) and subsequent amendments thereto. 7. The amendments made to the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 by para 2 of this Order shall extend to and apply also to the Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada Municipal Corporations and to any other Municipal Corporation constituted under the Andhra Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1994. SCHEDULE (see paragraph – 5) (1) All the rules made under the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955; (2) In the said rules, as amended from time to time, for the words “Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation”, the words “the Municipal Corporation” shall be substituted. (BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNOR OF ANDHRA PRADESH) GIRIDHAR ARAMANE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT” 33. Section 455AA of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act 1955 provides as under: “455-AA. Notwithstanding anything in the Act, the Municipal Commissioner may regulate and penalise the constructions of buildings, made by the owner, or by an individual as the case may be, unauthorisedly or in deviation of the sanctioned plan [as on 31/08/2018] as a one time measure, as per the procedure and by levying such penal amount as may be prescribed and upon payment of such amount all pending or contemplated proceedings and action of enforcement shall be deemed to have been withdrawn and the competent authority shall issue necessary Occupancy Certificate to the owner or the individual as the case may be.” 34. It is evident that Section 455AA, provides for regularization etc., of unauthorized construction or deviations of sanctioned plan of the building which stood on a particular date as a one time measure. It is evident that Section 455AA, provides for regularization etc., of unauthorized construction or deviations of sanctioned plan of the building which stood on a particular date as a one time measure. Any unauthorized construction or construction in deviations of the sanctioned plan, after the specified date would not be covered under Section 455AA. Even if the date is taken as 31.12.2014 as per para-2 of the Order 2015 or 31.08.2018 substituted later on, the own case of the petitioners is that the constructions are at the final stage, presently and the development agreement, GPA annexed with the petition shows that its date is 11.02.2020. In other words, the building in question for regularization etc., would not be covered under Section 455AA of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act. 35. In view of the aforesaid, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that if opportunity was given to them, they could have applied for regularization cannot be accepted. 36. The petitioners may have their remedy against the owners/builders as the case may be, as may be permissible under law, but on that count, with respect to the building which is raised contrary to the building rules and regulations and without any sanctioned plan, the petitioners subsequent purchasers cannot challenge the order of confirmation passed with due opportunity of hearing to the owners. 37. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in consequence.