JUDGMENT : (1.) By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the decision of the respondent No.1-Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board (for short 'the Board') for not promoting the petitioner on the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) with effect from 6th March, 2003 recording the reasons for the same in the communication dated 17th July, 2004 and further prayed to direct the respondent-authorities to give promotion to the petitioner on the said post with effect from 06.03.2003 with all consequential benefits. (2.) 2.1. The factual matrix of the case is that the petitioner joined the service as junior Engineer in the Public Health Engineering Wing of the Health Department of the Government of Gujarat on 21st June, 1974. 2.2. The designation of junior Engineer was changed subsequently to Assistant Engineer and the petitioner continued to work on the said post of Assistant Engineer till the year 1980 when the respondent No.1- Board came into existence and the activities, which were earlier being carried out by the Public Health Engineering Wing of the State Government was transferred to the Board and accordingly, the petitioner was also transferred with the other employees to the Board. 2.3. The petitioner was thereafter promoted to the post of Deputy Executive Engineer (Civil) on 23rd July, 1987. The petitioner was at Serial No.13 in the list of promotees and thereafter, one Mr.K.V.Priyani was at Serial No.14. 2.4. It is the case of the petitioner that in the seniority list of the cadre of the Deputy Executive Engineer published by the respondent-Board, the name of the petitioner was shown at Serial No.283 and name of Mr.K.V.Priyani was shown at Serial No.284. 2.5. According to the petitioner, the promotion from Deputy Executive Engineer to the next higher post of Executive Engineer is governed by the Rules framed by the respondent-Board namely Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board Service of Engineers (Class-I) Recruitment Rules, 1988 (for short 'the Rules, 1988') and as per the said Rules, promotion to the post of Executive Engineers is required to be given on the basis of "proved merit and efficiency" from amongst the persons working in the cadre of Deputy Executive Engineer (Civil) for a minimum period of eight years. 2.6. 2.6. It is the case of the petitioner that no departmental inquiry was ever initiated by the respondent-Board during his service career nor any adverse entry in Annual Confidential Report was ever communicated to the petitioner, and in spite thereof, the petitioner was not considered by the respondent-Board for promotion to the higher post of Executive Engineer (Civil) while the respondent-Board vide order dated 6th March, 2003 promoted nine persons from the post of Deputy Executive Engineer (Civil) to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) and the juniors of the petitioner namely Shri K.V.Priyani was also promoted to the higher post and thereafter, two more persons who were junior to the petitioner were also promoted to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil). The petitioner therefore made a representation on 10th March, 2003 for redressal of his grievance about his non-promotion on the post of Executive Engineer which was further followed by subsequent representations dated 13th May, 2003 and 3rd June, 2003. The petitioner however, voluntarily retired from service on 30th October, 2003 in view of the frustration and humiliation to work under administrative control of the Officers who were juniors to the petitioner. 2.7. The petitioner also preferred Special Civil Application No.3829 of 2004 before this Court which was disposed of on 1st April, 2004 with a direction to the respondent-Board to consider the representations made by the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the order. 2.8. The petitioner thereafter appeared before the Member Secretary of the respondent-Board in June, 2004 and the respondent-Board by order dated 17th July, 2004 informed the petitioner that the request of the petitioner for giving him promotion for the post of Executive Engineer with effect from 6th March, 2003 was not accepted on the ground that the petitioner did not have any field experience as Deputy Executive Engineer. Being aggrieved by the order dated 17.07.2004, the petitioner has preferred this petition which was admitted by this Court on 25th April, 2005. (3.) 3.1. Being aggrieved by the order dated 17.07.2004, the petitioner has preferred this petition which was admitted by this Court on 25th April, 2005. (3.) 3.1. Learned advocate Mr.Vaibhav Vyas for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner ought to have been promoted to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) and he could not have been left out on the ground that the petitioner did not possess the field experience while working as Deputy Executive Engineer (Civil), more particularly, when even the persons who are juniors to the petitioner and promoted to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) also did not possess the field experience while working as Deputy Executive Engineer (Civil). 3.2. It was submitted that as per the recruitment rules there is no requirement that a Deputy Executive Engineer has to possess "field experience". 3.3. Learned advocate Mr.Vyas invited the attention of the Court to the Rule No.2(a) to submit that for giving promotion to the post of the Executive Engineer, only requirement is that a person should be of "proved merit and efficiency" from amongst the persons working a Deputy Executive Engineer (Civil) for a minimum period of eight years. It was therefore submitted that the petitioner was having the experience of working as Deputy Executive Engineer (Civil) for eight year from 1987 onwards and therefore, he was eligible for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil). It was submitted that Rule 2(a) of the Recruitment Rules does not stipulate that the person is required to have "field experience" as Deputy Executive Engineer (Civil). 3.4. Learned advocate Mr.Vyas also referred to and relied upon Rule 3(b) which provides that to be eligible for appointment by promotion to the post of Executive Engineer, a Deputy Executive Engineer (Civil) is required to render at least eight years' minimum continuous service as Deputy Executive Engineer (Civil) with the respondent No.1-Board for the Public Health Engineering Service Class-II under the Health and Family Welfare Department. It was therefore submitted that even the Rule 3(b) does not prescribe any criteria for having field experience of the Deputy Executive Engineer. Learned advocate Mr.Vyas therefore submitted that the petitioner has been discriminated by the respondent-Board for not granting promotion to the post of Executive Engineer only on the ground that he did not possess "field experience" while working as Deputy Executive Engineer (Civil). 3.5. Learned advocate Mr.Vyas therefore submitted that the petitioner has been discriminated by the respondent-Board for not granting promotion to the post of Executive Engineer only on the ground that he did not possess "field experience" while working as Deputy Executive Engineer (Civil). 3.5. In support of his submissions, learned advocate Mr.Vyas referred to and relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in case of Gujarat Public Service Commission Versus Dr.D.S.Maru and another passed in Letters Patent Appeal No.2034 of 2010 in Special Civil Application No.12453 of 2009 to submit that the Division Bench while considering the applicability of the relevant Rules of Recruitment has held that Courts have to interpret the law as it stands and the rules are to be interpreted as they are and nothing can be read in a manner that contemplates the addition or something that is not indicated or intended, the effect of which would severely limit the rules and go against the intention of the legislature in editing them. 3.6. Learned advocate Mr.Vyas also referred to and relied upon the decision of this Court (Coram: Hon'ble Ms.Justice Abhilasha Kumar as her ladyship was then) in Special Civil Application No.7580 of 2008 in case of R.S.Bhatt versus Gujarat Public Service Commission and Others wherein, the learned Single Judge applied the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench to come to the conclusion that the Recruitment Rules are required to be interpreted as they are without addition of something which is done by the respondent-Board in the facts of the present case by reading the efficiency as 'field experience' to be rendered by an Executive Engineer for eight years. It was therefore submitted that in the facts of the present case, more particularly, when the juniors of the petitioner were also promoted without any field experience of eight years, the petitioner ought to have been promoted to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil). 3.7. Learned advocate Mr.Vyas also referred to and relied upon the additional-affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner on 12th August, 2018 pursuant to the order passed by this Court on 03.08.2018 to point out that the four other persons who were promoted to the post of Executive Engineer were also lacking "field experience". 3.7. Learned advocate Mr.Vyas also referred to and relied upon the additional-affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner on 12th August, 2018 pursuant to the order passed by this Court on 03.08.2018 to point out that the four other persons who were promoted to the post of Executive Engineer were also lacking "field experience". It was also pointed out that to the best of knowledge of the petitioner, Shri S.K.Vyas, Shri Dalal and Shri J.S.Darji who were holding the post of Superintendent Engineer and Executive Engineer were also not having the field experience. It was further stated that the respondent-authority while considering the case of promotion to the post of Executive Engineer has denied the promotion to the petitioner but at the same time have promoted other six persons, junior to him. It was also pointed out that Shri P.M.Patel, Shri Pradhan and Shri Chauhan who were also promoted to the post of Executive Engineer by order dated 6th March, 2003 were not having "field experience" and therefore the respondent authority could not have denied promotion on the said ground of not having "field experience". 3.8. Learned advocate Mr.Vyas submitted that the petitioner was holding the post of Deputy Executive Engineering for about sixteen years and therefore the petitioner was very much eligible for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer and there was no adverse remark in the Annual Confidential Report (ACR) of the petitioner during the sixteen years of service and therefore, denying the promotion to the petitioner only on the ground of not having "field experience" is arbitrary and therefore liable to be quashed and set aside. 3.9. In support of such submissions, reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Badrinath Versus Government of Tamil Nadu and Others, (2000) 8 Supreme Court Cases 395 wherein the Apex Court held that every Officer has right to be considered for promotion under Article 16 to a higher post subject to eligibility, provided he is within the zone of consideration as well as in the case of A C Shah Versus State of Gujarat, 1993 (2) GLR 1829 wherein Division Bench of this Court held that fixing of different quotas and prescribing different periods of experience for promotional purposes based on different educational qualification is not invalid or violative of the Constitutional provisions. (4.) 4.1. (4.) 4.1. On the other hand, learned advocate Mr.Mehul Rathod assisted by learned advocate Ms.Nilam Chauhan for the respondent-Board submitted that the petitioner cannot claim the promotion by way of a right because as per the Recruitment Rules, the promotion to the post of Executive Engineer is to be considered on the basis of "proved merit and efficiency" and if the petitioner fulfills such criteria then only required to be considered the promotion to the post of Executive Engineer. It was submitted that meeting of the Departmental Promotion Committee (for short 'the DPC') was held on 5th March, 2003 and the DPC after considering the evaluation of the confidential report of proved merit and efficiency did not recommend the petitioner for the promotion for the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) as he was not found fit on the ground of lack of "field experience". It was pointed out that the persons who fulfilled the promotional criteria and were found fit by the DPC were promoted to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) by order dated 6th March, 2003. It was therefore submitted that the decision of the DPC could not be challenged before this Court by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India mainly on the ground that junior is promoted. 4.2. It was submitted that the request of the petitioner for voluntary retirement from the post of Deputy Executive Engineer was approved and he was permitted to retire voluntarily from 31st October, 2003 and thereafter, pursuant to the direction issued by this Court vide order dated 1st April, 2004 in Special Civil Application No.3829 of 2004, the representation of the petitioner was decided by the impugned order dated 17.07.2004 rejecting the request of the petitioner to give promotion to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) with the deemed date of 6th March, 2003. It was pointed out that in the order dated 17.07.2004 it was specifically stated that the promotion on the post of Executive Engineer (Civil), "field experience" was required, which was not fulfilled by the petitioner and therefore, DPC did not recommend name of the petitioner for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) and it cannot be said that to read "experience" and "field experience" would be arbitrary reading of Rules. It was reiterated that the respondent-Board based on the recommendation of the DPC which was final and binding to the petitioner did not promote the petitioner to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil). 4.3. It was submitted that the respondent-Board has denied all the allegations made by the petitioner by filing an additional affidavit-in-reply dated 14th June, 2017, wherein it is averred as under : "5. It is respectfully submitted that there is no guideline or circular of the Board fixing the specific norms for judging "proved merit and efficiency" as stated in Rule 2(a) of the Gujarat Water Supply Sewerage Board Service of Engineers (Class-1) Recruitment Rules, 1988 ('the Rules' for short). However, I say and submit that for evaluating the 'proved merit and efficiency' of any candidate as per Rule 2 (a) of the Rules, it is the consistent practice followed since beginning to take into account the field working experience of the candidate for the purpose of promotion. 6. It is respectfully submitted that the working experience of field and working experience of the office work are totally different. I further say and submit that the post of the Executive Engineer is most responsible post for the work in the important and execution of any project work in the field. It is further submitted that as Executive Engineer the candidate has to act as Divisional Head and is fully responsible for execution, commissioning and maintenance and operation of the various projects undertaken within the jurisdiction of the Division and therefore, to have a field experience as Deputy Engineer is an inevitable requirement for the Promotion to the post of Executive Engineer and therefore, for judging proved merit and efficiency of the candidate, the factor of "field working experience", is required to be taken into account as the most important factor. 7. It is respectfully submitted that since appointment, the petitioner has work experience of office work like Planning Division Work, Head Office Project Movement Work, World Bank Project Division, Monitory and Planning, etc. But does not possess the actual field work experience, the copy of details of the working period of the petitioner is enclosed herewith and marked as Annexure-R5 to this additional reply. 8. But does not possess the actual field work experience, the copy of details of the working period of the petitioner is enclosed herewith and marked as Annexure-R5 to this additional reply. 8. It is respectfully submitted that the Departmental Promotion Committee has considered the case of the petitioner along with others for the purpose of promotion to the post of Executive Engineer and not recommended for promotion as the petitioner was not having field working experience. Copies of extract of the confidential reports and the minutes of the DPC dated 05.03.2003 are enclosed here with and marked as Annexure-R6 and Annexure-R7 to this additional affidavit." 4.4. Learned advocate for the respondent-Board also relied upon the additional affidavit-in-reply dated 2nd November, 2018 in reply to the additional affidavit of the petitioner dated 12.08.2018 to point out that the name of the Officers given by the petitioner in the additional affidavit are not relevant to the facts of the case as no details/opinion/remarks with regard to field experience was reported in the respective confidential reports and all the Officers namely Shri S.K.Vyas, Shri N.N.Dalal and Shri J.S.Darji retired from the service of the Board between the years 2005 to 2007. 4.5. With regard to the other Officers who are named in the additional affidavit of the petitioner, it was submitted that the proceedings of DPC are placed on record at Annexure R-7 by the respondent-Board to show that all of the other Officers were having field experience as Deputy Executive Engineer. 4.6. With regard to the averment made by the petitioner that Rule 3(b) of the Recruitment Rules which provides for rendering of minimum service of eight years continuous as Deputy Executive Engineer in the Board as eligibility criteria for the promotion to the post of Executive Engineer it was submitted that it would mean that experience of eight years continuous service as Deputy Executive Engineer is a qualifying criteria for promotion and the word "experience" includes "field experience" also which is considered as one of the criterias for judging "proved merit and efficiency" by the DPC for the promotion to the post of Executive Engineer. 4.7. 4.7. Learned advocate for the respondent-Board also referred to and relied upon the additional affidavit-in-reply dated 22nd February, 2019 whereby, the details of Shri P.M.Patel, Shri R.P.Pradhan, Shir H.C.Chauhan were placed on record at Annexure-R-II along with the additional affidavit-in-reply to show that they were having the field experience whereas the petitioner, all through out his career worked with the concerned administrative Department of the State Government and was not possessing any experience to work with the field office which is considered by the DPC for not promoting the petitioner to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil). It was therefore, submitted that the petitioner was not considered for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer in the facts of the case as well as on the interpretation of the Recruitment Rules. (5.) Considering the submissions made by the learned advocates for the petitioner and the respondent, the only ground on which the promotion was denied to the petitioner is that the petitioner did not possess the "field experience". Therefore, the short question which arises for consideration is whether this Court can re-appreciate the decision of the DPC which is communicated to the petitioner by order dated 17th July, 2004 while rejecting the representation of the petitioner to consider his case for the promotion to the post of Executive Engineer with effect from 6th March, 2003 or not. (6.) Relevant Recruitment Rules, 1988 which govern the promotion from the post of Deputy Executive Engineer (Civil) to that of Deputy Engineer (Civil) are as under : "2. Appointment to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) in the Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board Services shall be made either a. By promotion of a person of proved merit and efficiency from amongst the persons working as Deputy Executive Engineer (Civil) for a minimum period of eight years, or b. By direct selection. The ratio for appointment by promotion and by direct selection shall be 3:1. Provided that if in any year recruitment by direct selection is not made according to the prescribed ratio, the short fall of direct recruits shall lapse and shall not be carried forward in the subsequent year. 3. The ratio for appointment by promotion and by direct selection shall be 3:1. Provided that if in any year recruitment by direct selection is not made according to the prescribed ratio, the short fall of direct recruits shall lapse and shall not be carried forward in the subsequent year. 3. To be eligible for appointment by promotion to the post mentioned in rule 2 above the Deputy Executive Engineer (Civil) in the Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board service must - a. posses at least a Diploma in Civil Engineering of recognized institute or a qualification equivalent to Diploma in Civil Engineering recognized by the Government. b. must have rendered at lease eight years minimum continuous services as Deputy Executive Engineer (Civil) in Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board services or the a Public Health Engineering Service Class-II under the Health and Family Welfare Department, including the period of probation, if any." (7.) On perusal of the above Rules, it does not appear that the DPC is required to consider "field experience" for the purpose of promotion of a person to the post of Executive Engineer. Rule 2(a) read with Rule 3(b) only prescribe that a person who is discharging the duties as Deputy Executive Engineer is required to possess minimum qualification and must have rendered at least eight years' minimum continuous service and he should be a person of proved merit and efficiency. In the facts of the case of the petitioner the promotion is denied only on the ground of not having "field experience". It is true that decision of the DPC generally need not be interfered by this Court by invoking extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, however, if the decision is based on irrelevant factors, principles of Wednesbury is required to be applied, more particularly, when juniors of the petitioner who are promoted to the higher post though not having the requisite "field experience" as contended by the petitioner, but, the same is denied by the respondent-Board. Therefore irrespective of the fact that whether the juniors to the petitioner are promoted to the higher post the only question with regard to denying the promotion to the petitioner on ground of not having field experience is considered. Therefore irrespective of the fact that whether the juniors to the petitioner are promoted to the higher post the only question with regard to denying the promotion to the petitioner on ground of not having field experience is considered. (8.) In view of the above, the decision of the Division Bench in case of Gujarat Public Service Commission (Supra) and the decision of the learned Single Judge in case of R.S.Bhatt (Supra) are required to be applied. In the case of R.S.Bhatt (Supra), the learned Single Judge has applied the decision of the Division Bench while considering the eligibility of the petitioner in the said case for appointment on the post in question through direct recruitment as under : "30. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgment in Gujarat Public Service Commission v. Dr.D.S.Maru & Anr.(supra), wherein a Division Bench of this Court has held as below: "10. On perusal of the said Rules it is specifically noticed that in sub-rule (b) of Rule 3 of the said Rules, the phrase, "or equivalent degree or diploma" is not incorporated by the legislation. Meaning thereby, the Legislature never intended to confer a right on the persons holding a degree equivalent to the degrees mentioned in the said sub-rule. In other words, person holding any degree other than the ones which are mentioned in sub-rule (b) of Rule 3 of the said Rules are not considered eligible being not at par with the persons holding the degree mentioned in the sub-rule. It is trite law that courts cannot legislate. Courts have to interpret the law as it stands. The legislature in its wisdom has thought fit not to incorporate the phrase, "or an equivalent degree or diploma" in sub-rule (b) of Rule 3. That being so, the court cannot insert that phrase in sub-rule (b) of Rule 3 of the said Rules. If at any time, the Legislature feels like amending the rule, it can always do so. The legislature in its wisdom has thought fit not to incorporate the phrase, "or an equivalent degree or diploma" in sub-rule (b) of Rule 3. That being so, the court cannot insert that phrase in sub-rule (b) of Rule 3 of the said Rules. If at any time, the Legislature feels like amending the rule, it can always do so. If it is felt that the rules as they stand do not cope up with the required social change, the same can be amended after following the procedure prescribed for the same." As held by the Division Bench in the above judgment, since the administrative experience of five years on the post of "Superintendent/ Head Clerk" is not incorporated in Rule 3(c), it can be gathered that the legislature did not intend to restrict the experience required for the said posts in the case of direct recruits. The Rules are to be interpreted as they are. They cannot be read in a manner that contemplates the addition of something that is not indicated or intended, the effect of which would severely limit the Rules and go against the intention of the legislature in enacting them." 31. As a result of the above discussion, this Court arrives at the inescapable conclusion that not only does the petitioner possess the requisite qualifications for the post of Assistant Director/ Administrative Officer, Class-II as per Rule 3(c) of the Recruitment Rules, he is also required to be accorded preference, as he possesses a Law degree, which is one of the preferences prescribed in the second proviso to Rule 3(c). " (9.) The Division Bench of this Court in case of A.C.Shah (Supra) has also upheld the validity of the Rule 2(a) of the Deputy Engineer (Electrical) Recruitment Rules, 1978 on the ground that by prescribing a different period of experience of service of eight years for Diploma Holders and treating them equal to the junior Engineers and considering their promotion to the post of Deputy Engineer, Rule making authority cannot be attributed with any intention to the effect that it intended to treat the Supervisors as equal to junior Engineers on completion of eight years of service. It was held that it is not the function of the Court to undertake an exercise as to whether the Recruitment Rules are more beneficial to a class or other or as to whether it is going to cause more hardship to one class or the other. Therefore challenge to the Recruitment Rules was negatived, upholding the applicability of the Recruitment Rules which provided for requisite service experience to be eligible for promotion. However, in the facts of the case, the petitioner was having experience of eight years on the post of Deputy Executive Engineer which could not have been substituted by the respondent-Board to interpret the same as field experience as a necessary criteria for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer. (10.) Hon'ble the Supreme Court in case of Badrinath (Supra) has held as under : "47. Every officer has a right to be considered for promotion under Article 16 to a higher post subject to eligibility provided he is within the zone of consideration. But the question is as to the manner in which his case is to be considered. This aspect is a matter of considerable importance in service jurisprudence as it deals with 'fairness' in the matter of consideration for promotion under Article 16. We shall therefore refer to the current legal position. 58. From the above judgments, the following principles can be summarised: (1) Under Article 16 of the Constitution, right to be 'considered' for promotion is a fundamental right. It is not the mere 'consideration' for promotion that is important but the consideration must be 'fair' according to established principles governing service jurisprudence. (2) Courts will not interfere with assessment made by Departmental Promotion Committees unless the aggrieved officer establishes that the non-promotion was bad according to Wednesbury Principles or was it mala fides. (3) Adverse remarks of an officer for the entire period of service can be taken into consideration while promoting an officer or while passing an order of compulsory retirement. But the weight which must be attached to the adverse remarks depends upon certain sound principles of fairness. (4) If the adverse remarks relate to a distant past and relate to remarks such as his not putting his maximum effort or so on, then those remarks cannot be given weight after a long distance of time, particularly if there are no such remarks during the period before his promotion. (4) If the adverse remarks relate to a distant past and relate to remarks such as his not putting his maximum effort or so on, then those remarks cannot be given weight after a long distance of time, particularly if there are no such remarks during the period before his promotion. This is the position even in cases of compulsory retirement, compulsory retirement. (5) If the adverse remarks relate to a period prior to an earlier promotion they must be treated as having lost their sting and as weak material, subject however to the rider that if they related to dishonesty or lack of integrity they can be considered to have not lost their strength fully so as to be ignored altogether. (6) Uncommunicated adverse remarks could be relied upon even if no opportunity was given to represent against them before an order of compulsory retirement is passed." (11.) The Hon'ble Supreme Court on the basis of the above principles applied the legal principles of "fairness" and also Wednesbury Rule and considered whether relevant facts were not considered and irrelevant facts were considered denying the promotion by the DPC in the facts of the said case. After analysing the facts, the Apex Court applied the principles of Wednesbury holding that the relevant facts were not considered by the Committee resulting into likelihood of bias by the Committee. (12.) Hon'ble the Supreme Court also dealt with "doctrine of necessity" to interfere in the decision of the Screening Committee to issue a writ of certiorari and/or mandamus to the State or Public Authority authority in the facts of the case before the Court. (13.) While dealing with the issue as to whether it is within the province of the Court to issue a mandamus to promote the petitioner to the higher post or to assess his grading which normally does not happen and in this context the Apex Court held as under : "88. We may, however, point out that it is not as if there are no exceptions to this general principle. The occasions where the Court issued a writ of certiorari and quashed an order and had also issued a mandamus at the same time to the State or public authority could be very rare but we might emphasise that the power of this Court to mould the relief in the interests of justice in extraordinary cases cannot be doubted. The occasions where the Court issued a writ of certiorari and quashed an order and had also issued a mandamus at the same time to the State or public authority could be very rare but we might emphasise that the power of this Court to mould the relief in the interests of justice in extraordinary cases cannot be doubted. In Comptroller & Auditor General of India v. K.S. Jagannathan such a power on the part of this Court was accepted by a three Judge Bench, Madan, J. referred to the observations of Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) in Dwarkanath v. ITO wherein the learned Judge explained that our Constitution designedly used wide language in Article 226 to enable the Courts to 'reach justice wherever found necessary' and 'to mould the reliefs to meet peculiar and complicated requirements of this country'. Justice Madan also referred to Mayor of Rochester v. Regina 1858 EB & E 1024, King v. Revising Barrister for the Borough of Hartley 1912 (3) KB 518, Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 1968 AC 997 and to a passage from Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Ed. Vol. 1, p. 59. Finally Madan, J. observed: "20. There is thus no doubt that the High Courts in India exercising their jurisdiction under Article 126 have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders and give necessary directions where the government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the government or has exercised such discretion mala fide or on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring the relevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or the policy for implementing which such discretion has been conferred. In all such cases and in any other fit and proper case a High Court can, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give directions to compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the government or a public authority, and in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties, the court may itself pass an order or give directions which the government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion." We emphasise the words underlined in the above passage to the effect that the Court may in some rare situations itself pass an order or give directions which the government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised is discretion. The same view was expressed by another three Judge Bench in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India even regarding disciplinary cases. Verma, J. (as he then was) observed (at p. 762, para 18) as follows: "The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary authority/ appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." The underlined words reiterate the powers of this Court in rare and exceptional cases. 89. De Smith also states in his Administrative Law (5th Ed. para 6.089) that normally, the proper form of mandamus will be one to hear and determine according to law, though by holding inadmissible the considerations on which the original decision was based, the Court may indirectly indicate the particular manner in which the discretion has to be exercised. (R v. Manchester JJ) (1899 (1) QB 571 (576); R v. Flint shire CC Country License (Stage Plays) Committee 1957 (1) QB 350 ; Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 1968 AC 997 and R v. Lord (City of) Licensing JJ exp. Stewart 1954 (1) WLR 1325. 90. (R v. Manchester JJ) (1899 (1) QB 571 (576); R v. Flint shire CC Country License (Stage Plays) Committee 1957 (1) QB 350 ; Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 1968 AC 997 and R v. Lord (City of) Licensing JJ exp. Stewart 1954 (1) WLR 1325. 90. In the light of the above precedents, we have considered whether this is a fit case where this Court should issue a mandamus or remit the matter back to the State Government. After giving our anxious consideration to the facts of the case, we are of the view that having regard to our findings on Points 1 to 5 and to the continuous unfair treatment meted out to the appellant by the State of Tamil Nadu - even as accepted by the Central Government in its comments - this is a pre-eminently fit case requiring the issue of a mandamus. We are, therefore, constrained to exercise all the powers of this Court for rendering justice and to cut short further proceedings. The consideration of the appellant's case for the said promotion has been hanging fire and going up and down for the last twenty five years. Disgusted with the delays, the appellant has also taken voluntary retirement. In the light of our decision on Points 1 to 5, we declare the censure on the fourth case as void and without jurisdiction and in the alternative also as liable to be quashed under Wednesbury principles. The adverse remarks of by-gone years prior to 1972 have lost all their sting. The positive factors in the appellant's favour both recorded (at the compulsion of the Central Government) and others to which we have referred to earlier as meriting consideration are, in our opinion, sufficient to entitle him for promotion to the super-time scale. The appellant's case is, in our view, no less inferior to the cases of the other officers who were conferred the similar benefit of super-time scale by the State of Tamil Nadu, details of which have been profusely given in the writ petition. For the aforesaid reasons, we quash the punishment of censure, the assessment made by the Joint Screening Committee, the orders passed by the State and Central Government refusing to grant him super-time scale and in rejecting the appeal of the appellant and we further direct as follows. For the aforesaid reasons, we quash the punishment of censure, the assessment made by the Joint Screening Committee, the orders passed by the State and Central Government refusing to grant him super-time scale and in rejecting the appeal of the appellant and we further direct as follows. In the special and peculiar circumstances of the case, we direct the respondents to grant the appellant the benefit of the super-time scale from the date on which the appellant's junior Sri P. Kandaswamy was granted super-time scale. The respondents arc accordingly directed to pass an order in this behalf within eight weeks of the receipt of this order and to give him all consequential benefits attendant thereto. The said benefits shall also be reflected in his pension and other retrial benefits. They shall be worked out and paid to him within the time aforementioned." (14.) Thus, in view of the above conspectus of law and considering the Recruitment Rules for promotion of Deputy Executive Engineer (Civil) to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil), in the facts of the present case, the DPC has wrongly applied the criteria of "field experience" which is not the requisite criteria for promotion and only criteria is that the person should be of "proved merit and efficiency" and ought to have rendered minimum eight years of service as Deputy Executive Engineer was enough. As the DPC has applied irrelevant criteria of "field experience", the same would be unreasonable and as the respondent-Board has wrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon it by considering the irrelevant factor of not having "field experience" ignoring the relevant consideration and materials so as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion by the Recruitment Rules upon the DPC, the present case is a fit and proper case to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue a writ/mandamus directing the respondent-Board to grant promotion to the petitioner to the post of Executive Engineer to prevent the injustice caused to the petitioner. (15.) For the foregoing reasons, the petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed. (15.) For the foregoing reasons, the petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The respondent-Board is directed to grant promotion to the petitioner with effect from 6th March, 2003 till he voluntarily retired on 30th October, 2003 and the consequences may follow by paying the arrears to the petitioner on the promoted post till the date of his voluntary retirement that is the arrears of pay, allowances and revision of benefits such as pension, gratuity, leave encashment, etc. to the petitioner. (16.) Such exercise shall be completed within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of this order. The respondent-authority shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of 6% on the amount payable to the petitioner on expiry of aforesaid period of twelve weeks till the date of payment. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No orders as to cost.