JUDGMENT : [Nelson Sailo, J.] 1. This is an appeal from Jail filed by the accused/convict (hereafter referred to as the appellant) against the Judgment dated 30.03.2021 passed by the learned Judge, Special Court under POCSO Act, Lunglei in Crl. Tr. No. 417/2019. The operative portion of the impugned Judgment by which the appellant was convicted and sentenced as contained in paragraph Nos. 25 & 29 are abstracted as below:- “25. In view of the facts and circumstances stated above, the courts find the accused guilty and convict him for commission of offence of ‘aggravated penetrative sexual assaults’ as described in Section 3 read with Sub-Section (m) of Section 5 of the POSCO Act, 2012 and Section 376-AB read with Sub-Section (a) of Section 376 IPC. The accused shall either be liable for punishment under Section 6 of POSCO Act or section 376-AB of IPC in terms of Section 42 of POSCO Act. 29. Considering the submissions of the learned counsels and the convict, and also the fact that the convict is uneducated, born and brought up in a remote village where public awareness level is low, a first time offender with familial responsibility, he had no wife or children at present, and at the same time, seriousness of the offence and the resultant misery he caused to an innocent girl of less than 12 years, this court sentences the convict to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 12 years and to pay fine of Rs. 1000/- by opting the provisions of Section 6 of POSCO Act instead of Section 376-AB IPC due to the mitigating circumstances aforementioned. In default, imprisonment for another one month.” 2. Brief facts of the case essential for disposal of the appeal is that an FIR was lodged by Sh. V.L Siama, father of the prosecutrix at Lungsen Police Station on 24.04.2019 stating that his daughter, who was below 12 years of age on 01.04.2019 was wrongfully confined and raped by the appellant in Lungsen. The delay in filing the FIR was due to late revelation of the incident by his daughter. He, therefore, requested that appropriate legal action be taken against the appellant. Accordingly, the FIR was registered at Lungsen P.S Case No. 2 on the same day under Sections 376 AB/341 IPC and also under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The delay in filing the FIR was due to late revelation of the incident by his daughter. He, therefore, requested that appropriate legal action be taken against the appellant. Accordingly, the FIR was registered at Lungsen P.S Case No. 2 on the same day under Sections 376 AB/341 IPC and also under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The case was taken up for investigation by the appointed Investigating Officer (I.O) who recorded the statements of the complainant and arrested the appellant while he also recording his statements. The I.O also seized the birth certificate of the alleged victim which indicated that she was born on 17.05.2007. After the judicial statements of the alleged victim was recorded and she medically examined, the I.O finding a prima facie case against the appellant under Section 376/341 IPC read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act filed the charge-sheet. Charge was framed against the appellant under the aforesaid sections of law on 26.08.2019 by the learned Trial Judge and the appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. As such, trial against the appellant commenced. During trial, the prosecution examined as many as 10 prosecution witnesses and the alleged victim was examined as Court witness. Upon completion of the prosecutions’ evidence, the appellant was examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C) and in response to the questions put to him, he denied having committed the offence of rape upon the prosecutrix. He also wanted to examine witnesses in his defence and accordingly, 2 (two) witnesses were examined as defence witness. 3. Thereafter, upon conclusion of the evidence of the rival parties and upon hearing the parties, the learned Trial Court passed the impugned Judgment & Order of conviction and the order of sentence in the manner as already abstracted above. 4. We have heard Mr. Joseph L. Renthlei, learned Amicus Curiae and Mr. C. Zoramchhana, learned Public Prosecutor for the State. The learned Amicus Curiae submits that the evidence of the doctor, who conducted the medical examinations of the victim does not corroborate with the statements and version of the prosecutrix. As such, the fact that rape was indeed committed upon the alleged victim is not established. C. Zoramchhana, learned Public Prosecutor for the State. The learned Amicus Curiae submits that the evidence of the doctor, who conducted the medical examinations of the victim does not corroborate with the statements and version of the prosecutrix. As such, the fact that rape was indeed committed upon the alleged victim is not established. He submits that the statements made by the alleged victim/ prosecutrix under Section 164 Cr.P.C and her depositions during the trial are inconsistent in as much as in her recorded statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C, she stated that the appellant committed rape upon her at her grandmother’s residence while in her deposition before the Trial Court she stated that all the sexual assaults happened in the house of the appellant. 5. Mr. Joseph L. Renthlei, learned Amicus Curiae further submits that the alleged offence of rape was said to have been committed upon the prosecutrix on 01.04.2019 but an FIR was lodged only on 24.04.2019. In other words, the delay in filing the FIR has not been explained by the prosecution. He submits that the only explanation for such delay in filing the FIR apparently was due to certain negotiations for payment of money between the parties as can be seen from the evidence of the defence witnesses. At any rate, the lack of proper explanation warrants that the appellant be given the benefit of doubt. 6. The learned Amicus Curiae also submits that the statements of the prosecutrix and the statements of her friends who was examined as PW-5 do not corroborate. As per the prosecutrix, PW- 5 came to her house and as she was leaving, she followed PW-5 to her house from where she went to her maternal grandmother’s house. However, as per the statements of PW-5, she went to the house of the prosecutrix and after the prosecutrix informed her that the appellant used to have sex with her, she got scared and left for her house. She did not mention about the prosecutrix having followed her home. As such, the learned Amicus Curiae submits that in view of such inconsistency, the appellant should also be given the benefit of doubt. 7. She did not mention about the prosecutrix having followed her home. As such, the learned Amicus Curiae submits that in view of such inconsistency, the appellant should also be given the benefit of doubt. 7. The learned Amicus Curiae further submits that after the prosecutrix fell down unconscious all of a sudden in her school, she was taken to the Hospital for treatment wherein, the doctor concerned opined that the prosecutrix was a victim of rape. However, the doctor who gave such opinion was not examined by the prosecution during trial. Therefore, in absence of any such evidence, the learned Trial Court could not have convicted the appellant and should have given him the benefit of doubt instead. The learned Amicus Curiae thus submits that impugned judgment should be set aside and quashed. In support of his submissions, the learned Amicus Curiae relies upon the case of Santosh Prasad vs. State of Bihar (2020) 3 SCC 443 . 8. Mr. C. Zoramchhana, learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, submits that from the cross-examination of PW-4, who is the father of PW-5, it is clear that the prosecutrix used to stay in the house of the appellant after her parents got divorced. The wife of the appellant is the elder sister of the prosecutrix’s mother and it was in their house that the appellant committed rape upon her. Therefore, there is no variation or contradiction in the statements of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C and those recorded during the trial. He submits that even if there was any contradiction, the same are negligible and can be ignored. The learned Public Prosecutor also submits that from the reply given by the appellant on being examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C, it is clear that the appellant and the prosecutrix used to live together at one point of time and it was during such time, the incidents took place. 9. The learned Public Prosecutor further submits that the doctor’s evidence may be silent about the details of the examination on the person of the prosecutrix especially her genital part but the evidence at any rate is not against the case of the prosecution. 9. The learned Public Prosecutor further submits that the doctor’s evidence may be silent about the details of the examination on the person of the prosecutrix especially her genital part but the evidence at any rate is not against the case of the prosecution. Refuting the submissions made by the learned Amicus Curiae that the delay in filing the FIR was on account of certain monetary negotiation attempted between the parties, the learned Public Prosecutor submits that in fact there is no evidence to show that the delay in filing the FIR was due to non-payment of the money demanded by the parents of the prosecutrix. The demand for payment of money is only a cooked up story made by the defence in order to derail the case of the prosecution. The learned Public Prosecutor submits that the prosecutrix admittedly was not even 12 years of age and that her parents had separated. Therefore, it is not excepted from her that she would inform or narrate such incident willingly to anyone except to only those whom she could trust. He, therefore, submits that delay by itself is not fatal and in fact in appropriate case, the Apex Court has even held that the delay of about 3 years would not be fatal to the case of the prosecution particularly, when the same is explained and the testimony of the prosecutrix inspires confidence. He submits that in a case of rape, to seek corroboration of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix would amount to adding insult to the injury. He also submits that when there is no false motive involved, the version of the prosecutrix should not be doubted. Assurance, short of corroboration can lead to conviction and that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. He thus submits that under the given facts and circumstances, the learned Trial Court rightly convicted the appellant and therefore, Court may not interfere with the impugned judgment & order and with the sentence imposed. In support of his submissions, the learned Public Prosecutor relies upon the case of State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Sanjay Kumar, (2017) 2 SCC 51 and Ganesan vs. State represented by its Inspector of Police (2020) 10 SCC 573 . 10. We have heard the submissions made by the learned counsels for the rival parties and we have perused the materials available on record. 10. We have heard the submissions made by the learned counsels for the rival parties and we have perused the materials available on record. In order to find out as to whether the appellant has rightly been convicted and sentenced under the aforesaid provisions of law, let us examine the evidence led by the prosecution. 11. The prosecutrix was examined as Court Witness No. 1 and in her examination-in-chief, she deposed that she knows the appellant present in the Court and she calls him Pa Dina. The appellant is the husband of her mother’s elder sister. She used to stay with her maternal grandmother and began to live with the appellant after her mother remarried. The appellant sexually assaulted her three times and all the assaults happened in his house. The appellant took off her clothes including her underwear and he touched her breast and had sex with her by inserting his penis into her vagina. He had sex with her three times. She was very scared and did not tell anyone about it. The first person she spoke to about the assaults was her friend Zodinliani who came to her house and was talking to her. When she came over, she and the appellant were the only ones at home. When Zodinliani said she wanted to leave, she told her that she was scared of the appellant because he sexually assaulted her and then she went along with her friend to her house. From there she went to her maternal grandmother’s house and refused to go back to stay with the appellant. She went to school from her grandmother’s house and one day while she was in the school, she felt giddy and fell down unconscious. She was taken to the school office and made to lie down in the long chair. After she got up, she went home and her maternal grandfather took her to the hospital. At the hospital, they were told that she was weak and they returned home. Later on, she was taken to the Civil Hospital, Lunglei by her grandfather and the doctors there spoke to her grandfather. In her cross-examination, the prosecutrix stated that she did not remember as to whether the doctors at the Civil Hospital, Lunglei had checked her private part or not. Later on, she was taken to the Civil Hospital, Lunglei by her grandfather and the doctors there spoke to her grandfather. In her cross-examination, the prosecutrix stated that she did not remember as to whether the doctors at the Civil Hospital, Lunglei had checked her private part or not. She stated that when the appellant had sex with her, it used to be painful but the appellant never used to beat her. She also does not remember the dates when the sexual assaults happened. 12. PW-1 is the father of the prosecutrix and also the complainant. In his examination-in-chief, he stated that the prosecutrix was her daughter and she was born on 17.05.2007. He was informed by the maternal grandfather of the prosecutrix about the sexual assaults committed on her by the appellant. The prosecutrix was taken by her maternal grandfather to Lunglei where she was admitted in the Civil Hospital. After they returned to Lungsen, the prosecutrix’s grandfather told him that the appellant had been raping her daughter. Thereafter, upon consulting his relatives, he filed an FIR at Lungsen Police Station. In his cross-examination, he stated that they had written down an FIR but it was re-written by the Police and he put his signature on it. The FIR which they wrote was in the name of the maternal grandfather of the prosecutrix but the one written by the Police was in his name. The prosecutrix was a shy and quiet child and did not tell him herself about the sexual assaults committed by the appellant on her. 13. PW-2 Sh. Pachhunga is the maternal grandfather of the prosecutrix and in his examination-in-chief, he deposed that on 05.04.2019, the prosecutrix fell down unconscious during the parade in her school. They took her to the hospital where the doctor said she was weak and prescribed her vitamins. However, she had seizure again in the same evening and therefore, he took her to Civil Hospital, Lunglei the next day where she was admitted. After running a number of tests upon the prosecutrix, the doctors could not find out anything wrong with her, but finally the doctors there opined that she was a victim of rape but he did not know the doctor who told him so. After running a number of tests upon the prosecutrix, the doctors could not find out anything wrong with her, but finally the doctors there opined that she was a victim of rape but he did not know the doctor who told him so. After the prosecutrix was discharged, the seizures continued and finally, they filed an FIR on 24.04.2019 whereafter, the Police on the following day, seized the birth certificate of the prosecutrix and he signed the seizure memo as a witness to the seizure. In his cross-examination, PW-2 stated that he gave a photocopy of the birth certificate of the prosecutrix to the Police while he kept the original certificate with him. He stated that his information about the sexual assaults on the prosecutrix was from the doctor who examined her at the Civil Hospital, Lunglei. While in the Civil Hospital, he also received a telephone call from his wife, informing him that PW-4, the father of PW-5 (Zodinliani, who was a friend of the prosecutrix) told her about the prosecutrix having informed his daughter (PW-5) that she was sexually assaulted by the appellant. 14. PW-3, Sh. Vanlalsanga Joute is the seizure witness of the birth certificate of the prosecutrix. In his examination-in-chief, he deposed that he knows the prosecutrix and that he is a Para Legal Volunteer and also the Village Council President of Lungsen. He was called by the Officer-in-Charge of Lungsen Police Station to witness the seizure of the birth certificate of the prosecutrix. However, in his cross-examination, he said that he did not see the certificate and also whose birth certificate was seized and also about any arrest made. 15. Sh. Lalnghinglova PW-4 is the father of Zodinliani (PW-5) who is the friend of the prosecutrix. PW-4 in his examination-in-chief stated that the prosecutrix used to go to school with his daughter Zodinliani. One day, the prosecutrix fell down unconscious in school and Zodinliani came to the place where he was cutting stones. She told him that the prosecutrix told her that the appellant used to rape her and to which, he said that they should help her. In his cross-examination, he stated that the prosecutrix used to talk to her daughter and he used to see them together sometimes and he did not notice anything abnormal about the prosecutrix. He came to know about the sexual assaults on the prosecutrix from his daughter. In his cross-examination, he stated that the prosecutrix used to talk to her daughter and he used to see them together sometimes and he did not notice anything abnormal about the prosecutrix. He came to know about the sexual assaults on the prosecutrix from his daughter. The prosecutrix used to stay in the house of the appellant and the appellant was the husband of the elder sister of the prosecutrix’s mother. The parents of the prosecutrix divorced and her mother remarried and was staying in Kanghmun. Her father also got re-married to another lady and was living in Lungsen itself. Therefore, the prosecutrix was living with her aunt and her husband i.e., the appellant. 16. PW-5 Zodinliani is the friend and classmate of the prosecutrix. In her examination-in-chief, she stated that she had gone to the house of the appellant whom they used to call Pa Dina. Sometime that year (2019), though she could not remember the date or month, the appellant and the prosecutrix were at home but not Smt. Chullovi, the wife of the appellant. She went over and chatted with the prosecutrix for some time. As she was leaving, the prosecutrix told her that she was scared because the appellant used to have sex with her. Being scared herself when she heard about this, she left for home. Later, when they were in school and standing in a line, the prosecutrix all of a sudden fell down unconscious. After she went home that day, she told her father what the prosecutrix had told her and to which, her father said that they should help her. Afterwards, the Police asked her what she knew about the sexual assaults committed upon the prosecutrix and she told them whatever she knew. In her cross-examination, PW-5 stated that even the other children in school knew that the prosecutrix fell down unconscious in school. She was not scared of the appellant before the prosecutrix told her about being sexually assaulted by him. She and the prosecutrix were both studying in Class-IV. Apart from what the prosecutrix told her about the sexual assaults, she had no personal knowledge of her being victimized. The prosecutrix also did not tell her about the date or time when the assaults happened. 17. She and the prosecutrix were both studying in Class-IV. Apart from what the prosecutrix told her about the sexual assaults, she had no personal knowledge of her being victimized. The prosecutrix also did not tell her about the date or time when the assaults happened. 17. PW-6 Smt. Zotluangi in her Examination-in-Chief stated that she did not know the date of the incident but the prosecutrix told her relative Zodinliani (PW-5) that the appellant had raped her and PW- 5 then reported the matter to her father (PW-4). She herself then got the information from PW-4. One day the prosecutrix fell down unconscious in her school and when she came to know about it, it was her belief that the same was connected to the sexual assault committed by the appellant upon the prosecutrix. She told the wife of the appellant about her fears as she thought that she did not know about the appellant having committed rape. In her cross-examination PW-6 stated that she did not come to know about the rape from the prosecutrix but only from other persons. She did not know when the offence happened and the appellant was her neighbor. There was no prior allegation of wrong doing by the appellant and to her knowledge, he was a good person and it was heard for her to believe that he had committed rape. 18. PW-7 is Dr. Lalduhawmi who had examined the prosecutrix. In her examination-in-chief, she stated that she does not know the appellant. On 11.07.2017, she was posted at Lungsen PHC as the sole Medical Officer. On 24.04.2019, she received a requisition from the Police to conduct medical examination upon the prosecutrix, who was alleged to have been raped. The prosecutrix was produced for examination by the Police and she was accompanied by her relative. She was 11 years and 9 months old and the incident had taken place 24 days earlier. They could not find any injury and the swabs taken from the vagina and pubic hair did not reveal anything. PW-7 exhibited her report on the medical examination of the prosecutrix and her signature as Exbt. P-IV & P-IV(a) respectively. In her cross-examination, PW-7 stated that there were no stains, injuries or marks or violence. There was some pubic hair and the girl appeared to be the normal size for her age. 19. PW-7 exhibited her report on the medical examination of the prosecutrix and her signature as Exbt. P-IV & P-IV(a) respectively. In her cross-examination, PW-7 stated that there were no stains, injuries or marks or violence. There was some pubic hair and the girl appeared to be the normal size for her age. 19. PW-9 Smt. Bobita Lalhmingmawii is the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, who recorded the judicial statements of the prosecutrix. PW-9 in her examination-in-chief stated that on 26.04.2019, the prosecutrix was brought to her by the Police and she recorded the statements exactly as was narrated to her by the prosecutrix. In her cross-examination she stated that the prosecutrix was brought by the Police but they were not present when she recorded the statements of the prosecutrix. She did not recollect as to how much time was given to the child for reflection. The prosecutrix was normal in appearance and it did not appear as if she had been tutored by her parents. 20. PW-10 Sh. Rosangkima is the case I.O who conducted the investigation. In his examination-in-chief, he stated that on 24.04.2019 he registered a criminal case against the appellant on receiving an FIR from PW-1. As he was the only Police Officer posted at Lungsen Police Station, he took up the investigation himself. During investigation, he recorded the statements of the complainant and the prosecutrix. He made requisition for medical examination of the victim and received the report. He arrested the appellant, interrogated him and recorded his statements. He also made requisition for recording judicial statement of the victim and he seized the birth certificate of the victim. Upon completing his investigation, he found that there was a prima facie case against the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 376 AB and 341 IPC and therefore, he filed the charge-sheet before the Court. In his cross-examination, PW-10 reiterated what he stated in his examination-in-chief and denied the suggestions made to him by the counsel for the defence. 21. From an analysis of the evidence led by the prosecution witnesses, it may be noticed at this stage that the statement of the prosecutrix that she had spoken about the assault for the first time to her friend Zodinliai (PW-5) is corroborated by the statements of PW-5 herself, PW-4 who is the father of PW-5 and also PW-6 besides the other prosecution witnesses. In fact, the version of the other prosecution witness also corroborate to the version of the prosecutrix. 22. In defence, the appellant examined 2 (two) defence witnesses. DW-1 Smt. Ngurziki in her examination-in-chief stated that she was born in the year 1957 at Lungrang. Their family shifted to Lungsen after her daughter was married to a man from Lungsen. She was a manual labourer and as for the appellant, he too married a girl from Lungsen. The appellant was originally a resident of Lungrang but after marriage, he began residing at Lungsen. She knew the wife of the appellant and it was through her that he came to know the appellant. She further stated that she came to know from the mother of the appellant Tlanzuali that Pachhunga, father of Chullovi (wife of appellant) asked for money from the parents of the appellant and also from his employer (owner of the vehicle which the appellant drove). She knew that they did not give money to him and that the FIR was lodged after Pachhunga failed to get money from them. However, she does not know why Pachhunga demanded money from them and she knows that the appellant did not have any criminal case earlier. In her cross-examination, DW-1 stated that the appellant and his wife initially lived in the house of Pachhunga and that the prosecutrix was staying with them. She also stated that though they resided in the same locality with Pachhunga, they were not close neighbors. 23. DW-2 Smt. P.C Lalnunnemi in her examination-in-chief stated that she was born in the year 1981 at Lungrang and was married in the year 2004. Their family shifted to Lunglei in the year 2005 and she knew the appellant from his childhood as they both belong to Lungrang village. She has a taxi and she invited the appellant to drive the taxi in the year 2019. The appellant came from Lungsen to Lunglei and drove her taxi for nearly a month. She learned from Tlanzuali (mother of the appellant) that the parents of Chullovi alleging that the appellant raped the prosecutrix demanded Rs. 60,000/-. As they could not pay the said amount, they again demanded Rs. 30,000/. The money was not paid as the appellant said that he did not commit the offence. The father of Chullovi and Chullovi herself called her over phone and asked her to give them Rs. 60,000/-. As they could not pay the said amount, they again demanded Rs. 30,000/. The money was not paid as the appellant said that he did not commit the offence. The father of Chullovi and Chullovi herself called her over phone and asked her to give them Rs. 30,000/- initially and later on, a sum of Rs. 5,000/- as fine, as the appellant had raped the prosecutrix. They also stated that they would not submit FIR if the money was arranged. The appellant however denied having rape the prosecutrix and saw no reason why he had to pay the fine. Later, Chullovi called her again and told her that the appellant should return back to their village for it was time to work in Jhum or else her parents would lodge an FIR. She then angrily asked her why they were trying to make money through the appellant. In her cross-examination, DW-2 stated that she was not in Lungsen to know clearly about the allegation against the appellant. Apart from hearing the denial of the appellant about the sexual assault, she did not verify from the prosecutrix about the allegation made against the appellant. 24. From the above deposition of DW-2, what can be seen is that there is an attempt on her part to create an impression that the FIR was lodged since she, as the employer of the appellant, did not pay money to the family of the prosecutrix. What is important to notice is that the demand for money or non-payment for money by itself does not indicate that rape was not committed upon the prosecutrix. Both DW-1 & DW-2 are residents of Lungsen village originally and so is the appellant. Therefore, they being acquaintances, DW-1 & DW-2 apparently stepped forward as defence witnesses. DW-2 in her cross-examination deposed that she was not in Lungsen village when the incident happened to know clearly about the allegation against the appellant. She also did not verify from the prosecutrix as to whether rape was indeed committed upon her by the appellant. All that she knew was that the appellant denied having committed the offence. On the other hand, the prosecutrix had stated in clear terms that the appellant had committed rape upon her and her statements have been clearly corroborated by PW-5, PW-4 & PW-6 in particular, apart from the other prosecution witnesses. All that she knew was that the appellant denied having committed the offence. On the other hand, the prosecutrix had stated in clear terms that the appellant had committed rape upon her and her statements have been clearly corroborated by PW-5, PW-4 & PW-6 in particular, apart from the other prosecution witnesses. It may further be noticed that the version of the prosecutrix in her examination-in-chief has neither been shaken nor falsified during her cross-examination by the defence. The Apex Court in the Case of Ganesan (supra) after referring to a number of decisions of the same Court reiterated the established principle that where the testimony of victim is found reliable and trustworthy, conviction on basis of her sole testimony will be permissible. Paragraph 10.1 of the judgment may gainfully be abstracted as below:- “10.1 Whether, in the case involving sexual harassment, molestation etc., can there be conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, in Vijay, it is observed in paragraphs 9 to 14 as under: (SCC pp. 195- 98) “9. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 559, para 16) ‘16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence.’ 10. In State of U.P. v. Pappu this Court held that even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a ground to absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the court to absolve the accused. This Court further held that there can be conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get assurance of her testimony. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 597, para 12) ‘12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 597, para 12) ‘12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice, would do.’ 11. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. the court is duty bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21) 8. .....The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix.... The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix.... The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case.... Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. ... Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. ... 21. ... The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.’ 12. In State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra, this Court held that rape is not mere physical assault, rather it often distracts (sic destroys) the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence. 13. In State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh, this Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Wahid Khan v. State of M.P. placing reliance on an earlier judgment in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan. 14. Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that the statement of the prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix." 25. Coming to the present case, although the learned Amicus Curiae has tried to point out some discrepancy in the version of the prosecutrix in her statements recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C and her statements made during the trial before the Court, it may be seen that PW-4 who is the father of PW-5 and PW-5 who in turn is a friend and classmate of the prosecutrix in his cross-examination stated that the prosecutrix used to stay in the house of the appellant and his wife is the elder sister of the prosecutrix’s mother. The parents of the prosecutrix divorced and her mother remarried and was living with her new husband at Kanghmun. The father of the prosecutrix also remarried to another lady and was living at Lungsen itself. The prosecutrix was therefore living with her maternal Aunt and the appellant. Therefore, it is not surprising that the prosecutrix who was not even 12 years of age on being assaulted sexually only could narrate about the incidents to her friend and classmate (PW-5) when she came visiting. The prosecutrix was therefore living with her maternal Aunt and the appellant. Therefore, it is not surprising that the prosecutrix who was not even 12 years of age on being assaulted sexually only could narrate about the incidents to her friend and classmate (PW-5) when she came visiting. It is also in evidence that the prosecutrix is also shy and quiet in nature and therefore, the discrepancies, if any, in her statements before and after trial under the facts and circumstances can be ignored. 26. The Apex Court in the case of the State of State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Sanjay Kumar (supra) in the given facts of that case held that the testimony of the victim in cases of sexual offences is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of the statements, Courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of the sexual assault alone to convict the accuse. No doubt, her testimony has to inspire confidence. Seeking corroboration to a statement before relying upon the same as a Rule, in such cases, would literally amount to adding insult to injury. The deposition of the prosecutrix has, thus, to be taken as a whole. Needless to reiterate that the victim of rape is not an accomplice and her evidence can be acted upon without corroboration. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness does. If the Court finds it difficult to accept her version, it may seek corroboration from evidence which lend assurance to her version. To insist on corroboration, except in the rarest in the rare cases, is to equate one who is a victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to a crime and thereby, an insult womanhood. 27. The case of Santosh Prasad (supra) relied upon by the learned Amicus Curiae in our considered view on facts are distinguishable. In that case, the Apex Court found that the version of the prosecutrix was doubtful and the finding was that there was enmity between the parties because of a land dispute. As such, the said decision is found to be not applicable to the present case. 28. Thus, upon due consideration of the case in its entirety, we do not find any good ground to interfere with the impugned judgment & order convicting the appellant. As such, the said decision is found to be not applicable to the present case. 28. Thus, upon due consideration of the case in its entirety, we do not find any good ground to interfere with the impugned judgment & order convicting the appellant. In so far as the sentence passed by the learned Trial Court is concerned, the offence alleged to have been committed being prior to the amendment of Section 6 of the POCSO Act vide Act 25 of 2019 w.e.f., 16.08.2019 and also upon due consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered view that ends of justice will be met if the appellant is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years instead of 12 years. As for the remaining part of the sentence, the same shall remain unaltered. It is ordered accordingly. 29. With the above observations and modification, the appeal stands disposed of. 30. For the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Joseph L. Renthlei, the learned Amicus Curiae the Mizoram State Legal Services Authority shall pay him a remuneration of Rs. 9,000/- (Rupees Nine Thousand) only.