ORDER : The plaintiff before the learned trial Court filed this revision under Section 115 C.P.C. questioning the correctness of order dated 04.11.2019 of learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Nuzvid in I.A.No.516 of 2018 in O.S.No.188 of 2008. The respondent herein is the defendant in the suit. 2. By the impugned order, the learned trial Court condoned 465 days delay and permitted the respondent herein to file application to set aside the ex-parte decree. It is that order which is under challenge now. The dispute between the parties is concerning Ac.0.35 cents of dry land situated in Veleru Village of Krishna District. This revision petitioner filed O.S.No.188 of 2008 seeking permanent injunction against the defendant therein from interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the said property. By judgment dated 14.09.2016, the learned trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. It is thereafter the defendant therein thought of moving an application to set aside that decree and judgment stating that it was an ex-parte decree and for doing so she found that there was delay of 465 days and therefore, she sought for condonation of that delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and filed I.A.No.516 of 2018. The respondent in that petition, who is the plaintiff in the suit, who is the revision petitioner herein, filed a counter and resisted the application. After due enquiry, the learned trial Court by the impugned order dated 04.11.2019 allowed that application and condoned the delay with a direction to the defendant/respondent herein to pay Rs.2,000/- as costs. During the course of the present hearing of this revision, it is stated that the revision petitioner did not receive the costs and preferred this revision and the costs were deposited into the trial Court by the respondent herein. 3. Learned counsel on both sides submitted arguments. 4. The point for determination is: “Whether the impugned order is illegal or is materially irregular and the discretion was not judiciously exercised by the learned trial Court in considering the sufficiency of cause to condone delay of 465 days? 5. 3. Learned counsel on both sides submitted arguments. 4. The point for determination is: “Whether the impugned order is illegal or is materially irregular and the discretion was not judiciously exercised by the learned trial Court in considering the sufficiency of cause to condone delay of 465 days? 5. Point: A perusal of the impugned order indicates that the learned trial Court referred to the facts and contentions raised by both sides and at para No.6 it is stated that even though the defendant/petitioner before the trial Court failed to explain appropriate reason for delay of 465 days, the trial Court considered the fact that the petitioner therein is a poor lady and with a view to give fair opportunity and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, it inclined to allow that application so that it could here the ex-parte decree set aside application. Thus, it is fact on record that the learned trial Court was not at all satisfied with the reasons assigned by the present respondent herein in seeking condonation of delay. However, on equitable grounds such as the poverty of the lady, the trial Court condoned the delay. In the present revision that approach of the trial Court is challenged as incorrect. There is merit in that contention of the revision petitioner. One should notice what the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India stated in Lingeswaran Vs. Thirunagalingam, 2022 Livelaw (SC) 227. That was also a case of condonation of delay and the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down that when once the enquiring Court records a finding that there was no proper explanation satisfactorily shown to the Court for condonation of delay, the matter should rest there and the condonation application was required to be dismissed. Trial Courts could not go further and condone the delay even when there are no merits in the application and condonation of delay even in such cases leads to giving a premium to a person, who failed to explain delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. Then the Hon’ble Apex Court referred to the importance of law of limitation and reiterated the principles laid down in Popat Bahiru Goverdhane Vs. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 10 SCC 765 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 . Then the Hon’ble Apex Court referred to the importance of law of limitation and reiterated the principles laid down in Popat Bahiru Goverdhane Vs. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 10 SCC 765 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 . Thus, the ruling cited above precisely governs the present subject matter since in the case at hand also the trial Court having recorded its dissatisfaction about the cause proposed before him stating that it was not a sufficient cause it ought to have rested the matter there and should not have gone further. It is on this ground alone, this revision petition can be disposed of in favour of the revision petitioner. However, since certain more facts and legal principles were argued before this Court, there is a need to go further. Before the trial Court in the petition for condonation of delay, a sworn affidavit was filed by the petitioner therein, who is respondent herein, stating that she is the defendant in the suit and she first engaged an advocate by name Sri Dorayya and thereafter she engaged another advocate by name Sri Madhava Rao and thereafter she engaged another advocate by name Sri Neelambaram. However, all those advocates never informed her about the need for filing the written statement on her behalf and always she was sent away by them without permitting her to go into the Court. She got doubt on the conduct of those counsels and in her opinion they colluded with the opposite party and therefore, she filed a complaint before the Court and the Bar Council and thereafter the Court advised her to file a petition to set aside ex-parte decree by engaging another counsel. Acting upon that advise, she engaged another counsel and filed this application and it is categorically stated that she filed the application to set aside the decree as well as delay condonation petition along with her written statement for the suit and stated that she has good ground to succeed in that suit. It is for those reasons she sought for condonation of delay. In the counter filed against it, all the facts narrated therein were denied as false and incorrect and it was also mentioned that no proof was filed about giving complaint against the earlier counsels etc. A few aspects require mention here. It is for those reasons she sought for condonation of delay. In the counter filed against it, all the facts narrated therein were denied as false and incorrect and it was also mentioned that no proof was filed about giving complaint against the earlier counsels etc. A few aspects require mention here. According to the affidavit of the defendant/respondent herein, her written statement was not filed and therefore, along with the applications for condonation of delay etc., she had also filed her written statement before the trial Court. That aspect of the matter is stated as false and incorrect in the counter. Para No.6 of the impugned order shows that the defendant in the suit initially failed to file written statement but thereafter she had come up with a petition under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. and a written statement and after enquiry that petition was allowed on 09.07.2009 and the written statement of the defendant was received. Thus, it was way back in the year 2009 the defendant in the suit had filed her written statement. However, in the delay condonation petition, she swore on oath saying that her counsels duped her and did not file her written statement at any time and therefore, she was filing her written statement along with delay condonation application. Thus, the facts narrated in her sworn affidavit are factually incorrect and against the record. Being assisted by a new counsel, now it is not expected that factually incorrect facts should have been sworn in an affidavit. Despite of this impugned order does not indicate any reflection on part of the trial judge on this aspect of the matter. 6. The defendant before the trial Court stated that as against her earlier counsels, she entertained suspicion and petitioned against them both to the Court as well as Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh. In the counter filed against it, apart from denial of such assertions, it was stated that no proof in that regard was filed. Therefore, that aspect of the matter was expected to be considered by the trial Court. However, a verification of the impugned order does not show any adjudication on these disputed facts on part of the trial Court. Thus, the impugned order failed to consider submissions and rival submissions and arrived at a conclusion against the material on record. Therefore, that aspect of the matter was expected to be considered by the trial Court. However, a verification of the impugned order does not show any adjudication on these disputed facts on part of the trial Court. Thus, the impugned order failed to consider submissions and rival submissions and arrived at a conclusion against the material on record. However, while arguing this revision, learned counsel for respondent showed the Court and the opposite side a photostat copy of the said representation filed by the respondent. It is a Telugu printed representation addressed to learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Nuzvid and copies were marked to Bar Association, Nizvid, Senior Civil Judge and Additional Sessions Judge, Nuzvid and Sessions Judge, Machilipatnam, Krishna District and another copy is also marked to the President, Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh. Thus, it is not a petition filed for disciplinary action before the Bar Council, but it is only a representation given to trial Court. It is relevant to see certain facts narrated in this representation. As per first paragraph of this representation, way back in the year 2006, she litigated a dispute before the Court against the present suit plaintiff. Be it noted the present suit is of the year 2008. Thus, even earlier to this suit, she had filed some litigation before the trial Court. What was that litigation and what happened to that litigation could not be found either in that representation or in the proceedings before the trial Court. Be that as it may. As per this representation, in the suit at hand filed by her neighbour Sri Medepalli Lazer, she engaged her advocate and was contesting the suit. However, the advocates did not inform her about the adjournments and the progress of the suit. It is relevant to note here that in this representation she stated that in the year 2017 during September month she was working and attending works in her agricultural land and at that time, the plaintiff in the suit came to her and said that he won the suit and decree and judgment were passed in his favour. It was only then she realized that the suit was disposed of by the trial Court. Thus, as per this representation printed in Telugu, the knowledge of ex parte decree was gained by the defendant in the suit, who is respondent herein, during September, 2017. It was only then she realized that the suit was disposed of by the trial Court. Thus, as per this representation printed in Telugu, the knowledge of ex parte decree was gained by the defendant in the suit, who is respondent herein, during September, 2017. However, in her application to condone delay filed before the trial Court, she omitted to make mention of this facts and omitted to mention the source of knowledge of ex-parte decree and the date of her knowledge etc. Thus, all material facts were omitted. The omission of material facts is also rightly mentioned in the counter. However, the learned trial Court did not feel it proper to decide those disputed facts in one way or other. While she got the knowledge of ex-parte decree in September, 2017, she filed the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on 14.03.2018. Perhaps to avoid explaining the cause of her inaction from September, 2017 till March 2018, she omitted to mention the date on which she gained knowledge of ex-parte decree. Thus, known material facts are suppressed. Thus so much is clear from the record. The learned trial Court did not think that it was its duty to dilate on all these facts and decide the dispute. Thus, the impugned order is apparently illegal as well as irregular as it failed to decide anything and simply concluded that it was condoning the delay. 7. Learned counsel for respondent submits that in every case of delay, there could be some lapses on part of a litigant but that alone is not enough to turn down the plea and shut the door against the party and as long no mala fides are there, there should be liberal approach for the Courts to condone the delay and it is precisely that made the learned trial Court to condone the delay and this Court should not interfere and then in support of his contention, learned counsel cited a judgment in G. Govindappa Vs. P.R. Ramakrishna Rao, 2017 (1) Law Summary 1969 (A.P.). A perusal of this judgment would show that the following factual inputs made this Court to have its reasons formulated in allowing it to condone the delay. P.R. Ramakrishna Rao, 2017 (1) Law Summary 1969 (A.P.). A perusal of this judgment would show that the following factual inputs made this Court to have its reasons formulated in allowing it to condone the delay. That was a suit for declaration of title and also for permanent injunction and the property in dispute was a valuable Acs.2.00 cents of agricultural land and that suit was decreed ex parte. The defendant therein moved an application to set aside the ex parte decree and a petition to condone the delay of 394 days in moving that application therein. Therein it was found that according to the defendant, there was an earlier suit in O.S.No.56 of 2007 and that was suppressed by the plaintiffs while that suit was filed by the plaintiff himself against the same defendant. In that particular case, it is also found that the counsel representing the defendant died and it was one important reason that disabled the defendant from prosecuting the suit. It is further seen that the trial Court after analyzing all the facts on record was satisfied that the defendant though was diligent in prosecuting the case, suffered setbacks because of the above referred facts. It was on those grounds – 1. The valuable properties are involved; 2. Suppression of material facts by the plaintiffs; 3. Death of a counsel; and 4. Trial Court properly recorded a finding of satisfaction of cause of delay – that resulted in that judgment. When those facts are juxtaposed, one would notice a totally different story here. Here is a case where trial Court recorded dissatisfaction about the cause proposed for condoning the delay and the facts borne out by the record would indicate total slackness on part of the petitioner therein/respondent herein as she failed in even mentioning the necessary material particulars and seems to have suppressed important facts bearing on the issue. There is total negation of judicious consideration on part of the trial Court in deciding a case of this nature. Therefore, the said ruling does not help the respondent herein. 8. Learned counsel for respondent also cites a judgment in Ummer Vs. Pottengal Subida, (2018) 15 SCC 127 . That was a case where when the litigant suffered in the hands of lawyers, necessary legal proceedings were initiated before Consumer Forum and after due enquiry, the client was granted compensation as against the counsels. 8. Learned counsel for respondent also cites a judgment in Ummer Vs. Pottengal Subida, (2018) 15 SCC 127 . That was a case where when the litigant suffered in the hands of lawyers, necessary legal proceedings were initiated before Consumer Forum and after due enquiry, the client was granted compensation as against the counsels. It was all those facts that brought out the result that was there in that judgment. In the case at hand, the sworn affidavit filed before the trial Court does not indicate about any proceedings being taken up against the counsels either before Consumer Forum or before the Bar Council by mentioning any particular specific dates of application etc. The papers that are filed for perusal during the course of hearing this revision would also show that such representation was given not to the Bar Council and not to the Consumer Forum by way of appropriate petitions/applications. Moreover, it seems that such representation was given to the trial Court and in a day or two, thereafter, application for condonation of delay was filed. Till now, the learned counsel for respondent is unable to say whether any proceedings were pending before Bar Council against the erring advocates. These facts would show that only to take advantage of the rulings in other cases the petitioner has brought out a representation. 9. Learned counsel for respondent submits that the petitioner/plaintiff in the suit had no right and all the rights and justice lie with the defendant. Therefore, the trial Court’s order need not be disturbed. While it is not necessary to decide this particular aspect but since the argument is put forth it could be mentioned here that the immovable property and the title over it cannot be the subject matter for decision in the suit for injunction filed by the plaintiff. If the respondent/defendant in the suit believes her title, all the legal remedies are open to her to ventilate in an appropriate litigation. As per the impugned order, she had put in her written statement and issues were settled after hearing both sides and plaintiff examined three witnesses, but then the defendant did not choose to cross-examine them and it was in such circumstances, a decree was passed. Whether that is a contest decree or an ex-parte decree is not a matter for consideration here. 10. Whether that is a contest decree or an ex-parte decree is not a matter for consideration here. 10. Upshot of the entire discussion is that the impugned order failed to consider what is to be considered and crossed its jurisdiction in condoning the delay even after finding that there was no sufficient cause shown to him to condone the delay. The said order cannot be maintained. Therefore, point is answered in favour of the of the revision petitioner. 11. In the result, this Civil Revision Petition is allowed setting aside the order dated 04.11.2019 in I.A.No.516 of 2018 in O.S.No.188 of 2008 on the file of learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Nuzvid. Rs.2,000/- deposited by the respondent herein before the trial Court can be received by her moving an appropriate application before the learned trial Court. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.