JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. Shiv Prasad Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Manoj Kumar, learned counsel for the State. 2. The present petition has been filed for quashing of order dated 13.05.2016 (Annexure-3) passed in S.T. Case No. 123 of 2016, G.R. Case No. 677 of 2015 (Gua Barajamda) P.S. Case No. 42 of 2015) whereby cognizance for the offence under sections 10, 13, 39 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and section 17 of Criminal Law (Amendment) Act has been taken against the petitioner. Further prayer has been made for quashing of order dated 04.04.2018 (Annexure-6) passed in S.T. Case No. 123 of 2016 whereby petition dated 01.02.2018 filed by the prosecution under section 137 of Evidence Act for re-examination of P.W.9, has been allowed, pending in the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Chaibasa. 3. F.I.R. has been lodged alleging therein that on the basis of secret information the petitioner was apprehended by the police near Barajamda Railway Station and from his possession several incriminating articles and naxal literatures were recovered which were seized in presence of witnesses. On interrogation the petitioner disclosed that the said articles were to be supplied to the members of extremist organization. On the basis of these allegations Gua(Barajamda) P.S. Case No. 42 of 2015, dated 15.12.2015 under sections 10, 13, 39 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and under section 17 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act has been registered. 4. Mr. Shiv Prasad Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that learned Sessions Judge vide order dated 04.04.2018 has allowed the petition dated 01.02.2018 for re-examination of P.W.9 namely, Md. Tauquir Alam, Dy. S.P. (I.O.) in which rejoinder was filed by the defence. He further submitted that impugned orders dated 13.05.2016 and 04.04.2019 are bad in law. According to him the learned court below by order dated 13.05.2016 has taken cognizance against the petitioner for the offence under sections 10, 13, 39 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and section 17 of Criminal Law (Amendment) which is violation of Section 45 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act which clearly stipulates that no court shall take cognizance of any offence without the previous sanction of the Central Government or any officer authorized by the Central Government in this behalf. He further submitted that in view of this provision the order taking cognizance is itself bad in law. He further submitted that in view of this provision the order taking cognizance is itself bad in law. To buttress his argument, learned counsel for the petitioner relied on judgment in the case of “Roopesh Vs. State of Kerala and Others” [2022 Live Law (Ker) 130] wherein para 28 it has been held as under:- “28. The sanction accorded to prosecute the petitioner for reason of the same having not been issued within the time stipulated in the UA(P)A and the Rules of 2008 is vitiated. The statutory mandate of time having not been complied with, the Special Court cannot take cognizance of the offences under Ss.20 and 38 of the UA(P)A Act. There is also a complete absence of application of mind. Under S.196(1) of the Cr.P.C, again there is no application of mind in the sanction as evidenced from the orders impugned and hence the cognizance taken of the offence under S.124-A of the IPC also has to fail. The cognizance taken by the Sessions Court under the IPC and UA(P)A are set aside and the orders passed, impugned in the Criminal Revision Petitions are set aside. The Criminal Revision Petitions stand allowed.” 5. On the point of sanction, learned counsel for the petitioner further relied on judgment in the case of “ Ashrafkhan @ Babu Munnekhan Pathan & Others Vs. State of Gujrat & Others” reported in (2012) 11 SCC 606 wherein para 37 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “37. The plea of the State is that the Commissioner of Police having granted the sanction under Section 20-A(2) of TADA, the conviction of the accused cannot be held to be bad only on the ground of absence of approval under Section 20-A(1) by the Deputy Commissioner. As observed earlier, the provisions of TADA are stringent and consequences are serious and in order to prevent persecution, the legislature in its wisdom had given various safeguards at different stages. It has mandated that no information about the commission of an offence under TADA shall be recorded by the police without the prior approval of the District Superintendent of Police. Not only this, further safeguard has been provided and restriction has been put on the court not to take cognizance of any offence without the previous sanction of the Inspector-General of Police or as the case may be, the Commissioner of Police. Not only this, further safeguard has been provided and restriction has been put on the court not to take cognizance of any offence without the previous sanction of the Inspector-General of Police or as the case may be, the Commissioner of Police. Both operate in different and distinct stages and, therefore, for successful prosecution both the requirements have to be complied with. We have not come across any principle nor we are inclined to lay down that in a case in which different safeguards have been provided at different stages, the adherence to the last safeguard would only be relevant and breach of other safeguards shall have no bearing on the trial. Therefore, we reject the contention of the State that the accused cannot assail their conviction on the ground of absence of approval under Section 20-A(1) of TADA by the Deputy Commissioner, when the Commissioner of Police had granted sanction under Section 20A(2) of TADA..” 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied on judgment in the case of “Rambhai Nathabhai Gadhvi & Ors. Vs. State of Gujrat” reported in (1997) 7 SCC 744 wherein paras 8, 11, 14 and 15 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “8. Taking cognizance is the act which the Designated Court has to perform and granting sanction is an act which the sanctioning authority has to perform. Latter is a condition precedent for the former. Sanction contemplated in the sub-section is the permission to prosecute a particular person for the offence or offences under TADA. We must bear in mind that sanction is not granted to the Designated Court to take cognizance of the offence, but it is granted to the prosecuting agency to approach the court concerned for enabling it to take cognizance of the offence and to proceed to trial against the persons arraigned in the report. Thus a valid sanction is sine qua non for enabling the prosecuting agency to approach the court in order to enable the court to take cognizance of the offence under TADA as disclosed in the report. The corollary is that, if there was no valid sanction the Designated Court gets no jurisdiction to try a case against any person mentioned in the report as the court is forbidden from taking cognizance of the offence without such sanction. The corollary is that, if there was no valid sanction the Designated Court gets no jurisdiction to try a case against any person mentioned in the report as the court is forbidden from taking cognizance of the offence without such sanction. If the Designated Court has taken cognizance of the offence without a valid sanction, such action is without jurisdiction and any proceedings adopted thereunder will also be without jurisdiction. 11. In such a situation, can it be said that the sanctioning authority granted sanction after applying its mind effectively and after reaching a satisfaction that it is necessary in public interest that prosecution should be launched against the accused under TADA. As the provisions of TADA are more rigorous and the penalty provided is more stringent and the procedure for trial prescribed is summary and compendious, the sanctioning process mentioned in Section 20-A(2) must have been adopted more seriously and exhaustively than the sanction contemplated in other penal statutes. One of us (Dr Anand, J.) has explained in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra while dealing with sanction under Section 20-A of TADA, that: (SCC p. 647, para 56) “56. The section was obviously introduced to safeguard a citizen from any vexatious prosecution under TADA. Vide Section 20-A(2) of TADA no court can take cognizance of an offence under TADA unless there is a valid sanction accorded by the competent authority as prescribed by the section.” 14. Apart from what we have noticed above, the non-application of mind by the Director General of Police, Gujarat State, is even otherwise writ large in this case. A perusal of Ext. 63 (supra) shows that the Director General of Police in fact did not grant any sanction for the prosecution of the appellants. Last part of the order reads: “I A.K. Tandon, Director General of Police, Gujarat State, Ahmedabad under the powers conferred under the amended provisions of TADA (1993) Section 20-A(2) give permission to add Sections 3, 4 and 5 of TADA.” Thus, what the Director General of Police did was to grant permission “to add Sections 3, 4 and 5 of TADA” and not any sanction to prosecute the appellants. It is pertinent to note here that the permission to add Sections 3, 4 and 5 of TADA had been granted by the Home Secretary, the competent authority, much earlier and no such permission was sought for from the Director General of Police by the DSP. The Designated Court thus, failed to notice that Ext. 63 was not an order of sanction but an unnecessary permission of the Director General of Police to add Sections 3, 4 and 5 of TADA. The Director General of Police, apparently, acted in a very casual manner and instead of discharging his statutory obligations under Section 20-A(2) to grant (or not to grant) sanction for prosecution proceeded to deal with the request of the DSP contained in his letter dated 9-8-1993, as if it was a letter seeking permission to apply the provisions of TADA. The exercise exhibits that the Director General of Police did not even read, let alone consider “carefully”, the FIR and the letter of the DSP dated 9-8-1983. We cannot but express our serious concern at this casual approach of the Director General of Police. On a plain reading of Ext. 63, therefore, we must hold that it is not an order of sanction to prosecute the appellants as required by Section 20-A(2) of the Act. 15. In view of the aforesaid legal and factual position we have no doubt that sanction relied on by the prosecution in this case was not accorded by the Director General of Police in the manner required by law. Ext. 63 is not the result of a serious consideration and the document reflects scanty application of the mind of the sanctioning authority into vital and crucial aspects concerning the matter. It vitiates sanction and hence Ext. 63 cannot be treated as sanction under Section 20-A(2) of TADA7. Relying on these judgments, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the entire prosecution is fit to be quashed. He further submitted that in absence of any valid cognizance order trial has proceeded. He further elaborated his arguments by way of submitting that at a belated stage sanction order has been submitted which is against rule 3 and 4 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) (Recommendation and Sanction of Prosecution) Rules which prescribes time limit for making recommendation and sanction of prosecution which in total is 14 days. He further elaborated his arguments by way of submitting that at a belated stage sanction order has been submitted which is against rule 3 and 4 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) (Recommendation and Sanction of Prosecution) Rules which prescribes time limit for making recommendation and sanction of prosecution which in total is 14 days. He further submitted that subsequently sanction order has been brought on record which is bad in law. He further submitted that at the fag end of trial on 24.01.2018 sanction order was produced.” 7. On these grounds, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that entire prosecution case is fit to be quashed at this stage even if the trial has proceeded. 8. Per contra, Mr. Manoj Kumar, learned G.A.-III, appearing on behalf of respondents-State submitted that in the light of facts the petitioner has rightly been made accused in this case. He further submitted that the learned court below has rightly taken cognizance after having being satisfied that prima facie case is made out under sections 10, 13, 39 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and section 17 of Criminal Law (Amendment) Act. He further submitted that the learned court below has rightly passed order dated 04.04.2018 by allowing re-examination of P.W.-9 which is very well in consonance with Section 137 of the Evidence Act. He further submitted that in view of Clause (i) of Section 45 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 the Central Government has authorized the Secretaries of all the State Governments and Union Territory Administrations in-charge of the Home Department to exercise the powers to sanction prosecution in respect of offences punishable under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 triable by a court in their respective States and Union Territories by letter dated 10th June, 2005 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India contained in Annexure-A to supplementary counter-affidavit. He further submitted that ‘authority’ has been defined under section 2(1) (b) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) (Recommendation and Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 2008 which suggests that there is no requirement of notification and a letter of appointment is sufficient which has already been done on 10.06.2005 by the Central Government much before the framing of the rules. He further submitted that ‘authority’ has been defined under section 2(1) (b) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) (Recommendation and Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 2008 which suggests that there is no requirement of notification and a letter of appointment is sufficient which has already been done on 10.06.2005 by the Central Government much before the framing of the rules. Learned counsel for the State further submitted that trial has already proceeded and trial is almost at the verge of conclusion, at this stage, the petitioner has raised these issues which can be raised at the time of final argument before the trial court. 9. In view of above submission of the learned counsel for the parties the Court has gone through the material on record. Charge sheet has been submitted. Learned court below has taken cognizance and the case is committed to the Court of Sessions and after framing of charge on 15.07.2016 the trial has proceeded. Looking into the contents of the F.I.R, it transpires that there is serious allegation against the petitioner for transmitting certain articles to the naxalite terrorist group. Ingredients of alleged sections are made out looking into the contents of the F.I.R. Admittedly, sanction has been brought on record that may be with some delay and what prejudice has been caused to the petitioner that will be decided in the trial which is at the fag end of conclusion. In the light of Central Government Notification, 2005, competent authority has already been assigned to give sanction and subsequently, sanction order has been brought on record before the trial court. Power has been conferred upon the Court under section 137 of the Evidence Act to call the witness at any stage and in view of seriousness of the crime and on the particular point, learned court has directed to recall P.W.-9, can not be said to be illegal order in view of the fact that it is duty of the Trial Court to find the truth in the criminal proceeding and finding the truth the court has recalled P.W.9. There is no illegality in passing the impugned order dated 04.04.2018. Cognizance has been taken in the year, 2016 itself and trial has proceeded and the trial is at the verge of conclusion and at the belated stage this petition has been filed which can be well agitated before the trial court by the petitioner. There is no illegality in passing the impugned order dated 04.04.2018. Cognizance has been taken in the year, 2016 itself and trial has proceeded and the trial is at the verge of conclusion and at the belated stage this petition has been filed which can be well agitated before the trial court by the petitioner. Whether invalid sanction goes to the root of jurisdiction of the court that can also be argued in the final argument as the trial is going to be concluded shortly. Reference may be made to the case of “Ashok Tshering Bhutia V. State of Sikkim” reported in (2011) 4 SCC 402 . Whether invalid sanction goes to the root of jurisdiction of the court which would vitiate the trial and conviction, held that in the absence of anything to show that any defect of irregularity therein caused a failure of justice would be relatable to error, omission or irregularity in the grant of sanction. However, a mere error, omission or irregularity in sanction is not considered to be fatal unless it has resulted in the failure of justice or has been occasioned thereby. 10. Absence of sanction vis-a-vis vitiation of sanction order, stages of trial at which to be raised. It has been held in the case of “Prakash Singh Badal and Another Vs. State of Punjab & Others” reported in (2007) 1 SCC 1 that question as to absence can be agitated at threshold of trial but question as to vitiation has to be raised during trial. In the case in hand, sanction has been granted which has been brought on record before the trial court, accordingly, that will be subject matter of the trial. 11. The judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of “Roopesh” (supra) in that case at the very initial stage discharge petition was filed which was rejected that was subject matter before the Kerala High Court and in the light of that it has been held about the sanction but in the case in hand the petitioner has been allowed to proceed the trial and at the fag end of trial, this petition has been filed. This judgment is not helping the petitioner. 12. This judgment is not helping the petitioner. 12. In the case of “Ashrafkhan @ Babu Munnekhan Pathan & Other” (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner in that case trial was already concluded and by way of appeal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court decided that issue. In the case in hand the trial has already proceeded and at the fag end of trial this petition has been filed. This judgement is on different footing. Moreover paragraph no. 35 speaks otherwise which is quoted here-in-below:- “35. The submission that absence of sanction under Section 20-A(2) by the Commissioner of Police has been held to be a curable defect and for parity of reasons the absence of approval under Section 20-A(1) would be curable is also without substance and reliance on the decision of Lal Singh v. State of Gujarat, (1998) 5 SCC 529 , in this connection, is absolutely misconceived. An Act which is harsh, containing stringent provision and prescribing procedure substantially departing from the prevalent ordinary procedural law cannot be construed liberally. For ensuring rule of law its strict adherence has to be ensured. In the case of Lal Singh (supra) relied on by the State, Section 20-A(1) of TADA was not under scanner. Further, this Court in the said judgment nowhere held that absence of sanction under Section 20-A(2) is a curable defect. In Lal Singh (supra) the question of sanction was not raised before the Designated Court and sought to be raised before this Court for the first time which was not allowed. This would be evident from the following paragraph of the judgment - “4. Sub-section (2) makes it clear that when the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceeding and has not been raised, mere error or irregularity in any sanction of prosecution becomes ignorable. We therefore do not permit the appellants to raise the plea of defect in sanction.” In view of the above observation, this case is not helping the petitioner. 13. We therefore do not permit the appellants to raise the plea of defect in sanction.” In view of the above observation, this case is not helping the petitioner. 13. In the case of “Rambhai Nathabhai Gadhvi & Others” (supra) relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner in that case issue before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was after conclusion of trial and in the case in hand the trial has already proceeded, sanction has been brought on record, the cognizance order is of the year, 2016 and at the fag end of trial this petition has been filed. This judgement is not helping the petitioner. 14. All these grounds in view of conclusion of trial are fit to be raised by the petitioner in the final argument of the pending case in the trial court. The impugned order recalling P.W.-9 is not bad in law as the discussion made above. 15. As a cumulative effects, discussions made here-in-above, reasons and analysis at the belated stage, it is not a fit case to exercise the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed. Interim order dated 27.08.2019 is vacated. 16. It is open to the petitioner to raise all the points in the trial court at the time of final argument.