JUDGMENT : (1.) Both these special civil applications are filed by the respective parties challenging the award of the Labour Court, Nadiad, dated 03.04.2019 in Reference (LCN) No. 19 of 2017. By the award in question, the workman has been directed to be reinstated in service without backwages. Special Civil Application No. 13879 of 2019 has been filed by the workman, inasmuch as, by the award in question, the Labour Court has denied backwages. Special Civil Application No. 15497 of 2019 has been filed by the Gujarat State Electricity Corporation, the employer aggrieved by the award directing reinstatement. (2.) Heard Mr.Dipak Dave, learned counsel for the employer and Mr.U.T.Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the workman in both these petitions. Papers of Special Civil Application No. 15497 of 2019 were referred to during the course of arguments. (3.) Facts in brief would indicate that the father of the workman-Vijendrasinh Solanki was serving as a Helper in the office of the employer Corporation. He expired on 03.12.2009. In accordance with the prevailing policy i.e. GSO 295 of the Corporation, in case an employee dies during service of the Board, one dependent would be employed by the Board provided where one or more members of the family are not already employed. The workman on 19.01.2010, applied to the Corporation for employment invoking the provisions of this GSO. He was possessing the educational qualification of Diploma in Mechanical Engineering. He was thereafter appointed as a Plant Attendant, Grade-I, by an appointment order dated 15.05.2010. He joined on 20.05.2010. 3.1 A representation was made by a newspaper agency in regard to the illegality of the appointment of the workman and therefore, what was subsequently revealed was that the workman was serving with one Jindal Saw Limited from where he had resigned on 26.03.2010. It is the case of the Corporation that when the workman had filled in his application form and a statement was recorded pursuant an inquiry for eligibility of his appointment, he had specifically stated in his application that he had no sources of employment. Even in his application dated 20.03.2010, under the signature of the workman he had stated that he was not serving anywhere. Based on this statement, the workman was appointed on the post. Even in his application dated 20.03.2010, under the signature of the workman he had stated that he was not serving anywhere. Based on this statement, the workman was appointed on the post. On a subsequent inquiry when it was found that the workman was engaged with Jindal Saw Mill, a statement was obtained of the workman on 28.03.2011 where, according to the Corporation the workman admitted that he had worked for the period from 06.06.2008 till 26.03.2010 and therefore, he was not eligible for appointment on compassionate grounds. Based on this statement and a certificate produced of the Jindal Saw Mill dated 29.03.2010, a show cause notice was issued to the workman on 11.04.2011 inter alia stating that on the basis of a letter of one Madhya Gujarat News Network dated 08.03.2011 it has come to the notice of the Corporation and now based on the statement given by the workman on 28.03.2011, read together with the certificate that the workman was engaged with Jindal Saw Mill when he applied for appointment on compassionate grounds with the Corporation. GSO 295 specifically provided that the benefit of appointment would be given only when he was not employed anywhere else. GSO 7 was also relied upon and based on this a show cause notice was issued to the workman asking the workman to show cause as to why he should not be removed from service. After the show cause notice was so given, by an order dated 11.12.2013, the Gujarat State Electricity Corporation Limited removed the workman from service which was a subject matter of challenge before the Labour Court in the reference and the award which is impugned by the respective parties. 3.2 The Labour Court after having discussed the evidence on record i.e. the statement of the workman dated 28.03.2011, the show cause notice dated 11.04.2011 came to the conclusion that even while invoking the provisions of GSO 295 read with GSO 7, if it was the case of the employer that the appointment was obtained by fraud, principles of natural justice had to be complied with and without holding a departmental proceeding, the order of dismissal/removal could not have been passed. The findings of the Labour Court were therefore that the order of removal was passed in violation of the provisions of natural justice and the Labour Court directed reinstatement without backwages. (4.) Mr. The findings of the Labour Court were therefore that the order of removal was passed in violation of the provisions of natural justice and the Labour Court directed reinstatement without backwages. (4.) Mr. Dipak Dave, learned counsel for the employer would make submissions on two counts. Firstly, Mr. Dipak Dave, learned counsel for the petitioner - employer, would submit that it was erroneous for the Labour Court to opine that a departmental proceeding was incumbent in order to pass an order of removal. He submitted that it was not a case where it was an order of removal from service, but it was a case where the appointment was cancelled. In other words, since it was a case where the appointment was cancelled, no inquiry was necessary in such type of cases. He would submit reading the GSOs in question namely GSO 295 and GSO 7 that the same specifically provided that the benefit of employment on compassionate grounds would be available only if one of the family members was not employed. He would submit that on the death of the father on 03.12.2009, when the petitioner applied for appointment specifically by the application of 20.03.2010, to the question whether he was engaged anywhere else, a specific reply in the application was in the negative. Under these circumstances, on the basis of the complaint made by the newspaper network, when the statement of the workman was recorded in light of his statement on 04.03.2010 while being given employment that he has no source of income, in the statement of 28.03.2011, he had admitted that he was engaged for a period from 06.06.2008 to 26.03.2010 with Jindal Saw Ltd and he had given a certificate of employment with the Company on 29.03.2010. This was therefore a clear case where the appointment was obtained by fraud. It was a case where the appointment was cancelled and therefore no departmental proceedings were necessary when in a case it was found by the employer that the employment was obtained by fraud, the same was void ab initio and no inquiry was necessary. This was therefore a clear case where the appointment was obtained by fraud. It was a case where the appointment was cancelled and therefore no departmental proceedings were necessary when in a case it was found by the employer that the employment was obtained by fraud, the same was void ab initio and no inquiry was necessary. 4.1 Alternatively it was the submission of Mr.Dipak Dave, learned advocate for the employer that even if it is the conclusion of the Court that an inquiry was necessary in the facts of the case, in a written statement, it was specifically pleaded as an alternative submission that if the Labour Court comes to the conclusion that the order of dismissal was without inquiry, then an opportunity of leading evidence in the nature of inquiry before the Labour Court ought to have been given. He would invite the Court's attention to the specific averments made in the written statement of the employer where in the alternative, it was requested to the Labour Court that the employer be permitted to hold a departmental inquiry and prove the charge before the Labour Court. In absence of that opportunity, the award of the Labour Court is bad. 4.2 In support of his submission to the first principle of law that it was the case where the appointment obtained by fraud was cancelled and therefore no departmental proceedings were necessary, Mr.Dipak Dave, learned counsel would rely on the following decisions: (1) Paschim Gujarat Vij Company vs. Kalyanji Somchand Maheshwari rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No. 561 of 2011. Mr.Dave would rely on paragraph 6 of the judgment and submit that the facts of the present case are akin to the judgment delivered by the Division Bench and therefore, no inquiry was necessary. (2) Punjab Urban Planning And Development Authority and Another vs. Karamjit Singh reported in 2019 (2) ApexCJ 459. He would rely on the relevant paragraphs of the decision to submit that it is well settled that if the initial appointment itself is void, then the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are not applicable for terminating the services of the workman. He would draw the specific attention of the Court to para 5.5 of the judgment in the case of Punjab Urban Planning And Development Authority (supra). (3) Mr. He would draw the specific attention of the Court to para 5.5 of the judgment in the case of Punjab Urban Planning And Development Authority (supra). (3) Mr. Dave, learned counsel, also relied on a decision in the case of Union of India & Anr vs. Raghuvar Pal Singh, AIR 2018 SC 1411 . He would rely on paras 7 and 21 of the decision and submit that when an appointment is made de-hors the statutory rule and it has no validity and therefore those who come by the back door have to return by the same back door and cannot claim protection of the principles of natural justice. He would rely on the concept of "useless formality" theory and submit that there will be no purpose served in giving an opportunity of hearing or following the principles of natural justice. (4) Ramchandra Singh vs. Savitri Devi reported in (2003) 8 SCC 319 . He would rely on paras 15 and 16 of the decision to submit that fraud is a conduct which itself amounts to misrepresentation. Para 21 of the judgment was read in support of his submission that no court in the land would allow a person to keep an advantage of what he has obtained by fraud. 4.3 In the alternative submission of the Labour Court not acceding to the request of permitting him to hold an inquiry, when it was specifically pleaded for in the written statement, Mr.Dave would rely on a decision in the case of Workmen of Motipur Sugar Factory Private Ltd. vs. Motipur Sugar Factory Private Ltd., AIR 1965 SC 1803 . (5.) Mr.U.T.Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the workman would make the following submissions: (i) While considering the submissions of the employer, the Court needs to keep in mind that under scrutiny is an award of the Labour Court in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. (ii) On perusal of the award of the Labour Court, what is evident is that no evidence in terms of oral evidence was led by the employer to substantiate and support the order of termination. It is therefore now not open for the employer to contend that an opportunity ought to be given to lead evidence and prove the charge. (ii) On perusal of the award of the Labour Court, what is evident is that no evidence in terms of oral evidence was led by the employer to substantiate and support the order of termination. It is therefore now not open for the employer to contend that an opportunity ought to be given to lead evidence and prove the charge. (iii) Taking the Court through the reasonings of the Labour Court, Mr.Mishra, learned advocate, would submit that the Labour Court came to the conclusion and rightly so, that the appointment order of the workman was dated 15.05.2010. He was then on probation from 23.11.2010 for a period of six months. On 11.04.2013, the order of removal was passed. The removal order was passed on the basis of a letter dated 08.03.2011 written by one Madhya Gujarat News Network. Based on this letter, it appears that the workman was confronted and asked to give a statement on 28.03.2011 at the place of work where he had stated that he had worked with Jindal Saw Mill Ltd. from 06.06.2008 to 26.03.2010 from where he had resigned on 26.03.2010. A show cause notice was issued on 11.04.2012 asking the workman to show cause as to why he should not be removed from service on the basis of he not being entitled to the benefit of GSO 295. (iv) The documents which were relied upon by the author of the letter dated 08.03.2011 were not supplied to the workman and it was only based on the statement recorded on 28.03.2011 without an inquiry, that the services of the workman were put to an end. (v) It cannot be a case where it was a cancellation of appointment on the basis of having so obtained by fraud. The employer had based on the statement recorded on 28.03.2011 issued a show cause notice asking the employee to show cause why he should not be removed from service. Based on the show cause notice an order of removal dated 11.12.2013 was passed and the Labour Court, therefore, rightly relying on the decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court held that no order of removal could have been passed without holding departmental proceedings. Based on the show cause notice an order of removal dated 11.12.2013 was passed and the Labour Court, therefore, rightly relying on the decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court held that no order of removal could have been passed without holding departmental proceedings. No charge sheet was issued and therefore, it was reasonably believed by the Labour Court based on the examination of statements at exh.11/6 that it was a statement which the workman had to give under coercion of higher employee in the hierarchy and he had produced the certificate but nothing was produced on record under the circumstances and the Labour Court therefore rightly, in Mr.Mishra's submission ordered reinstatement. (vi) In context of the applicability of the GSO and the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act that the Industrial Disputes Act prevails is a submission made by Mr.Mishra, learned advocate, for which he would rely on a decision in the case of Vikramaditya Pandey vs. Industrial Tribunal, Lucknow, reported in 2001 SCC (L&S) 438. (vii) As far as denial of backwages is concerned, in the petition filed by the workman, Mr.Mishra, learned advocate would submit that once having come to the conclusion that the order of termination was bad and it was found that the employer had acted in gross violation of statutory provision, the Labour Court ought to have awarded full backwages. In support of his submissions, Mr.Mishra, learned advocate wold rely on a decision in the case of Dipali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Mahavidyalaya and Others [ (2013) 10 SCC 324 ] especially para 38 thereof. (6.) Considering the submissions made by the learned counsels for the respective parties, the Court has to consider whether in the facts of the case and the arguments made before the Labour Court, can the order of the Labour Court be sustained. (7.) Before the Labour Court, the cause of action arose for the workman to approach the Court was the order dated 11.12.2013. The order of 11.12.2013 was at Ex. 11/18 before the Labour Court. The order is annexed to the petition of the employer too. Reading the order indicates that it is the stand of the Gujarat State Electricity Corporation Limited that the father of the employee Shri Jitendrasingh K Solanki had died on 03.12.2009. That the employee on 20.03.2010 in accordance with GSO 295 applied for a job. 11/18 before the Labour Court. The order is annexed to the petition of the employer too. Reading the order indicates that it is the stand of the Gujarat State Electricity Corporation Limited that the father of the employee Shri Jitendrasingh K Solanki had died on 03.12.2009. That the employee on 20.03.2010 in accordance with GSO 295 applied for a job. On 04.03.2010, when an inquiry was conducted for the purposes of the eligibility to be engaged with the Corporation, it had been found that a statement was given by the employee that he was not engaged anywhere or employed anywhere. That he had specifically stated that he had no source of income. The case of the employer was that this was a misleading statement made before the Inquiry Officer during the course of an inquiry to ascertain the eligibility of the employee. 7.1 Thereafter, it appears that one Gujarat News Network had written a letter on 08.03.2011 that the employee plant attendant had obtained job by misrepresentation. Based on this letter, on 28.03.2011, an officer of the Corporate Office, Vadodara, had summoned the employee and recorded a statement where the employee had given a statement that he had been working with one A.P.C Bearing Company for six months as a trainee engineer and thereafter he was employed with M/s. Jindal Saw Limited from 06.06.2008 to 26.03.2010. The conclusion therefore on the statement so given by the employee was that he had misrepresented in taking engagement by fraud inasmuch as, though the benefit of the GSO 295 was not available to the employee, based on the statement it was decided that he should be removed from service for which a show cause notice was issued on 11.04.2011. What was also invoked was Clause 16 of GSO 7. It will be in the fitness of things to reproduce the relevant clause of GSO 295 of the Gujarat Electricity Company. Clause 9 thereof reads as under : "9. EMPLOYMENT OF DEPENDENTS : 1 In case of deceased employees. In case an employee dies during service in the Board, one dependant (Child or spouse) would be employed by the Board on any vacant post for which such dependant holds the necessary qualifications/experience. This benefit would not be available in cases where one or more members of the family of the deceased employee is/are already employed within or outside the Board. 2. This benefit would not be available in cases where one or more members of the family of the deceased employee is/are already employed within or outside the Board. 2. In case of retired employees. Dependant children of retired employees who apply for posts advertised by the Board, will be given preference over other applicants having equal qualifications/experience. This benefit would not be available in cases where one or more members of the family of the deceased employee is/are already employed within or outside the Board. In both the above cases of recruitment, in relaxation of the maximum age prescribed, the maximum age limit would be considered to be 40 years of age. Explanation: Family member means a child only. Such appointments will be made with the prior approval of the Head Office." 7.2 As far as GSO 7 is concerned, Clause 16 thereof reads as under: "Any candidate who is found to have knowingly furnished any particulars which are false or to have suppressed material information of a character which, if known would ordinarily have debarred him from obtaining employment in the service of the Board, is liable to be disqualified and if appointed, to be removed from service." 7.3 Reading both these clauses indicates that a beneficiary of GSO 295 can only be one who has not been employed anywhere. In other words, the benefit of clause 9 of GSO 295 can be given to the dependent of the family of the deceased or the benefit would not be available to the family of the deceased in cases where one or more member of the family are already employed. It is the case of the employer here that based on a complaint of the Gujarat News Agency, the employee had given a statement on 28.03.2011 and had produced a certificate of 29.03.2010 which clearly indicated that it was a case where the employee was engaged with Jindal Saw Mill till 26.03.2010 i.e. when the employee had applied for appointment with the Corporation. The statement in the application therefore that he was not engaged was misleading and therefore the appointment being obtained by fraud was cancelled. It is in light of this that the findings of the Labour Court need to be appreciated. (8.) Firstly, before the Labour Court it has come on record that no oral evidence was led by the employer. The statement in the application therefore that he was not engaged was misleading and therefore the appointment being obtained by fraud was cancelled. It is in light of this that the findings of the Labour Court need to be appreciated. (8.) Firstly, before the Labour Court it has come on record that no oral evidence was led by the employer. Perusal of the award of the Labour Court would indicate that it was not even the case of the employer as is now pleaded before the Court that no departmental proceedings were necessary because it was a case where it was cancellation of appointment obtained by fraud. The Labour Court had no opportunity to examine this issue which is now raised by the learned counsel Mr.Dipak Dave for the employer citing the decisions referred to hereinabove. (9.) Perusal of the reasonings of the Labour Court would indicate that the Labour Court found that based on a complaint made by the newspaper on 08.03.2011, a statement was recorded by a superior officer of the Corporation at the workplace by summoning the employee. The Labour Court has found that on examining of the statement dated 28.03.2011 produced at Mark 11/6, it was a specific case in the statement of claim that such a statement was given by the employee as a result of undue influence or coercion on the part of the superior officer coming and recording such statement at the work place and the employee therefore had admitted that he had worked with Jindal Saw Limited from 06.06.2008 to 26.03.2010. The Labour Court found that the employer had not cross examined and denied the veracity of the employee that such a statement was obtained through coercion. It was the specific case of the employee that the statement was prepared and the employee was asked to sign on such statement and this stand of the employee was not tested by cross examining him on this issue by the employer. It is in light of this evidence that the Labour Court found favour with the employee holding that it can reasonably be inferred that the employee had no option but to sign on the signed statement made ready beforehand. In absence of a stand contrary to the one of the employee not tested through the cross examination at the hands of the employer, such a finding of the Labour Court cannot be faulted. In absence of a stand contrary to the one of the employee not tested through the cross examination at the hands of the employer, such a finding of the Labour Court cannot be faulted. (10.) Secondly, coming to the question of whether a departmental inquiry ought to have been held, the Labour Court has found based on the decisions of this Court in the case referred to in the award of the Labour Court that the show cause notice was given to the employee asking the employee to show cause as to why he should not be removed from service based on a statement recorded. The employee was a civil servant or holding a post in the nature thereof and therefore to hold that he had mislead the employer and obtained appointment could not have been an exercise undertaken without holding a departmental proceeding and issue of a charge sheet to the employee who was in service. The exercise was found to be in violation of principles of natural justice and merely because the statement was recorded on 28.03.2011 and a certificate produced, the employer could not have outright removed him from service without following the procedure envisaged under the principles of natural justice that is by holding a regular departmental inquiry. (11.) That brings us to the submission of the learned counsel for the employer that it was cancellation of appointment and no inquiry was necessary. Reliance placed on the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Kalyanji Somachand Maheshwari (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the case because the Division Bench only discussed the concept of compassionate appointment and the purpose thereof. The question whether a departmental proceeding was necessary or could have been given a go-bye is not an issue which appears to be under consideration in the Division Bench's decision. (12.) As far as the other decisions on the appointment obtained by fraud is concerned, there can be no dispute on the proposition of law canvassed by the learned counsel for the employer, Mr.Dipak Dave. (12.) As far as the other decisions on the appointment obtained by fraud is concerned, there can be no dispute on the proposition of law canvassed by the learned counsel for the employer, Mr.Dipak Dave. However, when the facts of the present case are considered in light of the submissions made by the parties before the Labour Court on the basis of evidence, which have been produced by the workman and the documents produced by the employer, without leading oral evidence the Labour Court has come to the conclusion that the proceedings which culminated into the order of removal could not have been so held without holding departmental proceedings. (13.) Even in the decision in the case of Kamal Nayan Mishra vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that when the appointment is obtained by fraud, departmental proceeding is a must. Paragraphs 12 to 24 thereof reads as under: "15. A confirmed government servant is the holder of a civil post entitled to the benefits of the safeguards provided by Article 311 of the Constitution. On the other hand, a probationer does not have any substantive right to hold the post, and is not entitled to the protection under Article 311. A probationer's services can be dispensed with during the period of probation, or at the end of the probation period, if his service is found to be unsatisfactory or if he is found to be unfit for appointment. In Ajit Singh vs. State of Punjab - 1983 (2) SCC 217 , this Court explained why termination of a probationer is permissible an inquiry: "If a servant could not be removed by way of punishment from service unless he is given an opportunity to meet the allegations if any against him which necessitates his removal from service, rules of natural justice postulate an enquiry into the allegations and proof thereof. This developing master servant relationship puts the master on guard. In order that an incompetent or inefficient servant is not foisted upon him because the charge of incompetence or inefficiency is easy to make but difficult to prove, concept of prohibition was devised. To guard against error of human judgment in selecting suitable personnel for service, the new recruit was put on test for a period before he is absorbed in service or gets a right to the post. To guard against error of human judgment in selecting suitable personnel for service, the new recruit was put on test for a period before he is absorbed in service or gets a right to the post. Period of probation gave a sort of locus pententiae to the employer to observe the work, ability, efficiency, sincerity and competence of the servant and if he is found not suitable for the post, the master reserved a right to dispense with his service without anything more during or at the end of the prescribed period which is styled as period of probation. Viewed from this aspect, the courts held that termination of service of a probationer during or at the end of a period of probation will not ordinarily and by itself be a punishment because the servant so appointed has no right to continue to hold such a post any more than a servant employed on probation by a private employer is entitled to. (See Purshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India - 1958 SCR 828 ). The period of probation therefore furnishes a valuable opportunity to the master to closely observe the work of the probationer and by the time the period of probation expires to make up his mind whether to retain the servant by absorbing him in regular service or dispense with his service." 17. Ram Ratan Yadav (supra) held that the services of a probationer who gave wrong information in regard to material particulars having a bearing on his fitness or suitability for appointment, can be terminated without giving any opportunity to show cause against the proposed termination. But once a probationer is confirmed in the post, his position and status becomes different as he gets the protection of Article 311. If it is found that the government servant who is holder of a civil post, has given any false information during the course of employment, that will have to be treated as a misconduct, and punishment can be imposed only after subjecting him to an appropriate disciplinary proceedings as per the relevant service Rules. 18. There are also several other features in this case which distinguish it from Ram Ratan Yadav. 18. There are also several other features in this case which distinguish it from Ram Ratan Yadav. First is that Ram Ratan Yadav related to an employee of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan, who did not have the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, whereas in this case we are concerned with a government servant protected by Article 311. Second is that the attestation form in this case, was required to be furnished by the employee, not when he was appointed, but after fourteen years of service. The third is that while action was promptly taken against the probationer, in the case of Ram Ratan Yadav, within the period of probation, in this case even after knowing that appellant had furnished wrong information, the respondents did not take any action for seven long years, which indicated that the department proceeded for a long time on the assumption that the wrong information did not call for any disciplinary or punitive action. The belated decision to terminate him, seven years later was unjustified and violative of Article 311. 19. If the appellant had been issued a charge sheet or a show cause notice he would have had an opportunity to explain the reason for answering the queries in column 12 in the manner he did. He could have explained that he did not understand the queries properly and that he was instructed to furnish the information as on the date of appointment. In fact his contention that he was required to answer the queries in column (12) with reference to the date of his appointment, finds support from the termination order, which says that the appellant was terminated for giving wrong information and concealment of facts in the attestation form at the time of initial recruitment. This clearly implies that he was expected to reply the queries in column 12 with reference to his initial appointment, even though clauses 12(b) and (c) of the form stated that the information should be as on the date of signing of the attestation form. The explanations given by the appellant, would have certainly made a difference to the finding on guilt and the punishment to be imposed. But he could not give the said explanations as there was no show cause notice or enquiry. The explanations given by the appellant, would have certainly made a difference to the finding on guilt and the punishment to be imposed. But he could not give the said explanations as there was no show cause notice or enquiry. The termination order is also unsustainable, as the statement therein that the appellant had given wrong information and concealed the facts at the time of initial recruitment, is erroneous. 20. The learned counsel for respondents drew our attention to the Instructions to the Employees in the preamble to the Attestation Form and the undertaking contained in the verification certificate by the employee at the end of the attestation form, which puts him on notice that any false information could result in termination of his service without enquiry. It is contended that as the attestation form stated that an employee could be terminated without notice, if he furnishes false information, the employee is estopped from objecting to termination without notice. The said contention may merit acceptance in the case of a probationer, but not in the case of a confirmed government servant. 21 No term in the attestation form, nor any consent given by a government servant, can take away the constitutional safeguard provided to a government servant under Article 311 of the Constitution. 22 A seven Judge Bench of this Court held in Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager, N.E. Frontier Railway, [ 1964 (5) SCR 683 ], observed as follows while negativing a contention that a person who enters service by executing a contract containing a rule contrary to Article 311, with open eyes, cannot be permitted to challenge the validity of the said rule or the contract: "31...In our opinion, this approach may be relevant in dealing with purely commercial cases governed by rules of contract; but it is wholly inappropriate in dealing with a case where the contract or the Rule is alleged to violate a constitutional guarantee afforded by Article 311(2);... 32. Let us then test this argument by reference to the provisions of Art. 311(1). Art. 311(1) provides that no person to whom the said article applies shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. 32. Let us then test this argument by reference to the provisions of Art. 311(1). Art. 311(1) provides that no person to whom the said article applies shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. Can it be suggested that the Railway Administration can enter into a contract with its employees by which authority to dismiss or remove the employees can be delegated to persons other than those contemplated by Art. 311(1) ? The answer to this question is obviously in the negative, and the same answer must be given to the contention that as a result of the contract which embodies the impugned Rules, the termination of the railway servant's services would not attract the provisions of Art. 311(2), though, in law, it amounts to removal." 23. We also find from an examination of the terms of the attestation form that termination without notice or inquiry was contemplated only in the context of furnishing false information in and around the time of the appointment. Note (1) of the preamble warns that "the furnishing of false information or suppression of any factual information in the attestation form would be a disqualification and is likely to render the candidate unfit for employment. Similarly the certificate at the end of the attestation form states that "I am not aware of any circumstances which might impair my fitness for employment under government. I agree that if the above information is found false or incomplete in any material respect, the appointing authority will have a right to terminate my services without giving notice or showing cause." Be that as it may. 24. The termination of appellant without an inquiry or hearing was illegal and invalid. In the normal course, we would have set aside the termination and directed reinstatement with consequential benefits, reserving liberty to the employer to initiate disciplinary proceedings. 24. The termination of appellant without an inquiry or hearing was illegal and invalid. In the normal course, we would have set aside the termination and directed reinstatement with consequential benefits, reserving liberty to the employer to initiate disciplinary proceedings. But the peculiar facts of this case require us to adopt a slightly difference approach to do complete justice between the parties." (14.) This brings us to the alternative submission of Mr.Dave that in light of a specific averment made in the written statement that if the Labour Court comes to the conclusion that an inquiry ought to be held and an opportunity so be given, the Labour Court ought to have given that opportunity to the employer, I am in agreement with that submission of Mr.Dave, learned counsel in light of the decisions cited in the case of Motipur Sugar (supra) where the specific averment was made by the employer before the Labour Court for giving it an opportunity to lead evidence, the Labour Court ought to have permitted the employer to lead evidence to prove the charge of the employee having obtained appointment by fraud. (15.) As far as the prayer of backwages is concerned, since the Court is of the opinion that the award of the Labour Court needs to be set aside and the proceedings be remanded for decision afresh, at this stage, no orders need be passed on the question of denial of backwages. (16.) Accordingly, both the petitions are allowed. The award of the Labour Court dated 03.04.2019 in Reference (LCN) 19 of 2017 of the Labour Court, Nadiad, is quashed and set aside. In light of the law laid down in Motipur Sugar Factory (supra), the Labour Court shall permit the employer to lead evidence before itself with regard to the dispute that is whether the appointment of the employee was obtained by fraud and the Labour Court shall, on the basis of evidence that is led before it after giving an opportunity of hearing to the workman before the Labour Court, pass a fresh award in light of what is laid down hereinabove. Depending on the award in question, a decision shall be taken by the Labour Court in accordance with law. Depending on the award in question, a decision shall be taken by the Labour Court in accordance with law. It is expected that since the Labour Court is requested to re-examine the issue on the basis of the employer being permitted to lead evidence on condition that both the employee and the employer shall co-operate in the proceeding before the Labour Court, the Labour Court, Nadiad is requested to hear and decide the proceedings afresh within a period of preferably six months from the date of receipt of the writ of this Court. Both the petitions are accordingly, allowed with no orders as to costs.