ORDER : K. Vinod Chandran, J. The above Crl. MC is filed by the petitioner who is convicted in Sessions Case 460 of 2012 under Sections 450, 394 & 302. Life imprisonment was imposed under Section 302 IPC and term sentences under Sections 450 & 394, respectively of 10 years each. The Sessions Court had also, relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka [ (2008) 13 SCC 767 ], directed that the accused shall not be released from the prison for a period of 20 years. In appeal, the conviction on all counts was confirmed by this Court. The sentence of life imprisonment, which was directed to be without remission for 20 years was interfered with for reason of the Sessions Judges having no such power as declared in Union of India v. V. Sriharan [ (2016) 7 SCC 1 ]. The direction to continue the imprisonment for 20 years without remission was alone interfered with. The sentence of life imprisonment under S.302 and the term sentences under the other two provisions stood confirmed. 2. The question raised in this Crl.M.C. is as to whether the sentences have to be undergone concurrently or consecutively; especially when no such direction is evident from the judgment. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellant Sri. M. Ravikrishnan relies on the judgment of a learned Single Judge produced as Annexure C. We are of the opinion that the judgment of the learned Single Judge would violate the doctrine of merger, by which the subordinate forum decisions merge in the decisions of the appellate or revisional forum; modifying, reversing or affirming that of the subordinate forum, as held in Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kerala [ (2000) 6 SCC 359 ] and reaffirmed and reiterated by a coequal bench in Khoday Distilleries Ltd v. Sri. Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd [ (2019) 4 SCC 376 ]. The learned Counsel then placed before us the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ranjit Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh [ (1991) 4 SCC 304 ], Ranjit Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh [ (1984) 1 SCC 31 ] and Muthuramalingam v. State [ (2016) 8 SCC 313 ]. 3. The learned Counsel then placed before us the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ranjit Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh [ (1991) 4 SCC 304 ], Ranjit Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh [ (1984) 1 SCC 31 ] and Muthuramalingam v. State [ (2016) 8 SCC 313 ]. 3. First we deal with Annexure C judgment which considered the question of whether the sentences imposed by the trial court should run concurrently or consecutively after the judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court and also the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which dismissed the SLP filed by the 3rd accused. A review petition was filed by A3, the second petitioner in the Crl. MC, before the Hon'ble Supreme Court for the very same relief, relying on Section 427(2) of the Cr.PC, which stood rejected. The learned Single Judge while expressing the opinion that even the second petitioner (A3) would have been given the benefit of a concurrent sentence, rejected it all the same since the Hon'ble Supreme Court had rejected a similar prayer in a review filed. However, with respect to A1, the first petitioner in the Crl M.C, the learned Single Judge directed that the term sentence shall run concurrently with the sentence of imprisonment for life. The aforesaid directions were issued based on a judgment of a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Surja Ram v. State, [AIR 1963 Rajasthan 202]. The learned Single Judge applying the dictum in Surja Ram (supra), held that though, S.427 (2) speaks of a subsequent sentence of imprisonment for a term or for life, awarded to a life convict undergoing the sentence, being concurrent; this principle can be adopted when a life sentence is imposed with term sentences, in the same trial. It was held that when a sentence of imprisonment for life is passed in a particular case, and there is also another sentence of imprisonment for a term, imposed in the same trial, then the principle of S.427(2) kicks in, especially when in the judgment the term imprisonment is imposed subsequent to the life imprisonment. The learned Judge also applied the principle that the term of every sentence starts from the moment the judgment is delivered. The learned Judge also applied the principle that the term of every sentence starts from the moment the judgment is delivered. With all the respect at our command, we are unable to agree with the interpretation of the provision made by the learned Single Judge for more than one reason. 4. First, the sequence in which the sentence is imposed for the various offences on which an accused is convicted, is often not a result of any deliberation and is mechanical; with the graver offence preceding the lesser one. Then, there was no warrant for the learned Single Judge to clarify the position, under S.482, especially when there is a merger of the decision of the Sessions Court with the decision of the High Court. The dismissal of the SLP by the Hon'ble Supreme Court does not result in a merger as held in Kunhayammed. (supra). Further S.482 is to be exercised, to give effect to any order under this Code, to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Even the ground of securing ends of justice is not available, insofar as the Government having not exercised its power of remission regarding the sentence imposed on the two accused who were the petitioners in the Crl.M.C., even when the matter was being heard by the learned Single Judge. 5. First of all, as we noticed, the order of the learned Single Judge violates the doctrine of merger and then, the relief prayed in the Crl.M.C. was only on an anticipation that the Government would grant remission. The learned Single Judge thus exercised the inherent jurisdiction in a total vacuum. We pertinently notice that the Division Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan had invoked the jurisdiction, only when remission was granted and the question arose as to whether the life convict had to then undergo the term sentences imposed on him. Yet again, when the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a review petition by one of the accused seeking concurrent running of sentences, had rejected the prayer, the sentence imposed had to run consecutively not only for the said accused but also for the other accused who was imposed with the very same sentences of life and 10 years by the trial court, with respect to the identical offence arising from the very same transaction and that too in the very same trial. The accused who did not file a S.L.P cannot be placed in a more advantageous position from the one who unsuccessfully challenged the conviction and got rejected a review, praying for concurrent sufferance of imprisonments imposed. The sentencing discretion employed by the trial court and the High Court on both the accused was similar. That having been said, we have to necessarily look at the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions cited by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner herein. 6. Ranjith Singh (I) (supra) was a case in which a life convict, while on parole committed another murder for which, again he was convicted under S.303, with death. Before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the only question raised was on the question of sentence under S.303, which provision was held unconstitutional, upon which the sentence was altered as imprisonment for life. The Hon'ble Supreme Court noticing the fact that the second murder was committed within a span of one year from his earlier conviction and that too when he was released on parole, directed that the sentence shall not run concurrently and specifically ordered that if there is any remission or commutation in respect of his earlier sentence, the subsequent sentence would commence thereafter. Invoking Article 32, the convict approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court relying on subsection (2) of S.427. The Hon'ble Supreme Court accepted the argument that when a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed, it definitely means a sentence to serve the reminder of life in prison unless commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority. A person having only one life span; a sentence, on a subsequent conviction of imprisonment either for a term or life, can only be super imposed to the earlier life sentence and certainly not added to it since extending the life span of the offender or for that matter anyone, is beyond human might (sic para 8). The court found that whereas under sub section (1) of S.427, an express direction of the court should be there for enabling the convict to undergo the different sentences concurrently; under sub-section (2), the provision itself provides for such concurrent running of the earlier life sentence and the subsequent sentence, for life or a term. The court found that whereas under sub section (1) of S.427, an express direction of the court should be there for enabling the convict to undergo the different sentences concurrently; under sub-section (2), the provision itself provides for such concurrent running of the earlier life sentence and the subsequent sentence, for life or a term. The learned Judges noted the directions in the 1983 judgment and upheld it, since the consecutive running of the subsequent life sentence was only, if and when, there was a remission or commutation of the earlier sentence. It was held that the operation of the super imposed subsequent sentence of life imprisonment shall not be wiped out merely because, the corresponding earlier sentence of life imprisonment is remitted or commuted by the appropriate authority. The effect of S.427 (2) was held to be such that if the earlier life sentence is remitted or commuted, the super imposed subsequent life sentence kicks into operation immediately, unless the same corresponding benefit in respect of the subsequent sentence is also granted to the convict. 7. The present case is not similar to the facts of Ranjith Singh (supra). Here, the petitioner was earlier convicted for life and he was released on remission of that sentence for life and he is now convicted on a subsequent offence of murder, which was committed after his release from prison, on remission of the sentence on the earlier conviction. S.427 (2) hence has no application to the instant case and as we already observed, we cannot accede to the interpretation that, in the judgment, the sentence under S.302 having been first imposed, the subsequent sentences should only run concurrently based on the principle under S.427 (2). Now we come to Muthuramalingam (supra), where, again the facts were different from the instant case in so far as there were multiple life sentences imposed on the accused for each one of the murders committed, in a single incident. The question referred to the larger bench was whether 'consecutive life sentences can be awarded to a convict on being found guilty of a series of murders for which he has been tried in a single trial' (sic). The question was answered in the negative and we extract paragraph 34 : 34. In conclusion our answer to the question is in the negative. The question was answered in the negative and we extract paragraph 34 : 34. In conclusion our answer to the question is in the negative. We hold that while multiple sentences for imprisonment for life can be awarded for multiple murders or other offences punishable with imprisonment for life, the life sentences so awarded cannot be directed to run consecutively. Such sentences would, however, be superimposed over each other so that any remission or commutation granted by the competent authority in one, does not ipso facto result in remission of the sentence awarded to the prisoner for the other. 8. We have to dwell deeper, in so far as the sentences being different in the present case; but there is discernible a principle, from the discussions made in the decision of the Constitution Bench. The Learned Judges looked at S.31 and the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in O.M. Cherian alias Thankachan v. State of Kerala [ (2015) 2 SCC 501 ] and Duryodhan Rout v. State of Orissa [ (2015) 2 SCC 783 ] which held that subsequent life sentences cannot run consecutively on the simple logic that imprisonment for life, implies imprisonment till the end of the normal life of the convict. The logic underlying the ratio of the said decisions, was held to be undisputed going by the principles enunciated in a number of decisions starting from Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra [ (1961) 3 SCR 440 ] up to Sriharan (supra). The undisputed legal position is that life imprisonment means the entirety of the life, unless it is curtailed by remissions, validly granted under the CrP.C. by the appropriate Government or under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India. A direction that requires the offender to undergo imprisonment for life twice was held to be 'anomalous and irrational for it will disregard the fact that humans like all other living beings have but one life to live' (sic). The case of Ranjith Singh (supra) was referred to and the principle of super imposition of a subsequent life sentence over the earlier life sentence was affirmed. The case of Ranjith Singh (supra) was referred to and the principle of super imposition of a subsequent life sentence over the earlier life sentence was affirmed. It was found that, on facts in Ranjith Singh (supra) the subsequent conviction having occurred while the accused was suffering an earlier life sentence, it was covered by S.427(2) of the CrP.C. However, the question referred to the Constitution Bench was different and dealt with different sentences of life, for multiple murders in the same trial. Such cases, it was held, fell more appropriately under S.31. While sub-section (1) of Section 31 empowers the court to award several punishments prescribed for different offences in the very same trial, it also casts a discretion on the court to direct that such punishment of imprisonment shall commence one after the expiration of the other, unless the court directs such punishment shall run concurrently. 9. We pause here, to observe that there the question considered was regarding separate life sentences in a single trial; whether they can be directed to run consecutively. The learned Judges held that apart from the provision of S.427 (2), the principle adopted in Ranjith Singh (supra), that life sentence implies imprisonment for the reminder of the life of the convict and hence consecutive life sentences cannot be awarded as humans have only one life, has also to be extended to S.31 of the Cr.P.C. It was held so in paragraph 24 : 23. Parliament, it manifests from the provisions of Section 427(2) CrPC, was fully cognizant of the anomaly that would arise if a prisoner condemned to undergo life imprisonment is directed to do so twice over. It has, therefore, carved out an exception to the general rule to clearly recognise that in the case of life sentences for two distinct offences separately tried and held proved the sentences cannot be directed to run consecutively. The provisions of Section 427(2) CrPC apart, in Ranjit Singh case [Ranjit Singh v. UT of Chandigarh, (1991) 4 SCC 304 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 965], this Court has in terms held that since life sentence implies imprisonment for the remainder of the life of the convict, consecutive life sentences cannot be awarded as humans have only one life. The provisions of Section 427(2) CrPC apart, in Ranjit Singh case [Ranjit Singh v. UT of Chandigarh, (1991) 4 SCC 304 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 965], this Court has in terms held that since life sentence implies imprisonment for the remainder of the life of the convict, consecutive life sentences cannot be awarded as humans have only one life. That logic, in our view, must extend to Section 31 CrPC also no matter Section 31 does not in terms make a provision analogous to Section 427(2) of the Code. The provision must, in our opinion, be so interpreted as to prevent any anomaly or irrationality. So interpreted Section 31(1) CrPC must mean that sentences awarded by the court for several offences committed by the prisoner shall run consecutively (unless the court directs otherwise) except where such sentences include imprisonment for life which can and must run concurrently. We are also inclined to hold that if more than one life sentences are awarded to the prisoner, the same would get superimposed over each other. This will imply that in case the prisoner is granted the benefit of any remission or commutation qua one such sentence, the benefit of such remission would not ipso facto extend to the other. [underlining by us for emphasis] 10. It was also held by the Constitution Bench that, when a life imprisonment is imposed, along with term imprisonments for other offences, it shall run concurrently unless the court directs that the prisoner shall first undergo the term sentence before the commencement of his life sentence. In the present case we find no such direction having been issued and, in those circumstances, going by the dictum of the Constitution Bench, the sentences have to be deemed to be concurrent and not consecutive, since, after undergoing imprisonment for the whole life; ie: till death, there cannot be a further imprisonment, factually and even on principle, impossible. All the same there could be a direction that the term sentences are suffered before the life sentence [para 32 of Muthuramalingam (supra)]. 11. Now the question arises as to whether on remission being granted to the life sentence, would the term sentences imposed in the same trial also be deemed to have been served; since under subsection (2) of S.31, there cannot be a sentence exceeding 14 years. In this context we notice paragraph 25 of the Muthuramalingam (supra) : 28. 11. Now the question arises as to whether on remission being granted to the life sentence, would the term sentences imposed in the same trial also be deemed to have been served; since under subsection (2) of S.31, there cannot be a sentence exceeding 14 years. In this context we notice paragraph 25 of the Muthuramalingam (supra) : 28. While we have no doubt about the correctness of the proposition that two life sentences cannot be directed to run consecutively, we do not think that the reason for saying so lies in the proviso to Section 31(2). Section 31(2) CrPC deals with situations where the court awarding consecutive sentences is not competent to award the aggregate of the punishment for the several offences for which the prisoner is being sentenced upon conviction. A careful reading of sub-section (2) would show that the same is concerned only with situations where the courts awarding the sentence and directing the same to run consecutively is not competent to award the aggregate of the punishment upon conviction for a single offence. The proviso further stipulates that in cases falling under subsection (2), the sentence shall in no case go beyond 14 years and the aggregate punishment shall not exceed twice the amount of punishment which the court is competent to award. Now in cases tried by the Sessions Court, there is no limitation as to the court's power to award any punishment sanctioned by law including the capital punishment. Sub-section (2) will, therefore, have no application to a case tried by the Sessions Court nor would sub-section (2) step in to forbid a direction for consecutive running of sentences awardable by the Court of Session. [underlining by us for emphasis] 12. Section 31 (2) does not hence apply to sentences passed by a Sessions Court and the said reasoning in Duryodhan Rout (supra) was held to be not correct, though the dictum of consecutive running of life sentences was upheld. Viewed in that context, sub-section (2) of S.31 has no application to the present case, nor can the principle in Section 427(2) have any application. Life imprisonment when imposed, always & necessarily, extends to the whole of the life of the convict and in those circumstances, logically the term sentences should also run concurrently. Viewed in that context, sub-section (2) of S.31 has no application to the present case, nor can the principle in Section 427(2) have any application. Life imprisonment when imposed, always & necessarily, extends to the whole of the life of the convict and in those circumstances, logically the term sentences should also run concurrently. However, since the bar under sub section (2) of S.31 is not applicable in the present case, where the Sessions Court had no limitation in awarding any punishment sanctioned by law, including capital punishment, the very same super imposition of sentences has to occur when life sentence is subjected to remission. 13. What is res integra, as we discern from the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, are only two aspects. The first, as to when, there are two life sentences, to be suffered concurrently and in one, remission is granted, whether remission can be granted to the other, immediately or only after a further 14 years, as provided in Section 433-A of the Criminal Procedure Code? The second, as to what would be the consequence of a remission being granted to a life sentence imposed on a convict, who has also been imposed with term sentences in the very same trial; without any direction to suffer the sentences consecutively or concurrently ? We are not called upon to answer the first, and the second question is what would be germane applied by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in two life sentences, for consideration. According to us, the principle of superimposition will have to be applied to the facts from which arise the second question. If a life sentence is reduced to 14 years, then necessarily the term sentences imposed in the same trial kicks into operation and in those circumstances, a release would be possible only if the power of remission is exercised by the appropriate Government with respect to all the term sentences. 14. Having so stated the law as declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we cannot but notice that there is absolutely no reason in the present case to invoke S.482. 14. Having so stated the law as declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we cannot but notice that there is absolutely no reason in the present case to invoke S.482. There is no remission or commutation granted and the convict has not even suffered the minimum period for granting remission or commutation under Sections 433 and 433A of the Cr.P.C. We answered the question posed, only to make the position clear, as to the effect of term sentences and life imprisonment, imposed in the same trial, without any direction of such sentences running concurrently or consecutively, and there is a remission granted to the life sentence after 14 years. There is however, no reason to entertain the Crl.M.C. under Section 482 in the above case, since the circumstance of a remission or commutation has not arisen. The Crl.M.C stands dismissed.