JUDGMENT : VINOD CHATTERJI KOUL, J. 1. Setting-aside of the Order dated 5th November 2016, passed by Principal District Judge, Jammu (for brevity “Appellate Court”) in a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, bearing File No. 45/Appeal titled Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. M/s Muktanand Auto Ltd. and Others and maintaining of Order dated 19th September, 2014, passed by Munsiff Jammu (for short “Trial Court”) in a suit bearing File no. 19/827/Misc. titled M/s Shree Muktanand Auto Aid Ltd. and Others vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Another, on the grounds made mention of in petitions on hand. 2. The case set up by petitioners is that petitioner no. 2 was initially selected for grant of retail outlet licence for petrol and other petroleum products in the month of February 2001. She is said to have apprised respondents qua her weak financial condition and requested them to allow her to have financial partners for smooth conduct of retail outlet business and as a consequence of which, partnership deed was proposed to respondents so as to add petitioner no. 3 as second partner. It is stated that proposal submitted by petitioner no. 2 was accepted and ultimately an agreement for dispensing pump and selling licence was executed between petitioners and respondents on 12th April 2002. It is also contended that land over which petrol pump was to be operated, was taken over by respondents on lease hold basis for a period of 40 years and a proper lease deed in this regard was executed. It is also stated that reconstitution of the firm, permitting Santosh Gupta as financial, was sought, but by communication dated 15th December 2003, respondent no. 2 called upon petitioner to indicate as to whether dealership granted in their favour had been transferred to third person or not and thereafter some information was sought from petitioners. It is contended that respondent no. 2 vide communication dated 18th May 2004, called upon petitioners to submit their reply within 24 hours containing a potential threat therein that on failure of petitioners to submit reply, the retail outlet licence granted to petitioners would be terminated. Faced with the situation, petitioners filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction seeking to restrain respondents from terminating their retail outlet licence which was granted to petitioners vide agreement dated 12th April 2002. Faced with the situation, petitioners filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction seeking to restrain respondents from terminating their retail outlet licence which was granted to petitioners vide agreement dated 12th April 2002. Petitioners also sought a decree of mandatory injunction seeking a direction to respondents to maintain the supply of petrol, diesel and lubricants and to implement all other day to day obligation, with a further direction to consider and dispose of the request of petitioners for change of constitution of licence. Learned 3 rd Additional Munsiff, Jammu, vide order dated 24th May 2004 restrained respondents from terminating the retail outlet licence granted in favour of petitioners and also directed to maintain the supplies of petroleum products. It is averred that through respondents filed written statement in the matter yet they did never seek vacation of interim order. Another suit is stated to have been filed. In both the suits, the Trial Court vide common order dated 19th September 2014 decided interim applications and made interim orders passed therein absolute and restrained respondents from terminating the licence of petitioner as also to maintain supplies to disposal of main suit. 3. Respondents, aggrieved of order dated 19th September 2014, preferred two separate Appeals. The Appellate Court vide order dated 5th November 2016 accepted both the appeals and set-aside the Trial Court orders and as a corollary thereof, application for temporary injunction filed by plaintiffs/petitioners were dismissed. 4. I have heard learned counsel for parties and considered the matter. 5. Learned counsel for petitioners states that impugned order is contrary to facts and law as it has resulted in serious miscarriage of justice inasmuch as it has upset the well-reasoned order of the Trial Court. It is contended that the Trial Court had discussed the merit of contentions raised by both the parties to find out as to whether a prima facie case for making the interim directions absolute was made out or not. It is also stated that the Trial Court at page 15 of the order not only discussed the facts of the case but also the case law cited by both the parties and after taking note of the factual submissions and law cited, discussed all three broad principles which govern the grant or refusal of temporary injunction. It is also stated that the Trial Court at page 15 of the order not only discussed the facts of the case but also the case law cited by both the parties and after taking note of the factual submissions and law cited, discussed all three broad principles which govern the grant or refusal of temporary injunction. It was only after finding that there was strong prima facie case in favour of petitioners that the interim order was made absolute. This important aspect of the matter, according to learned counsel for petitioner, has not been taken into account by the Appellate Court while passing impugned order. It is also vehemently stated that impugned order has virtually non-suited the petitioners and suits filed by them have been rendered infructuous, which has resulted in serious miscarriage of justice. He also submits that the plea of petitioners, which was well appreciated by the Trial Court, could not be considered and appreciated by the Appellate Court that although petitioners had been put on a show cause notice, yet the show cause notice was only a formality and contained a potential threat of causing injury, i.e., termination of the licence and in this regard only 24 hours time was given so that intended action of terminating the licence was taken without affording full opportunity to petitioners to present their case and without holding an inquiry into the matter. He also avers that chance of constitution of a firm, which is otherwise permissible under the terms and conditions of the agreement even if assumed to be there, could not have been made the basis of taking a drastic action of terminating the licence and depriving petitioners of their right of livelihood. It is not that every violation of terms and conditions must necessarily entail termination of a licence and once it is found that there is power reserved with the company to permit the change of constitution, there could be no serious infraction of terms and conditions of the agreement if in anticipation of the permission granted to partnership firm is reconstituted. Such violation even if proved could be penalized by monetary penalty and cannot be made the basis for taking the extreme action of terminating the licence. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents avers that impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity. Such violation even if proved could be penalized by monetary penalty and cannot be made the basis for taking the extreme action of terminating the licence. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents avers that impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity. It is stated that the Appellate Court has rightly set-aside the Trial Court as the Trial Court has ignored the fact of the case that the site of petrol outlet under lease with respondent upon which a petrol pump has been constructed by respondent is the absolute property in possession of respondents and the respondents have regularly been paying the rent of the property under lease and that appellants are only the agents/dealers of respondents to sell the petroleum products of respondents at the retail outlet and that Trial Court has not appreciated the legal position of creation of partnership by appellants while considering the interim application inasmuch as the Trial Court has not appreciated the law cited by respondents in support of their case. It is submitted that object and purpose of injunction is to restrain some wrongful act whereas in the present case, respondents being owners in possession of petrol outlet are authorized to check the violation committed by its dealer. It is also submitted that the Appellate Court discussed all aspects of the matter verbosely. 7. In view of case set up and submissions made by learned counsel for parties, it would be apt to go through both the Trial Court order and Appellate Court order. 8. In terms of order dated 19th September 2014 passed by the Trial Court, application for grant of temporary injunction has been decided, making absolute interim order dated 9th August 2004 whereas in terms of impugned order dated 5th November 2016 passed by the Appellate Court, the Trial Court order dated 19th September 2014 has been set-aside. 9. As is gatherable from above, it was interim application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the Trial Court that was decided by it. Order 39 relates to temporary injunctions and interlocutory orders. Provisions of Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC is, thus, advantageous to be reproduced here: “1. 9. As is gatherable from above, it was interim application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the Trial Court that was decided by it. Order 39 relates to temporary injunctions and interlocutory orders. Provisions of Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC is, thus, advantageous to be reproduced here: “1. Cases in which temporary injunction may be granted: Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise: (a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in a execution of a decree. (b) that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to [defrauding] his creditors. (c) that the defendant threatens to dispossess, the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit: Provided that the Court before granting any injunction shall invariably call upon the applicant to satisfy it by an affidavit or otherwise that no suit of similar nature is pending in or has already been decided by any court of competent jurisdiction. 2. Injunction to restrain repetition or continuance of breach: (1) In any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind, whether compensation is claimed in the suit or not, the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after judgment, apply to the Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained, of, or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right. (2) The Court may by order grant such injunction, on such terms as to the duration of the injunction, keeping an account, giving security, or otherwise, as the Court thinks fit.” 10. An injunction is a judicial process, by which a party is required to do, or refrain from doing any act. It is the remedy in the form of an order of the court addressed to a person that either prohibits him from doing or continue to do such act. An injunction is a judicial process, by which a party is required to do, or refrain from doing any act. It is the remedy in the form of an order of the court addressed to a person that either prohibits him from doing or continue to do such act. Therefore, injunction is a relief which prevents or restricts from doing an act or may include the order from doing any act for the purpose of prevention. A temporary or interim injunction restrains a party temporarily from doing the specified act and can be granted only until the disposal of the suit or until further order of the court. It is regulated, as said above, under the provisions of Order 39 CPC and may be granted at any stage of the suit. 11. Law is well settled that prior to grant of injunction, the court must be satisfied that there is a prima facie case in favour of the person seeking injunction and such person would suffer irreparable loss in the event injunction is not granted and the balance of convenience is in favour of such person. It is not necessary for the party to prove his case to the hilt and if a fair question is raised for determination, it should be taken that a prima-facie case is established. 12. The jurisdiction of the Courts is not confined to grant injunction only to protect equitable right; it extends to the protection of legal rights to property from damage during the pendency of litigation. While exercising such rights the court does not pretend o determine the legal rights to property; it simply keeps the property in its actual condition until the title can be established. On the assumption that the party asking interference of the Court to protect his legal right needs the protection of the Court until his legal right is established then the Courts can grant injunction. Therefore, the party approaching the Court for protection must show a fair prima-facie case to establish the title he asserts. While considering the question of prima facie case what the Court is required to see is whether there is a fair question involved in the suit for decision and it will suffice. All that the plaintiff is required to show is that he has a fair and serious question to be tried. 13. While considering the question of prima facie case what the Court is required to see is whether there is a fair question involved in the suit for decision and it will suffice. All that the plaintiff is required to show is that he has a fair and serious question to be tried. 13. It is well settled that while granting temporary injunction, the Court cannot be regarded to deal with the suit on merits. The proceedings pertaining to grant of temporary injunctions are supplemental proceedings and the Court should refrain from giving a finding on the merits of the case. When the present case is looked into in the context of above discussion, it is clearly coming to fore that the Appellate Court while passing impugned order, has discussed the merits of the main case. The Appellate Court was to decide the Appeal vis-a-vis the interim order passed by the Trial Court. The observations made in the impugned order has direct bearing on the whole case of plaintiffs/petitioners. Allowing of the appeal by the Appellate Court has, in essence and core, non-suited the plaintiffs/petitioners. In that view of matter, impugned order requires interference. 14. For the reasons discussed above, the instant petitions are allowed and impugned Order dated 5th November 2016, passed by Principal District Judge, Jammu, in a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, bearing File no. 45/Appeal titled Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. M/s Muktanand Auto Ltd. and Others, is set-aside, and the Order dated 19th September 2014, passed by Munsiff, Jammu, in a suit bearing File No. 19/827/Misc. titled M/s Shree Muktanand Auto Aid Ltd. and Others vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and another, is upheld. 15. Copy of this order be sent down along with the record, if summoned/received.