JUDGMENT : SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI, J. 1. Heard Mr. Pandey Neeraj Rai, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Ravi Prakash, the learned counsel for the State and Mr. Rishikesh Giri, the learned counsel for the respondent opposite party no. 2. 2. This petition has been filed for quashing the entire criminal proceeding including the order taking cognizance dated 20.02.2019 in connection with Cyber Crime P.S. Case No. 04/2018, pending in the court of the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-II, Ranchi. 3. The FIR was lodged on the basis of a complaint to the S.P. Cyber Crime Branch, Ranchi by one Perfetti Van Melle India Private Limited, represented by its purported power of attorney holder Mr. Anand Tiwary, the offending act in the complaint is under the heading infringing activities. It was further alleged that an unknown person has without any permission/consent of the company used clip of the Mentos advertisement and a song of well known Hindi movie whereby they have sought to demean and denigrate the Hon’ble and respectable Chief Minister and other political dignitaries of the State of Jharkhand. The said video has been tweeted from twitter handle account @ madeinranchi. It was also alleged that the informant's/complaint’s right under Trademarks Act and Copy Right Act has been infringed. 4. Mr. Pandey Neeraj Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was arrested on the allegation of being user of the twitter handle account on 03.04.2018 itself. Eventually, he was granted regular bail on 10.04.2018 by the court below. His mobile phone which was seized was released by order dated 24.05.2018. He further submits that the charge-sheet has been submitted against the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 419, 420, 468, 500 and 505 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 63 of the Copy Right Act, under Sections 103 and 105 of the Trademark Act and under Sections 66(C) and 66(D) of the Information Technology Act. He also submits that the cognizance has been taken without examining whether the ingredients are made out against the petitioner or not. He further submits that in absence of any legal evidence, the cognizance has been taken against the petitioner. He also submits that the cognizance has been taken without examining whether the ingredients are made out against the petitioner or not. He further submits that in absence of any legal evidence, the cognizance has been taken against the petitioner. He further elaborated his argument by way of submitting that it has been alleged that the petitioner has uploaded a video in his twitter account on 01.04.2018 in which the Chief Minister of Jharkhand was shown, mixing the same with a song of Hindi film and advertisement of Mentos. He also submits that the video was uploaded in a lighter sense on 01.04.2018. There was nothing to harm the reputation of any higher. He further submits that the said video was not meant for any commercial purpose and admittedly the product has not been used for business or advertisement purpose and accordingly there is no ingredient under Section 63 of the Copy Right Act, Sections 103 and 105 of the Trademark Act and Section 66(C) and 66(D) of the Information Technology Act against the petitioner. He further draws attention of the Court to the supplementary affidavit wherein the case diary has been annexed and by way of referring the statement of one Pratyush Kumar Guha, he submits that he has only stated that he has asked the informant to lodge the FIR. On this ground, he submits that it is a case of malicious prosecution and no ingredient is made out against the petitioner and this Court is competent to quash the entire criminal proceeding including the order taking cognizance. 5. Mr. Ravi Prakash, learned counsel for the State submits that there are ingredients of the said sections and therefore the learned court has rightly taken the cognizance. He further submits that the petitioner has admitted before the police about release of the said video and the investigating agency has submitted charge-sheet against the petitioner. 6. Mr. Rishikesh Giri, learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 supported the contents of the FIR. He further submits that the petitioner has been benefited by way of releasing the said video and due to which viewership of his twitter has been increased. 7. In view of the above submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, this Court has gone through the materials on the record. 2 supported the contents of the FIR. He further submits that the petitioner has been benefited by way of releasing the said video and due to which viewership of his twitter has been increased. 7. In view of the above submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, this Court has gone through the materials on the record. Looking to the complaint, this Court finds that there was mixing of Mentos with well known Hindi movie song in the said video. Looking into the averment made in the complaint, so far as penal Sections 419, 420, 468, 500, 505 of the Indian Penal Code are concerned, the ingredients of these sections are not made out against the petitioner. 8. Section 419 of the Indian Penal Code speaks about punishment for cheating by personation, the ingredient of which is not made out against the petitioner by reading the entire complaint. 9. Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code speaks about cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. The ingredients of an offence of cheating are that there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him, the person so deceived should be induced to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property or the person so deceived should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived. A reference may be made to the case of S.W. Palanitkar vs. State of Bihar, 2002 SCC (Cri) 129. 10. Section 468 of the Indian Penal Code speaks about forgery for purpose of cheating and the entire contents of the FIR are not disclosing the ingredient under this section. 11. Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code speaks about punishment for defamation. For taking cognizance under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code, the explanation (ii) of Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code is required to be looked into and if the requirement of that is fulfilled, then only cognizance under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code will be taken. Moreover, aggrieved person is required to file the case. A reference is made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S. Khushboo vs. Kanniammal and Another, (2010) 5 SCC 600 . Paragraph 40 of the said judgment is quoted herein-below: “40. Moreover, aggrieved person is required to file the case. A reference is made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S. Khushboo vs. Kanniammal and Another, (2010) 5 SCC 600 . Paragraph 40 of the said judgment is quoted herein-below: “40. A complaint under Sections 499, 500 and 501 IPC was filed in response to this report. Like the present case, the Court had to consider whether the complainant had the proper legal standing to bring such a complaint. The Court did examine Section 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (analogous to Section 199 of the Cr.P.C. 1973) and observed that the said provision laid down an exception to the general rule that a criminal complaint can be filed by anyone irrespective of whether he is an “aggrieved person” or not. But there is a departure from this norm in so far as the provision permits only an “aggrieved person” to move the Court in case of defamation. This section is mandatory and it is a settled legal proposition that if a Magistrate were to take cognizance of the offence of defamation on a complaint filed by one who is not an “aggrieved person” the trial and conviction of an accused in such a case by the Magistrate would be void and illegal.” 12. Section 505 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out against the petitioner as it has not been alleged that anything has been delivered for public mischief. Thus, the ingredients under the aforesaid sections of the Indian Penal Code are not made out against the petitioner. 13. As per Section 28 of the Trade Marks Act, trademarks is valid only in relation to goods and services in respect of which trademarks is registered. From the contents of the FIR, it is crystal clear that the petitioner was never intended to sell a product similar to Mentos. Sub-Section (2) of Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act speaks that a person infringes the trademarks if he uses it for similar goods so as to cause confusion on the part of the public or which is likely to have an association with the registered trademarks. Sub-Section (2) of Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act speaks that a person infringes the trademarks if he uses it for similar goods so as to cause confusion on the part of the public or which is likely to have an association with the registered trademarks. Section 115 of the Trade Marks Act speaks about search and seizure and it required to be done by the officer not below the rank of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, whereas, in the case in hand, the case was investigated by the Police Inspector. Moreover, as per Sub-Section (4) of Section 115 of the Trade Marks Act, opinion of the Registrar is required to be obtained before making search and seizure, which has not been followed in the case in hand. 14. Section 52 of the Copyrights Act speaks about certain acts not to be infringement of copyright. Sub-Section (1)(l) of Section 52 of the Copyrights Act reads as under: “52(1)(l) the performance of a literary, dramatic or musical work by an amateur club or society, if the performance is given to a non-paying audience, or for the benefit of a religious institution.” 15. From reading of Sub-Section (1)(l) of Section 52 of the Copyrights Act, it is crystal clear that for literary, dramatic or musical work by an amateur club or society, the Copyrights Act is not applicable. 16. There is no allegation of use of electronic signature, password or any unique identification of any person by the petitioner. Thus, the ingredient of Section 66(C) of the Information Technology Act is not made out against the petitioner. Furthermore, there is no allegation of cheating by personating of any person by the petitioner. Thus also, the ingredient of Section 66(D) of the Information Technology Act is not made out against the petitioner. 17. The cognizance order dated 20.02.2019 is also not in accordance with law. What are the materials against the petitioner, is not disclosed in the impugned order. For taking cognizance, a detailed order is not required to be passed, however what are the prima facie materials against the accused, that is required to be disclosed in the cognizance order, which is lacking in the case in hand. 18. What are the materials against the petitioner, is not disclosed in the impugned order. For taking cognizance, a detailed order is not required to be passed, however what are the prima facie materials against the accused, that is required to be disclosed in the cognizance order, which is lacking in the case in hand. 18. In view of the above discussions, reasons and analysis, this Court comes to the conclusion that it is a fit case to exercise power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Accordingly, the entire criminal proceeding including the order taking cognizance dated 20.02.2019 in connection with Cyber Crime P.S. Case No. 04/2018, pending in the court of the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-II, Ranchi is, hereby, quashed. 19. This petition is, therefore, allowed and disposed of. 20. Interim order dated 27.11.2019 stands vacated.