JUDGMENT : ALEXANDER THOMAS, J. 1. These intra court appeals are disposed of on the basis of this common judgment, as more or less identical and similar issues arise in these cases. 2. Heard the learned Senior Counsel, instructed by the learned Standing Counsel for the appellants and the learned Advocates appearing for the respective respondent-writ petitioners. 3. The writ petitioners are retired employees of the appellant Company, viz. M/s. Kerala State Financial Enterprises Ltd. (KSFE Ltd.) which is fully owned by the Government of Kerala and they are essentially aggrieved by the non-disbursal of non-statutory service benefits, like Earned Leave surrender, arrears of Dearness Allowance, salary revision arrears, festival incentives, flood relief amount, etc. The main ground of denial of these benefits, put forth by the appellant Company, is the pendency of liabilities, due to the alleged grant of sticky loans/chits by the writ petitioners, which is allegedly in violation of the appellant Company's circulars and norms. 4. The learned Single Judge, after hearing both sides, has rendered the impugned judgments in these cases, finding that no disciplinary proceedings were ever initiated against the petitioners, while they were in service, on account of the abovesaid allegations and further that, no rule or regulation, enabling the company to initiate the proceedings for recovery or for withholding the abovesaid benefits after retirement, is in existence of the company. Hence, the learned Single Judge has held that the non-disbursal of the abovesaid benefits, based on an unsubstantiated allegation of having caused loss to the Company, is not only illegal but also ultra vires and that it would amount to violation of the property right of the writ petitioners, guaranteed in terms of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. On this basis, the learned Single Judge has issued directions for disbursal of the abovesaid benefits within a period of three months of receiving a copy of the judgment. Incidentally, at the W.P. (C) stage, gratuity amounts were also the subject matter of disputes and the learned Single Judge has directed that the gratuity and other benefits, due to the petitioners, shall be paid within 3 months and that the unpaid gratuity amount will carry interest @ 6% p.a. computed from the first day of the next month of the retirement of the respective writ petitioners, etc. Further, in case of failure to pay the amounts within 3 months, the amounts will carry interest @ 9% p. a. reckoned from the respective dates of retirements of the petitioners. 5. The learned Standing Counsel for the appellant company has submitted that now statutory terminal benefits, like gratuity, etc. have already been disbursed and the only dispute is regarding the other service benefits mentioned above. 6. According to the appellant company, their usual practice is to quantify the liability of each employee, prior to the settlement of retirement benefits of the incumbents concerned and for that purpose, liabilities/non-liability reports are collected from the Head Offices and branches, where the employees had worked, and in the process, if any liability is reported, they will have to be deducted from the benefits due to the employees. Further that, the writ petitioners have sanctioned sticky loans and chitties, in violation of the norms and that the said liability amounts will also have to be deducted from the above benefits. 7. The appellant company is registered and incorporated as a Company, as per the Companies Act and hence, it is a non-statutory body. The learned Advocates, appearing for the respondent-writ petitioners, have made available copies of the Manual of Procedure being followed by the appellant company as well as a copy of the Standing Orders applicable to employees of the appellant-KSFE. Clause 3.21 of the Manual of Procedure deals with “Standing Orders” and it states that the Standing Orders, as approved by the Government of Kerala and as amended from time to time, are given in Appendix II of Vol. II of the Manual. Clause 5.7 thereof deals with “Retirement/Death Benefits and Welfare Scheme.” Sub-Clause (a) of clause 5.7 deals with “Gratuity” and it is stated therein that the Company has introduced a Group Gratuity-cum-Life Assurance Scheme, in association with the LIC of India, etc. Sub-clause (b) of clause 5.7 supra deals with “Contributory Provident Fund.” Sub-clause (c) thereof deals with “Remittance of E.P.F. Contribution” etc. Various other benefits, like Employees' State Insurance, Medical Benefits, House Construction Advances, Motor Conveyance Advance, Group Savings Linked Insurance Scheme, etc. are dealt with in the further sub-clauses thereunder. 8. Sub-clause (b) of clause 5.7 supra deals with “Contributory Provident Fund.” Sub-clause (c) thereof deals with “Remittance of E.P.F. Contribution” etc. Various other benefits, like Employees' State Insurance, Medical Benefits, House Construction Advances, Motor Conveyance Advance, Group Savings Linked Insurance Scheme, etc. are dealt with in the further sub-clauses thereunder. 8. We are told by the learned Advocates, appearing for the respondent writ petitioners, that the norms of gratuity, payable to the employees of the appellant company, are regulated by the provisions of the Central Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Further that, pension is regulated by the norms, as in the Employees' Pension Scheme conceived under the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act (Central Act) and the provident fund norms are also essentially regulated by the said EPF Act. Now, there is no dispute that the abovesaid statutory terminal benefits, like gratuity, pension, provident fund, etc. do not form part of the dispute in these cases, as apparently, those amounts have been paid. 9. Clause 17 of the Standing Orders, applicable to the employees of the KSFE, deals with Superannuation and Retirement and Clause 17 (i) stipulates that every employee shall retire on attaining 58 years of age and the retirement of such employees will take effect from the afternoon of the last date of the month in which they attain the age of superannuation, etc. Chapter IV, containing Clauses 22 to 44, deals with Conduct, Discipline and Appeals (CDA). Clause 35 thereof deals with Misconduct and Sub-Clause (k) of Clause 35 mentions about habitual neglect of work or gross or habitual negligence. So, negligect of work or gross or habitual negligence is one of the enumerated misconducts. Clause 36 deals with Suspension. Section 2, appended to Chapter IV, deals with Discipline. Clause 37 thereof deals with the Nature of Offence and Clause 38 deals with Procedure for Imposing Penalty. Clauses 37 and 38 of the abovesaid Standing Orders read as follows: “Clause 37. Clause 36 deals with Suspension. Section 2, appended to Chapter IV, deals with Discipline. Clause 37 thereof deals with the Nature of Offence and Clause 38 deals with Procedure for Imposing Penalty. Clauses 37 and 38 of the abovesaid Standing Orders read as follows: “Clause 37. NATURE OF OFFENCE: Without prejudice to the provisions of other Regulations an employee who commits a breach of the Regulations or Standing Orders of the Company or who displays negligence, inefficiency or indolence or who knowingly does anything detrimental to the interests of the Company or in conflict with its instructions or who commits a breach of discipline or is guilty of any other act or misconduct or misbehaviour or for any other good and sufficient reason not specifically mentioned hereunder shall be liable to the following penalties. (1) Censure, reprimand or warning. (2) Fine. (3) With holding or postponement of increments or promotion, or stoppage of increment. (4) Reduction to a lower position or grade or time scale or a lower stage in a time scale provided that he shall not be reduced to a grade lower than the one to which he was originally recruited. (5) Recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Company by negligence or breach of orders. (6) Suspension without salary for a period not exceeding 15 days. (7) Removal from Service of the Company which does not disqualify him for further employment in the Company. (8) Dismissal from service which disqualifies him for further employment in the Company. Clause 38. PROCEDURE FOR IMPOSING PENALTY: No order imposing on an employee any penalty other than Censure warning, reprimand fine and withholding of increment, shall be passed except after a formal enquiry. No order imposing on an employee a penalty of censure, warning reprimand fine or withholding of increment, shall be passed except after the employee has been given an opportunity to offer his explanation and the same has been considered by the authority passing the order.” 10. Section 3 thereof deals with Appeal, with which we are not concerned. Chapter V thereof deals with Pay and Allowances. Various other benefits are dealt with under the subsequent Clauses. Section 3 thereof deals with Appeal, with which we are not concerned. Chapter V thereof deals with Pay and Allowances. Various other benefits are dealt with under the subsequent Clauses. On a perusal of the abovesaid rules and norms of the appellant company, it is clear that one of the enumerated penalties, as per Clause 37(5), is recovery from pay, the whole or part of any pecuniary loss, caused to the Company, by negligence or breach of orders. The procedure for imposing the said penalty is dealt with in Clause 38 supra. There is no dispute that no disciplinary proceedings have ever been initiated against the respondent-writ petitioners, alleging that their conduct in sanctioning the alleged sticky loans/chitties was done in breach of the norms and that it amounts to negligence or gross negligence, which is a misconduct. So also, no disciplinary enquiry has been conducted, on the basis of any such memo of charges/allegations, as against these writ petitioners, in terms of Clause 38. 11. A perusal of the abovesaid rules and norms would make it clear that there are no provisions in those rules and norms, which permit the employer company to continue disciplinary proceedings after retirement or for initiation of fresh disciplinary action after retirement, where such action has not been taken before retirement. So, with the retirement of the respective incumbents concerned, the jural relationship of employer and employee has snapped and has ceased to exist. The learned Single Judge has rightly found that there are no provisions in the rules and norms of the company, which permit and authorize disciplinary action being continued after retirement. The fact of the matter is that no disciplinary action has ever been initiated against the respective respondent writ petitioners before their retirement, on the basis of the abovesaid allegations. 12. A plea was initially taken up before us that the provisions contained in the Kerala Service Rules (KSR), more particularly Rule 3 Part III KSR, may have been adopted or may have been made applicable to the appellant company. We gave sufficient time to the appellant company to produce copies of any Standing Orders, issued by the company in that regard or copies of any Resolution of the Board of Directors of the appellant company, adopting the abovesaid provisions of the KSR, more particularly Rule 3 Part III KSR. We gave sufficient time to the appellant company to produce copies of any Standing Orders, issued by the company in that regard or copies of any Resolution of the Board of Directors of the appellant company, adopting the abovesaid provisions of the KSR, more particularly Rule 3 Part III KSR. No such Standing Orders or Board Resolutions have been produced before us. As a matter of fact, on 30.8.2022, after hearing, a submission was made by the appellant that short time may be granted to enable them to get instructions as to whether there are any rules permitting disciplinary action after retirement or whether Rule 3 Part III KSR has been adopted, etc. 13. Though only a week's time was sought, we had liberally granted one month's time and posted the case to 20.9.2022. The case could actually be listed before this Bench only later, on 20.10.22. Even on 20.10.2022, the appellant was not able to produce any Board Resolutions or Standing Orders, showing the applicability or adoption of Rule 3 Part III KSR or any such other norms, which permit continuance disciplinary action after retirement. The appellants again sought for adjournment by a week to furnish instructions on the abovesaid aspects and accordingly, we have adjourned the case to today (26.10.2022). 14. Today, a statement dated 25.10.2022 has been filed on behalf of the appellant in W.A. No. 1245/2022. It is stated, in Paras 7 and 8 of the said statement dated 25.10.2022, that the provisions of the KSR have been made applicable to certain aspects, with regard to allowances, House Rent Allowances, Dearness Allowances, Travelling Allowances, etc. and the same are payable to the employees of the appellant-company, at the rate declared by the Government of Kerala to their employees from time to time. It is further stated, in Para 8 of the said statement, that Part-III KSR had not been made applicable to the appellant company, vide any Board resolution or order. So, it is clear that the provisions of Part-III KSR, including Rule 3 Part-III KSR, have not been made applicable to the appellant company either on the basis of any Board resolution or Standing Order, etc. That apart, the operative portion of Rule 3 Part-III KSR read with Note 2 thereunder, permits recovery or withholding from pension, after completing enquiry, as envisaged therein. That apart, the operative portion of Rule 3 Part-III KSR read with Note 2 thereunder, permits recovery or withholding from pension, after completing enquiry, as envisaged therein. Further, the latter part of Note 2 as well as Note 3 of Rule 3 Part-III KSR permits fixation of liabilities and its recovery from the DCRG payable to a retired employee, where such liabilities can be fixed without departmental or judicial proceedings, as referred to in the operative portion of Rule 3 Part-III KSR. So, the said liability of fixation process, on the basis of summary enquiry, as conceived in Note 3 to Rule 3 Part-III KSR, is only as against the death-cum-retirement gratuity. In the instant case, there is no dispute regarding the disbursal of pension and gratuity. Therefore, the relevance of Rule 3 Part-III KSR and Note 3 thereunder, may not be of any import to the facts and circumstances of this case, as it mainly deals with the question of recovery from service benefits mentioned above, which are other than pension and gratuity. Since the appellant company themselves have admitted that Part-III KSR has not been made applicable to the employees of the appellant company, there is no necessity to dwell into any further details in that regard. 15. Further, the said statement dated 25.10.2022 would indicate that the appellant company quantifies the liability, by getting reports from various departments of the Head Office and branches, where the employee has worked, as well as from the internal audit and vigilance department of the company. That, based on such reports, the quantification of the liability is made and the employees have to either clear the said liabilities and until then, the abovesaid service benefits will have to be withheld. According to the appellant company, they have intimated the said liabilities, as mentioned in Annexure-A of the said statement. It is further stated, in Para 4 of the said statement, that the amounts now withheld will be released once the appellant recovers the amounts through legally acceptable measures, such as revenue recovery proceedings or once the customers clear the default and close the account. 16. The learned Advocates, appearing for the respondent-writ petitioners, submit that the allegations raised in the above alleged liability process are that the writ petitioners have been negligent in sanctioning loans and chitties and that the liabilities have thus occurred on the basis of such sticky loans/chitties. 16. The learned Advocates, appearing for the respondent-writ petitioners, submit that the allegations raised in the above alleged liability process are that the writ petitioners have been negligent in sanctioning loans and chitties and that the liabilities have thus occurred on the basis of such sticky loans/chitties. The respondent-writ petitioners would contend that they have taken the decision to sanction the loans and chit transactions, etc. fully in accordance with the norms of the appellant company and only keeping into account the best business interests of the appellant company. Hence, they would urge that, for allegations of this nature, the liability process cannot be fixed, on the basis of a summary process and that too, unilaterally. Further that, only intimations are said to have been given, regarding the alleged liabilities and no proper adjudication or determination is made, as to whether the liability alleged could be legally fastened on the employees concerned. It is argued by them that, in such a process, the allegation of the appellant company is that, on account of negligence, the employee concerned has caused pecuniary loss to the appellant company and hence, the mandatory procedure for imposing such penalty, as conceived in Clause 38 of the abovesaid Standing Orders, should have been followed and thereafter, on the basis of such enquiry/due procedure, the penalty of recovery from the pay of the whole or part of the pecuniary loss, caused to the company, by negligence or breach of orders, should have been imposed on the employee concerned, as conceived in sub-clause (5) of Clause 37 of the Standing Orders. That, the abovesaid Standing Orders, dealing with the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Norms of the company, permits only such disciplinary enquiry to be initiated and completed before the retirement of the employee concerned. That, such enquiry or memo of charges have never been issued by the appellant company to the above respondent-writ petitioners and the so-called mere intimation of such alleged liabilities cannot be a substitute to the mandatory procedure, conceived in terms of the abovesaid Rules. 17. That, such enquiry or memo of charges have never been issued by the appellant company to the above respondent-writ petitioners and the so-called mere intimation of such alleged liabilities cannot be a substitute to the mandatory procedure, conceived in terms of the abovesaid Rules. 17. After hearing both sides, we are of the view that, since the specific allegation of the appellant company is that the respondent-writ petitioners have been allegedly negligent in sanctioning loans and chit transactions and that this has led to pecuniary loss to the appellant-company, if such factual issues are disputed, then necessarily the mandatory procedure under Clause 38 of the Standing Orders should have been complied with and penalty, as conceived in sub-clause (5) of clause 37 of the Standing Orders, could have been duly imposed on the employee concerned. Such a mandatory procedure should have been initiated and completed before the retirement of the employee concerned. There are no provisions in the norms and Standing Orders of the company, which permit the continuance of such disciplinary proceedings after the retirement of the employee concerned or initiation of any such fresh disciplinary proceedings after the retirement of the employee concerned. Indisputably, all the writ petitioners have retired from service. Before retirement from service, the abovesaid mandatory procedure of enquiry and imposition of penalty of recovery from pay, as envisaged in Clause 37(5), and in accordance with the mandatory procedure, in terms of Clause 38, have not been initiated or completed by the appellant company. Since there are no provisions in the norms and Standing Orders of the company, there is no question of initiating such proceedings after the retirement of the employees concerned. Moreover, the alleged liability fixation process has been carried out by the appellants unilaterally and behind the back of the writ petitioners. These alleged liabilities could not have been fixed unilaterally and by a summary process. 18. Hence, it is only to be held that the impugned action of the appellants, in withholding the abovesaid non-statutory dues mentioned above, is illegal and ultra-vires. The matter in issue is covered against the appellant and in favour of the respondent-writ petitioners by various judgments of this Court. 18. Hence, it is only to be held that the impugned action of the appellants, in withholding the abovesaid non-statutory dues mentioned above, is illegal and ultra-vires. The matter in issue is covered against the appellant and in favour of the respondent-writ petitioners by various judgments of this Court. Further, from the factual particulars, shown in Annexure-A to the abovesaid statement dated 25.10.2022, filed by the appellant, and the pleadings and materials on record, details of the writ petitioners, regarding their date of retirement, date of intimation, date of loans, etc. are as follows: S. No. Writ Appeal No. Date of Loan Date of Retirement Date of intimation 1. W.A. No. 1256/2022 16.02.2015, 12.05.2017 and 18.05.2017 13.07.2017 Not intimated 2. W.A. No. 1104/2022 Date not mentioned 31.03.2019 11.11.2021 3. W.A. No. 1100/2022 Date not mentioned 31.05.2018 08.05.2019 4. W.A. No. 1107/2022 2014, 2018, 2019 30.06.2020 15.06.2020 5. W.A. No. 1116/2022 Date not mentioned 31.07.2020 15.06.2020 6. W.A. No. 1117/2022 2014 to 2018 29.02.2020 17.02.2020 7. W.A. No. 1118/2022 2013 and 2018 29.02.2020 17.02.2020 8. W.A. No. 1125/2022 21.11.2015 31.05.2019 20.05.2019 9. W.A. No. 1151/2022 2011 to 2017 31.07.2020 08.07.2020 10. W.A. No. 1152/2022 2015 to 2018 31.05.2019 08.05.2019 11. W.A. No. 1154/2022 2011, 2014-2017 31.07.2020 08.07.2020 12. W.A. No. 1245/2022 Date not mentioned 31.12.2016 14.03.2018 13. W.A. No. 1247/2022 2014 31.05.2020 11.05.2020 14. W.A. No. 1250/2022 Date not mentioned 31.07.2019 06.07.2019 15. W.A. No. 1263/2022 2014 to 2017 31.08.2020 13.07.2020 16. W.A. No. 1303/2022 2012, 2013, 2016, 2017 and 2020 31.07.2020 08.07.2020 19. In many of the cases, even the intimations regarding the alleged liabilities have been given after the retirement of the respondent writ petitioner concerned. Mere intimation of the alleged liabilities fixed unilaterally, without due procedure and that too, on disputed questions of facts, is not legally tenable and mere summary process will also not suffice, as factual issues will have to be determined, as to whether the writ petitioners concerned have acted in negligence of their duties, in sanctioning loans and chit transactions and that this has caused pecuniary loss to the appellant company, etc. 20. Further, the matter in issue is covered by a series of decisions of this Court, in favour of the writ petitioner, both rendered by the Division Benches as well as the Single Benches. 20. Further, the matter in issue is covered by a series of decisions of this Court, in favour of the writ petitioner, both rendered by the Division Benches as well as the Single Benches. Copies of some of those decisions have been produced as Exts.P-4 to P-6 in the case papers in W.A. No. 1256/2022. There is yet another decision of the Division Bench of this Court, rendered on 29.10.2015 in W.A. No. 530/2015 [arising out of W.P. (C) No. 33923/2014]. It may be pertinent to refer to the contents of Para 3 of the said judgment dated 29.10.2015, rendered in W.A. No. 530/2015, which reads as follows: “3. Hearing the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner and the learned standing counsel for the establishment, we would revert to the directions in W.P. (C) No. 34192 of 2009 which were clear to the effect that no action could be taken except under the relevant provisions governing service conditions. Obviously, that is the only mode in which action could be taken. Nothing is pointed out by the establishment as to the existence of any particular rule or bi-lateral authorisation under which the amounts due to the petitioner towards the surrender value could have been appropriated by the establishment on the premise that a loan disbursed by him on behalf of the establishment had become sticky or was not recoverable. It was therefore that the learned single Judge had rightly left open the right of the establishment to proceed against the appellant/petitioner for recovery of general damages and issued the direction for payment, clarifying that it will not be deemed as an exoneration of the appellant/petitioner from paying any liability otherwise found in accordance with due procedure established by law. That being so, the insistence to furnish security by executing bond with two sureties could not have been made. The power of the Corporation to effect any such restraint does not arise. All that could be done is for the Corporation to seek appropriate remedy and recover amounts if any that could be recovered from the appellant/writ petitioner in accordance with law. In the result, this writ appeal is allowed vacating the direction in clause (i) that the appellant/petitioner has to execute bond with two sureties to receive the leave surrender benefits. Consequentially, it is ordered that leave surrender benefits shall be disbursed to the petitioner/writ appellant without any condition as to bond. In the result, this writ appeal is allowed vacating the direction in clause (i) that the appellant/petitioner has to execute bond with two sureties to receive the leave surrender benefits. Consequentially, it is ordered that leave surrender benefits shall be disbursed to the petitioner/writ appellant without any condition as to bond. The other directions in the impugned judgment will stand, however that, the time limit for satisfying the judgment of the learned single Judge will stand extended by one month from today.” 21. Further, it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court, in the judgment dated 22.2.2019 in W.P. (C) Nos. 30292 and 30588 of 2018, that withholding of such service dues, payable to the employees of the KSFE, is not justifiable. It may be pertinent to refer to the contents of Paras 10 to 12 of the abovesaid decision of the Division Bench in W.P. (C) No. 30588/2018, which read as follows: “10. The learned counsel for the petitioner concedes that no disciplinary action was taken and no notice was ever issued to the 2nd respondent before retirement from the service. It is settled law, that there cannot be any imposition of punishment upon an employee after his retirement, once the employer employee relationship is cut off. It of course possible to proceed with further steps for recovery of the loss, if appropriate proceedings had already been initiated in this regard. In the instant case when it is conceded that no notice was ever issued before the date of retirement for fixation of the loss and further since no loss was ever quantified in accordance with law, the petitioner cannot be heard to say that they are justified in not disbursing the service benefits actually payable to the 2nd respondent. This being the position, the merit asserted by the 2nd respondent-former employees that they are entitled to get the entire service benefits without retaining even a single pai by the petitioner is having considerable force. 11. It is true, the challenge involved in the present writ petitions is only against the orders passed by the Upa Lok Ayukta, whereby personal presence of the Managing Director was ordered and the main complaint is still pending consideration. 11. It is true, the challenge involved in the present writ petitions is only against the orders passed by the Upa Lok Ayukta, whereby personal presence of the Managing Director was ordered and the main complaint is still pending consideration. On going through the materials on record, we are of the view that Exts.P2/P6 orders issued by the Upa Lok Ayukta were actually not warranted and that the personal presence of the Managing Director was not necessary to have effective adjudication of the proceedings. If the petitioner/establishment failed to file the statement/put forth their version on time, it was quite possible for the Upa Lok Ayukta to have drawn adverse inference. That apart, the reason for not filing the statement was explained in the affidavit in support of the I.A. pointing out that the Lawyer representing the petitioner was not available in station as he had to go to Bangalore in connection with the MBBS admission of his daughter and that there was no wilful fault on the part of the petitioner or the Managing Director. In the said circumstance, we are of the view that the said orders are not liable to be sustained. They are required to be set aside and we do so. 12. The remaining question is whether the matters should be sent back to the Upa Lok Ayukta to have the proceedings finalized; particularly since the complaints are still pending. In view of the legal position as to the further course of action to be pursued (particularly since the petitioner would not be justified in proceeding with further steps for causing the recovery of the alleged loss) in the instant case the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the petitioner sought time to ascertain whether they could release the amounts due to the second respondent and if so, the grievance could be redressed here itself. After getting instructions, the learned Standing Counsel for the petitioner fairly submits that since no notice was ever issued to the 2nd respondent prior to the date of retirement and since no fixation of loss was done before retirement and since the position of law stands settled, they are ready to disburse the balance due in respect of the 2nd respondent in W.P. (C) No. 30292/2018 and the entire amount due to the 2nd respondent in W.P. (C) No. 30588/2018. The learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent fairly submits that, in view of the fair gesture expressed from the part of the petitioner, as put forth by the learned counsel, a reciprocal gesture would be made by the 2nd respondent as well and that they do not intend to raise any claim with regard to the payment of interest, cost or damages, if the amounts due are released within a reasonable time to be fixed by this Court. It is also added by the learned counsel that necessary proceedings would be filed before the Upa Lok Ayukta to the effect that, since the amounts due have been satisfied by the petitioner, no further proceedings are required to be pursued in Ext.P1 complaint and to get it closed.” A copy of the said decision of the Division Bench in W.P. (C) Nos. 30292 and 30588 of 2018 has been produced as Ext. P-6 in W.A. No. 1256/2022. Exts.P-4 and P-5 therein are copies of the Single Bench verdicts in W.P. (C) Nos. 18942/2019 and 32811/2018. In all these decisions, it has been held that, since there is no rule which permits the employer KSFE to withhold benefits after retirement, such terminal benefits and other due service benefits, which are properties acquired by the employees, by virtue of their valuable service, will have to be disbursed to them. Of course, this is without prejudice to the right of the employer to initiate other appropriate proceedings, in the manner known to law, for recovery of such alleged dues. 22. Further, a contention has been raised by the appellant KSFE that what is now withhold is not statutory benefits, like pension, gratuity, etc. but other non-statutory dues, like leave surrender, festival incentives, DA arrears, pay revision arrears, service incentives, etc. and that therefore, there is no illegality in the appellant withholding such non statutory dues. The said contention is not tenable, for the simple reason that the dues owed by the employer to the employee, be it statutory dues or non statutory dues, are valuable property, which are acquired by the employees concerned, due to the service rendered by them to the company. Such property rights are protected, by virtue of the provision contained in Article 300A of the Constitution of India, which mandates that no person shall be deprived of his property, save by the authority of law. Such property rights are protected, by virtue of the provision contained in Article 300A of the Constitution of India, which mandates that no person shall be deprived of his property, save by the authority of law. As of now, there are no rules or norms existing in the appellant company, which authorize the withholding of such due amounts, after the retirement of the employees. 23. True that, the appellant company is incorporated and registered as a 'company' as per the Companies Act, and therefore, it is a non-statutory body. It is by now well established that non-statutory norms framed by a non-statutory body, like a registered company or a registered society, etc. will also be binding on them. Where the employer body is a non statutory body, they may not have any statutory source of power to frame statutory rules. Where it is impossible for a non-statutory body to frame rules for regulating the service conditions of its employees, then the only way out is for the non-statutory employer body to frame non-statutory provisions. It has been held by the Apex Court, in decisions as in B.S. Minhas vs. Indian Statistical Institute (ISI) and Others, (1983) 4 SCC 582 , in Paras 23 and 24, that a non-statutory bye-law framed by a non-statutory body, like a registered society, even if it is not having the statutory force, is still binding. It may be pertinent to refer to Paras 23 and 24 of the decision of the Apex Court in B.S. Minhas's case (supra), which read as follows: “23. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the appointment of Respondent 4 as Director of Respondent 1 is illegal because of non-compliance with bye-law 2. Bye-law 2 does require that before appointment, the vacancy in the post of Director should be suitably publicised. In the instant case, it is admitted on both sides that no publicity whatsoever was given in respect of the vacancy. The contention of Shri Garg, however, is that the bye-law having no force of statute, non-compliance with its requirement cannot in any way affect the appointment of Respondent 4 as Director of Respondent 1. Shri Tarkunde, however, contended that assuming that the bye-law is not statutory, even so Respondent 1 was bound to comply with it. The contention of Shri Garg, however, is that the bye-law having no force of statute, non-compliance with its requirement cannot in any way affect the appointment of Respondent 4 as Director of Respondent 1. Shri Tarkunde, however, contended that assuming that the bye-law is not statutory, even so Respondent 1 was bound to comply with it. In support of his contention he strongly relied upon Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 : AIR 1979 SC 1628 : (1979) 3 SCR 1014 : (1979) 2 LLJ 217 . The Court in that case held: “It is a well-settled rule of administrative law that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them. This rule was enunciated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Vitarelli vs. Seaton, 359 US 535 : 3 LEd 2d 1012 (1959) where the learned Judge said: “An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged....Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed....This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword.” The aforesaid principle laid down by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Vitarelli vs. Seaton, 359 US 535 : 3 LEd 2d 1012 (1959) has been accepted as applicable in India by this Court in Amarjit Singh Ahluwalia vs. State of Punjab, (1975) 3 SCC 503 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 27 : AIR 1975 SC 984 : (1975) 3 SCR 82 : (1975) 1 LLJ 228 and in subsequent decision given in Sukhdev Singh vs. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, (1975) 1 SCC 421 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 101 : AIR 1975 SC 1331 : (1975) 3 SCR 619 : (1975) 1 LLJ 399 . Mathew, J. quoted the above-referred observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter with approval. 24. Mathew, J. quoted the above-referred observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter with approval. 24. In view of the pronouncement of this Court on the point it must be held to be obligatory on the part of Respondent 1 to follow the bye-laws, if the bye-laws have been framed for the conduct of its affairs to avoid arbitrariness. Respondent 1 cannot, therefore, escape the liability for not following the procedure prescribed by bye-law 2.” 24. The Apex Court in B.S. Minha's case supra has placed reliance on various other decisions of the Apex Court, in cases as in R.D. Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 , Amarjit Singh Ahluwalia vs. State of Punjab, (1975) 3 SCC 503 , Sukhdev Singh vs. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, (1975) 1 SCC 421 in that regard. The binding efficacy of non statutory norms, framed by non statutory bodies, for regulating the conditions of service of its employees, are stated in Para 141 of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Preetha Kumari B. vs. Joint Registrar, 2022 (4) ILR (Ker.) 273. Therefore, merely because an employer body happens to be a non-statutory body, will not in any manner deprive the said body, the competence for framing norms and rules which may be non-statutory in nature, but will still be binding on both the employees concerned and the employer concerned. Therefore, such a non statutory provision, framed by such a non-statutory body, will also be a due authority of law, as conceived in Article 300A of the Constitution, for depriving the property right of a person. In the absence of even such non-statutory norms, there is no question of withholding or depriving the precious right to property of the employee concerned. Otherwise, it would be in contravention of the property right guaranteed in terms of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. But, where the employer is a statutory body, then statutory norms may be required. Reference in this regard could be made to the decision of the Apex Court in State of Jharkhand and Others vs. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava and Another, (2013) 12 SCC 210 . 25. But, where the employer is a statutory body, then statutory norms may be required. Reference in this regard could be made to the decision of the Apex Court in State of Jharkhand and Others vs. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava and Another, (2013) 12 SCC 210 . 25. A reading of the decision of the Two Judges' Bench of the Apex Court in State of Jharkhand and Others vs. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava and Another, (2013) 12 SCC 210 would indicate that the case concerned the grant of pension and gratuity benefits to State Government employees and the said aspects were covered by the statutory rules, as per the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950. A reading of Para 13 thereof would clearly indicate that there was no provision in the said Bihar Pension Rules for withholding of the pension/gratuity, when such departmental proceedings or judicial proceedings are still pending. So, the statutory rules did not permit or enable withholding of pension or gratuity, so long as such departmental proceedings or judicial proceedings, as envisaged in the said Rule, are not finalized and the said proceedings are still pending. Hence, to get over the difficulty, the State Government relied on certain administrative instructions, for withholding of pensionary benefits, during the pendency of such departmental proceedings or judicial proceedings, envisaged in terms of such statutory rules. The Apex Court held that, since the scenario is regulated by statutory rules, the situation cannot be regulated by administrative instructions, supplanting such statutory rules. In the light of these aspects, the Apex Court held, in Para 16 thereof, that the attempt of the State Government concerned therein, to take away a part of the pension or gratuity or even leave encashment without any statutory provision and under the umbrage of administrative instruction, cannot be countenanced. Their Lordships have reiterated that, as far as the statutory rules, as per the Bihar Pension Rules considered in that case, are concerned, there is no provision for withholding pension or gratuity in the given situation and had there been any such provisions in the Rules, the position would have been different. Their Lordships have reiterated that, as far as the statutory rules, as per the Bihar Pension Rules considered in that case, are concerned, there is no provision for withholding pension or gratuity in the given situation and had there been any such provisions in the Rules, the position would have been different. It is in this context that the Apex Court held that since the grant of pension or gratuity to the State Government employees were specifically covered by statutory rules and the statutory rules also contemplated institution of departmental proceedings or judicial proceedings, as the case may be, and as the said Rules did not enable the State Government to withhold pension or gratuity during the pendency of such departmental proceedings or judicial proceedings, the impugned action of the State Government therein, to withhold such terminal benefits, during the pendency of the proceedings, by placing reliance on administrative instructions, was held to be ultra vires the Rules. 26. In a scenario where the employer body itself is a non statutory body, like a registered company or a registered society, and it does not have any statutory source of power to frame statutory rules and regulations to deal with the scenario of withholding of service benefits to the employees after their retirement on account of pending liabilities, etc. then such non statutory bodies can frame non statutory rules and norms to regulate the scenario. As a matter of fact, in the present case, the Rules, as it stands now, are Standing Orders framed by the company for regulating various aspects of the conditions of service of the employees, including Conduct, Discipline and Appeal (CDA) aspects, about which mention has been made hereinabove. Wherever it is impossible for the non statutory employer body to frame statutory rules, the only way they can meet the situation is to frame non statutory rules and norms. 27. A reference to the decision of the Three Judges' Bench of the Apex Court in Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. vs. Rabindranath Choubey, AIR 2020 SC 2978 , would be pertinent. The said decision of the Apex Court dealt with the application of the provisions contained in Section 4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, which reads as follows: “Section 4. The said decision of the Apex Court dealt with the application of the provisions contained in Section 4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, which reads as follows: “Section 4. Payment of gratuity: (1) Gratuity shall be payable to an employee on the termination of his employment after he has rendered continuous service for not less than five years: (a) on his superannuation. (b) on his retirement or resignation. (c) on his death or disablement due to accident or disease: Provided that the completion of continuous service of five years shall not be necessary where the termination of the employment of any employee is due to death or disablement: Provided further that in the case of death of the employee, gratuity payable to him shall be paid to his nominee or, if no nomination has been made, to his heirs, and where any such nominees or heirs is a minor, the share of such minor, shall be deposited with the controlling authority who shall invest the same for the benefit of such minor in such bank or other financial institution, as may be prescribed, until such minor attains majority. Explanation: For the purposes of this section, disablement means such disablement as incapacitates an employee for the work which he was capable of performing before the accident or disease resulting in such disablement. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1): (a) the gratuity of an employee, whose services have been terminated for any act, wilful omission or negligence causing any damage or loss to, or destruction of, property belonging to the employer shall be forfeited to the extent of the damage or loss so caused. (b) the gratuity payable to an employee [may be wholly or partially forfeited]: (i) if the services of such employee have been terminated for his riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on his part. (ii) if the services of such employee have been terminated for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, provided that such offence is committed by him in the course of his employment.” M/s. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. is a company registered and incorporated as per the Companies Act and thus, obviously a non statutory body. (ii) if the services of such employee have been terminated for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, provided that such offence is committed by him in the course of his employment.” M/s. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. is a company registered and incorporated as per the Companies Act and thus, obviously a non statutory body. Rules 34.2 and 34.3 of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal (CDA) Rules of the said employer body (Company) have been referred to in Para 6 of the decision of the Apex Court in Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. (supra) and the same reads as follows: “34.2. Disciplinary proceeding, if instituted while the employee was in service whether before his retirement or during his re-employment shall, after the final retirement of the employee, be deemed to be proceeding and shall be continued and concluded by the authority by which it was commenced in the same manner as if the employee had continued in service. 34.3. During the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, the disciplinary authority may withhold payment of gratuity, for ordering the recovering from gratuity of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the company if have been guilty of offences/misconduct as mentioned in sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 or to have caused pecuniary loss to the company by misconduct or negligence, during his service including service rendered on deputation or on re-employment after retirement. However, the provisions of Sections 7(3) and 7(3-A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 should be kept in view in the event of delayed payment in the case the employee is fully exonerated.” The Three Judges' Bench of the Apex Court in Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. (supra) have held, in Paras 10.30, 10.31, 10.32 and 11, as follows: “10.30. In view of the various decisions, it is apparent that under Rule 34.2 of the CDA Rules inquiry can be held in the same manner as if the employee had continued in service and the appropriate major and minor punishment commensurate to guilt can be imposed including dismissal as provided in Rule 27 of the CDA Rules and apart from that in case pecuniary loss had been caused that can be recovered. Gratuity can be forfeited wholly or partially. 10.31. Several service benefits would depend upon the outcome of the inquiry, such as concerning the period during which inquiry remained pending. Gratuity can be forfeited wholly or partially. 10.31. Several service benefits would depend upon the outcome of the inquiry, such as concerning the period during which inquiry remained pending. It would be against the public policy to permit an employee to go scot-free after collecting various service benefits to which he would not be entitled, and the event of superannuation cannot come to his rescue and would amount to condonation of guilt. Because of the legal fiction provided under the rules, it can be completed in the same manner as if the employee had remained in service after superannuation, and appropriate punishment can be imposed. Various provisions of the Gratuity Act discussed above do not come in the way of departmental inquiry and as provided in Section 4(6) and Rule 34.3 in case of dismissal gratuity can be forfeited wholly or partially, and the loss can also be recovered. An inquiry can be continued as provided under the relevant service rules as it is not provided in the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 that inquiry shall come to an end as soon as the employee attains the age of superannuation. We reiterate that the Act does not deal with the matter of disciplinary inquiry, it contemplates recovery from or forfeiture of gratuity wholly or partially as per misconduct committed and does not deal with punishments to be imposed and does not supersede the Rules 34.2 and 34.3 of the CDA Rules. The mandate of Section 4(6) of recovery of loss provided under Section 4(6)(a) and forfeiture of gratuity wholly or partially under Section 4(6)(b) is furthered by the Rules 34.2 and 34.3. If there cannot be any dismissal after superannuation, intendment of the provisions of Section 4(6) would be defeated. The provisions of section 4(1) and 4(6) of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 have to be given purposive interpretation, and no way interdict holding of the departmental inquiry and punishment to be imposed is not the subject matter dealt with under the Act. 10.32. Thus considering the provisions of Rules 34.2 and 34.3 of the CDA Rules, the inquiry can be continued given the deeming fiction in the same manner as if the employee had continued in service and appropriate punishment, including that of dismissal can be imposed apart from the forfeiture of the gratuity wholly or partially including the recovery of the pecuniary loss as the case may be. 11. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above and in view of the decision of three Judge Bench of this Court in Ram Lal Bhaskar (supra) and our conclusions as above, it is observed and held that (1) the appellant-employer has a right to withhold the gratuity during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings and (2) the disciplinary authority has powers to impose the penalty of dismissal/major penalty upon the respondent even after his attaining the age of superannuation, as the disciplinary proceedings were initiated while the employee was in service. Under the circumstances, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside and is accordingly hereby quashed and set aside and the order passed by the Controlling Authority is hereby restored. However, the appellant-employer is hereby directed to conclude the disciplinary proceedings at the earliest and within a period of four months from today and pass appropriate order in accordance with law and on merits and thereafter necessary consequences as per Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, more particularly Sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Gratuity Act and Rule 34.3 of the CDA Rules shall follow. The present appeal is accordingly allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.” 28. These aspects have also been considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case in Viswanathan A.B. vs. Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. (FACT), 2021 (2) KLT 899 . The Conduct, Discipline and Appeal (CDA) Rules, considered by the said Division Bench of this Court in FACT's case supra, are contained in Para 8 of the said decision and the same reads as follows: “Rule 32 (i) Disciplinary proceedings, if instituted while the employee was in service whether before his retirement or during his re-employment, shall after the final retirement of the employee, be deemed to be proceeding and shall be continued and concluded by the authority by which it was commenced in the same manner as the employee had continued in service. (ii) During the pendency of the disciplinary proceeding, the disciplinary authority may withhold payment of gratuity in accordance with sub-section (6) of Section (4) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.” 29. (ii) During the pendency of the disciplinary proceeding, the disciplinary authority may withhold payment of gratuity in accordance with sub-section (6) of Section (4) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.” 29. By placing reliance on the dictum laid down by the Three Judges' Bench of the Apex Court in Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. (supra) the Division Bench of this Court in FACT's (supra), has noted, in Para 6 thereof, as follows: “6. After exhaustively considering a series of Rulings rendered by the Apex Court in various related Rules dealing with disciplinary action before and after retirement in various statutory and other employer organizations, the Apex Court has held that in view of the non-obstante clause in Section 4(6), the same would also affect the claims for forthwith payment of the gratuity in terms of Section 4(1) thereof and that the Parliament by engrafting the provisions contained in Clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (6) of Section 4, has left the field of disciplinary action at the pre-retirement and post-retirement stages to the discretion of the employer organization concerned and they could regulate the field either by way of Statutory Rules or Non-statutory Rules, as the case may be. Further that, Rules 34.2 and 34.3 of Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. (supra) would permit the employer to continue the disciplinary action, which has been taken by the issuance of memo of charges prior to the retirement and the same could be continued even after retirement and concluded by the authority concerned by which it was commenced in the same manner as if the employee had continued in service. The Rules so provide that subject to strict compliance of the procedure and Rules of the employer organisation concerned, the disciplinary action could also be finalised and if the ultimate result of the major penalty proceedings taken by the employer organization results in penalty of termination of service on account of the matters envisaged in Clause a or Sub-Clause (i) or Sub-Clause (ii) or Clause b of Sub-Section 6 of Section 4, in the matter of wilful omission or negligence causing any damage or loss or destruction of property, etc. riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence, etc. riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence, etc. as envisaged in the Sub-Clauses in Section 4(6), then depending upon the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings, the employer concerned will have the liberty to take a decision whether to forfeit the gratuity and if so to what extent it can be forfeited from the gratuity amount otherwise payable to the employee in terms of Section 4(1) of the Act.” (Emphasis supplied) 30. After exhaustively considering a series of rulings rendered by the Apex Court, in various related Rules, dealing with disciplinary action before and after retirement in various statutory and other employer organizations, the Apex Court has held in Mahanadi Coalfield Ltd. (supra) that, in view of the non-obstante clause in Section 4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, the said provision would also affect the claims for forthwith payment of gratuity in terms of Section 4(1) thereof and that, the Parliament, by engrafting the provisions contained in Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section 6 of Sec.4 thereof, has left the field of disciplinary action at the pre-retirement and post-retirement stages to the discretion of the employer organization concerned and so, they could regulate the field, either by way of statutory rules or non statutory rules, as the case may be. In other words, where the employer body has the power to frame statutory rules for regulating the scenario, then the provision for withholding such in-service benefits, after retirement, should be on the basis of statutory rules. Where the employer body itself is a non statutory body and it does not have any source of power to frame statutory rules, then the said employer body, could frame non statutory rules and norms for regulating the scenario. As a matter of fact, both the employer bodies concerned in the afore cited decisions, viz. M/s. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. as well as M/s. Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. (M/s. FACT), are companies registered and incorporated as per the Companies Act. The CDA Rules concerned in both the abovesaid companies are non statutory rules framed by the respective employer company concerned. M/s. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. as well as M/s. Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. (M/s. FACT), are companies registered and incorporated as per the Companies Act. The CDA Rules concerned in both the abovesaid companies are non statutory rules framed by the respective employer company concerned. Therefore, the necessary implication that flows from the afore cited decisions in Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. (supra) and FACT's (supra) as well as the afore cited decision of the Apex Court in B.S.Minhas's (supra) and the other decisions relied on in B.S.Minhas's case supra would clearly lead to the legal position that, where the employer body is a non statutory body, like a registered company or a registered society etc. and there is no statutory source to frame rules for covering the scenario of withholding of service benefits even after retirement, then such bodies can frame non statutory rules and norms appropriately for regulating the scenario. The CDA Rules framed by M/s. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. as well as the CDA Rules framed by M/s. FACT are clear pointers that, even such non statutory rules would suffice to regulate the scenario conceived in terms of Section 4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. As a matter of fact, the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, would deal with, not merely statutory corporations, but various other employer bodies which are non statutory bodies, like registered companies/registered societies, and even employer bodies, who may be partnership firms, proprietary concerns, etc. 31. However, the position in regard to non-statutory bodies, like co-operative societies registered as per the Kerala Co-operative Societies (KCS) Act, 1969, etc. could be different. This is so, as the provisions of the KCS Act make wide and extensive provisions for regulating the conditions of service of employees of co-operative societies and also empowers the State Government with wide powers to frame statutory rules under that Act, to regulate the service conditions of such employees. The Kerala Co-operative Societies (KCS) Rules, so framed by the Government, are statutory rules making detailed provisions to regulate various service conditions, including disciplinary action, terminal benefits, etc. So, such co-operative societies, which are non-statutory bodies, are bound by such statutory rules framed by the Government. The Kerala Co-operative Societies (KCS) Rules, so framed by the Government, are statutory rules making detailed provisions to regulate various service conditions, including disciplinary action, terminal benefits, etc. So, such co-operative societies, which are non-statutory bodies, are bound by such statutory rules framed by the Government. The impact of such statutory rules making inroads into the contract of personal service, entered into by such co-operative societies with the employees, have been considered in detail in the Full Bench decision of this Court in the aforecited Preetha Kumari's case (supra). Such a position may not be available in the case of a non-statutory employer body, like a company registered as per the Companies Act or a society registered as per the Societies Registration Act, etc. Some of the aspects based on Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. (supra) and FACT's case (supra) have also inter-alia been mentioned in a later decision of the Division Bench of this Court, in the case concerning retired employees of co-operative societies, in the decision in Mohanan Nair P.G. vs. Omallur Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Others, ILR 2022 (2) Kerala 1123. It may also be apposite in this regard to refer to yet another decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Yadava S. vs. Kerala State Co-operative Bank and Others, 2022 (6) KHC 109 (DB), about post-retiral continuance of pending pre-retiral disciplinary proceedings taken against employees of co-operative societies. 32. Earlier, when the property right formed part of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed in terms of Article 19, the Apex Court has held, in decisions as in Khem Chand vs. Union of India and Others, AIR 1963 SC 687 , Deokinandan Prasad vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1971 SC 1409 , etc. that the right to arrears and pay and allowances would also be ‘property’ within the meaning of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India. After the repeal of Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31(1) by the Constitution 44th Amendment Act, the Apex Court has held, in the case in State of West Bengal vs. Haresh C. Banerjee, (2006) 7 SCC 651 , that the right to receive pensionary benefits will be a constitutional right, as contemplated in Article 300A. True that, the right to property is no longer a fundamental right. But, it is still recognized as a constitutional right, in terms of Article 300A, mentioned above. True that, the right to property is no longer a fundamental right. But, it is still recognized as a constitutional right, in terms of Article 300A, mentioned above. In the light of these aspects, there cannot be any doubt that, in the absence of enabling provisions, there is no question of withholding the abovesaid service benefits due to the employees concerned. The legal position in that regard is declared. 33. Before parting with these cases, we note that these issues have been cropping up in the establishment of the appellant company, as can be seen from the various unreported decisions mentioned hereinabove. We are not aware as to the reasons as to why the appellant company has not amended their standing orders or rules, for providing a specific provision for enabling the continuance of pending disciplinary proceedings or for instituting fresh disciplinary proceedings after the retirement of the employee, to take care of such situations, as is available in Government or Public Sector establishments. We should not be misconstrued to have held that an exact replica of such provisions, applicable in other establishments, should be engrafted. It is for the appellant company to consider the various pros and cons of the scenario and thereafter, consider engrafting a suitable provision, by way of amending the existing standing orders for the conduct, discipline and appeal norms mentioned above, so that the company is enabled and equipped to meet with the present kind of scenario, so as to enable recovery from gratuity and non-statutory dues, in accordance with law, even after retirement of the employer concerned. We make it clear that the abovesaid observations made by us, regarding the consideration of the amendment of the Standing Orders, Rules and norms of the appellant company, are only to alert the appellant company and the same cannot be construed as any mandatory directions issued by this Court to frame such rules and norms. The aspects relating to rule and norm making functions are within the domain of the appellant company and it is for them to deal with the scenario, in the manner they deem fit and proper and in accordance with law. 34. Sri. E.K. Nandakumar, learned Senior Counsel instructed by Sri. M. Gopikrishnan Nambiar, learned Standing Counsel for the appellant KSFE, would submit that cases of this nature are recurring and that the problem appears to be quite acute. 34. Sri. E.K. Nandakumar, learned Senior Counsel instructed by Sri. M. Gopikrishnan Nambiar, learned Standing Counsel for the appellant KSFE, would submit that cases of this nature are recurring and that the problem appears to be quite acute. Hence, it is for the Board of Directors of the appellant company to seriously consider these issues and may consider engrafting suitable provisions, fully in consonance with law, by way of amendment of the existing Standing Orders, after due consultation with their Standing Counsel and may consider further action, if it is found appropriate and fit. 35. The upshot of above discussion is that, we do not find any valid grounds to interfere with the well considered verdict of the learned Single Judge in these cases. However, we make it clear that the time limit for compliance stipulated in the impugned judgments, rendered by the learned Single Judge, shall be reckoned from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment by the appellant. Needless to say that the orders and observations in this judgment will not in any manner preclude the appellant to institute appropriate civil proceedings in accordance with law, for recovery of the alleged dues from the respondents. No other orders and directions are called for. 36. With these observations and directions, the above Writ Appeals will stand disposed of.