JUDGMENT : NISHA M. THAKORE, J. 1. The present Second Appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908, has been filed against the impugned judgment and decree dated 20.04.2022, passed by the Learned Additional District Judge, Aravalli in Regular Civil Appeal No. 23 of 2021 (in short “impugned order”). 2. This matter was listed for admission hearing and Mr. D.B. Kothari learned counsel appearing for the respondent has raised preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of the present Second Appeal on the ground that the impugned judgment and decree challenged by the appellant-original defendant arises out of the appeal filed by the present appellant under Section 29 of the Gujarat Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (in short “the Rent Act 1947”). 3. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the respondent being the original plaintiff had filed Regular Civil Suit No. 79 of 2014 for recovery of possession of the rented premise as well as for arrears of rent against the appellant. He also drew the attention of this Court that the Suit was filed on 26.12.2014. The said Suit filed by the original plaintiff-respondent herein, came to be decreed in favor of the respondent. 4. In support of his submissions, learned counsel appearing for the respondent had relied upon the decision of this Court in Second Appeal No. 22 of 2010 and submitted that a similar order can be passed in the present case. 5. Aforesaid objections of the respondent have been vehemently objected by Mr. Saurabh Patel, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. He invited the attention of this Court to the facts of the case and submitted that the rent premise is a shop situated on non-agricultural land of Mouje: Modasa, Ta. Modasa, District Arvalli. He further submitted that the land bearing Revenue Survey No. 512 was owned by one Mahendrabhai Manilal Gor, who had purchased the aforesaid land in the year 2002 as reflected in the mutation entry No. 14060 dated 19.07.2002. He further submitted that said Mahendrabhai Manilal Gor had applied for revised non-agricultural permission vide application dated 09.03.2004, whereby the District collector vide order dated 22.04.2004 was pleased to grant such revised non-agricultural permission. He further submitted that necessary permission for construction was availed by said Mahendrabhai Gor and same came to be granted by Modasa Nagarpalika vide order dated 24.02.2003. 6. He further submitted that necessary permission for construction was availed by said Mahendrabhai Gor and same came to be granted by Modasa Nagarpalika vide order dated 24.02.2003. 6. He referred to and relied upon the Notification dated 30.10.2001 issued by the State of Gujarat, whereby vide Gujarat Act No. 27 of 2001 amendment was made after sub-section 1A of Section 4 of the principal Act, which is reproduced as under: “1(A) This Act shall not apply to: (a) any premises constructed on or after the commencement of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Gujarat Second Amendment) Act, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as “the amending Act”). (b) any existing premises which is self-occupied by the owner of vacant on or after the commencement of the amending Act, and is let after such commencement. For a period of ten years from the date of the commencement of the amending Act. Explanation: For the purpose of this section “existing premises” means any premises which exists on the date of the commencement of the amending Act.” 7. He further relied upon second Notification dated 31.03.2011 issued by the State of Gujarat, whereby vide Gujarat Act No. 6 of 2011, the amendment was made in sub-section 1A in Section 4 in the principal Act. The same reads as under: “1. (1) This Act may be called the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 2011. (2) It shall come into force from the 1st April, 2011. 2. In the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the principal Act”) in Section 3 in sub-section (2) for the figures, letters and words “31st day of March, 2011” the figures, letters and words “31st day of March, 2021” shall be substituted. 3. In the principal Act in Section 4 in sub-section (1A), the words “for a period of ten years from the date of the commencement of the amending Act” shall be deleted.” 8. By relying upon the aforesaid Notifications, Mr. Patel submitted that the Gujarat Act No. 27 of 2001 came into effect from 05.09.2001 and remained in force for a period of 10 years i.e. 31.03.2011. He further referred to Notification dated 31.03.2011, more particularly, by referring sub-section 2 of Section 3 of the principal Act whereby the Gujarat Rent Act, 1947 has been extended upto 31.03.2011. Patel submitted that the Gujarat Act No. 27 of 2001 came into effect from 05.09.2001 and remained in force for a period of 10 years i.e. 31.03.2011. He further referred to Notification dated 31.03.2011, more particularly, by referring sub-section 2 of Section 3 of the principal Act whereby the Gujarat Rent Act, 1947 has been extended upto 31.03.2011. He therefore, submitted that on conjoint reading of sub-section 2 of Section 3(2) and Section 4-1(A) of the principal Act what transpires is that initially from the year 2001 to 2011, the Rent Act was suspended in case of eventuality mentioned in the earlier Notification dated 30.10.2001 and thereafter, it has been continued till date by virtue of second notification. 9. At this stage, Mr. Patel referred to the Notification and submitted that pursuant to the construction permission being granted by the Nagarpalika on 24.02.2003, it can safely be assumed that the construction of the complex in which rented premise is situated came into existence after the year 2001 and therefore, submitted that in view of the eventuality mentioned in sub-section 1-A of Section 4 of the Rent Ac, his case would fall in exemption. He has drawn attention of this Court to the date of the rent agreement, which is a registered document dated 02.12.2004 whereby the rented premise came to be leased to the appellant. He therefore submitted that both the eventualities as provided under the Notification dated 30.10.2001 would be applicable. He therefore submitted that the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act would not apply in case of the appellant. 10. On the second contention of respondent, Mr. Patel, submitted that though original suit proceedings or appeal under Section 29 of the Bombay Rent Act, were invoked but ultimately the nomenclature provisions of the Act may not govern the present appeal as demonstrated earlier, the provisions of Civil Procedure Code will govern or hold the jurisdiction. He therefore, submitted that as per Sub-Section 3 of Section 29 of the Bombay Rent Act, the Revision would not be maintainable before this Court against the impugned judgment and order passed under Section 29 of the Bombay Rent Act. He, therefore, prays to entertain the present Second Appeal as it involves the substantial question of law on the issue of jurisdiction. 11. Mr. He, therefore, prays to entertain the present Second Appeal as it involves the substantial question of law on the issue of jurisdiction. 11. Mr. Patel further drew attention of this Court to the Schedule I appended in the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, whereby Modasa city or any other part of Aravalli District is not forming part of the said District mentioned in the said Schedule. He referred to and relied upon Notification dated 13.08.2013 issued by the Revenue Department, whereby Arvalli District came to be carved out from original District Sabarkantha. He therefore submitted that though the appeal was filed under sub-section 2 of Section 29 of the Bombay Rent Act before the learned Appellate Court in view of the aforesaid explanation being offered, revision under sub-section 2 of Section 29 would not be maintainable in the facts of the case. He, therefore, submitted that the present Second Appeal under section 100 of the Civil Procedure has been rightly invoked and is maintainable before this Court. 12. In rejoinder, Mr. Kothari, learned counsel for the respondent has referred to and relied upon the decision of this Court. He invited the attention of this Court to the judgment of this Court in the case of Tohelram Ravaldas Gidwani vs. Parshottamdas Chhaganlal Shah, 1995 (2) GLH 1019 . He also relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Punamchandra Revashankar Joshi vs. Ramjibhai Maganlal, 1966 GLR 807 . He lastly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Patel Valmik Himatlal vs. Patel Mohanlal Muljibhai (Dead) through LRs. 1998 (7) SCC 383 . He further submitted that though the Schedule I appended to the Bombay Rent Act does not reflect Modasa city or town in the list of District to which Bombay Rent Act has been made applicable but by virtue of merger of the Bombay Merged State Act, 1950 would be attracted which also includes the Bombay Rent Act thereby Bombay Rent Act provisions stand extended to the merged Districts including Modasa city of Sabarkantha District. He further submitted that merely because in the year 2013, Aravalli District came to be carved out from Sabarkantha District that would not take away jurisdiction as extended in view of the Bombay Merged State Act, 1950. He further submitted that merely because in the year 2013, Aravalli District came to be carved out from Sabarkantha District that would not take away jurisdiction as extended in view of the Bombay Merged State Act, 1950. To substantiate his arguments, he urged that Gandhinagar District came to be carved out from Ahmedabad District in 1964, Valsad District came to be carved from District Surat in 1966, Anand District came to be carved out from the District Kheda in 1997 and those newly constituted Districts are not mentioned in Schedule I of the Bombay Rent Act and therefore, it does not mean the Bombay Rent Act would not have any applicability to those Districts. At this stage, he referred to the aforesaid decision relied upon and submitted that this Court has decided the cases arising from the aforesaid Districts under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. He lastly submitted that in any case assuming for a while by expecting submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant having chosen the wrong Forum to be the First Appellate Court, the same cannot be challenged by way of Second Appeal, which would be over reaching the Revisional jurisdiction of the Bombay Rent Act. 13. The only question which arises for consideration is whether a second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil procedure, 1908 is maintainable against a Judgment and order passed under sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Rent Act, 1947. 14. In order to appreciate the controversy raised above, it is necessary to look into the scope of second appeal as provided under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short “the code”). The same is reproduced as under: “Section 100: Second Appeal (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex-parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex-parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.” 15. The scope of exercise of the jurisdiction by the High Court in second appeal under section 100 of the code is limited to the substantial question of law. There are two material ingredients which must be satisfied in order to attract the provisions of Section 100 of the code. The first ingredient is that the decree sought to be challenged under Section 100 of the code must be a decree in appeal. The second ingredient is that there must not be any other express provision either in the body of the Civil Procedure Code or in any other law for the time being in force barring an appeal against an appellate decree. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 100 of the code and sub-section (2) of Section 100 of the code are not relevant for the purpose of this case. Now, the use of the expression “save where otherwise expressly provided.............by any other law for the time being in force” used in Section 100 of the code, in the opinion of this Court, creates such an impediment. An express provision to the contrary has been made in Section 29(2) of the Rent Act, 1947. It expressly prohibits second appeals. The material part of sub-section (2) of Section 29 reads as: “No further appeal shall lie against any decision in appeal under sub-section (1).......” 16. Now turning to sub-section (1) of Section 29 we find in clause (b) the following provisions: “(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, an appeal shall lie............. It expressly prohibits second appeals. The material part of sub-section (2) of Section 29 reads as: “No further appeal shall lie against any decision in appeal under sub-section (1).......” 16. Now turning to sub-section (1) of Section 29 we find in clause (b) the following provisions: “(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, an appeal shall lie............. (b) elsewhere, from a decree or order made by a Judge of the Court of Small Causes established under the Provincial Small Cause Court Act, 1887, or by the Court of the Civil Judge deemed to be the Court of Small Causes under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 2 or by a Civil Judge exercising such jurisdiction, to the District Court.......” The decision contemplated by sub-section (2) of Section 29 is the appellate decree or order which may be passed against original decrees and orders made under Section 28, Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 29 contemplates original decrees and orders made under Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. Section 28 refers to ‘any suit or proceeding’ between a land-lord and a tenant relating to the recovery of rent or possession of any premises. This expression used in sub-section (1) of Section 28 is wide enough to embrace original suit proceedings of recovery of arrears of rent and eviction within its ambit. Thus, there is no competent remedy other than filing of revision under section 29 of the Rent Act against the judgment and order passed by the appellate court under sub-section 2 of section 29 of the Rent Act, 1947. 17. The arguments canvassed by the Learned counsel appearing for the respondent- original Plaintiff as regards maintainability of second appeal based on the contention raised before this Court as regards applicability of the Rent Act, 1947, is concerned goes to the root of matter. The learned counsel for the respondent has placed heavy reliance on the provisions of the Act itself read with Schedule-I appended therein which specifies extension of the said Act to Five Districts of the State of Gujarat i.e. though the same does not specify District Sabarkantha or newly constituted Aravalli in which Modass falls. The Court finds force in the submission made with regards to the applicability of said Act by virtue of Bombay Merged State (Laws) Act, 1950. The Court finds force in the submission made with regards to the applicability of said Act by virtue of Bombay Merged State (Laws) Act, 1950. The learned counsel has relied upon the meaning of expression “merged states” and section 3 which provides for extension of laws prevailing to the merged states as included under First Schedule of the said Act i.e. the Rent Act, 1947. The submission is made herefore that in spite of the absence of Sabarkantha or Aravalli under Schedule-I of the Rent Act, 1947, the same stands extended to such areas by virtue of Bombay Merged State ( Laws)Act, 1950. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the Appellant-Original Defendant has submitted that even if such contention is accepted then also by reading of section 4(1-A) of the Bombay Rent Act read with two notifications issued by the Government of Gujarat, the two eventualities ie. the construction being put after year 2001 and secondly considering the rent agreement, the property being let after year 2001 i.e. After amendment Act, 2001, the case will fall under exemption and hence, would be outside the scope of the provisions of Bombay Rent Act. Thus, in light of the facts of the case when two eventualities namely the construction of the premises having come into existence after 2001 and the rent agreement having been executed after 2001, the present case will fall in the exemption under section 4-1(A)(a) of the Rent Act. 18. At this stage, it would be apt to note the distinction to be drawn between lack of jurisdiction and a mere error in exercise of jurisdiction. The former strikes at the very root of the exercise and want of jurisdiction which may vitiate the proceedings rendering them and the orders passed therein a nullity. A mere error in exercise of jurisdiction does not vitiate the legality and validity of the proceedings and the order passed thereon unless set aside in the manner known to law by laying a challenge subject to the law of limitation. So far as inherent lack of jurisdiction is concerned, when the subject matter to be decided is wholly outside the jurisdiction of the court of law to render such a decision, if passed, has to be considered nullity. So far as inherent lack of jurisdiction is concerned, when the subject matter to be decided is wholly outside the jurisdiction of the court of law to render such a decision, if passed, has to be considered nullity. This jurisdiction defect is of the highest degree which cannot be cured by waiver or even consent of parties and is liable to be set aside at any stage of proceedings. In such a case the appellate court would interfere with the decree passed and will set aside it as such decree is Coram non-judice and void. In cases which are mostly related to a defect in territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction, the decision of the court does not vitiate the decree and regard it as a nullity. However, in the latter case, which is mostly related to defect in subject matter jurisdiction and decree passed in such case is compulsorily nullity and void ab initio. 19. In light of the aforesaid legal situation, the moot question which arises for consideration is whether this Court in Second Appeal under section 100 of the Code can examine the legality, validity or contention of nullity of the Judgment and order passed by the Appellate Court under section 29(2) of the Rent Act, 1947? 20. At this stage, it would be apt to look into section 29 of the Rent Act, 1947. The same reads as under: “29. Appeal (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, an appeal shall lie: (a) in Greater Bombay, from a decree or order made by the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, exercising jurisdiction under Section 28, to a bench of two judges of the Court which shall not include the Judge who made such decree or order. (b) else where, from a decree or order made by a Judge of the Court of Small Causes established under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 or by the Court of the Civil Judge deemed to be the Court of Small Causes under Clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 28 or by a Civil Judge exercising such jurisdiction, to the District Court. Provided that no such appeal shall from: (I) a decree or order made in any suit or proceeding in respect of which no appeal lies under the CPC, 1908. Provided that no such appeal shall from: (I) a decree or order made in any suit or proceeding in respect of which no appeal lies under the CPC, 1908. (II) a decree or order made in any suit or proceeding (other than a suit or proceeding relating to possession) in which the plaintiff seeks to recover rent and the amount or value of the subject matter of which does not exceed: (i) where such suit or proceeding is instituted in Greater Bombay, Rs. 3000/- (ii) where such suit or proceeding is instituted elsewhere, the amount up to which the Judge or Court specified in Clause (b) is invested with jurisdiction of a Court of Small Causes, under any law for the time being in force. (III) an order made upon an application for fixing the standard rent or for determining the permitted increases in respect of any premises except in a suit or proceeding in which an appeal lies. (IV) an order made upon an application by a tenant for a direction to restore any essential supply or service in respect of the premises let to him. (1A) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be made within thirty days from the date of the decree or order, as the case may be: Provided that in computing the period of limitation prescribed by this sub-sec. the provisions contained in Sections 4, 5 and 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, shall, so far as may be, apply. (2) No further appeal shall lie against any decision in appeal under Sub-Section (1) but the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that any such decision in appeal was according to law call for the case in which such decision was taken and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit. (2) No further appeal shall lie against any decision in appeal under Sub-Section (1) but the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that any such decision in appeal was according to law call for the case in which such decision was taken and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit. (3) Where no appeal lies under this section from a decree or order in any suit or proceeding in Greater Bombay the Bench of two judges specified in Clause (a) of sub-section (1) and elsewhere the District Court, may for the purpose of satisfying itself that the decree or order made was according to law, call for the case in which such decree or order was made and the bench or court aforesaid or the District Judge or any Judge to whom the case may be referred by the District Judge, shall pass such order with respect thereto as it or he thinks fit.” 21. Noticeably the appellate forum was approached by the Appellate herein himself, invoking jurisdiction under section 29(2) of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 and now realizing the error has choose to directly invoked jurisdiction under section 100 of CPC, thereby raising the defense of the case being covered under exemption as provided under section 4(1-A) of the said Act read with two notifications dated 30.10.2001 and 2011. In my opinion, this court cannot look into the aspect of decree being nullity while exercising jurisdiction under section 100 of CPC. Section 9 of the CPC puts embargo on the applicability of the code itself. Thus, in view of the aforesaid statutory provision under special enactment ie. Bombay Rent Act, 1947. 22. Moreover, in the case of Garikapati Veeraya vs. N. Subbiah Choudhary, AIR 1957 SCR 488 , the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that “a right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right and that the institution of a suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved. Such a vested right can only be taken away either expressly or by necessary implication. Such a vested right can only be taken away either expressly or by necessary implication. Hence, the relevant date is the date of the institution of the suit and not when the case comes for hearing or for decision.” However, in the case on hand the special enactment was very much in existence and the provisions of the Act transpired the actual position of law, which is otherwise not disputed by the learned Counsel for the Appellant having invoked section 100 of Code. In fact, the Learned Counsel prayed to this Court to ignore the label under which appeal was filed before the First Appellate Court however, the Court finds that even if erroneous, the same did not estopped the party from praying that the revision may be dealt with under the proper law applicable to the case and such a prayer has, as a rule, was required to be made in the court which is requested to exercise its judicial discretion for that purpose. In the considered opinion of this Court, once the first appeal was filed considering the provisions of the Rent Act, 1947 and the Appellate Court having exercised such powers, this Court will have no jurisdiction, under section 100 of Code, to examine such the legality and validity including the aspect of nullity, in respect of the impugned Judgment and order of first appellate court. Hence, the present Second Appeal is held not maintainable. 23. It is needless to clarify that this Court has not opined on merits of the case and the Appellant is at liberty to avail appropriate remedy as may be available under law before appropriate forum. In view of the disposal of the Second Appeal, Civil Application is also disposed of. FURTHER ORDER: After the order was pronounced, Mr. Saurabh Patel, learned advocate appearing for the appellant prays for extension of the stay granted by the learned Additional District Judge, Modasa, vide order dated 20.04.2022 below Exh.10. The aforesaid prayer has been objected by Mr. Deep Kothari, learned advocate for the respondent. He submitted that since the Second Appeal itself is not found maintainable, the stay granted by the District Court, Modasa may not be extended any further. However, Mr. Deep Kothari, fairly stated before this Court that the execution proceedings of the impugned judgment and order will not be pressed for further period of 30 days from today. He submitted that since the Second Appeal itself is not found maintainable, the stay granted by the District Court, Modasa may not be extended any further. However, Mr. Deep Kothari, fairly stated before this Court that the execution proceedings of the impugned judgment and order will not be pressed for further period of 30 days from today. Considering the statement before this Court by learned advocate appearing for the respondent, the prayer of Mr. Saurabh Patel seeking extension of the stay order is not accepted.