ORDER : The appellant herein has approached this Court through this letter’s patent appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 read with Rule 134 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952 for assailing the order dated 27.01.2022 passed by the learned Single Bench in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.17449/2019 whereby, the writ petition of the appellant petitioner was dismissed and the order dated 18.10.2019 terminating the appellant petitioner from service, was affirmed. 2. We have heard and considered the submissions advanced by Shri Kuldeep Mathur, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Himanshu Choudhary, and have gone through the impugned order and record of the writ petition. 3. The appellant herein applied for selection as a Teacher Grade-III pursuant to the recruitment notification initiated by the District Establishment Committee, Zila Parishad, Jodhpur. He was selected and appointed on the above post vide appointment order dated 03.10.2017. Upon the petitioner having completed two years’ probation, his name was recommended for confirmation. However, a notice was issued to the petitioner by CEO, Zila Parishad, Jodhpur on 13.08.2019 with reference to four criminal cases having been lodged against him in Kota and Nagaur. The petitioner filed reply to the notice, stating therein that he had been given benefit of probation in two of the criminal cases whereas, in remaining, he had been acquitted. It was also mentioned that it was clearly stated in the police verification report, that the petitioner had been convicted in two criminal cases and as such, there was no concealment on part of the petitioner warranting his termination. The writ petition of the petitioner was however dismissed by the learned Single Bench of this Court keeping in view the ratio of Hon’ble the Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors. 2016 (8) SCC 471 , observing that even an acquittal from criminal charges does not automatically entitle a candidate for appointment and the employer has a right to consider the antecedents of such candidate and decide whether he is suitable for appointment on the post concerned. 4. The learned Single Bench, took note of the fact that one criminal case wherein, the appellant petitioner, was convicted involved the charges under the Rajasthan Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 1992 in which, the appellant petitioner pleaded guilty and was convicted. 4. The learned Single Bench, took note of the fact that one criminal case wherein, the appellant petitioner, was convicted involved the charges under the Rajasthan Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 1992 in which, the appellant petitioner pleaded guilty and was convicted. As per the record, the other case in which, the petitioner was convicted involved the offence of theft. 5. In this background, the learned Single Bench observed that the character of the appellant petitioner disentitled him for appointment on the post of a teacher. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed. 6. Shri Kuldeep Mathur, learned Senior Advocate urged that the appellant petitioner had been granted benefit of probation and as such his service would be saved by virtue of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act. However, he too is not in a position to dispute the fact that both the criminal cases wherein, the appellant petitioner was convicted, involved offences of moral turpitude. As per circular dated 15.07.2016 issued by the Department of Personnel, Government of Rajasthan, the character of the aspirant for Government Service is required to meet the following standards and a person who has been convicted for the offence involving moral turpitude is disentitled to be appointed in Government Service :- “Character. The character of a candidate for direct recruitment to the service must be such as to qualify him for employment in the service. He must produce a certificate of good character from the principal/Academic Officer of the University or College in which he was last educated and two such certificates written not more than six months prior to the date of application from two responsible persons not connected with the College or University and not related to him. (1) A conviction by a court of law need not of itself involve the refusal of a certificate of good character. The circumstances of the conviction should be taken into account and if they involve no moral turpitude or association with crimes of violence or with a movement which has as its object the overthrow by violent means of the government as established by law, the mere conviction need not be regarded as a dis-qualification. The circumstances of the conviction should be taken into account and if they involve no moral turpitude or association with crimes of violence or with a movement which has as its object the overthrow by violent means of the government as established by law, the mere conviction need not be regarded as a dis-qualification. (2) Ex-prisoners, who by their disciplined life while in prison and by their subsequent good conduct have proved to be completely reformed, should not be discriminated against on grounds of their previous conviction for the purpose of employment in the service. Those, who are convicted of offences not involving moral turpitude or violence, shall be deemed to have been completely reformed on the production of a report to that effect from the Superintendent. After Care Home or if there are no such Homes in a particular district, from the superintendent of police of that district. (3) Those convicted of offences involving moral turpitude or violence shall be required to produce a certificate from the superintendent, After Care Home, or if there is no such home in a particular district, from the superintendent of police of that district, endorsed by the Inspector general of prisons, to the effect that they are suitable for employment as they have proved to be completely reformed by their disciplined life while in prison and by their subsequent good conduct in the After Care Home.” 7. Apparently, the appellant petitioner falls foul of the said circular which mandates that an aspirant having been convicted for the offence involving moral turpitude is disentitled to be appointed in State Government Services. 8. So far as the plea regarding the benefit of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act having been extended to the petitioner is concerned, the said argument is of no help to the petitioner in view of the judgment rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited Vs. Anil Kanwariya [ (2021) 10 SCC 136 ], wherein it was held that :- “3.2 Aggrieved by the order of termination, the respondent-employee preferred Writ Petition No. 6969 of 2016 before the learned Single Judge of the High Court. Anil Kanwariya [ (2021) 10 SCC 136 ], wherein it was held that :- “3.2 Aggrieved by the order of termination, the respondent-employee preferred Writ Petition No. 6969 of 2016 before the learned Single Judge of the High Court. The learned Single Judge of the High Court solely relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of Avtar Singh v. Union of India, reported in (2016) 8 SCC 471 , and also on order dated 9.9.2015 passed by the learned Sessions Judge in appeal granting benefit of Section 12 of the Act 1958, allowed the writ petition and quashed and set aside the order of termination and directed the appellants to reinstate the respondent-employee with all consequential benefits. 3.3 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge, quashing and setting aside the order of termination and directing the appellants to reinstate the respondent-employee, the appellants-employer preferred appeal before the Division Bench being D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 560 of 2019. The Division Bench also solely relying upon para 38.4.1 of the decision of this Court in the case of Avtar Singh (supra) and observing that the employee was held guilty in a dispute of trivial nature with his father, uncle, brother and cousin and as it was a trivial nature dispute and such a dispute which even if disclosed could have been ignored by the employer because of the benefit of Section 12 of the Act 1958, the Division Bench by the impugned judgment and order has dismissed the said appeal and has confirmed the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge, directing reinstatement of the employee with all consequential benefits. The review petition preferred by the appellants herein has also been dismissed. 4.3 It is further submitted that in the present case at the time when the respondent-employee applied for the advertised post, he was already convicted for the offences under Sections 341 and 323 IPC by the competent criminal court which he did not disclose. It is submitted that even thereafter also when he submitted the declaration at the time of documents verification on 14.04.2015, the respondent-employee though already suffered a conviction for the offences under Sections 341 and 323 IPC and at that time, i.e., on 14.04.2015, only the benefit under Sections 3 & 4 of the Act 1958 was given, he filed a false declaration. It is submitted that the learned trial Court did not grant the benefit of Section 12 of the Act 1958, which benefit of Section 12 of the Act 1958 was given only vide judgment and order dated 9.9.2015 by the learned Sessions Judge. It is submitted that as the respondent-employee suppressed the material fact of criminal case firstly in the year 2013 when he submitted the application and thereafter subsequently on 14.04.2015 when he submitted the declaration at the time of documents verification and thereafter when the services of the respondent were terminated after giving him an opportunity of being heard, the same ought not to have interfered with by the learned Single Judge and thereafter by the Division Bench. 5. The present appeals are vehemently opposed by Shri Navin Prakash, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent-employee. It is submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly the order passed by the learned Sessions Court granting the benefit under Section 12 of the Act 1958 and considering the fact that the dispute was of a trivial nature with the family members, the learned Single Judge rightly set aside the order of termination which has been rightly confirmed by the Division Bench. 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties at length. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the appellants herein – employer terminated the services of the respondent on nondisclosure of the pending criminal case against him at the time when he submitted the application for appointment, submitted in the month of October/November, 2013 and thereafter in the declaration dated 14.04.2015. As observed hereinabove, the respondent was chargesheeted for the offences under Sections 143, 341 and 323 IPC vide chargesheet dated 17.01.2011. The learned trial Court convicted the respondent for the offences under Sections 341 & 323 IPC, vide judgment and order dated 5.8.2013. However, granted the benefit under Section 3 of the Act 1958 only. In the month of October, 2013, the appellants issued an advertisement for the post of Technical Helper and the last date for submission of the application was 14.11.2013. Pursuant to the said advertisement, the respondent applied for the said post and the written test was held on 02.02.2014 and the result of which was declared on 31.03.2015. In the month of October, 2013, the appellants issued an advertisement for the post of Technical Helper and the last date for submission of the application was 14.11.2013. Pursuant to the said advertisement, the respondent applied for the said post and the written test was held on 02.02.2014 and the result of which was declared on 31.03.2015. The respondent submitted declaration on 14.04.2015 declaring that neither any criminal case is pending against him nor he has been convicted by any court of law. The date fixed for documents verification was 14.04.2015 and along with the documents verification he was required to file a declaration which he submitted stating that neither any criminal case is pending against him nor he has been convicted by any court of law. Therefore, on the date of submitting an application and even at the time when declaration was filed on 14.04.2015, there was already an order of conviction against him. Even at the relevant time, the benefit of Section 12 of the Act 1958 was not granted to the respondent, which was given subsequently vide judgment of the learned Sessions Court dated 09.09.2015. 6.3 Thus, at the time when he submitted the application for appointment in the month of October/November 2013, the respondent already suffered a conviction by the competent court which not only he did not disclose, but in fact, a false declaration was filed that neither any criminal case is pending against him nor he has been convicted by any court of law. That thereafter after receipt of the police verification/antecedents report dated 5.6.2015 from the Superintendent of Police, Sawai Madhopur and after giving a show cause notice and an opportunity of being heard to the respondent, the employer terminated the services of the respondent on the ground of nondisclosure /suppression of material fact and filing a false declaration. 8.2 In the case of Devendra Kumar (supra), while joining the training, the employee was asked to submit an affidavit giving certain information, particularly, whether he had ever been involved in any criminal case. The employee submitted an affidavit stating that he had never been involved in any criminal case. The employee completed his training satisfactorily and it was at this time that the employer in pursuance of the process of character verification came to know that the employee was in fact involved in a criminal case. The employee submitted an affidavit stating that he had never been involved in any criminal case. The employee completed his training satisfactorily and it was at this time that the employer in pursuance of the process of character verification came to know that the employee was in fact involved in a criminal case. It was found that the final report in that case had been submitted by the prosecution and accepted by the Judicial Magistrate concerned. On the basis of the same, the employee was discharged abruptly on the ground that since he was a temporary government servant, he could be removed from service without holding an enquiry. The said order was challenged by the employee by filing a writ petition before a Single Judge of the High Court which was dismissed. The Division Bench upheld that order, which was the subject matter of appeal before this Court. Dismissing the appeal, this Court observed and held that the question is not whether the employee is suitable for the post. The pendency of a criminal case/proceeding is different from suppressing the information of such pendency. The case pending against a person might not involve moral turpitude but suppressing of this information itself amounts to moral turpitude. It is further observed that the information sought by the employer if not disclosed as required, would definitely amount to suppression of material information and in that eventuality, the service becomes liable to be terminated, even if there had been no further trial or the person concerned stood acquitted/discharged. It is further observed by this Court in the said decision that where an applicant/employee gets an order by misrepresenting the facts or by playing fraud upon the competent authority, such an order cannot be sustained in the eye of the law. “Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal”. It is further observed and held that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit those persons who have defrauded or misrepresented themselves and in such circumstances the court should not perpetuate the fraud by entertaining petitions on their behalf. The relevant observations in the said decision are in paras 12, 13, 18 & 25, which are as under: 12. So far as the issue of obtaining the appointment by misrepresentation is concerned, it is no more res integra. The question is not whether the applicant is suitable for the post. The relevant observations in the said decision are in paras 12, 13, 18 & 25, which are as under: 12. So far as the issue of obtaining the appointment by misrepresentation is concerned, it is no more res integra. The question is not whether the applicant is suitable for the post. The pendency of a criminal case/proceeding is different from suppressing the information of such pendency. The case pending against a person might not involve moral turpitude but suppressing of this information itself amounts to moral turpitude. In fact, the information sought by the employer if not disclosed as required, would definitely amount to suppression of material information. In that eventuality, the service becomes liable to be terminated, even if there had been no further trial or the person concerned stood acquitted/discharged. 13. It is a settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets an office by misrepresenting the facts or by playing fraud upon the competent authority, such an order cannot be sustained in the eye of the law. “Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.” [Vide S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1994) 1 SCC 1 : AIR 1994 SC 853 .] In Lazarus Estates Ltd. V. Beasley [ (1956) 1 QB 702 : (1956) 2 WLR 502 : (1956) 1 ALL ER 341 (CA)] the Court observed without equivocation that: (QB p. 712) “… No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for fraud unravels everything.” 18. The ratio laid down by this Court in various cases is that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit those persons who have frauded or misrepresented themselves. In such circumstances the court should not perpetuate the fraud by entertaining petitions on their behalf. In Union of India v. M. Bhaskaran (1995) Supp (4) SCC 100 this court, after placing reliance upon and approving its earlier judgment in Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society vs. M. Tripura Sundari Devi (1990) 3 SCC 655 , observed as under: (M. Bhaskaran case, SCC p. 104, para 6) If by committing fraud any employment is obtained, the same cannot be permitted to be countenanced by a court of law as the employment secured by fraud renders it voidable at the option of the employer. 25. 25. More so, if the initial action is not in consonance with law, the subsequent conduct of party cannot sanctify the same. Sublato fundamento cadit opus – a foundation being removed, the superstructure falls. A person having done wrong cannot take advantage of his own wrong and plead bar of any law to frustrate the lawful trial by a competent court. In such a case the legal maxim nullus commodum caprere potest de injuria sua propria applies. The persons violating the law cannot be permitted to urge that their offence cannot be subjected to inquiry, trial or investigation. [Vide Union of India v. Major General Madan Lal Yadav (1996) 4 SCC 127 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 592 : AIR 1996 SC 1340 and Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1056.] Nor can a person claim any right arising out of his own wrongdoing (jus ex injuria non oritur).”” 9. In the case of State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Love Kush Meena ( AIR 2021 SC 1610 ), the aspirant had disclosed the fact regarding involving in the criminal case and he had been acquitted of the charges but despite that, Hon’ble the Supreme Court went on to held that as the acquittal was recorded by giving benefit of doubt, it would not entitle the candidate for appointment. 10. In the present case, the situation is graver. The criminal character of the appellant writ petitioner and his conviction in two cases involving offences of moral turpitude, disentitles him from being appointed in the Government Service. 11. As a result, the impugned order dated 18.10.2019, whereby the petitioner’s services were terminated so also the order dated 27.01.2022 passed by the learned Single Bench in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.17449/2019, whereby the writ petition preferred by the appellant petitioner was dismissed, do not suffer from any infirmity, illegality or perversity warranting interference therein. Hence, this intra court appeal fails and is dismissed as being devoid of merit.