JUDGMENT : I.A. No.9912 of 2019 1. This interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 38 days in preferring this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Heard the appellant. 3. Having regard to the averments made in the application and submissions made on behalf of the appellant, we are of the view that the appellant was prevented from sufficient cause in filing the appeal within the period of limitation. As such, the delay of 38 days in preferring the appeal is hereby condoned. 4. I.A. No. 9912 of 2019 stands allowed. L.P.A. No.722 of 2019 5. With the consent of the learned counsel for the appellant, the matter has been heard on merit and is being disposed of at this stage. 6. The instant intra-court appeal, preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 08.08.2019 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(L) No.3809 of 2003 whereby and whereunder Award dated 25.11.2002 passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad in Reference Case No. 57 of 1997 by which the direction has been issued for regularisation of respondent-workman w.e.f. 19.12.1997, has been refused to be interfered with while dismissing the writ petition. 7. Brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ proceeding, which are required to be enumerated herein, read as under :- It is the case of the respondent-workman that he was engaged as casual workman at Food Storage Depot, Airstrip, Panchananur, Gaya sometime in the month of September, 1977. The respondent-workman was not allowed to work since February, 1984 and as such Industrial Dispute has been raised under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act, 1947). A tripartite settlement was arrived among the parties dated 06.11.1989 and accordingly the respondent-workman was reinstated in service as a casual workman. The appellant-Corporation has come out with two circulars dated 06.05.1987 and 09.09.1996, whereby the scheme has been framed for casual worker who has completed three months’ service on 02.05.1986, will be regularised in the service, if they fulfill the requisite qualification. The appellant-Corporation has come out with two circulars dated 06.05.1987 and 09.09.1996, whereby the scheme has been framed for casual worker who has completed three months’ service on 02.05.1986, will be regularised in the service, if they fulfill the requisite qualification. The workman since has not been regularized, in terms of the policy decision as contained in circulars dated 06.05.1987 and 09.09.1996, therefore, a Dispute has been raised which finally has been referred by making a reference to the effect that – “Whether the action of the management of Food Corporation of India, Patna in not regularising the services of Ch. Jamuna Thakur is legal and justified? If not, what relief the workman is entitled to?” The said reference has been numbered as Reference Case No. 57 of 1997. The reference has been answered in favour of the workman directing the appellant-Corporation to regularise the workman w.e.f. 19.12.1997. The management has contested the claim taking the plea that the respondent-workman was not in service on the cut-off date, i.e., 02.05.1986 and as such, he is not entitled for benefit of the scheme. The Tribunal has negated the above plea by taking into consideration the scheme by which requirement for regularization has been decided to be extended to all casual workmen who have completed three months service as on 02.05.1986, if such workmen are fulfilling the requisite qualification as provided in the scheme. As per tripartite settlement dated 06.11.1989, the concerned workman has been reinstated in the service as a casual workman without back wages and the Tribunal has considered that once the circular has been implemented and benefit has been given to the similarly situated persons, the same cannot be denied to the respondent-workmen. The learned Single Judge, on the basis of the aforesaid ground, has refused to interfere with the Award, against which the present intra-court appeal has been preferred. 8. Mr. Nipun Bakshi, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Corporation, has taken the plea in assailing the Award as also the order passed by the learned Single Judge that the Tribunal has not considered that once the settlement has been arrived at which binds the parties in view of the provision of Section 18(3) of the Act, 1947 and, as such, the reference should not have been answered in favour of the workman and by doing that the Tribunal has committed gross illegality. The learned Single Judge has also not considered that aspect of the matter and in the background of the said decision, the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from infirmity and, hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law. Learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation has also taken the plea by putting reliance upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi (3) & others [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 ] that once the ratio has been laid down by the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court for not regularizing the services of the casual worker, the Tribunal ought not to have answered the reference in favour of the workman but having not taken it into consideration, the Award since has been passed, the Award is not sustainable in the eyes of law. According to the learned counsel for the appellant- Corporation, this aspect of the matter has also not been appreciated in right perspective by the learned Single Judge and, hence, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable in the eyes of law. However, the learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation, has apprised this Court about the order passed in similar nature of dispute in L.P.A. No.80 of 2019, L.P.A. No.582 of 2019, L.P.A. No.630 of 2019 and L.P.A. No.49 of 2021 and submitted that on facts the judgments rendered in these cases by this Court are not applicable. 9. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 10. The undisputed facts in this case are that the workman was appointed as casual worker sometime in the month of September, 1977 at Food Storage Depot, Airstrip, Panchananur, Gaya. The workman was not allowed to work since the month of February, 1984 and, as such a dispute has been raised under Section 18(3) of the Act, 1947. A tripartite settlement was arrived in between the parties on 06.11.1989 and in view thereof, the workman was reinstated in service as a casual workman. The workman was not allowed to work since the month of February, 1984 and, as such a dispute has been raised under Section 18(3) of the Act, 1947. A tripartite settlement was arrived in between the parties on 06.11.1989 and in view thereof, the workman was reinstated in service as a casual workman. The workman started discharging his duties but the appellant-Corporation has come out with two circulars, i.e., one on 06.05.1987 and another on 09.09.1996, whereby the policy decision has been taken for regularizing the casual workers who have completed three months’ service on 02.05.1986, if they fulfill the requisite qualification as prescribed in the circulars. The workman, since was not regularized, even though was coming under the fold of the Circulars dated 06.05.1987 and 09.09.1996, therefore, a dispute has been raised for regularizing the service, which was referred for adjudication before the adjudicator, being instituted as Reference Case No. 57/1997. The Award has been passed in favour of the workman holding him entitled for regularizing in service in terms of Circulars dated 06.05.1987 and 09.09.1996. The Tribunal has negated the plea of the appellant-Corporation that once the settlement has been arrived under the fold of the Act, 1947, the workman has ceased her right to claim regularization. The Tribunal has answered the same that even though the workman has been reinstated in service in view of the tripartite settlement, the same cannot stop him from claiming regularization, once the decision has been taken by way of issuance of Circulars dated 06.05.1987 and 09.09.1996 by the appellant Corporation. The Corporation, against the said Award, has assailed the same by filing writ petition which has been dismissed against which present intra-court appeal has been preferred. 11. The appellant has raised two issues, i.e., – (i) once the workman has been reinstated in service in view of the tripartite settlement, he has ceased his right to claim regularization, and (ii) the workman is not entitled for regularization in view of the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi (3) & others (Supra). 12. It requires to refer herein that this Court, in almost similar circumstances, has passed orders in L.P.A. No.582 of 2019 and L.P.A. No.630 of 2019 wherein also the terms of reference was for regularization of the services of the workman in view of the circular dated 06.05.1987. Vs. Uma Devi (3) & others (Supra). 12. It requires to refer herein that this Court, in almost similar circumstances, has passed orders in L.P.A. No.582 of 2019 and L.P.A. No.630 of 2019 wherein also the terms of reference was for regularization of the services of the workman in view of the circular dated 06.05.1987. This Court has considered the issue about the applicability of the judgment rendered in Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi (3) & others (Supra) and found therefrom that the issue of applicability of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was not an issue. Further, the workman has claimed regularization in view of the policy decision of the Management-Food Corporation of India dated 06.05.1987 and if the Tribunal has passed an award after taking into consideration the aforesaid policy decision, the same cannot be said to be illegal and in that view of the matter, the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Uma Devi (Supra) will not be applicable. For ready reference, paragraphs 8 and 9 of the said judgment are being quoted hereunder :- “8. In Civil Appeals Nos. 3595-612 of 1999 the respondents therein who were temporarily engaged on daily wages in the Commercial Taxes Department in some of the districts of the State of Karnataka claim that they worked in the Department based on such engagement for more than 10 years and hence they are entitled to be made permanent employees of the Department, entitled to all the benefits of regular employees. They were engaged for the first time in the years 1985-86 and in the teeth of orders not to make such appointments issued on 3-7-1984. Though the Director of Commercial Taxes recommended that they be absorbed, the Government did not accede to that recommendation. These respondents thereupon approached the Administrative Tribunal in the year 1997 with their claim. The Administrative Tribunal rejected their claim finding that they had not made out a right either to get wages equal to that of others regularly employed or for regularisation. Thus, the applications filed were dismissed. The respondents approached the High Court of Karnataka challenging the decision of the Administrative Tribunal. The Administrative Tribunal rejected their claim finding that they had not made out a right either to get wages equal to that of others regularly employed or for regularisation. Thus, the applications filed were dismissed. The respondents approached the High Court of Karnataka challenging the decision of the Administrative Tribunal. It is seen that the High Court without really coming to grips with the question falling for decision in the light of the findings of the Administrative Tribunal and the decisions of this Court, proceeded to order that they are entitled to wages equal to the salary and allowances that are being paid to the regular employees of their cadre in government service with effect from the dates from which they were respectively appointed. It may be noted that this gave retrospective effect to the judgment of the High Court by more than 12 years. The High Court also issued a command to the State to consider their cases for regularisation within a period of four months from the date of receipt of that order. The High Court seems to have proceeded on the basis that, whether they were appointed before 1-7-1984, a situation covered by the decision of this Court in Dharwad District PWD Literate Daily Wage Employees Assn. v. State of Karnataka [ (1990) 2 SCC 396 ] and the scheme framed pursuant to the direction thereunder, or subsequently, since they have worked for a period of 10 years, they were entitled to equal pay for equal work from the very inception of their engagement on daily wages and were also entitled to be considered for regularisation in their posts. 9. Civil Appeals Nos. 1861-2063 of 2001 reflect the other side of the coin. The appellant association with indefinite number of members approached the High Court with a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order of the Government directing cancellation of appointments of all casual workers/daily-rated workers made after 1-7-1984 and further seeking a direction for the regularisation of all the daily-wagers engaged by the Government of Karnataka and its local bodies. A learned Single Judge of the High Court disposed of the writ petition by granting permission to the petitioners before him, to approach their employers for absorption and regularisation of their services and also for payment of their salaries on a par with the regular workers, by making appropriate representations within the time fixed therein and directing the employers to consider the cases of the claimants for absorption and regularisation in accordance with the observations made by the Supreme Court in similar cases. The State of Karnataka filed appeals against the decision of the learned Single Judge. A Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeals. It held that the daily-wage employees, employed or engaged either in government departments or other statutory bodies after 1-7-1984, were not entitled to the benefit of the scheme framed by this Court in Dharwad District PWD case [ (1990) 2 SCC 396 ] referred to earlier. The High Court considered various orders and directions issued by the Government interdicting such engagements or employment and the manner of entry of the various employees. Feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of their claim, the members of the associations have filed these appeals.” Similar view has been taken in L.P.A. No. 630 of 2019. 13. However, the plea has been taken on behalf of the appellant-Corporation that the ratio of the aforesaid judgment will not be applicable in the facts of the instant case since in those cases there was no tripartite settlement. 14. This Court, therefore, has proceeded to examine as to whether once the settlement has been arrived at in between the parties, and the workman has been reinstated in course of pendency of the dispute, will it deprive the workman from claiming regularization, if the circular to that effect has been issued by way of policy decision to regularize the service of the workman who are coming under the fold of the aforesaid circular? 15. It is not in dispute that once the settlement has been arrived at in between the parties either under Section 18(1) or Section 18(3) of the Act, 1947, it binds the parties, as would appear from the aforesaid provision which reads as hereunder :- “18. 15. It is not in dispute that once the settlement has been arrived at in between the parties either under Section 18(1) or Section 18(3) of the Act, 1947, it binds the parties, as would appear from the aforesaid provision which reads as hereunder :- “18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.- (1) … … … (2) … … … (3) A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an arbitration award in a case where a notification has been issued under subsection (3A) of Section 10A or an award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] which has become enforceable] shall be binding on- (a) all parties to the industrial dispute; (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board, arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause; (c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates; (d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part.” 16. The question of binding effect of the settlement having been arrived at in between the parties in the facts of the given case cannot be said to be in dispute since the workman is not deviating from the terms of the agreement, since he has already been reinstated in the capacity of casual workman and also discharging the duty but the question herein is that once the workman has been reinstated in service in the capacity of casual workman, can he be deprived from raising the dispute for regularization of service? The answer of this Court is in negative, reason being that in the given facts of the case the appellant Corporation has come out with policy decision as contained in circulars dated 06.05.1987 and 09.09.1996 wherein the decision has been taken to regularize the services of the casual workmen, if completed three months of service as on 02.05.1986 and found to be eligible in terms of the conditions contained therein. The question arises that can the appellant Corporation be allowed to come in the way of regularization of the services of the workman once the decision has been taken by the Corporation itself to that effect? The Corporation, in that eventuality, since has taken a policy decision for regularizing the services of the casual workmen, if coming in the fold of policy decision contained therein, it is not available for the Corporation to turn around and oppose the case of the workman for regularization, otherwise, it will be said that the Corporation is acting contrary to its own policy decision. It is settled position of law that once the policy decision has been taken, it is not available for the decision taker to turn around and create hurdle in its effective implementation merely because the workman, in the facts of the given case, has been reinstated in the capacity of casual workman. 17. This Court has scrutinized the action of the appellant Corporation by taking into consideration the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Uma Devi (Supra). It would be evident from paragraph 53 thereof that the very object and intent of the judgment that if the employer is in the need/requirement of the service of the casual workers, by way of one exercise, the services of such workers are required to be regularized, if the condition stipulated, i.e., the services have been against the sanctioned post, as would appear from the ratio laid down as under paragraph 53 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads as hereunder :- “53. One aspect needs to be clarified. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa [ AIR 1967 SC 1071 ] , R.N. Nanjundappa [ (1972) 1 SCC 409 ] and B.N. Nagarajan [ (1979) 4 SCC 507 ] and referred to in para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of the courts or of tribunals. The question of regularisation of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases abovereferred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularise as a one-time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularising or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme.” 18. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularising or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme.” 18. This Court, after considering the aforesaid ratio as stipulated under paragraph 53 thereof, is of the view that it is not available for the appellant Corporation to take the plea that the service of the workman is not required since it is the appellant Corporation who have entered into tripartite agreement in taking the services of the workman but in the casual basis and, therefore, once the service is required, as would appear from the action of the appellant Corporation itself, otherwise, the workman would not have been inducted in service in casual basis and, therefore, even applying the ratio laid down as under paragraph 53 of the aforesaid judgment, since the appellant Corporation is in need of the services of the workman, if the dispute has been raised for regularization of the services of the workman and if the same has been answered in favour of the workman, which according to our considered view, cannot be said to suffer from an error. Moreover, since it is the decision of the appellant Corporation taken by way of circulars dated 06.05.1987 and 09.09.1996, to regularize the services of such workmen who have already completed three months of service as on the date of coming into effect of the aforesaid circulars, hence the appellant Corporation cannot be allowed to take a contrary view. 19. Moreover, since it is the decision of the appellant Corporation taken by way of circulars dated 06.05.1987 and 09.09.1996, to regularize the services of such workmen who have already completed three months of service as on the date of coming into effect of the aforesaid circulars, hence the appellant Corporation cannot be allowed to take a contrary view. 19. We have considered the Award passed by the Tribunal and found therefrom that thoughtful consideration has been given with respect to the applicability of the circulars dated 06.05.1987 and 09.09.1996 and by taking it into consideration, the claim of the appellant Corporation that merely because the tripartite agreement has been entered into, his status will always be of casual workman, has been discarded by the Tribunal, which according to our considered view, is well considered finding, reason being that if the status of the workman would remain be of casual workman, the very object and spirit of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Uma Devi (Supra) will be flouted for the reason that the intent of the said judgment is that if the requirement of services of casual workmen are there, they should be inducted in service on regular basis. The question may arise of the availability of sanctioned post but in the facts of the given case, the appellant Corporation cannot be allowed to take the aforesaid plea since the Corporation itself has come out with the circulars dated 06.05.1987 and 09.09.1996 whereby and whereunder the decision has been taken that before issuance of circulars if any casual workman has completed three months of service, their service will be required to be regularized and once there is decision to that effect, the aforesaid issue cannot be allowed to be raised, though such issue has not been raised but even then we are answering the issue since we are considering the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court wherein the issue of sanctioned post is there as under paragraph 53. 20. 20. This court has gone across the order passed in L.P.A. No.80 of 2019, L.P.A. No.582 of 2019, L.P.A. No.630 of 2019 and L.P.A. No.49 of 2021 wherein also, by taking into consideration the decision of the Corporation, as contained in policy decision dated 06.05.1987 and 09.09.1996, basis upon which Awards have been passed in those cases, this Court has refused to interfere with the impugned orders by dismissing the intra-court appeals. 21. The writ petition has been filed for issuance of writ of certiorari for quashing of the Award and as such, it requires to refer herein about the settled position of law in showing interference with the finding recorded by the Tribunal, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan and Others, [A.I.R. 1964 SC 477] at paragraph no.7 which is being reproduced hereinbelow : “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque [ (1955) 1 SCR 1104 ] Nagandra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam [(1958) SCR 1240] and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh [ AIR 1960 SC 1168 ]” In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and Others, [A.I.R. 1955 SC 233], the Hon'ble Apex Court, with regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, at paragraph-21 has observed which is being reproduced hereinbelow : “21. … … …, the following propositions may be taken as established : (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. … … …, the following propositions may be taken as established : (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Certiorari will also be issued when the court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior court were to rehear the case on the evidence, and substitute its own findings in certiorari. These propositions are well-settled and are not in dispute… … …” In Sawarn Singh and Another v. State of Punjab & Others, [ (1976) 2 SCC 868 ], their Lordships, while considering the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case, “this limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case, “this limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be.” 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” Recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa and Others v. Giridhari Sahu and Others, [ (2019) 10 SCC 695 ] has considered the issue about scope of issuance of writ of certiorari by the High Court and has laid down the proposition of law that if the finding recorded by the court is erroneous and based upon perversity, the order is fit to be quashed/set aside. In view of the judgment referred hereinabove, it is evident that the power of issuance of writ of certiorari, which is to be exercised by the High Court, sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference of the Award, is very limited and that can only be exercised if any perversity could be shown in the Award. 22. 22. This Court, after having discussed the settled position of law, has scrutinized the order passed by the learned Single Judge and found therefrom that thoughtful consideration has been given regarding the legal position as also the circulars dated 06.05.1987 and 09.09.1996 coupled with the fact that this Court has dismissed the intra-court appeals, i.e., L.P.A. No.80 of 2019, L.P.A. No.582 of 2019, L.P.A. No.630 of 2019 and L.P.A. No.49 of 2021. Accordingly, we are of the considered view that it is not a fit case to interfere with the Award and, as such, the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition, cannot be said to suffer from an error. 23. This Court, in the entirety of the facts and circumstances of case, is of the considered view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge requires no interference. 24. In the result, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed. 25. Stay petition (I.A. No.9914 of 2019) also stands disposed of.