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2022 DIGILAW 93 (JK)

Union Territory of J&K v. Partap Singh

2022-03-09

MOHAN LAL, SANJEEV KUMAR

body2022
JUDGMENT : 1. This is an application by the Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir seeking condonation of delay of 327 days in filing leave to appeal application to assail the judgment of acquittal dated 6th September, 2019 recorded by the Court of Principal Sessions Judge, Reasi [“the trial Court”] in file No.12/Sessions titled State v. Partap Singh, whereby the trial Court has acquitted the respondent-accused in FIR No.54/2013 of Police Station, Katra for offences under Section 8/20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 [“NDPS Act”]. 2. Before we advert to the explanation tendered by the applicant for inordinate delay in filing the leave application, it would be appropriate to allude to the merits of the appeal proposed to be filed by the applicant against the judgment of acquittal. 3. First the brief resume of the prosecution case against the respondent, as was put up before the trial Court. PW-1 Ranjit Singh, PSI along with PW-2 Constable Ashok Kumar, No.638 and PW-3 Constable Ashok Kumar No.599/RSI were on patrol duty in village Kadmal on 20.03.2013. At about 6.15 pm, they saw the accused person trying to give slip to the police. The accused was apprehended. He was found carrying a polythene bag containing charas like substance in 15 challies. PW-Ranjit Singh seized the contraband item and sent a docket in this respect to the Police Station, Katra for registration of the case. Accordingly, FIR No.54/2013 for offence under Section 8/20 of NDPS Act was registered in Police Station, Katra and the S.H.O. as well as Additional S.P. Katra came on the spot and proceeded with the investigation. The contraband was seized and weight of the contraband was found to be 650 gms, out of which 50 gms was taken out as sample for chemical analysis and the remaining was wrapped in the packet separately under mark A and B. During investigation, statements of the witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. were recorded, site plan was prepared and mark ‘B’ packet was sent to the FSL, Jammu for chemical examination. The recovered and seized substance was found to be charas, upon chemical examination by the FSL and, accordingly, Final Police Report was laid before the competent Court of jurisdiction. The accused was charged for offence under Section 8/20 NDPS Act by the trial Court vide its order dated 01.06.2013. The recovered and seized substance was found to be charas, upon chemical examination by the FSL and, accordingly, Final Police Report was laid before the competent Court of jurisdiction. The accused was charged for offence under Section 8/20 NDPS Act by the trial Court vide its order dated 01.06.2013. The charge was read over and explained to him to which accused did not plead guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. With a view to sustain the charge against the accused, the prosecution adduced the evidence of PW-1 Ranjit Singh, PW-2, Ashok Kumar No.638, PW-3 Ashok Kumar No.599/RSI, PW-8 Sher Singh, Naib Tehsildar and Abdul Gani Bhat, Assistant Scientific Officer, FSL, Srinagar. The incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution evidence were put to the accused, who denied the allegation and chose not to lead any evidence in defence. The trial Court, after appreciating the evidence on record and having regard to the arguments addressed by the prosecution and the defence, came to the conclusion that the evidence led by the prosecution was full of reasonable doubt and discrepancies and, therefore, the accused deserved the benefit of doubt. Consequently, vide judgment impugned the trial Court acquitted the accused of the charge giving him the benefit of doubt. It is this judgment, which is sought to be assailed by the applicant. 5. The appeal, besides being highly belated also lacks merit. PW-1 Ranjit Singh, who along with his associate police officials had apprehended the accused with 15 challies containing charas like substance contained in a polythene bag, prepared the docket and sent it to the concerned Police Station. The S.H.O., Police Station, Katra and the Additional S.P., Katra came on spot and took the required action. It is important to note here that neither the S.H.O, who was Investigating Officer in the case nor Additional S.P., who, too, had rushed to the place of occurrence alongwith I.O. have been examined as prosecution witness by the prosecution. The witness (PW-1) has even denied that the sample out of the contraband was taken in his presence. He has also admitted in his cross-examination that the place of occurrence was a thoroughfare but he did not associate any civilian present on spot. He has also denied having signed any paper prepared by the S.H.O. on spot. The witness (PW-1) has even denied that the sample out of the contraband was taken in his presence. He has also admitted in his cross-examination that the place of occurrence was a thoroughfare but he did not associate any civilian present on spot. He has also denied having signed any paper prepared by the S.H.O. on spot. Similarly, PW-2 Ashok Kumar, during his examination-in-chief has deposed that the accused was coming towards Kadmal and was signaled to stop by PW-1. PW-1 made personal search of the accused and recovered one bag containing 15 challies of charas. PW-1 addressed a docket to the Police Station through him and in response thereto, both S.H.O. and Additional S.P., Katra came to the place of occurrence. He also claims that the personal search of the accused was conducted in his presence and the contraband was seized in his presence. He has proved the seizure memo as well as the contents thereof. During cross-examination, the witness deposed that the place of occurrence was a thoroughfare where vehicles were coming and going and there were also residential houses and shops existing near the place of occurrence. He, however, states that the S.H.O. and the Additional S.P., who were conducting the investigation, did not summon any civilian during investigation nor accused was given an option to be searched by the Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer under section 50 NDPS Act. 6. PW-8, Naib Tehsildar, who had re-sealed the packets has stood by the prosecution that he on the request of police had re-sealed the packet, which, as per the police was containing some contraband. PW-Abdul Gani Bhat, Assistant Scientific Officer, FSL Srinagar in his deposition has stated that when he received the sample, it was weighing 50 gms and was sealed with seven intact seals. He has proved the contents of the report. 7. Having regard to the aforesaid evidence on record, the trial Court has found two serious infirmities in the case of the prosecution. The trial Court has concluded that in the given facts and circumstances, the statement of the Investigating Officer was necessary to prove the case of the prosecution and to explain the contradictions appearing in the statements of witnesses in whose presence the alleged contraband was recovered. The trial Court has concluded that in the given facts and circumstances, the statement of the Investigating Officer was necessary to prove the case of the prosecution and to explain the contradictions appearing in the statements of witnesses in whose presence the alleged contraband was recovered. The trial Court has also found fault with the prosecution case on the ground that the Investigating Officer had not associated any civilian as witness to the search and seizure, though, they were available on spot. The Investigating Officer, if produced as prosecution witness, perhaps could have rendered some explanation for not associating independent witnesses. The specimen of the contraband was sent to FSL for chemical examination on 26th March, 2013 and the same is shown to have been received by the chemical analyst on 11th June, 2013. There was, thus, inordinate delay in sending the sample, therefore, impinging upon the safe custody of the contraband in the interregnum. This, too, perhaps could have been explained by the Investigating Officer had he entered the witness box to support the prosecution case. The trial Court has, thus, rightly doubted even the safe custody of the contraband, particularly when the prosecution led no evidence to demonstrate that the seized contraband was deposited in the malkhana of the Police Station and the same was there in the safe custody till it reached the FSL for chemical examination. 8. From the impugned judgment, we notice that a plea was raised by the defence that since the contraband was recovered upon personal search of the accused and that being the case, it was incumbent upon the Investigating Officer to comply with the mandate of Section 50 NDPS Act and give an option to the accused of being searched in the presence of a Magistrate of a Gazetted Officer. This plea is, indeed, not dealt with by the trial Court. However, we are of the considered view that in the given facts and circumstances of the case, such plea was not tenable. 9. A Constitution Bench of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 1 SCC 609 considered the requirement to comply with Section 50 NDPS Act in the cases of making personal search of the accused. 9. A Constitution Bench of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 1 SCC 609 considered the requirement to comply with Section 50 NDPS Act in the cases of making personal search of the accused. The discussion made by the Supreme Court in paragraph Nos.18 to 22 fully explains the position of law on the point and, therefore, we deem it appropriate to reproduce the same herein below:- 18. Section 50 of the NDPS Act prescribes the conditions under which personal search of a person is required to be conducted. Being the pivotal provision, the Section, (as amended by Act 9 of 2001, inserting sub-sections (5) and (6) with effect from 2-10 2001) is extracted in full. It reads as under: “50. Conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted.--(1) When any officer duly authorised under section 42 is about to search any person under the provisions of section 41, section 42 or section 43, he shall, if such person so requires, take such person without unnecessary delay to the nearest Gazetted Officer of any of the departments mentioned in section 42 or to the nearest Magistrate. (2) If such requisition is made, the officer may detain the person until he can bring him before the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate referred to in sub-section (1). (3) The Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate before whom any such person is brought shall, if he sees no reasonable ground for search, forthwith discharge the person but otherwise shall direct that search be made. (4) No female shall be searched by anyone excepting a female. (5) When an officer duly authorised under section 42 has reason to believe that it is not possible to take the person to be searched to the nearest Gazetted Officer or Magistrate without the possibility of the person to be searched parting with possession of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance, or controlled substance or article or document, he may, instead of taking such person to the nearest Gazetted Officer or Magistrate, proceed to search the person as provided under section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). (6) After a search is conducted under sub-section (5), the officer shall record the reasons for such belief which necessitated such search and within seventy-two hours send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior.” 19. (6) After a search is conducted under sub-section (5), the officer shall record the reasons for such belief which necessitated such search and within seventy-two hours send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior.” 19. Sub-section (1) of the said Section provides that when the empowered officer is about to search any suspected person, he shall, if the person to be searched so requires, take him to the nearest gazetted officer or the Magistrate for the purpose. Under sub-section (2), it is laid down that if such request is made by the suspected person, the officer who is to take the search, may detain the suspect until he can be brought before such gazetted officer or the Magistrate. It is manifest that if the suspect expresses the desire to be taken to the gazetted officer or the Magistrate, the empowered officer is restrained from effecting the search of the person concerned. He can only detain the suspect for being produced before the gazetted officer or the Magistrate, as the case may be. Sub-section (3) lays down that when the person to be searched is brought before such gazetted officer or the Magistrate and such gazetted officer or the Magistrate finds that there are no reasonable grounds for search, he shall forthwith discharge the person to be searched, otherwise he shall direct the search to be made. 20. The mandate of Section 50 is precise and clear, viz. if the person intended to be searched expresses to the authorised officer his desire to be taken to the nearest gazetted officer or the Magistrate, he cannot be searched till the gazetted officer or the Magistrate, as the case may be, directs the authorised officer to do so. 21. At this juncture, we must state that the issue before us in terms of the referral order is not about the applicability of Section 50 of the NDPS Act per se but is confined to the scope and width of the expression “if the person to be searched so requires” as figuring in sub-section (1) of the said Section. Therefore, we deem it unnecessary to evaluate the submissions made by the learned counsel regarding the applicability of the rigours of Section 50 of the NDPS Act when a search of the suspect is conducted by an officer empowered under Section 41 of the said Act. 22. Therefore, we deem it unnecessary to evaluate the submissions made by the learned counsel regarding the applicability of the rigours of Section 50 of the NDPS Act when a search of the suspect is conducted by an officer empowered under Section 41 of the said Act. 22. We may, however, add that while considering the question of compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act, the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh (supra) considered the provisions of Section 41 as well. It observed as under :- “8. Section 41 of the NDPS Act provides that a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class or any Magistrate of the Second Class specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, may issue a warrant for the arrest of and for search of any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed any offence punishable under Chapter IV. Vide sub-section (2) the power has also been vested in gazetted officers of the Departments of Central Excise, Narcotics, Customs, Revenue Intelligence or any other department of the Central Government or of the Border Security Force, empowered in that behalf by a general or special order of the State Government to arrest any person, who he has reason to believe to have committed an offence punishable under Chapter IV or to search any person or conveyance or vessel or building etc. with a view to seize any contraband or document or other article which may furnish evidence of the commission of such an offence, concealed in such building or conveyance or vessel or place.” 10. It is, thus, trite law that the obligation of the authorized officer to give an option to the accused of being searched in the presence of a Magistrate or Gazetted Officer, in terms of Section 50 of NDPS Act is mandatory and requires strict compliance. Failure of the authorized officer making personal search of the accused and recovering contraband to comply with this provision would render the recovery of the contraband suspect and would vitiate the conviction based upon such recovery of the contraband from the person of the accused during search. Failure of the authorized officer making personal search of the accused and recovering contraband to comply with this provision would render the recovery of the contraband suspect and would vitiate the conviction based upon such recovery of the contraband from the person of the accused during search. The Supreme Court in the subsequent case of State of Punjab v. Baljinder Singh, (2019) 10 SCC 473 , however, clarified that Section 50 of the NDPS Act would be attracted in a case of ‘personal search’ and not to search of a vehicle or a container or premises. However, the question arises as to whether the search of the carry bag carried by the accused would fall within the ambit of term “personal search” and would require compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act or it would be a recovery of the contraband not from the personal of the accused but from the carry bag simpliciter, thus, obviating the compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. 11. Initially, there was some confusion. In the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Pawan Kumar, (2004) 7 SCC 735 , Hon’ble the Supreme Court confronted the issue, however, the Bench comprising of Justice Y.K. Sabharwal and Justice Arijit Pasayat delivered a split verdict. As per Justice Y.K. Sabharwal, in the case of search of a bag, which is inextricably connected with the person of the accused, Section 50 of the NDPS Act will apply but if it is not so connected, the provision will not apply. It was held that if the accused was carrying a bag on his shoulder and on search contraband is recovered from that bag, it would be search of person of the accused and, therefore, Section 50 of the NDPS Act will be attracted. However, as per Justice Arijit Pasayat, there would be no distinction between search of a bag found near a person and a bag carried by him and, therefore, search of a bag carried on the shoulder or back of a person is not search of person of the accused and, therefore, Section 50 of the NDPS Act would not be attracted. In view of the difference of opinion by two Hon’ble Judges, the matter was referred to the Larger Bench. 12. In view of the difference of opinion by two Hon’ble Judges, the matter was referred to the Larger Bench. 12. The Larger Bench of the Supreme Court considered the issue and in its verdict reported in (2005) 4 SCC 350 held that there was no warrant or justification for giving an extended meaning to the word “person” occurring in the same provision so as to include even some bag, article or container or some other baggage being carried by him. The Supreme Court, relying upon the judgment of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (1999) 6 SCC 172 and after discussing plethora of judgments from the Apex Court in paragraph Nos.6 to 12 held thus:- “6. The question, which requires consideration, is what is the meaning of the words “search any person” occurring in sub-Section (1) of Section 50 of the Act. Learned counsel for the accused has submitted that the word “person” occurring in Section 50 would also include within its ambit any bag, briefcase or any such article or container, etc., being carried by such person and the provisions of Section 50 have to be strictly complied with while conducting search of such bag, briefcase, article or container, etc. Learned counsel for the State has, on the other hand, submitted that there is no warrant for giving such an extended meaning and the word “person” would mean only the person himself and not any bag, briefcase, article or container, etc., being carried by him. 7. The word “person” has not been defined in the Act. Section 2(xxix) of the Act says that the words and expressions used herein and not defined but defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Code. The Code of Criminal Procedure, however, does not define the word “person”. Section 2(y) of the Code says that the words and expressions used therein and not defined but defined in the Indian Penal Code have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Code. Section 11 of the Indian Penal Code says that the word “person” includes any Company or Association or body of persons whether incorporated or not. Similar definition of the word “person” has been given in Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act. Section 11 of the Indian Penal Code says that the word “person” includes any Company or Association or body of persons whether incorporated or not. Similar definition of the word “person” has been given in Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act. Therefore, these definitions render no assistance for resolving the controversy in hand. 8. One of the basic principles of interpretation of statutes is to construe them according to plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any express intention or declared purpose of the statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. The onus of showing that the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges it. He must advance something which clearly shows that the grammatical construction would be repugnant to the intention of the Act or lead to some manifest absurdity (See Craies on Statute Law, Seventh ed. page 83-85). In the well known treatise ---- Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, the learned author has enunciated the same principle that the words of the Statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the Statute to suggest the contrary (See the Chapter ---- “The Rule of Literal Construction” p. 78, 9th Edn.). This Court has also followed this principle right from the beginning. In Jugalkishore Saraf v. M/s Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. AIR 1955 SC 376 , S.R. Das, J. said: “The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is, by giving to the words used by the legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation.” A catena of subsequent decisions have followed the same line. It, therefore, becomes necessary to look to dictionaries to ascertain the correct meaning of the word “person”. 9. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation.” A catena of subsequent decisions have followed the same line. It, therefore, becomes necessary to look to dictionaries to ascertain the correct meaning of the word “person”. 9. The dictionary meaning of the word “person” is as under : Chamber’s Dictionary : “An individual; a living soul; a human being; b: the outward appearance, & c :bodily form; a distinction in form; according as the subject of the verb is the person speaking, spoken to or spoken of.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary: “an individual human being; a human being as distinguished from an animal or thing; an individual having a specified kind of bodily appearance; the body of a human being as presented to public view normally with its appropriate coverings and clothings; a living individual unit; a being possessing or forming the subject of personality.” Black’s Law Dictionary : “In general usage, a human being (i.e. natural person), though by statute term may include a firm, labour organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations.” Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar: “The expression ‘person’ is a noun by P. Ramanatha Aiyar according to grammar and it means a character represented as on the stage, a human being; a self-conscious personality.” 10. We are not concerned here with the wide definition of the word “person”, which in the legal world includes corporations, associations or body of individuals as factually in these type of cases search of their premises can be done and not of their person. Having regard to the scheme of the Act and the context in which it has been used in the Section it naturally means a human being or a living individual unit and not an artificial person. The word has to be understood in a broad commonsense manner and, therefore, not a naked or nude body of a human being but the manner in which a normal human being will move about in a civilized society. Therefore, the most appropriate meaning of the word “person” appears to be _ “the body of a human being as presented to public view usually with its appropriate coverings and clothings”. In a civilized society appropriate coverings and clothings are considered absolutely essential and no sane human being comes in the gaze of others without appropriate coverings and clothings. Therefore, the most appropriate meaning of the word “person” appears to be _ “the body of a human being as presented to public view usually with its appropriate coverings and clothings”. In a civilized society appropriate coverings and clothings are considered absolutely essential and no sane human being comes in the gaze of others without appropriate coverings and clothings. The appropriate coverings will include footwear also as normally it is considered an essential article to be worn while moving outside one’s home. Such appropriate coverings or clothings or footwear, after being worn, move along with the human body without any appreciable or extra effort. Once worn, they would not normally get detached from the body of the human being unless some specific effort in that direction is made. For interpreting the provision, rare cases of some religious monks and sages, who, according to the tenets of their religious belief do not cover their body with clothings, are not to be taken notice of. Therefore, the word “person” would mean a human being with appropriate coverings and clothings and also footwear. 11. A bag, briefcase or any such article or container, etc. can, under no circumstances, be treated as body of a human being. They are given a separate name and are identifiable as such. They cannot even remotely be treated to be part of the body of a human being. Depending upon the physical capacity of a person, he may carry any number of items like a bag, a briefcase, a suitcase, a tin box, a thaila, a jhola, a gathri, a holdall, a carton, etc. of varying size, dimension or weight. However, while carrying or moving along with them, some extra effort or energy would be required. They would have to be carried either by the hand or hung on the shoulder or back or placed on the head. In common parlance it would be said that a person is carrying a particular article, specifying the manner in which it was carried like hand, shoulder, back or head, etc. Therefore, it is not possible to include these articles within the ambit of the word “person” occurring in Section 50 of the Act. 12. An incriminating article can be kept concealed in the body or clothings or coverings in different manner or in the footwear. Therefore, it is not possible to include these articles within the ambit of the word “person” occurring in Section 50 of the Act. 12. An incriminating article can be kept concealed in the body or clothings or coverings in different manner or in the footwear. While making a search of such type of articles, which have been kept so concealed, it will certainly come within the ambit of the word “search of person”. One of the tests, which can be applied is, where in the process of search the human body comes into contact or shall have to be touched by the person carrying out the search, it will be search of a person. Some indication of this is provided by Sub-section (4) of Section 50 of the Act, which provides that no female shall be searched by anyone excepting a female. The legislature has consciously made this provision as while conducting search of a female, her body may come in contact or may need to be touched and, therefore, it should be done only by a female. In the case of a bag, briefcase or any such article or container, etc., they would not normally move along with the body of the human being unless some extra or special effort is made. Either they have to be carried in hand or hung on the shoulder or back or placed on the head. They can be easily and in no time placed away from the body of the carrier. In order to make a search of such type of objects, the body of the carrier will not come in contact of the person conducting the search. Such objects cannot be said to be inextricably connected with the person, namely, the body of the human being. Inextricable means incapable of being disentangled or untied or forming a maze or tangle from which it is impossible to get free.” 13. In view of the aforesaid legal position, we are of the considered view that compliance of Section 50 of NDPS Act was not required. The contraband was allegedly recovered from the bag, which was being carried by the accused and, therefore, would not fall within the ambit of term “personal search” as contained in Section 50(1) of NDPS Act. 14. In view of the aforesaid legal position, we are of the considered view that compliance of Section 50 of NDPS Act was not required. The contraband was allegedly recovered from the bag, which was being carried by the accused and, therefore, would not fall within the ambit of term “personal search” as contained in Section 50(1) of NDPS Act. 14. In the instant case, the trial Court has not considered this aspect of the matter, though counsel for the defence had raised the issue of non-compliance of mandatory provisions of Section 50 of NDPS Act. Probably, because the trial Court otherwise found that the prosecution had failed to prove its case by leading evidence beyond any reasonable doubt. We, too, could have skipped consideration of this question but having regard to the confusion on the issue exhibited by the trial Courts holding trials in NDPS cases with regard to applicability of Section 50 and the concept and interpretation of the term “personal search”, we have made an effort to look for the law laid down by the Supreme Court and put it as succinctly as possible for the guidance of the Criminal Courts conducting trials of cases under NDPS Act. 15. Coming to the case in hand, we find that the explanation tendered by the applicant to explain the delay of 327 days is totally vague and unsatisfactory. Otherwise also, having regard to the nature of evidence led by the prosecution to prove its case before the trial Court, we do not feel inclined to grant leave to file acquittal appeal against the impugned judgment. 16. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay as also application seeking leave to appeal against the impugned judgment of acquittal is dismissed. 17. Before we part with this judgment, we deem it appropriate to notice that this Court vide order dated 09.12.2020 had directed the applicant to apprise the Court as to whether action has been taken or proposed to be taken against the Investigating Officer, who did not appear as a witness in the case as also the Public Prosecutor, who failed to take requisite steps for examination of the Investigating Officer and other relevant witnesses. 18. In response to the aforesaid interim order passed by this Court, Senior Superintendent of Police, Reasi has filed a status report and has also placed on record a copy of order No.164 of 2021 dated 10.02.2021. 18. In response to the aforesaid interim order passed by this Court, Senior Superintendent of Police, Reasi has filed a status report and has also placed on record a copy of order No.164 of 2021 dated 10.02.2021. A perusal of the order indicates that the Inspector General of Police, Jammu Zone has ordered an enquiry to be conducted by Imtiyaz Ahmed, Dy.S.P, S.O. to DIG, UR Range, Udhampur against Inspector Sanjeev Gupta, the then SHO, Police Station, Katra, Constable, Sudesh Kumar No.201/CR and Const. Gurcharan Singh No.532/U. We are, however, not aware as to whether the enquiry ordered by the Inspector General of Police, Jammu Zone has been taken to its logical end or not. 19. Be that as it may, it is the duty of the Inspector General of Police, Jammu Zone, Jammu to ensure that the enquiry ordered by him is taken to the logical conclusion and the delinquent officials are made accountable. This will be necessary to send a signal to the Investigating Officers, particularly those, investigating cases under NDPS Act to remain vigilant in future and perform their duties diligently so that people who indulge in drug trafficking are brought to book.