JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. J. Tsering, learned Public Prosecutor for the State applicant. Also heard Ms. N. Danggen, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. This application, under Section 439(2) read-with-Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is preferred by the State of Arunachal Pradesh through Shri Tumki Loya, Investigating Officer, Seppa Police Station Case No. 24/2022, for cancellation of bail granted to accused, Shri Babing Haffi, by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Seppa, vide order dated 17.05.2022, in Seppa P.S. Case No. 24/2022, under Sections 376(1)/341/354B of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The factual background, leading to filing of the present petition, is briefly stated as under: “On 06.05.2022, the informant, Smti X (name withheld), lodged one F.I.R. with the Officer-In-Charge, Seppa P.S. to the effect that on that day, at about 7.30 p.m., accused-Babing Haffi, contacted her over phone and visited her rented room, situated at Bazaaline colony Seppa, to collect his wrist watch. Then, after knowing her room, he locked the door from inside and sensing his ill intention, she warned her not to touch her and thereafter, he started threatening her with dire consequences if she does not accept his proposal to marry him, and thereafter, he grabbed her neck and assaulted her and thereafter, committed rape upon her without her consent and thereafter left her. Upon the said complaint, the Officer-In-Charge, Seppa Police Station, registered Seppa P.S. Case No. 24/2022, under Sections 376(1)/341/354B of the Indian Penal Code, and started investigation. During investigation, the I.O. arrested the accused and forwarded him to the Court on 07.05.2022. Thereafter, the accused preferred an application for bail before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Seppa, and vide order dated 17.05.2022, the learned Court below has granted bail to the accused.” 4. During investigation, the I.O. arrested the accused and forwarded him to the Court on 07.05.2022. Thereafter, the accused preferred an application for bail before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Seppa, and vide order dated 17.05.2022, the learned Court below has granted bail to the accused.” 4. Being highly aggrieved, the State, through the I.O., preferred this application for cancellation of the bail granted to the accused/respondent on the ground that the impugned order, dated 17.05.2022, is not tenable in the eye of law as it has been well settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court that the power of a Magistrate to grant bail is subject to the embargo provided under Clause (i) Sub-Section 1 of Section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the learned Court below has granted bail to the accused by observing that “as observed earlier, the investigation is almost completed and the accused is well settled and deep rooted in the society. He is not influential. There is no chance of absconding and possibility of influencing the investigation and intimidating the victim is very remote. The allegations are definitely serious but at the same time the purpose of detention has already been served. Further, except for the present case, there is nothing in the record to show that the accused is habitual sex offender or a criminal. The allegations are definitely serious but at the same time the purpose of detention has already been served. Further, except for the present case, there is nothing in the record to show that the accused is habitual sex offender or a criminal. Therefore, his release will not be a threat to the society.” And that, even there is no legal bar for a Magistrate to consider an application for grant of bail to a person, who is arrested for an offence, exclusively triable by a Court of Session and it would be proper and appropriate that in such case the Magistrate directs the accused person to approach the Court of Session for the purpose of getting the relief of bail, and that even in a case where Magistrate opts to make an adventure of exercising the powers under Section 437 of the Code in respect of a person who is suspected of the commission of such an offence, arrested and detained in that connection, such Magistrate has to specially negate the existence of reasonable ground for believing that such an accused is guilty of an offence punishable with the sentence of death or imprisonment for life, and that if the Magistrate has no occasion and in fact does not find that there is no reasonable ground to believe that the accused has not committed the offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, he shall be deemed to be having no jurisdiction to enlarge the accused on bail, and that in view of the materials available on the record, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate ought not to have grant bail to the accused in view of the embargo under Section 437(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and therefore, it is contended to cancel the bail granted to the accused/respondent vide order dated 17.05.2022 in BA No. 42/2022. 5. The respondent has filed affidavit-in-opposition denying the averments made in the petition. 6. Mr. J. Tsering, learned Public Prosecutor for the State of Arunachal Pradesh, reiterated the grounds mentioned hereinabove and relying upon a decision of this Court by a 3 (three) Judge Bench in State of Assam Vs. State, reported in 2007 (1) GLT 330, and also relying upon 2 (two) decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dinesh M.N. (S.P.) Vs. State of Gujarat, reported in 2008 0 Supreme(SC) 709, and Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs. State, reported in 2007 (1) GLT 330, and also relying upon 2 (two) decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dinesh M.N. (S.P.) Vs. State of Gujarat, reported in 2008 0 Supreme(SC) 709, and Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs. NCT, Delhi & Anr., reported in (2001) 4 SCC 280 , submits that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to grant bail under Section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the offence is punishable with death or imprisonment for life and as such, the impugned order suffers from manifest illegality and impropriety and therefore, it is contended to set it aside and to remand the accused/respondent to judicial custody. 7. Per contra, Ms. N. Danggen, learned counsel for the respondent, submits that the observation made by the learned Court below, while granting the privilege of bail to the accused/respondent, is based on sound principle of law and there is no instance of violation of any of the terms and conditions by the respondent and in absence of such instances, the bail, which has already been granted to the respondent, cannot be cancelled and therefore, Ms. Danggen contended to dismiss the petition. 8. Having heard the submission of learned Advocates of both side, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record and also gone through the impugned order passed by the leaned court below and through the case laws referred by Mr. Tsering, learned Public Prosecutor, and the relevant provisions of law and I find sufficient force in his submission. 9. Section 437 (1) (i) Cr.P.C. read as under:- When bail may be taken in non-bailable offence. (1) When any person accused of, or suspected of, the commission of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a court other than the High Court or Court of Sessions, he may be released on bail, but- (i) such person shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. 10. While interpreting this provision, a three Judge Bench of this court in Re: State Of Assam And Anr.(supra) relying upon a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prahlad Singh Bhati (supra), had held as under:- 27. 10. While interpreting this provision, a three Judge Bench of this court in Re: State Of Assam And Anr.(supra) relying upon a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prahlad Singh Bhati (supra), had held as under:- 27. In view of our aforesaid discussion, we sum up the matter as below: (i) A Magistrate has the jurisdiction to consider bail-application in cases of non-bailable offence where punishment provided is life imprisonment or death. This power is, however, subject to the restrictions under Section 437(1) Cr. P.C. (ii) The proviso to the above section is an enabling provision only and the Magistrates are required to examine and consider the other aspects of law governing grant of bail. (iii) The jurisdiction of the Magistrate is limited in such cases and is to be exercised sparingly and in rare cases only when he is satisfied that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is guilty of such offence. (iv) The stage of investigation has also a strong bearing in the matter of consideration of bail, and the Court is required to keep in mind the observations of the Apex Court in Prahlad Singh Bhati 2001 Cri LJ 1730 (supra). (v) Where it is brought to the notice of the Sessions Judge or the Magistrate, as the case may be, that a bail application is pending or disposed of by a Higher Court, it is duty incumbent on them to go through such orders before granting or refusing ball. (vi) The Sessions Judge/ Magistrate is required to record reasons briefly as to why bail has been granted. (vii) In case of successive bail applications, it must be indicated as to what was the subsequent development or as to why departure is made. 11. In the case of Prahlad Singh Bhati (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in paragraph No. 6,7,8 as under:- “6. Even though there is no legal bar for a Magistrate to consider an application for grant of bail to a person who is arrested for an offence exclusively triable by a Court of Session yet it would be proper and appropriate that in such a case the Magistrate directs the accused person to approach the Court of Session for the purposes of getting the relief of bail. Even in a case where any Magistrate opts to make an adventure of exercising the powers under Section 437 of the Code in respect of a person who is suspected of the commission of such an offence, arrested and detained in that connection, such Magistrate has to specifically negate the existence of reasonable ground for believing that such an accused is guilty of an offence punishable with the sentence of death or imprisonment for life. In a case where the Magistrate has no occasion and in fact does not find, that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that the accused had not committed the offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, he shall be deemed to be having no jurisdiction to enlarge the accused on bail. 7. Powers of the Magistrate, while dealing with the applications for grant of bail, are regulated by the punishment prescribed for the offence in which the bail is sought. Generally speaking if punishment prescribed is for imprisonment for life and death penalty and the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to grant bail unless the matter is covered by the provisos attached to Section 437 of the Code. The limitations circumscribing the jurisdiction of the Magistrate are evident and apparent. Assumption of jurisdiction to entertain the application is distinguishable from the exercise of the, jurisdiction. 8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the Court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words "reasonable grounds for believing" instead of "the evidence" which means the Court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 11... We would reiterate that in cases where the offence is punishable with death or imprisonment for life which is triable exclusively by a Court of Session, the Magistrate may, in his wisdom, refrain to exercise the powers of granting the bail and refer the accused to approach the higher Courts unless he is fully satisfied that there is no reasonable ground for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. 12. In the case of Dinesh M.N. (S.P.)(supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the conditions laid down under section 437(1) (i) are sine qua none for granting bail even under section 439 of the Code. 13. Now, adverting to the facts herein this case, a careful perusal of the impugned order reveals that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has granted bail to the respondent observing as under:- “As observed earlier, the investigation is almost completed and the accused is well settled and deep rooted in the society. He is not influential. There is no chance of absconding and possibility of influencing the investigation and intimidating the victim is very remote. The allegations are definitely serious, but at the same time the purpose of detention has already been served. Further, except for the present case, there is nothing in the record to show that the accused is habitual sex offender or a criminal. Therefore, his release will not be a threat to the society.” 14. It may be mentioned here that the Seppa P.S. Case No. 24/2022 was registered under sections 376(1)/341/354B of the Indian Penal Code. The punishment prescribed under section 376(1) IPC is rigorous imprisonment of not less than 7 years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and also with fine. And the offence is exclusively triable by the court of sessions. The punishment prescribed under section 376(1) IPC is rigorous imprisonment of not less than 7 years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and also with fine. And the offence is exclusively triable by the court of sessions. 15. The above being the factual and legal position, the Magistrate is bound to record his satisfaction that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is guilty of such offence. But, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Seppa, while granting bail to the respondent vides impugned order dated 17.05.2022, failed to record such satisfaction. It has observed that the allegations are definitely serious, but at the same time the purpose of detention has already been served. It has failed to consider the embargo imposed upon it by subsection 1 to section 437 Cr.P.C. 16. Thus, having tested the impugned order on the touchstone of the principles laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Prahlad Sing Bhati (supra) and by a three Judge Bench of this court in the case of Re: State Of Assam And Anr. (Supra) this court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order of granting bail to the respondent suffers from manifest illegalities and the same requires interference of this court. In view of above discussion and findings this court is unable to record concurrence with the submission of Ms. Danggan, learned counsel for the respondent. 17. In the result this petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 17.05.2022, granting bail to the respondent, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Seppa, in Seppa P.S. Case No. 24/2022, under sections 376(1)/341/354B of the Indian Penal Code, stands set aside and quashed. It is provided that the respondent shall surrender before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Seppa, forthwith, failing which he shall be taken into custody. Thereafter, the learned court below shall proceed with the matter in accordance with law.