JUDGMENT : Ashokkumar C. Joshi, J. 1. Since both these appeals arise out of the common judgment and order, the same were heard together and are being decided by this common judgment and order. 2. These appeals, under the provisions of Sections 372 and 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) respectively, have been filed by the original complainant and the State assailing the judgment and order dated 03.09.2012, passed in Atrocity Case No. 4 of 2010 by the learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Chhotaudepur, recording the acquittal. 3. Facts in brief are that on 27.03.2010, when the original complainant was going on Active motorcycle as pillion rider along with one Minitaben at whose place, the original complainant was serving, the respondent-accused got stopped the vehicle, and first threatened Minitaben to kill keeping grudge of Court case as also to implicate her husband. Thereafter, the respondent-accused also threatened the complainant to get committed rape on her if she would not leave job at Minitaben's place. Further, the respondent-accused also abused the complainant of her caste. Thus, the accused committed the offences punishable under Sections 341 and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 3(i)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocity) Act, 1989 (Atrocity Act) for which, FIR came to be registered against him. 3.1 Upon FIR being filed, investigation started and the Investigating Officer recorded statements of several witnesses and produced certain documentary evidence and after completion of the investigation, Charge-sheet was filed against the accused for the offence in question. The case was committed to the Sessions/Special Court and the learned trial Judge framed the Charge. Since the accused did not plead guilty, trial was proceeded against the accused. Vide impugned judgment and order, the learned trial Judge acquitted the accused. Being aggrieved by the same, the State has preferred the present appeal. 4. Heard, learned Additional Public Prosecutor Ms. Jirga Jhaveri for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1895 of 2012 and learned advocate Mr. Neel P. Lakhani for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1638 of 2012 as well as learned advocate Ms. Kruti M. Shah for the for the respondent-original accused, in both the appeals. 4.1 The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has mainly contended that the learned trial Judge has erred in holding that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Kruti M. Shah for the for the respondent-original accused, in both the appeals. 4.1 The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has mainly contended that the learned trial Judge has erred in holding that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. She submitted that the impugned judgment of the trial Court is based on presumptions and inferences and thereby, it is against the facts and the evidence on record. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor further submitted that the learned trial Judge has failed to appreciate the evidence on record in its true and proper perspective and thereby, has erred in recording the acquittal of the respondent-accused. 4.2 The learned Additional Public Prosecutor further contended that the learned trial Judge has erred in holding that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch as, PW-1 Jasodaben Maganbhai Rathva, Exh.44 has clearly supported her case as per the complaint filed by her and stated that on the date of incident, the accused threatened the complainant and also abused her of her caste. She has also stated about administering threat to Minitaben with whom, the complainant was going on motorcycle. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the learned trial Judge ought to have considered the deposition of this witness, however, the learned trial Judge did not believe the case of the prosecution and thereby, has committed a grave error. 4.3 The learned Additional Public Prosecutor further took this Court through the deposition of PW-6 Parsuram Sagarsinh Chauhan, Exh.59, who is the husband of Minitaben and submitted that this witness has also supported the case of the prosecution in toto, however, the learned trial Judge has erred in not believing the case of the prosecution. 4.4 Further, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor referred to the deposition of PW-7 Minitaben W/o Parsuram Sagarsinh Chauhan D/o Kishorchandra Thakkar, Exh.61 and submitted that this witness has also supported the case of the prosecution in black and white. She submitted that the complainant was going as pillion rider with this witness on her Activa and at that time the incident in question had occurred. She submitted that this witness has also referred to what is stated by the original complainant in her complaint, however, the learned trial Judge has also not believed her evidence and thereby, has gravely erred in recording acquittal. She submitted that this witness has also referred to what is stated by the original complainant in her complaint, however, the learned trial Judge has also not believed her evidence and thereby, has gravely erred in recording acquittal. 4.5 The learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant-State further submitted that despite sufficient material was there on record in support of the case of the prosecution and though the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, the learned trial Judge has committed error in discarding the evidence on record and not believing the same. 4.6 It is submitted that the learned trial Judge has ignored the settled legal position and thereby, has erred in coming to such a conclusion. 4.7 The learned Additional Public Prosecutor, taking this Court through the oral as well as the documentary evidence on record, submitted that though the prosecution has proved the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the learned trial Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence on record and thereby, has committed an error in recording acquittal. It is submitted that though all the ingredients of the offence alleged had been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the learned trial Judge did not believe the same and therefore, the impugned judgment and order suffers from material illegality, perversity and contrary to the facts and evidence on record. 4.8 Thus, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted although cogent and material evidence had been produced by the prosecution and the case was proved beyond reasonable doubt, the trial Court has committed a grave error in acquitting the accused and accordingly, it is urged that present appeal may be allowed by quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Neel P. Lakhani for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1638 of 2012 adopted the arguments advanced by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State and eventually, has urged that the appeal may be allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 6. Per contra, learned advocate Ms. Kruti M. Shah for the respondent-accused, while supporting the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court, submitted that the learned trial Judge has, after due and proper appreciation and evaluation of the evidence on record, has come to such a conclusion and has acquitted the accused, which is just and proper. 6. Per contra, learned advocate Ms. Kruti M. Shah for the respondent-accused, while supporting the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court, submitted that the learned trial Judge has, after due and proper appreciation and evaluation of the evidence on record, has come to such a conclusion and has acquitted the accused, which is just and proper. She submitted that it is trite law that if two views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality. 6.1 The learned advocate for the respondent-accused submitted that the ingredients of the offence alleged against the accused are not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and there were several contradictions and omissions in the evidence on record and therefore, the learned trial Judge has rightly acquitted the accused of the charges levelled against him. 6.2 The learned advocate for the respondent-accused strenuously submitted that some of the witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution and have declared hostile whereas, the remaining can be said to be the interested witnesses and accordingly, their evidence should be appreciated with caution and the learned trial Judge has rightly appreciated their evidence. 6.3 Thus, making above submissions, it is urged that no interference is required at the hands of this Court and eventually, it is urged that the present appeals may be dismissed. 7. Heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and gone through the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court as well as the material on record. 7.1 Before adverting to the facts of the case, it would be worthwhile to refer to the scope in acquittal appeals. It is well settled by catena of decisions that an appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and consider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. 7.1 Before adverting to the facts of the case, it would be worthwhile to refer to the scope in acquittal appeals. It is well settled by catena of decisions that an appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and consider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, the Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is prejudice in favour of the accused, firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. 7.2 Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrive at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person, and therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. 7.3 Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. That the duty is cast upon the the appellate Court, in such circumstances, re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether the accused is connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged. 7.4 In Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) Rep. through Legal Representatives vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (2019) 2 SCC 752 , the Apex Court has observed that “the presumption of innocence which is attached to every accused gets fortified and strengthened when the said accused is acquitted by the trial Court. 7.4 In Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) Rep. through Legal Representatives vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (2019) 2 SCC 752 , the Apex Court has observed that “the presumption of innocence which is attached to every accused gets fortified and strengthened when the said accused is acquitted by the trial Court. Probably, for this reason, the law makers felt that when the appeal is to be filed in the High Court it should not be filed as a matter of course or as matter of right but leave of the High Court must be obtained before the appeal is entertained. This would not only prevent the High Court from being flooded with appeals but more importantly would ensure that innocent persons who have already faced the tribulation of a long drawn out criminal trial are not again unnecessarily dragged to the High Court.” 7.5 Yet in another decision in Chaman Lal vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2020 SCC Online SC 988 [Criminal Appeal No. 1229 of 2017 on 03.12.2020] the Apex Court has observed as under: “9.1 In the case of Babu vs. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 , this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. In paragraphs 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under: 12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. [Vide: Balak Ram vs. State of U.P. (1975) 3 SCC 219 , Shambhoo Missir vs. State of Bihar, (1990) 4 SCC 17 , Shailendra Pratap vs. State of U.P. (2003) 1 SCC 761 , Narendra Singh vs. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699 , Budh Singh vs. State of U.P. (2006) 9 SCC 731 , State of U.P. vs. Ram Veer Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 102 , S. Rama Krishna vs. S. Rami Reddy, (2008) 5 SCC 535 , Arulvelu vs. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 , Perla Somasekhara Reddy vs. State of A.P. (2009) 16 SCC 98 and Ram Singh vs. State of H.P. (2010) 2 SCC 445 ] 13. In Sheo Swarup vs. King Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227 , the Privy Council observed as under: (IA p. 404) “.....the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.” 14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. [See: Tulsiram Kanu vs. State, AIR 1954 SC 1 , Balbir Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 216 , M.G. Agarwal vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200 , Khedu Mohton vs. State of Bihar, (1970) 2 SCC 450 , Sambasivan vs. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 , Bhagwan Singh vs. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85 and State of Goa vs. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC 755 ]. 15. 15. In Chandrappa vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , this Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432, Para 42) “(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes” etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 16. In Ghurey Lal vs. State of U.P. (2008) 10 SCC 450 , this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 17. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 17. In State of Rajasthan vs. Naresh, (2009) 9 SCC 368 , the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that: (SCC p. 374, Para 20) “20.......an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.” 18. In State of U.P. vs. Banne, (2009) 4 SCC 271 , this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances include: (SCC p. 286, Para 28) “(i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position. (ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record. (iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice. (iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case. (v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court. (vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.” A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal vs. State, (2009) 10 SCC 401 . 19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.” 9.2 When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under: “20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence” or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. [Vide: Rajinder Kumar Kindra vs. Delhi Administration, (1984) 4 SCC 635 , Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority vs. Gopi Nath and Sons, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 312, Triveni Rubber and Plastics vs. CCE, 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 665, Gaya Din vs. Hanuman Prasad, (2001) 1 SCC 501 , Aruvelu vs. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao vs. State of A.P. (2009) 10 SCC 636 ].” (Emphasis supplied) 9.3 It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh vs. Commissioner of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 , that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. 9.4 In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh vs. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 , this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In paragraph 31, it is observed and held as under: “31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai, (1978) 1 SCC 228 . This Court considered catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In paragraph 31, it is observed and held as under: “31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai, (1978) 1 SCC 228 . In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in Para-10 as under: (SCC p. 233) “10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to re-appreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case.” 31.1. In Sambasivan vs. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 , the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in Para-8 as under: (SCC p. 416) “8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in Para-8 as under: (SCC p. 416) “8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well-considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court's judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.” 31.2. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.” 31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan vs. State of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 309 , after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 31.3. In Atley vs. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 807 , in Para-5, this Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 809-810) “5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 Cr.P.C. came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 Cr.P.C. came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence. It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. [See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh vs. State AIR 1952 SC 52 and Wilayat Khan vs. State of U.P. AIR 1953 SC 122 ] In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions. 31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy vs. State of A.P. (1979) 1 SCC 355 , this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule.” (Emphasis supplied) 8. In the aforesaid backdrop, the Court has extensively gone through the depositions of the prosecution witnesses and the other documentary evidence, as well as the impugned judgment and order and found as under: (i) the prosecution has examined in all 8 (eight) witnesses, out of which, 4 (four) viz. PW-2 Vimalbhai Arvindbhai Desai, Exh.51 (panch witness), PW-3 Ravibhai Kiritbhai Soni, Exh.52/1 (panch witness), PW-4 Chunilal Karsanbhai Vankar, Exh.54 (panch witness), and PW-5 Dineshbhai Chathiyabhai Rathva, Exh.57 (panch witness), have turned hostile and PW-8 Keshavlal Premjibhai Gajipara, Exh.76 is the Investigating Officer. (ii) thus, in fact, no independent witness has remained and/or supported the case of the prosecution. (iii) if the deposition of PW-1 Jasodaben Maganbhai Rathva, Exh.44, the complainant, more particularly, the cross-examination is referred to, she has admitted that on the date and time of incident, Minitaben was having mobile phone with her, however she did not call anybody for help nor had she asked for help from anybody passing on the road. (iv) the original complainant (PW-1) has also admitted in her cross-examination that in fact her caste is Dhanka and not Rathva and both the castes are different. However, in her first information as well as in her school leaving certificate, there is mentioned of Rathva, though in the certificate produced, there is mention of Dhanka, which is doubtful. (v) PW-6 Parsuram Sagarsinh Chauhan, Exh.59, who is the husband of Minitaben, has admitted in his cross-examination that the respondent-accused had filed three cases of cheque return against him in the competent Court at Chhotaudepur, which were pending. (vi) it is the case of the prosecution that the respondent-accused had intercepted Minitaben, who was going on Activa motorcycle with complainant-Jasodaben and threatened her to kill and also get viral her clipping and thereafter, also threatened the complainant and also allegedly abused her of her caste, but surprisingly, the complaint is registered by Jasodaben and not Minitaben for so-called incident, for the reason best known to them; (vii) further, so far as the clipping stated to have been belonging to Minitaben is concerned, for which, the respondent-accused was threatening her to get it viral, is concerned, no evidence to that effect is there on record. Moreover, PW-6 Parsuram Sagarsinh Chauhan in his cross-examination has admitted that he has not seen any such clipping related to his wife. Moreover, PW-6 Parsuram Sagarsinh Chauhan in his cross-examination has admitted that he has not seen any such clipping related to his wife. (viii) evidence of PW-6 Parsuram Sagarsinh Chauhan, Exh.59, who is the husband of Minitaben, creates suspicion for the reason that he deposed to state that he did not know as to whether his wife (Minitaben) had lodged the complaint in question or not. Further, he also did not know as to the Saturday school timings of his wife. Besides, though Minitaben informed him about the threat given by the accused, this witness prefers not to join Minitaben and the complainant to accompany them to police station for lodging complaint. His wife Minitaben also preferred not to call PW-6 (Parsuram Sagarsinh Chauhan, Exh.59) when the incident had occurred. (ix) further, except bare words, there appears nothing on record to substantiate the fact that the accused had abused the complainant of her caste in public view. (x) the standard of proof in criminal cases is beyond reasonable doubt. 8.1 Thus, the prosecution story as well as the evidence on record, do not inspire confidence. Besides, some of the witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution. Thus, on re-appreciation and reevaluation of the oral and the documentary evidence on record, as well as considering the settled legal position, it transpires that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch as the ingredients of the offence alleged are not fulfilled. The Court has gone through in detail the impugned judgment and order and found that the learned trial Judge has meticulously considered the depositions of all the witnesses and came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 9. In view of the aforesaid discussion and observations, in the considered opinion of this Court, the prosecution has failed to bring home the charge against accused for want of sufficient material. The findings recorded by the learned trial Judge do not call for any interference. Resultantly, in fleri, the appeals fail and are dismissed accordingly. Impugned judgment and order dated 03.09.2012, passed in Atrocity Case No. 4 of 2010 by the learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Chhotaudepur, recording the acquittal is confirmed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. R&P, if received, be transmitted back forthwith.