JUDGMENT U.DURGA PRASAD RAO, J. - This Habeas Corpus petition is filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for release of her husband Eede Naga Raju, S/o Subrahmanyam, resident of Uppalameta, Jagareddygudem (M), West Godavari District who was detained as per the Detention order in Roc.No.C1/e-1882535/2022 dtd. 26/3/2022 passed by 2nd respondent under Sec. 3(2) r/w 3(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (1 of 1986) [for short, the Act 1 of 1986] and later confirmed by the 1st respondent as per the proceedings in G.O.Rt.No.913, dtd. 18/5/2022. 2. The detention order dtd. 26/3/2022 was passed by 2nd respondent on the ground that the detenue was involved in following four cases and thus he is a Bootlegger within the meaning of Sec. 2(b) of the Act 1 of 1986 and his activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public health and public order. 3. The detention order is challenged in this writ petition on the grounds that the detenue was on bail in all the crimes which fact was not taken into consideration while detaining him and further, those cases can be effectively dealt with under the general law and his activities are not prejudicial to the maintenance of public health and public order. It is further contended that there was no proximity or nexus between the 4 cases to order detention. 4. The 2nd respondent filed counter and opposed the writ petition. 5. Heard arguments of Sri B. P. Raju, learned counsel for the petitioner and Special Government Pleader representing learned Advocate General for respondents. 6. While severely fulminating the detention order, learned counsel for the petitioner Sri B. P. Raju, firstly argued that in all the 4 crimes which were taken as a ground for detention, he was granted bail even prior to the detention order, which indicates that the jurisdictional Court on a prima facie opinion that the detenue did not commit offence, granted him bail in all the cases. In that view, duty is cast on the Sponsoring Authority to place before the 2 nd respondent not only the material relating to the aforesaid 4 crimes but also the bail applications and bail orders for the consideration and satisfaction of the Detaining Authority to the effect that while at large on bail, there is a likelihood of detenues repeating similar offences and acting prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Learned counsel would strenuously argue that on such satisfaction only the Detaining Authority shall pass detention order by giving cogent reasons. Further, it is the duty of the Detaining Authority to furnish the grounds of the detention and also the materials which were considered for passing the detention order. Such materials invariably include the bail applications filed by the detenue and bail orders passed thereon. All these materials have to be furnished in order to enable the detenue to make an effective representation to the Advisory Board or the Government. Learned counsel would lament that in this case the procedure has been flagrantly violated by the authorities inasmuch as, in the detention order there is no mention about forwarding of the bail applications and bail orders to the 2nd respondent and there is no further mention in the detention order about consideration of those bail orders. Most importantly, detenue was not furnished with the bail applications and bail orders and thereby he was denuded of valuable opportunity to make an effective representation before the Advisory Board. Due to such violation, the learned counsel would emphasize, the detention order became illegal. He placed reliance on (1) Abdul Sathar Ibrabim Manik vs. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 2261 = . and (2) K. Ramamohan Reddy vs. Chief Secretary to Government of Andhra Pradesh. 7. Secondly, he argued that the crimes in which the detenue was involved and which were taken as a ground for detention are all not grievous offences and they can be dealt with under the general laws. Further there is no nexus or proximity among the 4 cases relied upon by the Detaining Authority to order detention. Therefore, the activities of the detenue cannot be said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and as such the detention order is illegal and unjust. Further there is no nexus or proximity among the 4 cases relied upon by the Detaining Authority to order detention. Therefore, the activities of the detenue cannot be said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and as such the detention order is illegal and unjust. He would argue that when general laws are sufficient to deal with the offences, the preventive detention shall not be resorted to by the State. On this aspect he placed reliance on Munagala Yadamma Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 2 SCC 386 = . and Sheela Bai vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2014 (4) ALT 22 = 2014 CrLJ 3341 . and order in W.P.No.5469 of 2022, dt.11/7/2022 of Division Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Chittipothula Chinna Muthyalu vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh. 8. Per contra, learned Special Government Pleader while supporting the impugned detention order would argue that Sec. - 3 of Act 1 of 1986 speaks of satisfaction of the Detaining Authority to pass a detention order. When the statute left an action dependent upon the opinion of the authority concerned by using the expression as is satisfied or is of the opinion or if it has reason to believe or if it consider necessary, then the opinion of such authority is conclusive, provided the procedure prescribed by the Act or Rules for formation of the opinion was duly followed and the authority acted bonafide and the authority himself formed the opinion. In such case the judicial review will be constricted primarily to know whether procedural fairness was scrupulously followed. He placed reliance on Amarendra Kumar Pandey vs. Union of India., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 600. He would submit that in this case the procedure was meticulously followed and basing on the materials placed, the 2 nd respondent formed the opinion. Hence the detention order is sustainable. (a) Nextly he argued that merely a person is on bail is not a ground to claim immunity from the preventive detention. Conversely, the possibility of misusing the freedom granted under bail will be more in the case of habitual offenders. Therefore, in this case having regard to the past history of the detenue in involving in the repeated crimes of similar nature, the Detaining Authority made a logical prognosis of his future behaviour. Conversely, the possibility of misusing the freedom granted under bail will be more in the case of habitual offenders. Therefore, in this case having regard to the past history of the detenue in involving in the repeated crimes of similar nature, the Detaining Authority made a logical prognosis of his future behaviour. Therefore, that the detenue was on bail in the above cases is of no consequence. He argued that bail orders were furnished to the detenue. He placed reliance on Haradhan Shah v. The State of West Bengal, 1975(3) SCC 198 . (b) Nextly he argued that the activities of the detenue are very much prejudicial to the maintenance of public order because in all the above 4 crimes, the detenue was dealing with ID liquor and the chemical examiner on testing the samples opined that the contraband seized was ID liquor which was unfit for human consumption and injurious to health. When the activities of detenue create grave or widespread danger to life or public health, it can be construed that he acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and preventive detention can be ordered. On this aspect he placed reliance on Doddi Sharada vs. Collector and District Magistrate, Hyderabad, 2005 (2) ALT 244 = 2005(1) APLJ 328. He thus prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 9. The point for consideration is whether there are merits in the writ petition to allow? 10. Point: We gave our anxious consideration to above respective arguments. The first argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is about the procedural violation. As rightly argued by learned Special Government Pleader, a person on bail is neither immuned nor insulated from preventive detention. The Detaining Authority upon considering the materials and other facts can still form an opinion that there is a likelihood of misuse of the bail by such person to repeat similar offences and order for preventive detention. In Haradhan Shah's case (6 supra) relied upon by Special Government Pleader, the Apex Court considering its various other decisions enumerated the principles in those decisions as follows: "34. xxxx The principles which can be broadly stated are these. In Haradhan Shah's case (6 supra) relied upon by Special Government Pleader, the Apex Court considering its various other decisions enumerated the principles in those decisions as follows: "34. xxxx The principles which can be broadly stated are these. First, merely because a detenu is liable to be tried in a criminal Court for the commission of a criminal offence or to be proceeded against for preventing him from committing offences dealt with in Chapter VIII of the Criminal Procedure Code would not by itself debar the Government from taking action for his detention under the Act. Second, the fact that the Police arrests a person and later on enlarges him on bail and initiates steps to prosecute him under the Criminal Procedure Code and even lodges a first information report may be no bar against the District Magistrate issuing an order under the preventive detention. Third, where the concerned person is actually in jail custody at the time when an order of detention is passed against him and is not likely to be released for a fair length of time, it may be possible to contend that there could be no satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority as to the likelihood of such a person indulging in activities which jeopardise the security of the State or the public order. Fourth, the mere circumstance that a detention order is passed during the pendency of the prosecution will not violate the order. Fifth, the order of detention is a precautionary measure. It is based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct in the light of the surrounding circumstances." 11. There is no demur about the discretionary power of the Detaining Authority in this regard. However, the crux of the argument of the petitioner is not about the lack of power of Detaining Authority to order preventive detention against a person who is on bail. On the other hand, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that in all the 4 cases which were considered for ordering preventive detention, bail was granted to detenue even prior to the detention order. As such, the duty is cast on the Sponsoring Authority to place before the 2 nd respondent, the FIRs in the 4 cases as well as the bail applications and bail orders also for consideration. As such, the duty is cast on the Sponsoring Authority to place before the 2 nd respondent, the FIRs in the 4 cases as well as the bail applications and bail orders also for consideration. Upon considering the entire material the 2nd respondent has to pass an order. We find force in the above argument. In our considered view, there is an avowed purpose in placing the bail applications and bail orders along with the FIRs and other relevant materials before the Detaining Authority. For instance, a Sponsoring Authority may place the record relating to certain number of criminal cases in which the detenue is involved for consideration of the Detaining Authority. In all those cases, if the detenue was already granted bails, such bail record also needs to be placed before the Detaining Authority to know the grounds on which bail was granted to the detenue by the concerned jurisdictional Courts. Bail might be granted on several grounds i.e., on account of his severe illness or non-filing of charge-sheet within the time stipulated under Sec. 167 Cr.P.C. or chargesheet was filed and his further detention was unwarranted or he placed cogent material to establish his alibi which was prima facie strong to consider the bail application. Therefore, considering the grounds on which the detenue was granted bail, particularly the ground of alibi plea, the Detaining Authority has to formulate his opinion whether preventive detention is essential or not. If the alibi plea was found to be prima facie strong but though not final at that stage and bails were granted holding that said plea has to be tested on the anvil of trial, still the Detaining Authority must carefully form his opinion as to whether preventive detention can be ordered on the strength of such doubtful cases placed before him and give cogent reasons if he orders preventive detention. When the Authority considers such material, it is imperative for the Authority to furnish the copies of the entire material including the bail applications and bail orders in order to enable the detenue to make an effective representation before the Advisory Board or the Government. The law on this aspect is no more res integra. In Abdul Sathar's case (1 supra) the Apex Court on verification of several decisions, drawn certain conclusions of which conclusion No.6 is thus: "6. The law on this aspect is no more res integra. In Abdul Sathar's case (1 supra) the Apex Court on verification of several decisions, drawn certain conclusions of which conclusion No.6 is thus: "6. In a case where detenu is released on bail and is at liberty at the time of passing the order of detention, then the detaining authority has to necessarily rely upon them as that would be a vital ground for ordering detention. In such a case the bail application and the order granting bail should necessarily be placed before the authority and the copies should also be supplied to the detenu." In K. Ramamohan Reddy's case (2 supra) also a division bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh has observed thus: "5. The law is well settled that all the relevant material containing in the grounds, form the basis or order of detention and therefore the said material should have been considered by 2nd respondent, the detaining authority, and the detenu should be supplied with the same, failure forms vice of non-application of mind by the detaining authority. Undoubtedly, the bail application, the order granting the bail and also orders issuing NBW should be taken into consideration by the detaining authority. It is important to notice that order granting bail to the detenu might indicate that there was, prima facie, no case against the detenu, in which he was involved. Hence it is a favourable material to the detenu, which has to be considered by the detaining authority before the comes to the subjective satisfaction." 12. Thus the above jurisprudence expounds the principle that if the detenue was already enlarged on bail in the cases in which he was involved and which were placed before the Detaining Authority seeking preventive detention, the sponsoring authority shall also place the bail applications and bail orders along with the record and the Detaining Authority shall invariably consider the same for forming opinion. Further, the copies of the bail applications and bail orders shall also be furnished to the detenue for making an effective representation before the Advisory Board or the Government. 13. In the instant case, in para-5 of the affidavit, the petitioner has clearly mentioned that in all the 4 crimes the detenue was on bail even prior to the detention order and the said fact is not disputed in the counter. 13. In the instant case, in para-5 of the affidavit, the petitioner has clearly mentioned that in all the 4 crimes the detenue was on bail even prior to the detention order and the said fact is not disputed in the counter. On the other hand the material filed along with the counter of the 2nd respondent contains copies of the charge-sheets in all the 4 cases and in those charge-sheets it was clearly mentioned that the accused (detenue) was released on bail. Then a perusal of the detention order and grounds of detention would show that the Detaining Authority has not taken into consideration the fact that the detenue was on bail in all those cases and no opinion has been expressed as to in view of bail being granted in all the cases, whether his preventive detention was essential or not. No such discussion was made in the order. Therefore, we are constrained to hold that the order impugned was made without proper application of the mind to the relevant facts. Added to it, the respondents have not produced any material to show that the copies of bail applications and bail orders in the above cases were furnished to the detenue under his acknowledgement so as to enable him to make effective representation to the Advisory Board or Government. Thus there is a serious procedural violation. Thereby the detention of the detenue, in our considered view is unjust and illegal and he deserves to be released. Therefore, it is not necessary for us to discuss about the other point of argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 14. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed and the detention order in Roc.No.C1/e-1882535/2022 dtd. 26/3/2022 passed by the 2nd respondent / The District Collector and District Magistrate, Eluru, West Godavari District is hereby set aside and the detenue namely Eede Nagaraju, S/o Subrahmanyam is directed to be released forthwith by the respondents if the detenue is not required in any other cases. No costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.