JUDGMENT : K. Sema, J The present appeal has been preferred against the judgment & order dated 08.04.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing W.P.(C) No. 213/2018 on the ground that there is no merit in the case. 2. Before adverting to the impugned judgment & order, the brief fact of the case is narrated as follows; (i) That the Nagaland Rural Development Service Rules, 2006 regulates recruitment and conditions of service of the employees in the department. In terms of the said rules, 25% of the post in the grade of Block Development Officer (BDO) and its equivalent post such as Rural Development Officer (RDO) and Assistant Project Officer (APO) is reserved for promotees and the remaining 75% is reserved for direct recruit through the Nagaland Public Service Commission (in short, NPSC). (ii) That by an advertisement dated 05/07/2012 the NPSC notified the selection process for the combined civil services exam under the State. By the Addendum dated 12/07/2012, 16(sixteen) posts of BDO in the Rural Development Department were also advertised. (iii) Pursuant to the selection process the petitioners were recommended for appointment to the post of BDO and consequent to which the notification dated 04/07/2013 was issued appointing the petitioners in the said post. In the said notification, the writ petitioner No. 1, 2 & 3 are at Sl. No. 1, 2 & 3 and the writ petitioner No. 4 to 13 are at Sl. No. 6 to 15 of the said notification. The writ petitioner No.14 was appointed by the notification dated 05/09/2013 while the writ petitioner No.15 who was initially appointed as the Secretarial Assistant (Class-III) by notification dated 26/09/2013 was appointed to the post of BDO by notification dated 31/01/2014 against the resignation vacancy of the candidate at Sl. No. 4 of the notification dated 04.07.2013. (iv) That the respondent No. 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8 who were serving in different Government departments were brought on deputation in the Rural Development Department as BDO’s in the year 2009 and 2010 and absorbed by the notification dated 21/12/2012 w.e.f. 18/12/2012. The respondent No.9 was appointed as RDO on 26/10/2005 on contract basis and his contractual service was regularized by the notification dated 21/12/2012 w.e.f. 18/12/2012. The respondent No.10 was appointed as RDO on 04/03/2006 on contract basis and his service was regularized as BDO by the notification dated 21/12/2012 w.e.f 18/12/2012. The respondent No.9 was appointed as RDO on 26/10/2005 on contract basis and his contractual service was regularized by the notification dated 21/12/2012 w.e.f. 18/12/2012. The respondent No.10 was appointed as RDO on 04/03/2006 on contract basis and his service was regularized as BDO by the notification dated 21/12/2012 w.e.f 18/12/2012. The respondent No.11 was appointed as RDO on 04/03/2006 on contract basis and by notification dated 21/12/2012 his service was regularized as BDO w.e.f. 18/12/2012. The respondent No.12 was appointed as RDO on 04/03/2006 on contract basis and by notification dated 21/12/2012 his service was regularized as BDO w.e.f. 18/12/2012. The respondent No.13 was appointed as RDO on 04/03/2006 on contract basis and by notification dated 21/12/2012 his service was regularized as APO w.e.f. 18/12/2012. The respondent No.14 was appointed as RDO on 20/12/2006 on contract basis and by notification dated 21/12/2012 his service was regularized w.e.f. 18/12/2012. The respondent No. 15 & 16 were appointed as RDO on 21/06/2007 on contract basis and by notification dated 21/12/2012, the respondent No. 15 & 16 were regularized in the post of BDO w.e.f. 18/12/2012. The respondent No. 17 was provisionally appointed as Mukhya Savika (MS) on 10/12/2003 and by the order dated 07/04/2009, the respondent No. 17 was regularized in the post of MS w.e.f. 19/02/2009. (v) That the Government has issued the Office Memorandum dated 17/09/1986 and the Office Memorandum dated 21/07/2004 prescribing procedure for regular absorption of the deputationst and also the Office Memorandum dated 19/11/1975 and 09/07/2004 for counting the seniority of Government servants appointed on contract basis and regularized in service. (vi) That by the Memorandum dated 19/10/2015, the department issued the tentative seniority list of Officers as on 01/10/2015. In the said seniority list, the private respondents are shown seniors to the writ petitioners except for the respondent No.17 who is shown senior only to the writ petitioner No.15. (vii) That against the tentative seniority list brought out by the Memorandum dated 19/10/2015, the writ petitioners submitted the representation dated 18/11/2015 and 19/11/2015. The representation remained unaddressed, but the department again issued the Memorandum dated 23/04/2018 publishing the tentative seniority list of Officers in the department as on 31/03/2018. In the said tentative seniority list in the grade of BDO/RDO/APO, the writ petitioners as in the tentative seniority list of 2015 appears below the private respondents. The representation remained unaddressed, but the department again issued the Memorandum dated 23/04/2018 publishing the tentative seniority list of Officers in the department as on 31/03/2018. In the said tentative seniority list in the grade of BDO/RDO/APO, the writ petitioners as in the tentative seniority list of 2015 appears below the private respondents. The representation submitted by the writ petitioners against the Memorandum dated 23/04/2018 publishing the tentative seniority list had yielded no positive results. (viii) In the writ petition, the petitioners has impugned the tentative seniority list issued vide Memorandum dated 23/04/2018 insofar as it relates to respondent No. 4 to 17 and the Note dated 16/04/2018 of the P&AR department (OM Branch) opining that the seniority of the deputationst and the contractual employees will be counted from the date of absorption and regularization which is reiterated by the department in the impugned meeting minutes dated 16/10/2018. (ix) The main grievance raised in the writ petition is that the Nagaland Rural Development Service Rules, 2006 regulates the recruitment and conditions of service of the employees in the department. The rules does not provide for appointment in the service of the department either by absorption and/or by regularization of service. The respondent No. 4 to 17 being appointed dehors the rules cannot be placed above the writ petitioners in the seniority list irrespective of whether the respondent No. 4 to 17 were absorbed/regularized in service prior to the appointment of the writ petitioners. (x) The case of the respondents on the other hand is that the respondent No. 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8 were brought on deputation in the year 2009/2010 and thereafter absorbed in the service of the department vide notification dated 21/12/2012 by giving effect to the O.M dated 21/07/2004 regulating procedures for filling up vacancies on deputation and regular absorption and by counting the seniority in service with effect from the date of absorption. While the respondent No. 9 to 16 were appointed on contract basis in the year 2005, 2006 & 2007 and their service were regularized vide notification dated 21/12/2012 only after qualifying the suitability test conducted by the department in terms of the scheme framed by the Government vide Memorandum dated 18/02/2004 and O.M dated 04/08/2008. While the respondent No. 9 to 16 were appointed on contract basis in the year 2005, 2006 & 2007 and their service were regularized vide notification dated 21/12/2012 only after qualifying the suitability test conducted by the department in terms of the scheme framed by the Government vide Memorandum dated 18/02/2004 and O.M dated 04/08/2008. The respondent No. 17 who was provisionally appointed to the post of Mukhya Savika (MS) by order dated 10/12/2003 was regularized in the said post by order dated 07/04/2009. All the respondents were absorbed and/or regularized in the service of the department with the prior approval of the State Cabinet. (xi) The case of the respondents further is that the tentative seniority list brought out by the department by Memorandum dated 19/10/2015 and Memorandum dated 23/04/2018 are based on the substantive date of appointment of the petitioners as well as the respondents and there is no illegality in placing the respondents above the petitioners in the tentative seniority list as the respondents were regularly appointed prior in point of time. It is also the case of the respondents that the seniority list published in the year 2015 and 2018 are only tentative in nature prior to the publication of the final seniority list and therefore the writ petition challenging the tentative seniority list is premature. (xii) It is also the case of the respondents that when the writ petitioners have not challenged the notification dated 21/12/2012 absorbing the deputation service of the respondent No. 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8 and the notification dated 21/12/2012 regularsing the contract service of the respondent No. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 & 16 and also the order dated 07/04/2009 regularizing the service of the respondent No. 17 in the post of Mukhya Savika (MS), it is not permissible for the writ petitioners to challenge the seniority extended to the private respondents in the tentative seniority list. It is that case of the respondents that their seniority position in the tentative seniority list flows from the notifications absorbing/regularizing their service in the department. Therefore, without challenging the notifications by which the service of the private respondents were absorbed/regularized, the consequential tentative seniority alone cannot be challenged. It is that case of the respondents that their seniority position in the tentative seniority list flows from the notifications absorbing/regularizing their service in the department. Therefore, without challenging the notifications by which the service of the private respondents were absorbed/regularized, the consequential tentative seniority alone cannot be challenged. (xiii) It is further the case of the respondents that no right accrues to the petitioners to challenge the Office note dated 16/04/2018 of the P&AR department as the same has not crystallized into a formal executive decision and published. (xiv) The learned Single Judge after hearing the parties has come to the finding that the petitioners have not challenged the Office Memorandum dated 21/07/2004 which prescribed procedure for regular absorption of deputationsts and provides that the seniority in service will be counted from the date of absorption. The learned Single Judge has also held that the writ petitioners have not challenged the absorption and regularization of the respondent No. 4 to 17 in service but has only prayed for re-fixation of their seniority position above the private respondents in the tentative seniority list of 2018. The petitioners therefore cannot be said to have any grievance against their seniority position. The learned Single Judge has also held that the tentative seniority list of 2015 and 2018 not being the final interse seniority list it would be premature to challenge the same though some promotion may have been made on the basis of the said tentative list. It is also the findings of the learned Single Judge that the grievance express by the petitioners to Item No. 44 of the Meeting Minutes dated 16/10/2017 which is in regard to the claim of seniority of the writ petitioners cannot be said to be conclusive and thus considered to be a decision taken by the Government. In the light of the findings above, the learned Single Judge has accordingly dismissed the writ petition. 3. It is the correctness of the judgment & order dated 08/04/2022 which is the subject matter of the present appeal. 4. We have heard Mr. Joshua Sheqi, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. T.B. Jamir, learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General for the State respondents. We have also heard Mr. Taka Masa, learned Sr. counsel for the private respondents No. 4 to 16 assisted by Mr. Arenlong, learned counsel. 5. Mr. 4. We have heard Mr. Joshua Sheqi, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. T.B. Jamir, learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General for the State respondents. We have also heard Mr. Taka Masa, learned Sr. counsel for the private respondents No. 4 to 16 assisted by Mr. Arenlong, learned counsel. 5. Mr. Joshua Sheqi submits that the judgment & order dated 08/04/2022 passed in W.P. (C) No. 213/2018 by the learned Single Judge is unsustainable in law and liable to be dismissed. The learned counsel firstly submits that the Rules, 2006 regulates the recruitment and conditions of service of the employees in the department. The rule does not provide for appointment in the service either by absorption or regularization. The appointment of the private respondents being dehors the rules, the respondent No. 4 to 17 cannot be brought within the relevance of the rules only by reading Rule-3 of the rules in isolation. Secondly, it is submitted that since the private respondents have all entered the service of the department in violation of the rules, it is immaterial whether the initial appointment of the respondents and/or their absorption or regularization is put to challenge or not. The respondents being illegal appointees cannot steal a march over the appellant in seniority and the appellants have to be placed above the respondents in the seniority list of 2018. Thirdly, it is submitted that the Article 14 is a positive concept and if any illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of the respondents in the past in matters of their appointment, the higher or the superior court cannot repeat or multiply the wrong or illegality in perpetuity by again placing the respondents over the appellants in the seniority list. 6. In support of his submission, Mr. Joshua Sheqi, learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the following case laws; (i) In the case of the Punjab State Warehousing Corpn. Chandigarh -versus-Manmohan Singh & Another, reported in (2007) 9 SCC 337 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that when the recruitment is governed by the rules framed under the proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution, no order under Article 162 of the Constitution can be made to alter or amend the said rules. Chandigarh -versus-Manmohan Singh & Another, reported in (2007) 9 SCC 337 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that when the recruitment is governed by the rules framed under the proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution, no order under Article 162 of the Constitution can be made to alter or amend the said rules. It was also reiterated that the appointment made without advertisement is not in compliance with the constitutional scheme as adumbrated under Article 14 & 16 of the Constitution. (ii) In the case of Ajaya Kumar Das -versus-State of Orissa & Others, reported in (2011) 11 SCC 136 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing as to whether Government circulars can override the statutory provisions in Rule-74(b) of the Orissa Service Code if it results in the reduction of pay of the employee on promotion, reiterated that the statutory rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution can be amended only by a rule or notification duly made under Article 309 and not otherwise. Statutory rules cannot be altered or amended by the executive orders, circulars or instructions nor can they replace the rules. The rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution cannot be tinkered with, by the administrative instructions or circulars. (iii) In the case of DDA & Others -versus-Joginder S. Monga & Others, reported in (2004) 2 SCC 297 , the Supreme Court held that the Government cannot amend or supersede statutory rules by administrative instruction to whittle down their effect and it is only when the rule is silent on any particular point, the Government can fill up the gaps and supplement the rules by issuing instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed. (iv) In the case of State of U.P -versus-Rafiquddin & Others, reported in 1987 (Supp) SCC 401, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that persons appointed to service in breach of the rules form a separate class and cannot be equated with those who are appointed to service as per the rules and the persons illegally appointed cannot claim seniority vis-à-vis those who have been regularly and properly appointed. It was also held that where recruitment to service is regulated by the statutory rules, recruitment must be made in accordance with those rules and any appointment made in breach thereof would be illegal. It was also held that where recruitment to service is regulated by the statutory rules, recruitment must be made in accordance with those rules and any appointment made in breach thereof would be illegal. (v) In the case of Monya Taipodia & Others -versus-State of Arunachal Pradesh & Others, reported in (2013) 2 GLT 1011, the Division Bench of this Court held that even when on account of lapse of a long period of time appointment made to service in breach of the relevant recruitment rules is not set aside and quashed, such irregular appointee shall not be allowed to steal a march over the regular appointees and that the Court or Tribunal even without setting aside and quashing the appointment of an irregular appointee may direct the appointing authority to treat a regular appointee as senior to the irregular appointee. (vi) In the case of M. Nakro -versus-State of Nagaland & Others, reported in 2008 (Suppl) GLT 676, the Division Bench of this Court dealing with the retrospective seniority given to the absorbed appellant from the date of the initial appointment in the parent department held that when the appointment of an employee is found to be irregular the Court having regard to the long period of service which such irregular appointee might have put in may not set aside the appointment yet the Court shall ordinarily make him rank junior to the regular appointee particularly when the regular and the irregular appointees had not come to be selected through the same selection process. (vii) In the case of The Nagaland Public Service Commission -versus-C.N Moe & Other decided by the Division Bench of this Court on 07/11/2019 in W.A No.17/2018, while dealing with the regularization of contractual appointees and the final seniority list placing the contractual appointees above the direct recruits held that appointments made in violation of the Regulation is to be considered illegal and the persons appointed in violation of the Regulation cannot be made senior to those persons regularly appointed. (viii) In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh -versus-Neeraj Awasthi & Others, reported in (2006) 1 SCC 667 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that appointments made dehors the rules and without following the procedures and in flagrant violation of the constitutional scheme as laid down in Article 14 & 16 of the Constitution must be held to be wholly illegal and without jurisdiction and if illegality has been committed in the past, it is beyond comprehension as to how such illegality can be allowed to perpetuate. (ix) In the case of Union of India & Another -versus-Kartick Chandra Mondal & Another, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 422 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the guarantee of equality before the law enshrined in Article 14 is a positive concept and it cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individual or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing wrong order. (x) In the case of Ramankutty Guptan -versus-Avara, reported in (1994) 2 SCC 642 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down that the procedure is the handmaid for justice and unless the procedure touches upon jurisdictional issue it should be moulded to subserve substantial justice. Therefore, technicalities would not stand in the way to subserve substantive justice. 7. Mr. T.B Jamir, learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General for the State respondents No. 1, 2 & 3 firstly submits that the writ petitioners/appellants in the writ petition has impugned only the Tentative Seniority list issued vide Memorandum dated 23/04/2018 and the File Noting dated 16/04/2018 of the P&AR department, whereas in the amended writ petition, the writ petitioners has additionally impugned the Meeting Minutes dated 16/10/2018 of the Rural Development Department without the leave of the Court. This the learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General submits is impermissible. 8. Mr. T.B. Jamir also submits that Rule-3 of the Rules, 2006 which provides for the application of the rules applies to the following persons, namely i) persons who at the commencement of these rules are holding substantively the Gazetted posts specified in the Schedule-I appended to these rules. This the learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General submits is impermissible. 8. Mr. T.B. Jamir also submits that Rule-3 of the Rules, 2006 which provides for the application of the rules applies to the following persons, namely i) persons who at the commencement of these rules are holding substantively the Gazetted posts specified in the Schedule-I appended to these rules. ii) Persons recruited to the service before or after the commencement of these rules. iii) Persons recruited to the service in accordance with the provisions of these rules. Rule 3 ii) of the Rules, 2006, it is submitted, regulates the appointment of the respondent No. 4 to 17 in the department and since no challenge is laid to Rule 3 ii) of the rules, the appointment of the respondents cannot be said to be dehors the rules. 9. Mr. T.B. Jamir has also submitted that the Office Memorandum dated 17/09/1986 and the Office Memorandum dated 21/07/2004 laying down the procedure for filling up of vacancies on deputation and absorption of the deputationsts and the Office Memorandum dated 19/11/1975 and the Office Memorandum dated 09/07/2004 laying down the guidelines for counting the seniority of the contractual government servant when regularized are policy decision of the Government framed much prior to the coming in force of the Rules, 2006. The private respondents where either absorbed and/or regularized in service by giving effect to the said O.M. and their seniority position in the service was also fixed in terms of the said O.M consequent to the Cabinet decision. Therefore, without laying a challenge to the said O.M the appellants has no right to impugned the tentative seniority list of 2018 issued by the department placing the private respondents above the appellants. 10. Mr. T.B Jamir further submits that the initial orders appointing the respondents on deputation as well as on contract basis has not been challenged. So also the notification dated 21/12/2012 absorbing the service of the respondent No. 4 to 8 as well as the notification dated 21/12/2012 regularizing the contract service of the respondent No. 9 to 16 as also the order dated 07/04/2009 regularizing the service of the respondent No.17 has not been challenged. The learned Sr. Addl. So also the notification dated 21/12/2012 absorbing the service of the respondent No. 4 to 8 as well as the notification dated 21/12/2012 regularizing the contract service of the respondent No. 9 to 16 as also the order dated 07/04/2009 regularizing the service of the respondent No.17 has not been challenged. The learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General therefore submits that in the absence of the challenge to the initial appointment orders of the respondents and the subsequent notification absorbing and/or regularizing the service of the respondents, the tentative seniority list published by the department vide Memorandum dated 23/04/2018 placing the respondents above the appellants alone cannot be challenged. In short, the case of the State respondents is that when the basic order remains unchallenged the consequential seniority list alone cannot be challenged to displace the position of the respondents from the seniority list. 11. It is further the case of the respondents that in spite of raising the question of the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of non challenge to the notification absorbing and/or regularizing the service of the respondents, no attempt has been made by the writ petitioners/appellants to amend the writ petition or to file rejoinder to the objection raised by the State. 12. It is then submitted that since the Nagaland Rural Development Service Rules, 2006 has application to the respondents by virtue of Rule-3 ii) of the rules. The Office Memorandum dated 17/09/1986 and the O.M dated 21/07/2004 laying down the procedure for filling up of vacancies on deputation and absorption of the deputationsts and the O.M dated 19/11/1975 and O.M dated 09/07/2004 laying down the guidelines for counting the seniority of contractual employees on regularization should be read as supplementing the rules for filling the gap providing as to how the deputationsts or the contract appointees has to be absorbed and/or regularized in service. 13. Lastly, it is submitted that in intra court appeal unless there is perversity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge no interference is called for. It is also submitted that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case and therefore, the case law relied upon by the appellants is distinguishable. 14. In support of his submission, the learned Sr. Addl. It is also submitted that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case and therefore, the case law relied upon by the appellants is distinguishable. 14. In support of his submission, the learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General, Nagaland has relied on the following case laws; (i) In Amarjeet Singh & Others -versus-Devi Ratan & Others, reported in (2010) 1 SCC 417 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the question of seniority which was consequential to the promotion held that challenging the consequential order without challenging the basic order is not permissible. It was also held that a party is under legal obligation to challenge the basic order and if and only if the same is found to be wrong the consequential order may be examined. In the said case reliance was also placed in Roshan Lal -versus-International Airport Authority of India where it was held that without a challenge to the appointment order or in view of the inordinate delay in challenging the same validity of the consequential seniority could not be examined. (ii) In the case of Amina Marwa Sabreen, (A Minor) & Others -versus-State of Kerala & Others, reported in (2018) 14 SCC 193 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with grant of relief not claimed for in the writ petition has held that when there is no prayer in the writ petition seeking quashing of the Government order and no attempt has been made by the petitioner to amend the writ petition to incorporate and challenge the said Government order despite the State having pointed out the fundamental infirmity, it is not permissible for the petitioner to seek relief only by making oral submission on the issue. (iii) In the case of Kuldeep Singh -versus-Commissioner of Police & Others, reported in (1999) 2 SCC 10 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it the order would be perverse but if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusion would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (iv) In the case of Tractor and Farm Equipment Ltd. -versus-Secretary to the Government of Assam Department of Agriculture & Others, reported in 2004 (1) GLT 117, the Division Bench of this Court has held that the writ appeal is not a statutory appeal against the judgment & order of an inferior court to the superior court but an appeal intersein High Court from one Co-ordinate Bench court to another Co-ordinate Bench. If two views are possible and a view which is reasonable and logical has been adopted by a Single Judge the other view howsoever appealing to the Division Bench, it is the view adopted by the Single Judge which should normally be allowed to prevail. (v) In the case of Inbasagaran & Another -versus-S. Natarajan (Dead) through legal representatives, reported in (2015) 11 SCC 12 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. 15. Mr. Taka Masa, learned Sr. counsel for the private respondents No. 4 to 16 subscribes to the submission made by the learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General, Nagaland and submits that the respondents No. 4 to 16 became regular employees of the department from the date they were either absorbed and/or regularized in service. Therefore, without first laying a challenge to the notifications absorbing and/or regularizing the service of the respondents, it is not permissible for the appellants to challenge only the seniority list of 2018 in which the respondents are placed above the appellants. 16. The learned Sr. counsel also submits that the appellants were directly recruited in service and were appointed on 14/07/2013, 05/09/2013 & 31/01/2014 respectively while the respondent No. 4 to 8 were absorbed in service by the notification dated 21/12/2012 w.e.f 18/12/2012 and the respondents No. 9 to 16 were regularized in service by the notification dated 21/12/2012 w.e.f 18/12/2012. The appellants were not even borne in the cadre when the respondents were absorbed and/or regularized in service. The appellants were not even borne in the cadre when the respondents were absorbed and/or regularized in service. The seniority position of both the appellants and the respondents in the grade of BDO and its equivalent post having been already finalized by the department, no legal right accrues to the appellants to challenge the tentative seniority list at this belated stage to unsettle the settled seniority position. 17. Mr. Taka Masa also submits that it is not permissible for the appellants to impugned the Office note dated 16/04/2018 which is only an opinion expressed by the Officers of the P&AR department for internal use and consideration for the benefit of the final decision making authority. The learned counsel submits that the Office note culminates into an executable order affecting the rights of the parties only when it reaches the final decision making authority in the department and gets its approval and the same is communicated to the person concerned. 18. Mr. Taka Masa further submits that the case laws submitted by the appellants counsel’s on the concept of negative equality has no relevance to the case in hand. So also the case laws cited by the appellants in support of the submission that persons appointed dehors the rules forms a different class and they should not be allowed to steal the march in seniority over those persons who had entered service after undergoing the process of selection and in accordance with rules, were given in the peculiar facts and circumstances of those case which is distinguishable from the facts of the present case. 19. In support of his submission, the learned Sr. counsel has relied on the following case laws; (i) In the case of Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia & Others -versus-Bombay Environmental Action Group & Others, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 363 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated the settled proposition that even if an order is void it requires to be declared so by a competent forum and it is not permissible for any person to ignore the same merely because in his opinion the order is void. (ii) In the case of S. Sumnyan & Others -versus-Limi Niri & Others, reported in (2010) 6 SCC 791 , the Apex Court has held that when the initial appointment of a person on temporary and adhoc basis and the subsequent regularization in service from the date of initial appointment is not under challenge the orders are final and binding on all concerned. (iii) In the case of Er. Fineson Pojar & 7 Others -versus-Er. Hokato Sema & 4 Others decided by the Division Bench of this Court on 30/11/2017 in W.A No. 8(K)/2013, held that even if it is assumed that the regularization order is an illegal order the same remains valid till it is cancelled or modified by the competent authority or set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. The contractual appointments and the regularization of the private respondents in service not having been challenged, the respondents have to be accordingly considered to be members of the service and governed by the rules. (iv) In the case of H.S Vankani & Others -versus-State of Gujarat & Others, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 301 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated that seniority once settled shall not be unsettled. If settled seniority at the instance of one’s junior in service is unsettled it may generate bitterness, resentment, hostility among the government servant and the enthusiasm to do quality work might be lost. (v) In the case of Vinod Verma -versus-Union of India & Others, reported in (2019) 20 SCC 576 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that no promotion or seniority can be granted from a retrospective date when the employee has not been borne in the cadre. (vi) In the case of Sethi Auto Service Station & Another -versus-Delhi Development Authority & Others, reported in (2009) 1 SCC 180 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that noting in a departmental file do not have the sanction of law to be an effective order and noting in the file culminate into an executable order affecting the rights of the parties only when it reaches the final decision making authority in the department, gets his approval and the final order is communicated to the person concerned. 20. The Nagaland Rural Development Service Rules, 2006 regulates the method of recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to the Nagaland Rural Development Service. 20. The Nagaland Rural Development Service Rules, 2006 regulates the method of recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to the Nagaland Rural Development Service. Rule-8 of the Rules, 2006 provides that recruitment to the service after the commencement of the rules shall be by direct recruitment and promotion from the lower grade and the quota allotted to each source of the recruitment shall be as shown in Schedule-II. The schedule provides that in the grade of BDO and its equivalent post such as RDO and APO, 25% of the post is reserved for the promotees and the remaining 75% is reserved for direct recruits through the NPSC. The rules does not provide for recruitment in service either by absorption and/or by regularization of contractual service. The submission therefore made by the learned counsel for the respondents that the respondents were appointed by giving effect to Rule-3(ii) of the rules cannot be accepted. Rule-3(ii) cannot be read in isolation but has to be read conjointly and in harmony with Rule-8 of the Rules, 2006. There is also no dispute with the settled position of law that the government cannot amend or supersede statutory rules by administrative instruction to whittle down its effect. Rule-8 of the Rules, 2006 provides that the recruitment shall be only by direct recruit through NPSC and promotion from the lower grade. No third mode of recruitment either by absorption of deputationst or regularization of contractual employees is prescribed by the rules. The submission therefore, made by the learned State counsel that the O.M dated 17/09/1986 and the O.M dated 21/07/2004 laying down the procedure for absorption of deputationst and the O.M dated 19/11/1975 and 09/07/2004 laying down the guidelines for counting the seniority of contractual appointees on regularization are policy decisions of the Government supplementing the rules for filling the gap providing as to how the deputationst or the contract employees should be absorbed and/or regularized in service also cannot be accepted in the facts of the present case. There is also no quarrel to the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the equality before the law enshrined in Article-14 of the Constitution is positive concept and cannot be enforced by a citizen or the Court in a negative manner and if an illegality has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individual or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum others cannot invoked the jurisdiction of the higher or the superior court for repeating or multiplying the same illegality or for passing wrong order. 21. The issue which however raises our anxiety is that the appellants in the writ petition has neither challenged the initial orders appointing the respondent No. 4 to 8 on deputation nor the orders appointing the respondent No. 9 to 17 on contract basis. The appellants, more importantly, has not assailed the notifications dated 21/12/2012 absorbing the deputation service of the respondent No. 4 to 8 and the notification dated 21/12/2012 regularising the contract service of the respondent No. 9 to 16 and also the order dated 07/04/2009 regularising the service of the respondent No. 17, therefore, in the absence of challenge to the said orders and notification(s) whether the appellants can challenge only the consequential memorandum dated 23/04/2018 publishing the tentative seniority list of the Officers in the department as on 31/03/2018 where in the grade of BDO/RDO/APO, the appellants are placed below the private respondents except for respondent No.17 who is shown senior only to the writ petitioner No. 15. There is no dispute that the private respondents were brought into the regular service of the department only from the date of their absorption and/or regularization and their seniority position in the tentative seniority list is projected only from the date of their absorption and/or regularization and not from a prior date. Moreover, even when the respondent raised the question of maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of non challenge to the notification absorbing and/or regularizing the service of the respondents, the appellants did not make any attempt to amend the writ petition or filed rejoinder to the objection raised by the State. Moreover, even when the respondent raised the question of maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of non challenge to the notification absorbing and/or regularizing the service of the respondents, the appellants did not make any attempt to amend the writ petition or filed rejoinder to the objection raised by the State. The primary contention of the appellants in the writ petition is that since the respondents were appointed dehors the rules they cannot steal a march in seniority over the appellants who were appointed in terms of the rules. 22. We have considered this aspect of the matter and we are of the view that without challenging the notification dated 21/12/2012 and the order dated 07/04/2009 by which the respondents were absorbed and/or regularized in service, the O.M dated 23/04/2018 publishing the Tentative Seniority List of 2018 placing the respondents above the appellants alone cannot be challenged. The seniority position of the respondents in the tentative seniority list flows from the notification absorbing and/or regularizing the service of the respondents. Therefore, without challenging the notification dated 21/12/2012 and the order dated 07/04/2009, the tentative seniority alone cannot be impugned. The settled proposition of law that without the challenging the basic order the consequential order alone cannot be challenged squarely applies to the present case. 23. In the case of Roshan Lal & Others -versus-International Airport Authority of India, reported in AIR 1981 SC 597 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court while adjudicating the question of illegal appointment of the respondents as Airport Officers (OPS) has held that it will not be justified in reopening the question of the legality of the appointment of the respondents several years after their appointments and as the prayer in the petition is primarily confined to the seniority list and the consequences flowing there from. The respondents in the said case were appointed in the year 1975 and the writ petition was filed in the year 1978. 24. In the case of Amarjeet Singh & Others (supra), the Supreme Court held that since the promotion of the appellant is not under challenge, the seniority which is consequential to the promotion could not be challenged without challenging the promotion. The Supreme Court further held that challenging the consequential order without challenging the basic order is not permissible. 25. 24. In the case of Amarjeet Singh & Others (supra), the Supreme Court held that since the promotion of the appellant is not under challenge, the seniority which is consequential to the promotion could not be challenged without challenging the promotion. The Supreme Court further held that challenging the consequential order without challenging the basic order is not permissible. 25. In the case of S. Sumnyan & Others (supra), the Supreme Court has held that when the initial appointment order of a person on temporary and adhoc basis and the subsequent regularization in service from the date of their initial appointment is not under challenge, the orders are final and binding on all concerned. Paragraph-27, 28, 29, 30, 31 & 33 of the said judgment are reproduced herein below; “27. The respondents in their writ petition had neither challenged the initial appointment order of the appellants appointing them as Assistant Engineers (Civil) on temporary and ad-hoc basis under the 1983 Rules, nor had they challenged the subsequent order passed by the Government of Arunachal Pradesh on the recommendation of the Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission regularising the services of the appellants as Assistant Engineers from the date of their initial appointment. 28. Not only were these orders were not challenged by the respondent 1 in the writ petition filed by him but the subsequent orders of promotion of these appellants to the post of Executive Engineers and their confirmation in the said post, on the basis of their seniority positions counting the ad-hoc period of service, were also not challenged. These orders are therefore final and binding on all concerned. 29. As noted earlier by us, several seniority lists, although provisional in nature, were published in the meantime, showing that the benefit of ad-hoc period had been given to the appellants. But these were never challenged by the respondent 1 and it was only in the year 2001 when some of them were promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer and one of them to the post of the Chief Engineer that the respondent 1 filed the aforesaid writ petition. 30. The High Court without considering those facts has only dealt with one aspect which is that the initial appointment of the appellants to the post of Assistant Engineer was de hors the Rules. 30. The High Court without considering those facts has only dealt with one aspect which is that the initial appointment of the appellants to the post of Assistant Engineer was de hors the Rules. The said findings recorded by both the Single Judge as also the Division Bench were uncalled for and unjustified for the simple reason that the appointment order itself indicated that their appointment would be governed by the Service Rules then existing, i.e., the 1983 Rules. 31. The fact that their services were regularized from the date of their initial appointment on the recommendation of the Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission was also totally ignored by the High Court. Thus, these facts coupled with the fact that none of the aforesaid orders were challenged by the respondent no.1, would indicate that the said orders are final and binding on all the persons concerned. The High Court ignored the fact that the respondent no. 1 himself was bound by the aforesaid orders. The respondent no.1 was bound by his own appointment orders. 33. Considering the said fact and also considering the precedents in the Department that all such employees were regularized from the date of their initial appointment, the Government of Arunachal Pradesh also regularized the services of the appellants in the post of Assistant Engineer from the date of their initial appointment and that was done on the recommendation of the Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission. The order of regularization having become final and binding on all concerned could not have been ignored and implicitly set aside by the High Court on a ground that the initial appointment of the appellants was de hors the Rules, which is totally a non-existent ground.” 26. In the case of Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia & Others (supra), the Supreme Court held that even if an order is void it requires to be declared so by a competent forum and it is not possible for any person to ignore the same merely because in his opinion the order is void. 27. In the case of Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia & Others (supra), the Supreme Court held that even if an order is void it requires to be declared so by a competent forum and it is not possible for any person to ignore the same merely because in his opinion the order is void. 27. In the case of Amina Marwa Sabreen (A Minor) & Others (supra), the Supreme Court has held that when there is no prayer in the writ petition seeking quashing of the Government order and no attempt has been made by the petitioner to amend the writ petition to incorporate and challenge the Government order despite the State having pointed out the fundamental infirmity, it is not permissible for the petitioner to seek relief only by making oral submission on the issue. 28. In the case of Mukul Saikia & Ors. -versus-State of Assam & Ors., reported in 2007(1) GLT 96, a Division Bench of this Court has held as follows; “15. The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioners that the private respondents, were illegally regularized though they were not selected by the APSC and their names do not appear in the select list dated 17.07.2007 has been rejected by the learned Single Judge on the ground that neither the policy decision of the Government nor the subsequent notification regularizing the services of the private respondents has been challenged by the petitioners in the writ petition. The appellants/writ petitioners in the writ petition has challenged only the Cabinet Memorandum dated 16.06.2000 without even bothering to challenge the policy decision of the Government to regularize the services of such respondents and also the notification regularizing their services. The appellants even in the appellate stage did not pray for amendment of the writ petition challenging the said policy decision as well as the notification even though the learned Single Judge has refused to go into the said question in the absence of any challenge in that regard. That being the position the learned Single Judge has rightly refused to entertain such contention in the absence of any challenge to the said policy decision as well as the notification regularizing the service of the private respondents. Hence we are unable to go into the question of legality or otherwise of the said decision in the absence of challenge to such policy decision and the notification. 16. Hence we are unable to go into the question of legality or otherwise of the said decision in the absence of challenge to such policy decision and the notification. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. The writ appeals are therefore dismissed being devoid of any merit.” 29. In the case of Er. Fineson Pojar & Others (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has held that even if it is assumed that the regularization order is an illegal order the same remains valid till it is cancelled or modified by the competent authority or set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. The contractual appointment and the regularization of such persons having not been challenged, such persons have to be accordingly considered to be members of the service and governed by the rules. 30. The cases relied upon by the appellants to claim seniority over the respondents on the ground that the respondents were not appointed in terms of the rules is distinguishable on the facts and circumstances of the case. 31. The case of State of U.P. -versus-Rafiquddin & Others (supra), on which the learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance is distinguishable from the present case. In Rafiquddin, the case related to determination of seniority of munisffs who were appointed in the competitive exam held in the year 1970 and 1972 under the Uttar Pradesh Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Rules, 1951. The successful candidates of the 1970 exam were appointed in two batches, the first on 25/10/1971 and the second by different notification between May, 1972 and June, 1973. A subsequent examination was held in the year 1972 and the 150 (one hundred and fifty) successful candidates were appointed to service in between the year 1975 and 1977. Some of the unsuccessful candidates of the 1970 exam hereafter referred to as the “UNPLACED CANDIDATES” were subsequently appointed by the State Government with the approval of the High Court by issuing the notification dated 19/08/1975. In March, 1977, the State published the seniority list of the successful candidates of the competitive exam held in the year 1970. Some of the unsuccessful candidates of the 1970 exam hereafter referred to as the “UNPLACED CANDIDATES” were subsequently appointed by the State Government with the approval of the High Court by issuing the notification dated 19/08/1975. In March, 1977, the State published the seniority list of the successful candidates of the competitive exam held in the year 1970. The unplaced candidates made a representation contending that as they were recruited in service pursuant to the 1970 examination they were entitled to the seniority as candidates belonging to the examination held in 1970 irrespective of their appointment being made in the year 1975. The unplaced candidates also claimed seniority to those recruited pursuant to the 1972 examination as well as those appointed consequent to the 1970 examination who had secured lower marks in the aggregate to the unplaced candidates. Their representation was rejected by the State on the ground that being unsuccessful in the competitive examination of 1970 the unplaced candidates were not entitled to the seniority of the year 1970 as that of the successful candidates. The unplaced candidates approached the High Court of Allahabad and the Division Bench allowed the writ petition on finding that the unplaced candidates were appointed in service on the basis of the result of the 1970 examination. The State preferred the appeal. It is in the facts and circumstances narrated above that the Supreme Court held that the unplaced candidates were appointed to the service in breach of the rules and they formed a separate class. They therefore, cannot be equated with those who were appointed to service from the 1970 examination on the recommendation of PSC nor can the unplaced candidates claimed seniority to those who were appointed on the basis of the competitive exam of 1972. The Supreme Court thus assigned the seniority of the unplaced candidates below the last candidates of the 1972 exam i.e. at the bottom of the list of the 1972 candidates. In the present case, the question for adjudication before the court is whether the appellants who were not even borne in the cadre when the respondents were brought into the regular cadre by absorption and/or regularization in service can claim seniority over the private respondents without even challenging the notifications by which the respondents were absorbed and/or regularized in service and even before the publication of the final seniority list by the department. The issue raised in the present case being entirely different from the facts of Rafiquddin’s case, the said case is not applicable to the present case. 32. The case of Monya Taipodia & Others -versus-State of Arunachal Pradesh & Others (supra), relied by the learned counsel for the appellant is also distinguishable from the present case. In Monya Taipodia case the Recruitment Rules of 1973 provided for appointment of graduate teachers and also senior (post graduate) teachers. The private appellants were appointed to the post of senior (post graduate) teachers on contractual basis for two years with the clear indication that their appointments would not be declared permanent. However, following a Cabinet decision and the recommendation of the DPC, the contractual service of the senior (post graduate) were regularized. The writ petitioners who had been working as senior (post graduate) teachers since 19/08/2005 filed the writ petition assailing the order dated 26/05/2004 and 05/02/2004 by which the contractual appointment of the post graduate teachers were regularized and also the order dated 11/11/2008 by which the respondent No. 4 & 5 were promoted as Headmaster/Vice-Principal. It is in this facts and circumstances of the case that the Division Bench of this Court held that it would not be proper to belatedly interfere with the regularization of the contractual employees and it would be in the fitness of things in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case to make the regularized employee rank junior to the writ petitioner in the gradation list of the post of graduate teacher. The petitioners’ in Monya Taipodia case had challenged the orders regularizing the service of the private appellants as well as the order of promotion which is not so in the present case. 33. The case of M. Nakro -versus-State of Nagaland & Others (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is also distinguishable. In M. Nakro case, the writ petitioner were appointed as the Sub-Divisional Officer (Electrical) as direct recruits in the power department through a selection process during the period 25/01/1994 to 16/03/2005. The respondent No.6 (present appellant) was recommended for appointment to the post of Lecturer by the NPSC and was thereafter appointed as Electrical Engineer Class-II (Gazetted) in Khelhoshe Polytechnic Atoizu on 16/10/1993. By the order dated 15/12/1998, the respondent No. 6 was appointed as SDO (Electrical) on deputation in the power department. The respondent No.6 (present appellant) was recommended for appointment to the post of Lecturer by the NPSC and was thereafter appointed as Electrical Engineer Class-II (Gazetted) in Khelhoshe Polytechnic Atoizu on 16/10/1993. By the order dated 15/12/1998, the respondent No. 6 was appointed as SDO (Electrical) on deputation in the power department. Thereafter, by notification dated 29/09/2005, the respondent No. 6 was absorbed as SDO (Electrical) in the power department and his seniority in the grade of SDO was counted w.e.f. the date of the Cabinet decision i.e. 15/09/2005. Thereafter, by another notification dated 07/12/2005, the seniority of the respondent No. 6 was made to be counted from 06/10/1993 i.e. the date of his appointment as the Lecturer in his parent department. Since by granting retrospective seniority to the respondent No. 6, the present writ petitioners/respondents became junior to the appellants, the writ petition was filed by the direct recruit SDO challenging the notification dated 29/09/2005 by which the appellant was absorbed in the post of SDO (Electrical) and the notification dated 07/12/2005 by which the respondent No. 6 was granted retrospective seniority w.e.f. 06/10/1993 in the absorbed post. The learned Single Judge while not interfering with the notification dated 29/09/2005 set aside the subsequent notification dated 07/12/2005. Being aggrieved, the appellant/respondent No. 6 filed the appeal. The Division Bench of this Court in the facts and circumstances of that case came to a finding that when the appointment is found to be irregular and the court having regard to the long period of service put in by the irregular appointees may not set aside the appointment yet it shall ordinarily make the irregular appointee rank junior to the regular appointee particularly when the regular and the irregular appointees had not come to be selected through the same selection process. It was further observed that in a situation such as the present one even if the Court, on account of the peculiarity of the case chooses not to interfere with the permanent absorption of the appellant, the appellant should not be allowed to reap the benefit of seniority with retrospective effect on the strength of the impugned notification dated 17/12/2005. The present case is not one where retrospective seniority is extended to the respondents from the date they were brought on deputation or from the date they were appointed on contract basis. The present case is not one where retrospective seniority is extended to the respondents from the date they were brought on deputation or from the date they were appointed on contract basis. Their seniority is counted only with effect from the date they were absorbed and/or regularized in service by the department consequent to the Cabinet decision. Moreover, the appellants who were not even borne in the cadre when the respondents were absorbed and/or regularized in service are claiming seniority over the respondents without even bothering to impugned the notification by which the respondents were absorbed and/or regularized. More so, the final inter-se seniority between the appellants and the respondents is yet to be published by the department. The facts in M. Nakro case can thus be differentiated and cannot be applied to the present case. 34. In Nagaland Public Service Commission -versus-C.N Moe & Others (supra), relied upon by the appellant, the writ petitioners were appointed to the post of Lower Division Assistant (LDA) by direct recruitment by the order dated 18/05/2011 as per the Nagaland Public Service Commission (Chairman, Members & Staff) Regulation, 2008. The private respondents were on the other hand initially appointed as LDA on temporary/contract basis in the year 2010 and 2011 sans any selection process and were regularized in the said post in the year 2011 a few days prior to the appointment of the writ petitioners. The writ petition was filed by the petitioners challenging the regularization in service of the respondents and also the final seniority list of gazette officers and staffs of the NPSC as on 01/01/2014 issued vide O.M dated 15/11/2017 in which, in the grade of LDA, the petitioners were placed below the respondents. The learned Single Judge came to a finding that the initial appointment and regularization of the private respondents as LDA was void ab-initiohowever as there was no prayer for removal of the private respondents from their service, no direction was issued for removal of the private respondents from service. The NPSC was however directed to modify the final seniority list issued vide O.M dated 15/11/2017 by placing the petitioners immediately above the private respondents. The NPSC was however directed to modify the final seniority list issued vide O.M dated 15/11/2017 by placing the petitioners immediately above the private respondents. The appeal preferred by the NPSC was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court holding that the regularization of the private respondents was illegal and therefore the respondents cannot be made senior to the writ petitioners in the post of LDA. The seniority of the respondents was therefore, directed to be counted from a date after 18/05/2011. The facts in C.N Moe case is distinguishable, as in the present case, the appellants are only claiming seniority over the respondents without even challenging the initial appointment of the respondents nor the notifications by which the respondents were absorbed and/or regularized in service. Moreover, unlike in C.N Moe case, no final seniority list has been published in the present case. 35. The law is well settled that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and the other is not enough, because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In the case of Union of India & Another -versus-Arulmozhi Iniarasu & Others, reported in (2011) 7 SCC 397 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows; “14. Before examining the first limb of the question, formulated above, it would be instructive to note, as a preface, the well settled principle of law in the matter of applying precedents that the Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the fact situation of the case before it fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of Statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper because one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. (Ref. Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani; Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV) v.. State of Maharashtra and Bhuwalka Steel Industries Ltd. v. Bombay Iron & Steel Labour Board.) 36. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper because one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. (Ref. Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani; Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV) v.. State of Maharashtra and Bhuwalka Steel Industries Ltd. v. Bombay Iron & Steel Labour Board.) 36. In view of our discussions above, we are of the considered view that the case laws relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is not applicable to the facts of the present case. We are in agreement with the finding of the learned Single Judge that without laying a challenge to the notification absorbing and/or regularizing the service of the private respondents the consequential tentative seniority list alone cannot be challenged. 37. It is also a settled law that an employee cannot be granted seniority prior to his birth in the cadre adversely affecting the seniority of others who had been appointed prior to him. The latecomers to the regular streams cannot steal a march over the early arrivals in the regular queue and seniority amongst members of the same grade must be counted from the date of their initial entry into the grade. In the instant case, the seniority inter-se amongst the appellants and the private respondents has to be counted from the date they were borne in the cadre. The appellants were appointed to the post of BDO on 04/07/2013, 05/09/2013 & 31/01/2014 respectively, while the private respondents were appointed to the said post and its equivalent by notification dated 12/12/2012 by absorption and regularization. The absorption and regularization of service of the private respondents having not been assailed the same has attained finality and the appellants at this juncture cannot turn around and claimed seniority over the respondents to unsettle the settled seniority position. In Roshan Lal -versus-International Airport Authority of India (supra), the Supreme Court has held that in the absence of challenge to the appointment order and inordinate delay in challenging the same, the validity of the consequential seniority cannot be examined. The appellants were under a legal obligation to challenge the notifications absorbing and/or regularizing the service of the private respondents and only if the same was found to be wrong the consequential seniority could have been examined. The appellants were under a legal obligation to challenge the notifications absorbing and/or regularizing the service of the private respondents and only if the same was found to be wrong the consequential seniority could have been examined. There being no challenge to such notifications the absorption and regularization of the private respondents in the regular service of the department has become final and the appellants cannot now be permitted to raise the question of inter-se seniority. 38. Another issue which arises for the consideration of this Court is whether the Memorandum dated 23/04/2018 issued by the department publishing the tentative seniority list of the Officers in the grade of BDO/RDO/APO as on 31/03/2018 can be taken as final. The learned Single Judge in the judgment & order dated 08/04/2022 while considering the grievance expressed by the writ petitioners to Item No. 44 of the Meeting Minutes dated 16/10/2018 which was in relation to the claim of seniority raised by the petitioner, by referring to the said Meeting Minutes, had observed that since Item No. 44 and also the rest of the items was to be circulated to all concerned within a time frame for further examination and necessary action, Item No. 44 could not be said to be conclusive and considered to be a decision taken by the Government. This Court accordingly concurs with the findings of the learned Single Judge that the recommendation of the committee cannot be said to be conclusive. We therefore, hold that the Memorandum dated 23/04/2018 publishing the tentative seniority list of officers as on 31/03/2018 which is impugned in the writ petition is only premature and not final. 39. In the State of Orissa & Others -versus-Mesco Steels Limited & Another, reported in (2013) 4 SCC 340 , the Supreme Court while deciding the question as to whether the writ petition filed by the respondents was premature, the same having been filed against an inter departmental communication that did not finally determine any rights or obligation of the parties held that; “19. It is obvious from a conjoint reading of letter dated 12-01-2006 and communication dated 19-09-2006 sent by the Director of Mines in response thereto that a final decision on the subject had yet to be taken by the Government, no matter the Government may have provisionally decided to follow the line of action indicated in its communication dated 12-01-2006 issued under the signature of the Joint Secretary, Department of Steel and Mines. It is noteworthy that there was no challenge to the communication dated 12-01-2006 before the High Court nor was any material placed before us to suggest that any final decision was ever taken by the Government on the question of deduction of the area granted in favour of the respondent so as to render the process of issue of show cause notice for hearing the respondent company an exercise in futility. 20. On the contrary, the issue of the show cause notice setting out the reasons that impelled the Government to claim resumption of a part of the proposed lease area from the respondent company clearly suggested that the entire process leading up to the issue of the show cause notice was tentative and no final decision on the subject had been taken at any level. It is only after the Government provisionally decided to resume the area in part or full that a show cause notice could have been issued. To put the matter beyond any pale of controversy, Mr. Lalit made an unequivocal statement at the bar on behalf of the State Government that no final decision regarding resumption of any part of the lease area has been taken by the State Government so far and all that had transpired till date must necessarily be taken as provisional. Such being the case the High Court was in error in proceeding on an assumption that a final decision had been taken and in quashing what was no more than an interdepartmental communication constituting at best a step in the process of taking a final decision by the Government. The writ petition in that view was pre-mature and ought to have been disposed of as such. Our answer to question No.1 is accordingly in the affirmative.” 40. The writ petition in that view was pre-mature and ought to have been disposed of as such. Our answer to question No.1 is accordingly in the affirmative.” 40. The appellants in the writ petition has also impugned the Office note dated 16/04/2018 conveying the views of the P&AR department that the seniority of the contract appointees as well as those in deputation service shall be counted from the date of regularization and/or absorption in service. However, no final decision has been taken by the competent authority on the views taken by the P&AR department by publishing the final seniority list of the officers in the department. It is therefore, not permissible for the appellants to impugned the Office note dated 16/04/2018 as if it is an ultimate decision taken by the competent authority for fixing the inter-se-final seniority between the appellants and the respondents. It is settled that the Office note dated 16/04/2018 cannot have the sanction of law as an effective order. An order will be deemed to be a valid order passed by the Government only when it is issued by the competent authority and publicized. We are also surprise as to how the appellants could have managed to have custody of the Office note dated 16/04/2018 when the note itself is not meant for outside exposure. No legal right therefore accrues to the appellants to challenge the Office note dated 16/04/2018. In Sethi Auto Service Station & Another -versus-Delhi Development Authority & Others (supra), the Supreme Court has held that; “14. It is trite to state that notings in a departmental file do not have the sanction of law to be an effective order. A noting by an officer is an expression of his viewpoint on the subject. It is no more than an opinion by an officer for internal use and consideration of the other officials of the department and for the benefit of the final decision-making authority. Needless to add that internal notings are not meant for outside exposure. Notings in the file culminate into an executable order, affecting the rights of the parties, only when it reaches the final decision-making authority in the department, gets his approval and the final order is communicated to the person concerned. 15. In Bachhittar Singh Vs. Needless to add that internal notings are not meant for outside exposure. Notings in the file culminate into an executable order, affecting the rights of the parties, only when it reaches the final decision-making authority in the department, gets his approval and the final order is communicated to the person concerned. 15. In Bachhittar Singh Vs. The State of Punjab, a Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion to consider the effect of an order passed by a Minister on a file, which order was not communicated to the person concerned. Referring to the Article 166(1) of the Constitution, the Court held that order of the Minister could not amount to an order by the State Government unless it was expressed in the name of the Rajpramukh, as required by the said Article and was then communicated to the party concerned. The court observed that business of State is a complicated one and has necessarily to be conducted through the agency of a large number of officials and authorities. Before an action is taken by the authority concerned in the name of the Rajpramukh, which formality is a constitutional necessity, nothing done would amount to an order creating rights or casting liabilities to third parties. It is possible, observed the Court, that after expressing one opinion about a particular matter at a particular stage a Minister or the Council of Ministers may express quite a different opinion which may be opposed to the earlier opinion. In such cases, which of the two opinions can be regarded as the "order" of the State Government? It was held that opinion becomes a decision of the Government only when it is communicated to the person concerned.” 41. We are conscious that the present appeal being an intra court appeal, unless the view express by the learned Single Judge is wholly unreasonable or perverse, the appellate court would be loath to substitute the view taken by the learned Single Judge merely on the ground that another view is plausible. In the present case, the learned Single Judge has painstakingly deliberated and decided on the issues raised before it by the parties and has assigned cogent and justifiable grounds to come to the conclusion. In the present case, the learned Single Judge has painstakingly deliberated and decided on the issues raised before it by the parties and has assigned cogent and justifiable grounds to come to the conclusion. In the case of N. Ramachandra Reddy -versus-State of Telangana & Others (supra), the Supreme Court while considering the scope of intra court appeal has held that unless the Appellate Bench conclude that the findings of the learned Single Judge are perverse, it shall not disturb the same. 42. In view of the discussions above and taking into consideration all attending facts and circumstances, we find no infirmity with the judgment & order dated 08/04/2022 passed in W.P.(C) No. 213/2018 by the learned Single Judge. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed. 43. No order as to cost.